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Conventional	  and	  unconventional	  gas	  Generally	  speaking,	  conventional	  natural	  gas	  is	  gas	  extracted	  from	  discrete,	  well-­‐defined	  reservoirs	  and	  can	  usually	  be	  developed	  using	  only	  vertical	  wells,	  with	  recovery	  rates	  of	  over	  80%	  of	  the	  original	  gas	  in	  place.	  	  Unconventional	   natural	   gas	   resources	   are	   generally	   found	   in	   less	   permeable	   rock	  formations,	  where	  resource	  accumulations	  may	  be	  distributed	  over	  a	  much	  larger	  area	  than	  conventional	  gas.	  Unconventional	  gas	  resources	  typically	  require	  well-­‐stimulation	  measures	   in	  order	   to	  be	  made	  productive,	  but	   recovery	   rates	  are	  much	   lower	   than	   in	  conventional	  gas	  –	  typically	  of	  the	  order	  of	  15-­‐30%	  of	  original	  gas	  in	  place.	  There	   are	   three	  main	   types	   of	   unconventional	   natural	   gas	   produced	   today,	  which	   are	  considered	  in	  this	  report:	  
• Tight	   gas:	   this	   is	   natural	   gas	   trapped	   in	   relatively	   impermeable	   hard	   rock,	  limestone	  or	  sandstone;	  
• Coal-­‐bed	  methane	  (CBM):	  this	  is	  natural	  gas	  trapped	  in	  coal	  seams,	  adsorbed	  in	  the	  solid	  matrix	  of	  the	  coal;	  and	  
• Shale	   gas:	   this	   is	   natural	   gas	   trapped	   in	   fine-­‐grained	   sedimentary	   rock	   called	  shale	  that	  has	  a	  characteristic	  ‘flaky’	  quality.	  
Objectives,	  scope	  and	  limitations	  The	  objective	  of	  this	  report	   is	  to	  investigate	  the	  impact	  of	  unconventional	  gas,	  notably	  shale	  gas,	  on	  EU	  energy	  markets.	  This	  report	  seeks	  to	  clarify	  certain	  controversies	  and	  identify	  key	  gaps	  in	  the	  evidence-­‐base	  relating	  to	  unconventional	  gas.	  The	  scope	  of	  this	  report	  is	  restricted	  to	  the	  economic	  impact	  of	  unconventional	  gas	  on	  energy	  markets.	  As	  such,	   it	   principally	   addresses	   such	   issues	   as	   the	   energy	   mix,	   energy	   prices,	   supplies,	  consumption,	   and	   trade	   flows.	   But	   it	   also	   covers	   resource	   estimates	   and	   the	  advancement	  of	  technologies	  for	  shale	  gas	  extraction.	  	  Whilst	  this	  study	  touches	  on	  coal-­‐bed	  methane	  and	  tight	  gas,	  its	  predominant	  focus	  is	  on	  shale	  gas,	  which	  the	  evidence	  at	  this	  time	  suggests	  will	  be	  the	  form	  of	  unconventional	  gas	  with	  the	  most	  growth	  potential	  in	  the	  short	  to	  medium	  term.	  This	   report	   considers	   the	  prospects	   for	   the	   indigenous	  production	  of	   shale	  gas	  within	  the	  EU’s	  27	  Member	  States.	   It	   evaluates	   the	  available	  evidence	  on	  unconventional	  gas	  resource	   size,	   extraction	   technology	   (past	   and	   possible	   future),	   resource	   access	   and	  market	  access.	  This	  report	  also	  considers	  the	  implications	  for	  the	  EU	  of	  large-­‐scale	  unconventional	  gas	  production	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  world.	  This	  acknowledges	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  changes	  in	  the	  dynamics	  of	   energy	   supply	   can	  only	  be	  understood	   in	   the	  broader	   global	   context.	  Specifically,	   it	   reviews	  effects	  of	   the	  rapid	  development	  of	  shale	  gas	  production	   in	   the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  (USA)	  and	  its	  effect	  on	  European	  gas	  markets,	  in	  combination	  with	  a	  growing	  liquefied	  natural	  gas	  (LNG)	  trade	  worldwide.	  An	  energy	  model	  is	  used	  to	  elaborate	   possible	   future	   scenarios	   that	   illustrate	   the	   potential	   impact	   of	  unconventional	  gas	  on	  the	  European	  energy	  system.	  
Methodology	  This	  report	  consists	  of	  two	  main	  components,	  namely:	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• A	  close	  examination	  of	   the	  unconventional	  gas	   literature	   covering	  both	  Europe	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world.	  	  
• Energy	   system	   modelling	   of	   possible	   scenarios	   of	   future	   global	   shale	   gas	  development	   that	   illustrate	   the	   conditions	   under	   which	   shale	   gas	   might	   be	  integrated	  into	  the	  energy	  system	  in	  the	  coming	  30	  years.	  	  Mindful	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  unconventional	  gas	  knowledge-­‐base	  is	  highly	  polarised	  and	  currently	  incomplete,	  this	  report	  identifies	  and	  describes	  select	  points	  of	  controversy	  in	  the	  literature	  that	  may	  have	  a	  bearing	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  unconventional	  gas	  in	  Europe.	  It	  then	   assesses	   the	   existing	   evidence	   around	   these	   points	   and	   evaluates	   the	   degree	   of	  uncertainty	  that	  currently	  exists.	  	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  report	  draws	  upon	  a	  range	  of	  techniques	  referred	  to	  as	  evidence-­‐based	  
policy	  and	  practice	   that	  aims	  at	  giving	  greater	  weight	  to	  scientific	  research	  evidence	  in	  policy-­‐making.	   Specifically,	   as	   in	   this	   report,	   it	   includes	   the	   synthesis	   of	   existing	  evidence	  through	  a	  process	  known	  as	  a	  systematic	  review.	  	  Simulations	  in	  this	  report	  are	  based	  on	  ETSAP-­‐TIAM,	  a	  multiregional	  partial	  equilibrium	  model	  of	  the	  energy	  systems	  of	  the	  entire	  world	  that	  is	  divided	  into	  15	  regions.	  ETSAP-­‐TIAM	   is	   developed	   and	   maintained	   by	   the	   Energy	   Technology	   Systems	   Analysis	  Programme	  under	  the	  aegis	  of	  the	  IEA.	  
Remarks	  Regarding	  regional	  and	  global	  estimates	  of	  unconventional	  gas:	  
• There	   are	   multiple	   and	   substantial	   uncertainties	   in	   assessing	   the	   recoverable	  volumes	   of	   shale	   gas,	   both	   at	   regional	   and	   global	   level.	   Even	   in	   areas	   where	  production	   is	   currently	   taking	   place,	   notably	   North	   America,	   there	   remains	  significant	   uncertainty	   over	   the	   size	   of	   the	   resource	   and	   considerable	   variation	   in	  the	  available	  estimates.	  For	  several	  regions	  of	  the	  world	  there	  are	  no	  estimates	  at	  all,	  but	   some	  may	  well	   contain	   significant	   resources.	   Given	   the	   absence	   of	   production	  experience	   in	   most	   regions	   of	   the	   world	   and	   the	   number	   and	   magnitude	   of	  uncertainties	   described	   below,	   current	   resource	   estimates	   should	   be	   treated	  with	  considerable	  caution.	  	  
• Based	   on	   an	   assessment	   of	   the	   existing	   literature,	   this	   report	   expresses	   the	  estimates	  of	  unconventional	  gas	  as	   technically	   recoverable	   resources	   (TRR).	  While	  resource	   estimates	   based	   on	   production	   experience	   are	   likely	   to	   be	  more	   robust,	  with	   very	   limited	   production	   experience	   it	   is	   more	   appropriate	   to	   incorporate	  estimates	   from	   studies	   that	   use	   a	   range	   of	   methodologies	   (expert	   judgement;	  literature	  review;	  bottom-­‐up	  assessment	  of	  geological	  parameters	  and	  extrapolation	  of	  production	  experience).	  Thus,	  this	  report	  focuses	  on	  TRR	  and	  takes	  no	  account	  of	  economic	   viability	   or	   any	   other	   constraints	   on	   resource	   recovery.	   The	   review	   is	  focused	  on	  literature	  with	  original	  estimates	  of	  unconventional	  gas	  and	  provides	  an	  overview	   of	   current	   estimates	   of	   TRR	   for	   tight	   gas	   and	   coal-­‐bed	  methane	   in	   four	  regions	  (USA,	  Canada,	  Europe	  and	  China)	  as	  well	  as	  globally.	  An	  estimate	  is	  given	  for	  shale	  gas	  for	  15	  regions	  worldwide.	  	  
• Current	  estimates	  for	  the	  TRR	  of	  shale	  gas	  suggest	  there	  may	  be	  just	  above	  over	  200	  trillion	  cubic	  metres	  (Tcm)	  globally.	  Similarly,	  the	  mean	  of	  current	  estimates	  for	  the	  global	   TRR	   of	   tight	   gas	   is	   45	   Tcm	   and	   the	  mean	   estimate	   of	   CBM	   is	   25	   Tcm.	   For	  comparison,	   the	   global	  TRR	  of	   conventional	   gas	   is	   estimated	   at	  425	  Tcm	  of	  which	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around	  190	  Tcm	  are	  currently	  classified	  as	  proved	  reserves	  (i.e.	  resources	  that	  can	  be	  easily	  recovered	  with	  the	  highest	  degree	  of	  confidence).	  
• For	   some	   regions,	   it	   was	   possible	   to	   obtain	   high,	   best	   and	   low	   TRR	   estimates	   for	  shale	  gas.	  In	  the	  USA,	  the	  high/best/low	  estimates	  are	  47/20/13	  Tcm	  and	  for	  China	  the	   estimates	   are	   40/21/1.6	   Tcm.	   As	   an	   illustration	   of	   the	   uncertainty	   in	   the	  estimates,	   the	   high	   and	   low	   estimates	   in	   the	   USA	   are	   230%	   and	   64%	   of	   the	   best	  estimate	   respectively.	  There	   is	   even	  greater	  uncertainty	   in	   the	  unconventional	   gas	  resource	   estimates	   for	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   world.	   Organisations	   that	   have	   provided	  multiple	   estimates	   for	   single	   regions	   have	   consistently,	   and	   often	   significantly,	  increased	  their	  estimates	  over	  time.	  The	  best	  estimate	  for	  Western	  Europe	  is	  12	  Tcm	  and	  for	  Eastern	  Europe	  it	  is	  4Tcm.	  
• The	  variability	  and	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  reviewed	  estimates	  have	  a	  variety	  of	  sources.	  Studies	   use	   different	   methodologies	   for	   the	   resource	   estimates,	   often	   using	  imprecise	   or	   ambiguous	   terminology.	   For	   estimates	   based	   upon	   geological	  appraisals,	  significant	  source	  of	  uncertainty	  stems	  from	  the	  assumed	  recovery	  factor	  –	  the	  fraction	  of	  the	  original	  gas	  in	  place	  that	  is	  estimated	  to	  be	  recoverable	  –	  which	  may	   vary	   substantially	   (15-­‐40%)	   for	   shale	   gas.	   For	   estimates	   based	   upon	   the	  extrapolation	   of	   production	   experience,	   a	   key	   source	   of	   uncertainty	   is	   the	  appropriate	   application	   of	   ‘decline	   curve	   analysis’,	   with	   no	   consensus	   on	   how	  quickly	  the	  rate	  of	  production	  from	  currently	  producing	  wells	  will	  slow	  in	  the	  future.	  Future	   technological	  progress,	   even	   if	   only	   leading	   to	   a	   small	   increase	   in	   recovery	  factors,	   could	   have	   a	   significant	   impact	   on	   the	   estimated	   ultimately	   recoverable	  resources.	  	  Regarding	  technological	  development:	  
• The	  successful	  development	  of	  shale	  gas	  in	  the	  last	  decade	  is	  due	  to	  the	  combination	  of	  progress	  in	  two	  key	  technologies,	  namely	  horizontal	  (or	  directional)	  drilling	  and	  hydraulic	   fracturing.	   Progress	   has	   also	   been	   made	   in	   other	   stages	   of	   shale	   gas	  exploration	   and	   production,	   from	   well	   pad	   design,	   to	   water	   management	   and	  infrastructure	  planning,	  to	  microseismic	  monitoring.	  
• Environmental	  concerns	  have	  accompanied	  the	  growth	  in	  shale	  gas	  exploration	  and	  production.	  Some	  significant	  risks	  can	  have	  similar	  causes	  to	  those	  associated	  with	  conventional	   onshore	   gas.	   These	   include:	   gas	   migration	   and	   groundwater	  contamination	   due	   for	   instance	   to	   faulty	   well	   construction;	   blowouts;	   and	   above	  ground	   leaks	   and	   spills	   of	   wastewater	   and	   chemicals.	   Significant	   risks	   that	   arise	  from	   shale	   gas	   development	   require	   additional	   consideration	   and	   dedicated	  analysis.	   Factors	   to	   take	   into	   account	   include,	   for	   example,	   the	   larger	   number	   of	  wells	  when	  compared	  to	  conventional	  practices,	  and	  the	  high	  volume	  of	  water	  and	  fracturing	  fluids	  used.	  
• As	  the	  horizontal	  section	  of	  wells	  gets	  longer,	  multi-­‐stage	  hydraulic	  fracturing	  with	  10	   to	   20	   stages	   per	   well	   has	   developed.	   Further	   improved	   understanding	   of	   the	  fracturing	   process	   may	   improve	   precision;	   improve	   the	   network	   of	   fractures	  created;	  reduce	  the	  number	  of	  fracturing	  stages	  per	  well;	  reduce	  the	  time	  needed	  to	  drill	   and	   fracture;	   and	   reduce	   the	   consumption	   of	   water.	   Such	   improvement	  may	  lead	   to	   a	   significant	   reduction	   in	   fracturing	   cost.	   Advancements	   in	   microseismic	  monitoring	  allow	  for	  the	  mapping	  and	  visualisation	  of	  how	  fracturing	  is	  progressing.	  It	  also	  provides	  information	  for	  the	  early	  detection	  of	  geo-­‐hazards.	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• Alternative	   fracturing	   fluids	   are	   being	   researched	   to	   allow	   the	   use	   of	   non-­‐fresh	  water	   and	   flowback	  water.	  Water	   treatment	   processes	   are	   being	   investigated	   that	  could	   potentially	   be	   used	   on	   a	   large	   scale,	   with	   the	   ultimate	   goal	   of	   achieving	   a	  closed-­‐loop	  system.	  	  
• Multiple	   horizontal	   wells	   drilled	   from	   a	   single	   pad	   will	   increase	   the	   operational	  efficiency	   of	   gas	   production	   and	   reduce	   infrastructure	   costs,	   land	   use	   and	  environmental	  impact.	  	  
• A	   larger	   number	   of	   wells	   per	   pad	   and	   longer	   wells	   will	   lead	   to	   a	   corresponding	  increase	  in	  time	  spent	  on	  drilling	  and	  well	  completion	  operations	  on	  each	  well	  pad.	  This	   would	   favour	   a	   new,	   more	   ‘industrialised’	   concept	   for	   site	   and	   rig	   design,	  including	   highly	   automated	   drilling	   rigs	   with	   higher	   efficiency.	   Drilling	   cost	  reduction	   in	   the	   order	   of	   30-­‐60%	   is	   judged	   feasible.	   Additional	   savings	   can	   be	  expected	  from	  the	  specialisation	  of	  well	  design	  and	  well	  construction.	  
• Based	   on	   the	   historical	   development	   of	   the	   different	   components	   making	   up	   the	  process	  of	  exploration	  and	  production	  of	  shale	  gas,	  as	  well	  as	  judgement	  on	  potential	  future	   gains,	   a	   model	   for	   potential	   shale	   gas	   development	   in	   Europe	   is	   outlined,	  covering	   minimum,	   most	   likely	   and	   maximum	   scenarios	   of	   the	   key	   variables	  contributing	  to	  the	  cost	  of	  shale	  gas	  production.	  Regarding	  land	  and	  resource	  access:	  
• There	  is	  a	  tight	   interrelationship	  between	  the	  regulatory,	  environmental,	   technical,	  social	   and	   economic	   challenges	   associated	   with	   land	   access	   for	   shale	   gas	  development.	   A	   series	   of	   obstacles	   to	   accessing	   land	   for	   unconventional	   gas	  development	  have	  been	  revealed:	  water	  management;	  protected	  areas;	  mineral	  right	  and	   royalties;	   surface	   disturbance;	   noise	   and	   visual	   impact;	   community	   impact;	  waste	  management;	  as	  well	  as	   the	  need	   to	  engage	  multiple	  small	   land	  owners	  and	  communities.	  
• Land	   is	   required	   to	   find,	   develop,	   produce	   and	   transport	   gas,	  which	   includes	  well	  pads,	  access	  roads,	  utility	  corridors	  (water	  and	  electricity	   lines,	  etc.),	   space	   for	  gas	  gathering	  lines,	  water	  management	  facilities,	  etc.	  
• It	  has	  become	  common	   to	  use	  a	   single	  pad	   for	  multiple	  horizontal	  wells	   (typically	  four	   to	   eight	  wells	   at	  present	   in	   the	  USA)	   in	  order	   to	  develop	  as	  much	   subsurface	  area	  as	  possible	  from	  one	  spot.	  Such	  pads	  require	  some	  one	  to	  four	  hectares	  of	  land.	  However,	   the	   effective	   surface	   area	   usage	   per	   well	   is	   significantly	   lower	   when	  constructing	  horizontal	  multi-­‐well	  pads.	  	  
• Well	   density	   or	   well	   spacing	   will	   depend	   on	   geological	   and	   other	   factors.	   The	  number	   of	   well	   pads	   per	   square	   mile	   typically	   varies	   from	   16	   for	   single	   vertical	  wells,	  down	  to	  one,	  for	  horizontal	  multi-­‐well	  configurations	  with	  six	  to	  eight	  wells	  on	  each	  pad.	  	  
• In	   addition	   to	   direct	   land	   use,	   there	   are	   disturbances	   caused	   by	   the	   duration	   and	  intensity	  of	  all	  the	  activities	  related	  to	  exploration,	  e.g.	  truck	  trips,	  noise	  levels	  and	  visual	   impacts.	   The	   duration	   of	   activities	   (including	   the	   construction	   of	  well	   pads	  and	  access	  roads,	  drilling,	  well	  completion	  and	  clean	  up)	  depend	  on	  multiple	  factors	  (number	   of	   wells	   per	   pad,	   and	   geological,	   logistical	   and	   regulatory	   factors).	   The	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duration	   of	   the	   complete	   operation	   typically	   vary	   from	   5	   to	   36	   months	   (for	  horizontal	  single	  and	  multi-­‐well	  pads	  respectively).	  	  
• It	   is	  necessary	   to	   consider	   the	  cumulative	   impact	   of	   several	  horizontal	  wells	  being	  drilled	  annually	  over	  a	  longer	  period	  of	  development.	  The	  potential	  impacts	  must	  be	  balanced	  with	   other	   land	  usage,	   such	   as	  wildlife,	   agriculture	   and	   tourism,	   and	   the	  overall	  quality	  of	  life	  in	  a	  community.	  	  Regarding	  the	  regulatory	  framework:	  
• A	   successful	   regulatory	   regime	   governing	   the	   exploitation	   of	   sub-­‐surface	  minerals	  must	  reconcile	   the	  objectives	  of	   three	  main	  sets	  of	  actors:	  governments,	  with	  their	  desire	   to	   maximise	   rents	   while	   achieving	   socioeconomic	   and	   environmental	  objectives;	   market	   players	   and	   their	   desire	   for	   a	   return	   on	   investment	   that	   is	  consistent	  with	  the	  risk	  associated	  with	  the	  project;	  and	  finally,	  the	  needs	  of	  societal	  actors	  to	  preserve	  or	   improve	  welfare	   in	  social,	  monetary	  or	  environmental	  terms.	  Key	   regulatory	   issues	   reported	   can	   be	   categorised	   according	   to	   their	  technical/logistical,	  legal	  and	  socioeconomic	  dimensions.	  	  
• With	   farm	   plots	   smaller	   and	   land	   ownership	   more	   diffuse	   in	   Europe,	   a	   key	  regulatory	   consideration	   is	  how	   to	  manage	  multiple	   landowners	  and	   their	  varying	  claims	  and	  concerns.	  In	  the	  USA,	  this	  is	  addressed	  by	  what	  is	  known	  as	  pooling	  and	  unitisation	  (the	  combination	  of	  several	  small	  tracts	  of	  land	  needed	  to	  support	  a	  well	  or	  well	  pad,	  up	  to	  the	  field-­‐wide	  operation	  of	  a	  producing	  reservoir),	  which	  allow	  for	  managing	   concession	   areas	   fairly	   and	   effectively.	   Such	   an	   approach,	   whereby	   the	  development	   of	   a	   ‘complex’	   of	   multiple	   well	   pads	   is	   managed	   centrally,	   helps	   to	  avoid	   duplication	   of	   infrastructure,	   as	   well	   as	   goods	   and	   service	   procurement.	   It	  speeds	  up	  permitting	  procedures	  and	  reduces	  environmental	  impact.	  
• It	  is	  often	  argued	  that	  because	  the	  landowners	  own	  both	  surface	  and	  mineral	  rights	  in	   the	   USA,	   this	   favours	   shale	   gas	   development	   (financially	   benefitting	   the	  landowner),	  whereas	  because	   the	  sub-­‐surface	  rights	  would	  generally	  be	  owned	  by	  the	  state	  in	  the	  EU,	  landowners	  have	  no	  incentive	  to	  support	  development.	  However,	  the	   situation	   is	   more	   complicated	   in	   both	   the	   USA	   and	   the	   EU,	   as	   well	   as	   being	  variable	  between	  different	  EU	  Member	  States.	  The	  real	  distinction	   is	   the	  degree	   to	  which	  surface	  landowners	  have	  a	  say	  in	  granting	  permission	  to	  develop	  an	  area.	  	  
• In	   the	   USA,	   the	   law	   tends	   to	   favour	   the	   owner	   of	   the	  mineral	   estate,	  whilst	   often	  granting	  the	  right	  to	  compensation	  for	  the	  use	  of	  the	  surface.	  In	  the	  EU,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	   there	   is	   variation	   between	   Member	   States	   in	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   surface	  landowners	  can	  restrict	   the	  development	  of	  shale	  gas.	  France,	   the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  Poland	  all	  have	  different	  regimes	  in	  place.	  Regarding	  market	  access:	  
• There	   are	   two	   principle	   determinants	   of	   whether	   new	   gas	   resources	   are	   able	   to	  reach	   markets:	   1)	   their	   physical	   proximity	   to	   suitable	   gas	   transportation	  infrastructure;	  and	  2)	  the	  regulatory	  structure	  of	  the	  natural	  gas	  market.	  Whilst	  the	  distance	   between	   the	   wellhead	   and	   pipelines	   drives	   up	   the	   capital	   and	   operating	  costs	  required	  to	  deliver	  gas	  to	  consumers,	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  natural	  gas	  market	  has	   important	   implications	   for	   how	   easily	   new	   supplies	   are	   able	   compete	   with	  established	  supplies.	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• The	  US	   and	   EU	   gas	   transportation	   systems	   are	   broadly	   analogous	   in	   terms	   of	   gas	  transmission	   pipeline	   density	   if	   we	   take	   into	   account	   the	   dense	   infrastructure	   in	  certain	   parts	   of	   the	   USA	   that	   is	   the	   legacy	   of	   many	   years	   of	   hydrocarbon	  development.	   There	   are	   53km	  of	   transmission	  pipeline	   for	   every	  1000	  km2	   in	   the	  USA,	  compared	  with	  29km	  in	  the	  EU.	  
• A	   liberalised	   and	   competitive	  market	   formed	   an	   important	   part	   of	   the	   regulatory	  backdrop	   to	   the	  unconventional	   gas	   revolution	   in	   the	  USA.	  The	   increased	   investor	  risk	   in	   this	   liberalised	   market	   has	   not	   prevented	   the	   completion	   of	   major	  infrastructure	  investments	  intended	  to	  bring	  unconventional	  gas	  to	  market.	  This	   is	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  narrower	  profit	  margins	  and	  greater	  uncertainty	  commonly	  ascribed	  to	  unconventional	  gas	  production.	  
• As	   large-­‐scale	   shale	   gas	   production	   has	   so	   far	   not	   been	   observed	   outside	   of	  liberalised	   energy	  markets,	   questions	   remain	   about	  whether	   the	  phenomenon	   can	  be	  replicated	  in	  differently	  structured	  markets	  and,	  if	  so,	  how	  this	  might	  look.	  	  
• Whereas	  the	  USA	  has	  a	  fully	  liberalised	  market	  for	  natural	  gas,	  reforms	  to	  the	  EU’s	  internal	   gas	   market	   are	   still	   ongoing.	   There	   have	   been	   encouraging	   recent	  developments	  indicating	  that	  EU	  market	  liberalisation	  is	  gathering	  pace.	  However,	  a	  recent	   European	   Commission	   report	   on	   market	   progress	   concedes	   that	   ‘a	   truly	  single	  energy	  market	  is	  far	  from	  complete’.	  Questions	  thus	  remain	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  EU’s	   internal	   market	   rules	   can	   be	   practically	   applied	   in	   the	   context	   of	   possible	  unconventional	   gas	   development	   and	   be	   clear,	   non-­‐discriminatory,	   timely	   and	  repeatable	  across	  large	  operations.	  Regarding	  the	  impact	  of	  shale	  gas	  in	  the	  USA:	  
• Unconventional	   gas	   production	   in	   the	   USA	   has	   increased	   markedly	   in	   the	   last	  decade.	   It	   accounted	   for	   58%	  of	   domestic	   production	   in	   2010,	   causing	   the	  USA	   to	  surpass	  Russia	  as	  the	  largest	  gas	  producer	  in	  the	  world.	  Much	  of	  the	  expansion	  has	  been	  due	  to	  shale	  gas,	  which	  accounted	  for	  23%	  of	  total	  US	  natural	  gas	  production	  in	  2010.	   Consequently,	   projections	   for	   future	   US	   production	   have	   been	   continuously	  revised	  upwards.	  
• It	  was	  initially	  expected	  that	  the	  USA	  would	  need	  to	  import	  substantial	  quantities	  of	  LNG,	  which	  led	  to	  massive	  investments	  in	  the	  LNG	  infrastructure	  in	  the	  last	  decade.	  The	  reality,	  however,	  is	  that	  the	  USA	  has	  ended	  up	  requiring	  less	  than	  10%	  out	  of	  its	  current	  150	  bcm	  re-­‐gasification	  capacity.	  Instead	  there	  are	  now	  plans	  to	  add	  export	  capabilities.	  
• Most	  of	  the	  growth	  in	  demand	  for	  gas	  in	  the	  USA	  is	  expected	  to	  occur	  in	  the	  power	  generation	   sector,	   followed	   by	   transportation	   (natural	   gas	   vehicles)	   and	   in	   the	  petrochemical	   industries.	   Gas-­‐fired	   power	   plants	   have	   cost,	   timing	   and	   emission	  advantages	   compared	   to	   coal-­‐fired	   plants,	   and	   incremental	   increases	   in	   gas-­‐fired	  electricity	  capacity	  have	  been	  observed	  since	  2005,	  which	  is	  backed	  up	  by	  reported	  plans	   for	   the	   coming	   years.	   The	   extent	   to	  which	   these	   advantages	   are	   capitalised	  upon	  depends	  partly	  on	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  US	  producers	  decide	  to	  export	  natural	  gas	  via	  LNG.	  	  
• Cost	  estimates	  for	  shale	  gas	  production	  and	  the	  break-­‐even	  price	  that	  is	  necessary	  to	  recoup	   expenditures	   per	   well	   vary	   considerably	   and	   are	   subject	   to	   much	  contestation.	  Break-­‐even	  price	   estimates	   in	   the	  USA	  have	  been	   reduced	   lately	   and	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range	   between	   $3-­‐7/MBtu.	   Estimates	   for	   Europe	   vary	   between	   $5-­‐12/MBtu.	  However,	  the	  production	  of	  natural	  gas	  liquids	  from	  shale	  wells	  is	  reportedly	  having	  a	  significantly	  positive	  effect	  on	  shale	  well	  economics	  in	  the	  USA,	  and	  technological	  learning,	  which	  has	   contributed	   to	   reducing	   total	   drilling	   and	   completion	   costs	   by	  half	  in	  the	  last	  five	  years,	  is	  expected	  to	  lower	  costs	  even	  more.	  	  
• Estimates	   of	   future	   natural	   gas	   prices	   in	   both	   the	   USA	   and	   for	   Europe	   have	   been	  repeatedly	   revised	  downwards	   in	   recent	  years,	   supported	  by	   the	   increase	   in	   shale	  gas	  developments.	  The	  spot	  price	  for	  natural	  gas	  in	  the	  USA	  (Henry	  Hub)	  has	  fallen	  from	  a	  peak	  at	  $13/MBtu	  in	  mid-­‐2008	  down	  towards	  $2/MBtu	  in	  2012.	  	  Regarding	  the	  impact	  in	  Europe	  to	  date:	  
• Global	   LNG	   trade	   volumes	   increased	   two-­‐fold	   between	   2000	   and	   2010,	   and	  increasing	  LNG	  liquefaction	  and	  regasification	  capacity	  looks	  set	  to	  continue	  to	  drive	  this	  trend	  for	  the	  foreseeable	  future.	  As	  a	  major	  consumer	  of	  natural	  gas,	  Europe	  is	  robustly	   contributing	   to	   this	   trend:	   the	  EU’s	   current	   regasification	   capacity	  of	   150	  bcm	  looks	  set	  to	  double	  by	  2020.	  
• There	   is	   ample	   evidence	   that	   LNG	   is	   changing	   the	   characteristics	   of	   global	   gas	  markets.	  Whereas	  the	  high	  cost	  of	  transporting	  gas	  had	  previously	  restricted	  trade	  to	  specific	  regions,	  fluctuations	  in	  supply,	  demand	  and	  prices	  are	  increasingly	  being	  transmitted	  throughout	  the	  globe.	  
• Rapidly	   increasing	   LNG	   capacity	   in	   receiving	   terminals	   in	   North-­‐West	   Europe	  strengthened	  the	   link	  between	  UK	  and	  US	  gas	  hub	  prices	  between	  2009	  and	  2010,	  enabling	  many	  EU	  Member	  States	  to	  benefit	  from	  the	  cheap	  spot-­‐traded	  gas	  partially	  resulting	  from	  increased	  unconventional	  gas	  production	  in	  the	  USA.	  US	  net	  imports	  of	  natural	  gas	  fell	  30%	  between	  2007	  and	  2010.	  
• With	   legal	   and	   technical	   barriers	   to	   growing	   volumes	   of	   spot-­‐traded	   gas	  disappearing	   as	   EU	   market	   reforms	   take	   effect,	   the	   sharp	   fall	   in	   spot	   prices	  witnessed	   in	   2009	   and	   2010	   occasioned	   widespread	   dissatisfaction	   amongst	   the	  utilities,	   which	   were	   locked	   into	   buying	   gas	   on	   oil-­‐indexed	   terms	   as	   they	   were	  gradually	  priced	  out	  of	  the	  market.	  Spot	  gas	  prices	  were	  some	  25%	  lower	  than	  oil-­‐indexed	  gas	  during	  this	  period.	  
• The	   close	   correlation	   between	   US	   and	   EU	   gas	   hub	   prices	   came	   to	   an	   end	   around	  April	  2010	  as	  a	  result	  of	  unforeseen	  demand-­‐side	  events,	   including	  the	  Fukushima	  disaster.	  However,	   the	   current	  balance	  of	   expert	  opinion	   suggests	   that	   the	  EU	  will	  continue	  to	  move	  slowly	  away	  from	  oil	   indexation	  because	  of	  the	  persisting	  risk	  of	  future	  exposure	  to	  discount	  hub	  prices.	  Regarding	  potential	  impacts	  on	  the	  global	  energy	  system:	  
• To	   explore	   the	   uncertainty	   surrounding	   the	   reserve	   size	   and	   production	   costs	   of	  shale	   gas,	   a	   scenario	   analysis	   has	   been	   carried	   out	   with	   a	   global	   energy	   system	  model,	  ETSAP-­‐TIAM,	  which	   is	  able	   to	  capture	   the	  complex	  and	   interrelated	   factors	  driving	  future	  gas	  supply	  and	  demand	  developments.	  Some	  preliminary	  conclusions	  as	   to	   what	   can	   be	   expected	   from	   shale	   gas	   development	   are	   summarised	   in	   the	  following	  points.	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• Overall,	   the	   scenario	   analysis	   highlights	   that	   shale	   gas	   does	   have	   the	   potential	   to	  extensively	   impact	   global	   gas	   markets,	   but	   only	   under	   strongly	   optimistic	  assumptions	  about	  its	  production	  costs	  and	  reserves.	  
• In	   a	   scenario	   favourable	   to	   shale	   gas	  development,	  natural	   gas	   as	   a	  whole	  has	   the	  potential	  to	  capture	  30%	  of	  the	  world’s	  total	  primary	  energy	  supply	  by	  2025,	  rising	  further	   to	   35%	   by	   2040.	   This	   would	  make	   it	   surpass	   oil	   as	   the	   world’s	   foremost	  source	  of	  energy.	  	  
• Relative	   to	   a	   scenario	   that	   is	   not	   carbon	   constrained,	   strict	   CO2	   emissions	   targets	  reduce	   the	   production	   of	   natural	   gas,	   including	   shale	   gas.	  However,	   the	   strict	   CO2	  emissions	  targets	  modelled	  do	  not	  preclude	  a	  significant	  absolute	  growth	  in	  natural	  gas	  use.	  The	  modelling	  results	  therefore	  support	  the	  potential	  role	  of	  natural	  gas	  as	  a	  bridge	  fuel.	  
• Shale	  gas	  is	  relatively	  evenly	  dispersed	  around	  the	  world	  and	  the	  majority	  of	  regions	  will	  likely	  witness	  at	  least	  some	  level	  of	  production	  in	  the	  future.	  The	  USA	  and	  China	  are	   well	   placed	   to	   become	   the	   top	   producers	   of	   shale	   gas,	   although	   significant	  production	   also	   takes	   place	   in	   most	   of	   the	   other	   regions.	   The	   scenario	   analysis	  suggests	  that	  shale	  gas	  will	  tend	  to	  be	  used	  within	  the	  regions	  where	  it	  is	  produced.	  No	   single	   region	   will	   produce	   enough	   shale	   gas	   so	   as	   to	   move	   from	   being	   a	   net	  importer	  to	  a	  net	  exporter.	  
• The	   global	   trade	   in	   natural	   gas,	   driven	   by	   conventional	   gas,	   will	   increase	   in	   any	  scenario.	  Shale	  gas	  development,	  however,	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  moderate	  the	  degree	  of	  growth,	  particularly	   for	   interregional	  LNG	   flows.	  Low	  LNG	  costs	  would	  mitigate	  the	  reduction	  in	  trade	  resulting	  from	  widespread	  shale	  gas	  development.	  
• Significant	   shale	   gas	   production	   has	   the	   potential	   to	   lower	   natural	   gas	   prices,	  although	  the	  extent	  of	  this	  reduction	  strongly	  depends	  on	  the	  way	  natural	  gas	  will	  be	  priced	  in	  the	  future.	  In	  particular,	  oil	  indexation	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  reduce	  the	  fall	  in	  gas	  prices	  resulting	  from	  shale	  gas	  development.	  
• The	  degree	  of	  penetration	  of	  gas	  in	  transport	  strongly	  depends	  on	  the	  oil-­‐gas	  price	  link.	   A	   weaker	   link	   implies	   greater	   potential	   for	   shale	   gas	   to	   induce	   a	   significant	  growth	  of	  gas	  use	  in	  transportation.	  
• The	   impact	   on	   demand	   in	   an	   optimistic	   shale	   gas	   scenario	   is	   not	   equal	   across	   all	  regions.	  Much	  depends	  on	  the	  relative	  competitiveness	  of	  fuels	  and	  technologies	  in	  each	  region.	  This	  is	  particularly	  apparent	  for	  electricity	  generation.	  While	  shale	  gas	  can	  induce	  a	  dramatic	  change	  in	  the	  USA’s	  electricity	  generation	  mix,	   its	   impact	  on	  China’s	  mix	  is	  more	  limited.	  
• Shale	   gas	   production	  will	   not	  make	   Europe	   self-­‐sufficient	   in	   natural	   gas.	   The	   best	  case	   scenario	   for	   shale	   gas	   development	   in	   Europe	   is	   one	   in	   which	   declining	  conventional	   production	   can	   be	   replaced	   and	   import	   dependence	  maintained	   at	   a	  level	   around	   60%.	   Regarding	   trade	   flows,	   the	   structure	   of	   EU	   gas	   imports	   is	   very	  sensitive	  to	  the	  LNG	  cost	  assumptions.	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  convention	  to	  MBtu)	  MMcf	  –	  Million	  cubic	  feet	  MSM	  –	  Microseismic	  Mapping	  Mtoe	  –	  Million	  tonnes	  of	  oil	  equivalent	  	  mtpa	  –	  Million-­‐tonne-­‐per-­‐annum	  MWD	  –	  Measurement	  while	  drilling	  MWh	  -­‐	  Megawatt	  hour	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NBP	  –	  National	  Balancing	  Point	  NIMBY	  –	  Not	  in	  my	  backyard	  NGL	  –	  Natural	  gas	  liquid	  NGV	  –	  Natural	  gas-­‐powered	  vehicle	  NPC	  –	  National	  Petroleum	  Council	  NPT	  –	  Non-­‐productive	  time	  NYMEX	  –	  New	  York	  Mercantile	  Exchange	  NYSDEC	  –	  New	  York	  State	  Department	  of	  Environmental	  Conservation	  	  NYSERDA	  –	  New	  York	  State	  Energy	  Research	  and	  Development	  Authority	  OECD	  –	  Organisation	  for	  Economic	  Co-­‐operation	  and	  Development	  OGIP	  –	  Original	  gas	  in	  place	  	  PJ	  –	  Petajoules	  ppm	  –	  Parts	  per	  million	  PPRTVs	  –	  Provisional	  peer-­‐reviewed	  toxicity	  values	  PRMS	  –	  Petroleum	  Resources	  Management	  System	  PT	  –	  Productive	  time	  PV	  –	  Photovoltaic	  RHS	  –	  Right-­‐hand	  side	  RSS	  –	  Rotary	  steerable	  systems	  RTRR	  –	  Remaining	  technically	  recoverable	  resources	  R&D	  –	  Research	  and	  development	  SEC	  –	  US	  Securities	  and	  Exchange	  Commission	  SGEIS	  –	  Supplemental	  Generic	  Environmental	  Impact	  Assessment	  SPE	  –	  Society	  of	  Petroleum	  Engineers	  Tcf	  –	  Trillion	  cubic	  feet	  	  Tcm	  –	  Trillion	  cubic	  metres	  TDS	  –	  Total	  dissolved	  solids	  TPA	  –	  Third	  party	  access	  TRR	  –	  Technically	  recoverable	  resources	  TSO	  –	  Transmission	  system	  operators	  TWh	  –	  Terawatt	  hours	  UK	  –	  United	  Kingdom	  UKERC	  –	  United	  Kingdom	  Energy	  Research	  Centre	  URR	  –	  Ultimately	  recoverable	  resource	  	  USA	  –	  United	  States	  of	  America	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USGS	  –	  United	  States	  Geological	  Survey	  WEC	  –	  World	  Energy	  Council	  WEO	  –	  World	  Energy	  Outlook	  report	  by	  the	  IEA	  
	  1	  
1 Introduction	  	  	  
I.	  Pearson	  (European	  Commission,	  JRC	  F.3)	  	  
1.1 What	  is	  this	  report	  about?	  This	   report	   investigates	   the	   impact	   of	   unconventional	   gas	   on	   European	   Union	   (EU)	  energy	  markets.	  	  Natural	   gas	   resources	   can	   be	   coarsely	   classified	   as	   being	   either	   conventional	   or	  unconventional.	   Conventional	   gas	   dominates	   worldwide	   production,	   accounting	   for	  over	  85%	  of	   total	  marketed	  output	   today.1	  Generally	  speaking,	  conventional	  gas	   is	  gas	  extracted	  from	  discrete,	  well-­‐defined,	  high-­‐permeability	  reservoirs.	  The	  fact	  that	  gas	  can	  easily	  migrate	  to	  the	  wellbore	  and	  up	  to	  the	  surface	  in	  these	  reservoirs	  means	  that	  they	  can	  usually	  be	  developed	  using	  vertical	  wells	   only	   and	  often	  yield	   economic	   recovery	  rates	  of	  more	  than	  80%	  of	  the	  original	  gas	  in	  place	  (OGIP).	  Unconventional	   gas	   is	   gas	   produced	   using	   additional	   processes	   beyond	   the	   standard	  drilling	   techniques	   deployed	   widely	   in	   conventional	   reservoirs.	   Unconventional	   gas	  resources	   are	   generally	   found	   in	   less	   permeable	   rock	   formations	   and	   for	   this	   reason	  they	   are	  more	   complex	   to	   extract.	   These	   resource	   accumulations	  may	   be	   distributed	  over	   a	  much	   larger	   area	   than	   conventional	   accumulations	   and	   typically	   require	  well-­‐stimulation	  measures	  in	  order	  to	  be	  made	  economically	  productive.	  Recovery	  rates	  are	  much	  lower	  than	  in	  conventional	  gas	  —	  typically	  of	  the	  order	  of	  15-­‐30%	  of	  OGIP.2	  	  There	  are	  three	  main	  types	  of	  unconventional	  gas	  produced	  today;	  shale	  gas,	  tight	  gas	  and	   coal-­‐bed	   methane.3	  Shale	   gas	   is	   natural	   gas	   produced	   from	   commonly	   occurring	  shale	  rock	   formations,	  a	  kind	  of	  sedimentary	  rock	   that	   is	  rich	   in	  organic	  matter.	  Tight	  gas	   refers	   to	   gas	  deposits	   found	   in	   low	  permeability	   rock	   formations,	   like	   sandstone.4	  And	  coal-­‐bed	  methane,	  as	  the	  name	  implies,	  is	  natural	  gas	  contained	  in	  coal	  beds.	  
1.2 Why	  is	  this	  report	  needed?	  	  Fossil	  fuels,	  such	  as	  oil,	  gas	  and	  coal,	  are	  by	  far	  the	  largest	  sources	  of	  energy	  in	  Europe,	  comprising	   just	   over	   75%	  of	   gross	   inland	   consumption	   in	   2010.5	  While	   governmental	  support	  will	  ensure	  that	  alternative	  energy	  sources	  such	  as	  renewables	  will	  increasingly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  IEA,	   'Are	  we	  entering	  a	  golden	  age	  of	  gas?',	   in	  World	  Energy	  Outlook	  (Paris:	  Organisation	  for	  Economic	  Co-­‐operation	  and	  Development	  2011),	  50.	  2	  E.J.	   Moniz,	   H.D.	   Jacoby	   and	   A.J.M.	   Meggs,	   'The	   future	   of	   natural	   gas',	   (Cambridge,	   Massachusetts:	  Massachusetts	  Institute	  of	  Technology,	  2010),	  6.	  3 	  Other	   kinds	   of	   unconventional	   gas,	   such	   as	   methane	   hydrates,	   are	   at	   a	   much	   earlier	   stage	   of	  development.	  4	  Tight	  gas	  is	  sometimes	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  continuation	  of	  conventional	  gas	  because	  tight	  gas	  sandstone	  and	   limestone	  are	  simply	  reservoir	  rocks,	  whereas	  coal	  and	  shale	  are	  considered	   to	  be	  both	   the	  source	  and	  the	  reservoir	  rock.	  5	  Source:	  Eurostat.	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contribute	   to	   total	  energy	  supply,	  hydrocarbons	  are	  widely	  projected	   to	  dominate	   the	  European	  energy	  mix	  through	  to	  at	  least	  2030.6	  It	  has	   long	  been	  known	  that	  global	  unconventional	  gas	  resources	  may	  be	  significant	  –	  they	   are	   roughly	   equal	   to	   conventional	   gas	   resources,	   according	   to	   one	   widely	   cited	  estimate.7	  In	  spite	  of	  their	  abundance,	  however,	  it	  was	  traditionally	  thought	  that	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	   the	  resource	  base	  was	   too	  difficult	  or	  costly	   to	  be	  commercially	  extracted.	  For	   this	   reason,	   virtually	   all	   estimates	   of	   the	   global	   oil	   and	   gas	   endowment	  up	   to	   the	  1990s	  focused	  on	  conventional	  reserves	  and	  resources.8	  In	  recent	  years,	  however,	  two	  key	  developments	  have	  shifted	  the	  focus	  to	  so-­‐called	  ‘unconventionals’.	  The	  first	  has	  been	  mounting	  concern	  that	  growing	  demand	  for	  energy	  worldwide	  would	  outstrip	   supply.	  Whilst	   uncertainty	   over	   access	   to	   fossil	   fuel	   reserves	   persists,	   global	  population	  growth	  and	  rising	  standards	  of	   living	  in	  the	  developing	  world	  have	  pushed	  energy	   demand	   up	   considerably.	   These	   two	   factors	   have	   resulted	   in	   significant	  increases	  in	  the	  market	  prices	  of	  oil	  and	  natural	  gas	  over	  the	  last	  decade.	  The	   second	   factor	   has	   been	   a	   dramatic	   increase	   in	   unconventional	   gas	   production	   in	  North	  America.	  Against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  stiffer	  international	  competition	  for	  resources,	  unconventional	  gas	  production	  in	  the	  USA	  has	  robustly	  increased,	  more	  than	  offsetting	  the	   steady	   decline	   in	   domestic	   conventional	   gas	   production.	   Unconventional	   gas	  accounted	  for	  around	  60%	  of	  all	  gas	  produced	  in	  the	  USA	  in	  2010	  –	  shale	  gas	  was	  23%.9	  This	  has	  had	  a	  dramatic	   supply	   impact,	   turning	   the	   relatively	   tight	  US	  gas	  markets	  of	  2006-­‐07	   into	   a	   buyers’	   market	   with	   depressed	   natural	   gas	   prices	   now	   forecast	   to	  continue	   for	   some	   years	   to	   come.10	  The	   sharp	   increase	   in	   shale	   gas	   production	   is	  particularly	  striking	  in	  light	  of	  the	  significant	  OGIP	  estimates	  of	  the	  resource	  not	  only	  in	  the	  USA,	  but	  globally.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  European	   Commission,	   'Energy	   infrastructure	   priorities	   for	   2020	   and	   beyond	   -­‐	   A	   Blueprint	   for	   an	  integrated	  European	  energy	  network',	  ed.	  Directorate-­‐General	  for	  Energy	  (Luxembourg:	  Office	  for	  Official	  Publications	  of	  the	  European	  Communities,	  2010).	  7	  H.H.	   Rogner,	   'An	   Assessment	   of	   World	   Hydrocarbon	   Resources',	   Annual	   Review	   of	   Energy	   and	   the	  
Environment	  22	  (1997).	  8	  NPC,	   'Facing	   the	  Hard	  Truths	  about	  Energy:	  A	   comprehensive	  View	   to	  2030	  of	  Global	  Oil	   and	  Natural	  Gas',	  (Washington	  DC:	  National	  Petroleum	  Council,	  2007),	  96-­‐97.	  9	  Source:	  EIA.	  10	  EIA,	  'Annual	  Energy	  Outlook	  2011	  with	  Projections	  to	  2035',	  (Washington,	  DC:	  US	  Energy	  Information	  Administration,	  2011).	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Figure	  1-­‐1:	  Shale	  gas	  production	  and	  wellhead	  gas	  prices	  in	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America11	  
	  The	  recent	  increase	  in	  unconventional	  gas	  production	  in	  the	  USA	  has	  been	  underpinned	  by	   technological	   advancements	   in	   hydraulic	   fracturing	   and	   horizontal	   drilling.	   These	  have	   been	   essential	   in	   reducing	   the	   per-­‐unit	   production	   cost	   of	   process-­‐intensive	  unconventional	  gas	  operations,	  making	  them	  progressively	  more	  price	  competitive	  with	  conventional	   gas.	   They	   have	   also	   unlocked	   access	   to	   resources	   previously	   beyond	  technical	   reach,	   increasing	   estimates	   of	   the	   size	   of	   the	   recoverable	   resource.	   These	  advances	  have	  been	  so	  noteworthy	  that	  they	  are	  covered	  in	  greater	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  3	  of	  this	  report.	  Besides	   the	   technological	   aspects,	   however,	   market	   forces	   are	   also	   relevant	   to	   our	  understanding	   of	   the	   US	   case.	   Higher	   market	   prices	   made	   previously	   marginal	   or	  uneconomic	   resources	   profitable	   to	   extract	   because	   they	   compensated	   for	   the	   higher	  costs	   involved	   in	   producing	   these	   resources.	   Price	   signals	   provided	   important	  incentives	   for	   switching	   to	   different	   fuel	   sources	   and	   they	   encouraged	   exploration,	  which	   led	   to	   the	   discovery	   of	   resources	   that	   were	   previously	   unknown.	   Most	  significantly	   in	   the	   case	   of	   US	   unconventional	   gas,	   rising	   prices	   incentivised	   the	  development	  and	  deployment	  of	  new	  technologies.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  recent	  increase	  in	  US	  unconventional	  gas	  production	  can	  be	  understood	  within	  the	  fundamental	  economics	  of	  the	  price	  mechanism.12	  Many	   questions	   still	   remain	   about	   how	   easily	   unconventional	   gas	   resources	   can	   be	  developed	  elsewhere.	  However,	   at	   the	   time	  of	  writing	   there	  are	  growing	  expectations	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Source:	   Production	   data	   from	   1982-­‐1989	   taken	   from	   J.A.	   Slutz,	   'Unconventional	   gas	   resources:	   well	  completions	  and	  production	  challenges'	   (paper	  presented	  at	   the	  Methane	   to	  Markets	  Partnership	  Expo,	  Beijing,	  China,	  2007).	  Production	  data	   from	  1990	  onwards	  taken	   from	  EIA,	   'AEO	  2011'.	  Price	  data	   from	  EIA.	  12	  It	   is	   also	   important	   to	   note	   the	   effect	   of	   US	   Government	   initiatives,	   such	   as	   the	   Section	   29	   Non-­‐Conventional	  Gas	  Tax	  Credits	  introduced	  in	  1980.	  This	  provided	  a	  $0.50/Mcf	  incentive	  for	  gas	  produced	  from	  tight	  gas	  sands,	  coal-­‐bed	  methane	  and	  Devonian	  shale.	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that	   ‘potential	   barriers	   to	   further	   unconventional	   gas	   production	   will	   be	   largely	  overcome	   and	   that	   increased	   supplies	   become	   available	   in	   other	   regions	   at	   costs	  comparable	   to	   those	   in	   North	   America’.13	  In	   light	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   rock	   formations	  potentially	  yielding	  unconventional	  gas	  can	  be	  found	  in	  abundance	  in	  many	  parts	  of	  the	  world,	   this	   has	   sent	   ripples	   through	   the	   energy	   research	   community.	   Rock	   that	   was	  previously	  considered	  to	  be	  of	  little	  value	  suddenly	  held	  the	  promise	  of	  changing	  some	  long-­‐held	  assumptions	  about	  natural	  gas	  as	  an	  energy	  carrier.	  	  Although	  proven	  reserves14	  of	  conventional	  gas	  have	  increased	  steadily	  since	  the	  1970s,	  the	  distance	  of	  much	  of	   these	   from	  markets15	  has	  prevented	  a	  greater	   role	   for	  natural	  gas	   in	   the	   global	   energy	  mix.	   This	   is	   because	   natural	   gas	   has	  much	   less	   flexibility	   in	  terms	  of	   transmission	   and	   storage	  when	   compared	  with,	   say,	   oil	   or	   coal,	   owing	   to	   its	  gaseous	  form	  and	  low	  energy	  density.	  Considerable	  capital	  expenditure	  is	  necessary	  to	  bring	  it	  to	  market,	  whether	  by	  pipeline	  or	  as	  liquefied	  natural	  gas	  (LNG),	  making	  natural	  gas	   relatively	   expensive	   to	   transport.	   The	   inflexibility	   and	   high	   cost	   of	   gas	   transit	  infrastructure	   also	   tends	   to	   lock	   buyers	   and	   sellers	   into	   long-­‐term	   relationships	   and	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  replace	  lost	  gas	  supplies.	  Being	  highly	  import-­‐dependent	  for	  gas	  and	  other	  energy	  products,	  the	  EU	  is	  especially	  affected	  by	   these	   concerns.	   The	  EU	   currently	   brings	   in	  well	   over	   half	   of	   the	   energy	   it	  consumes,16	  and	  it	  estimates	  that,	  in	  the	  next	  20-­‐30	  years,	  falling	  indigenous	  production	  levels	   will	   mean	   that	   up	   to	   70%	   of	   its	   energy	   demand	   will	   have	   to	   be	   met	   through	  imports.17	  Due	   to	   questions	   remaining	   about	   how	   quickly	   extraction	   capacity	   can	   be	  expanded	   by	   some	   of	   Europe’s	   most	   important	   suppliers,	   it	   is	   little	   wonder	   that	   the	  focus	  on	  unconventional	  gas	  has	  been	  intense,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  continent	  itself	  is	  only	  at	  the	  earliest	  stages	  of	  exploration	  for	  shale	  gas	  –	  the	  one	  that	  could	  be	  the	  most	  significant	  form	  of	  unconventional	  gas.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  IEA,	  'Golden	  age',	  17-­‐18.	  14	  An	  industry	  term	  for	  reserves	  that	  can	  be	  easily	  recovered	  with	  the	  highest	  degree	  of	  confidence.	  15	  Two-­‐thirds	  of	  global	  proven	  reserves	  of	  natural	  gas	  are	  located	  in	  Russia,	  Iran,	  Qatar,	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  the	  UAE,	  Venezuela	  and	  Nigeria.	  BP,	  'Statistical	  review	  of	  world	  energy',	  ed.	  BP	  (2011).	  16	  Source:	  Eurostat.	  17 	  European	   Commission,	   'Towards	   a	   European	   strategy	   for	   the	   security	   of	   energy	   supply',	   ed.	  Directorate-­‐General	   for	   Energy	   and	   Transport	   (Luxembourg:	   Office	   for	   Official	   Publications	   of	   the	  European	  Communities,	  2000).	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Figure	  1-­‐2:	  Primary	  production	  of	  natural	  gas	  and	  energy	  import	  dependence	  in	  the	  EU-­‐2718	  
Unconventional	   gas	  may	   offer	   a	   number	   of	   security-­‐of-­‐supply	   benefits	   for	   the	   Union,	  helping	   natural	   gas	   to	   become	   cheaper	   and	   more	   readily	   available	   on	   the	   European	  market.	   Unconventional	   gas	  may	  make	   it	   easier	   for	   the	   EU	   to	  meet	   its	   future	   energy	  needs,	  either	  through	  increasing	  indigenous	  production	  levels,	  or	  by	  reducing	  demand	  for	   gas	   elsewhere	   in	   the	  world,	   thus	   freeing	   up	  more	   supplies	   that	   can	   be	   imported.	  Easing	  tightness	  in	  global	  energy	  markets	  has	  recently	  been	  given	  added	  importance	  in	  light	  of	  waning	  public	  support	  for	  nuclear	  power	  following	  the	  Fukushima	  disaster.	  	  Given	  the	  concentrated	  nature	  of	  conventional	  gas	  supplies	  and	  the	  high	  costs	  and	  risks	  associated	  with	  long-­‐distance	  transportation,	  there	  may	  also	  be	  considerable	  economic	  and	   strategic	   value	   in	   the	   development	   of	   unconventional	   resources	   closer	   to	   the	  European	  market.	   Such	   supplies	  would	   add	  diversity	   to	   the	  EU’s	   gas	   supplies	   –	   a	   key	  goal	  of	  EU	  energy	  policy.19	  Many	  Southern	  and	  Eastern	  European	  states	  were	  severely	  affected	   by	   a	   disruption	   of	   Russian	   gas	   through	   Ukraine	   in	   2009,	   and	   the	   continued	  instability	   in	   other	   supplier	   states	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   ‘Arab	   Spring’20	  is	   a	   compelling	  reminder	  of	  the	  dangers	  of	  over-­‐dependence	  on	  any	  one	  gas	  source	  or	  supply	  route.	  Better	  diversification	  of	   supplies	  could	  also	   improve	   the	  EU’s	  bargaining	  position	  as	  a	  gas	  consumer.	  High	  prices	  for	  piped	  gas	   in	  those	  EU	  Member	  States	  with	  only	  a	  single	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Source:	   Eurostat.	  Dry	  marketable	   gas	   production	  measured	   after	   purification	   and	   extraction	   of	  NGLs	  (Natural	  Gas	  Liquids)	  and	  sulphur.	  Energy	  dependency	  shows	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  an	  economy	  relies	  upon	  imports	  in	  order	  to	  meet	  its	  energy	  needs.	  The	  indicator	  is	  calculated	  as	  net	  imports	  divided	  by	  the	  sum	  of	  gross	  inland	  energy	  consumption	  plus	  bunkers.	  19	  European	   Commission,	   'The	   EU	   energy	   policy:	   Engaging	   with	   partners	   beyond	   our	   borders',	   ed.	  Directorate-­‐General	   for	   Energy	   (Luxembourg:	   Office	   for	   Official	   Publications	   of	   the	   European	  Communities,	  2011),	  5.	  20	  In	  particular,	  Italian	  supplies	  of	  crude	  oil	  and	  natural	  gas	  were	  strongly	  affected	  by	  the	  unrest	  in	  Libya	  in	  2011.	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supplier	   suggest	   that	   greater	   economic	   efficiency	   can	   be	   achieved	   through	   the	  introduction	   of	   alternative	   supply	   options.	   Theoretically	   speaking,	   the	   broad	  geographical	  distribution	  of	  unconventional	  gas	  reserves	  could	  also	  reduce	  any	  nascent	  gas	  cartel’s	  power	  to	  control	  the	  scarcity,	  and	  hence	  price,	  of	  global	  natural	  gas	  supplies.	  	  Increased	   unconventional	   gas	   production	   may	   also	   have	   climatic	   and	   environmental	  benefits.	  When	  burned,	  natural	  gas	  emits	  less	  CO2	  and	  local	  pollutants21	  than	  other	  fossil	  fuels.	   As	   a	   result	   of	   this,	   some	   have	   argued	   that	   the	   use	   of	   natural	   gas	   for	   power	  generation	   is	   among	   the	   cheapest	   and	   fastest	  ways	   to	   reduce	  CO2	  emissions,	   and	   that	  additional	   unconventional	   production	  may	   help	   natural	   gas	   play	   a	   role	   as	   a	   ‘bridging	  fuel’	  until	  a	  permanent	  transition	  can	  be	  made	  to	  renewable	  sources	  of	  energy.	  Gas	  may	  also	  have	  an	  important	  function	  as	  lower	  carbon-­‐backup	  generation	  to	  help	  balance	  the	  intermittency	   of	  many	   renewable	   energy	   sources.	   Finally,	   substituting	   imports	   of	   gas	  extracted	  far	  away	  with	  unconventional	  gas	  produced	  closer	  to	  markets	  may	  reduce	  the	  carbon	  cost	  associated	  with	  the	  transportation	  of	  that	  gas	  and	  hence	  its	  life-­‐cycle	  carbon	  footprint.	  Whilst	   the	   benefits	   listed	   above	   are	   notable,	   unconventional	   gas	   carries	   a	   host	   of	  potential	   negative	   impacts	   and	   risks.	   Environmental	   concerns	   include	   the	   risk	   of	  induced	   seismicity,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   strain	   on	   land	   use	   in	   areas	   developing	   shale	   gas.	  Concerns	   centre,	   however,	   on	   the	   large	   volume	   of	   water	   required	   for	   the	   hydraulic	  fracturing	  process;	   the	  disposal	  of	   this	  water	  once	   it	  has	  been	  used;	  and	   the	  potential	  contamination	   of	   fresh	   water	   aquifers	   as	   a	   result	   of	   drilling	   and	   well	   stimulation	  processes.	   The	   latter	   point	   is	   especially	   of	   concern	   because	   the	   treatment	   of	  contaminated	   groundwater	   can	   be	   a	   long	   and	   costly	   process	   and	   may	   even	   be	  impossible	  in	  some	  cases.	  As	  such,	  moratoria	  on	  the	  hydraulic	  fracturing	  process	  have	  been	  sought	  while	  further	  investigation	  is	  carried	  out	  in	  certain	  US	  states,	  Quebec,	  South	  Africa,	  Bulgaria	  and	  France.	  With	  regard	  to	  climate	  policy,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing	  there	  is	  growing	  concern	  over	  the	  life-­‐cycle	  emissions	   from	  unconventional	  gas;	  particularly	  shale	  gas.	  Whilst	  gas	   that	   is	  sourced	  from	  unconventional	  shale	  or	  sandstone	  formations	  emits	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  CO2	   when	   burned,	   the	   additional	   processes	   necessary	   to	   extract	   it	   mean	   that	   more	  greenhouse	  gas	  is	  generally	  emitted	  at	  the	  mining	  stage.	  The	  extent	  of	  these	  additional	  emissions	  may	   diminish,	   and	   in	   the	   worst	   case	   even	   negate,	   any	   life-­‐cycle	   emissions	  advantage	  natural	  gas	  has	  over	  competing	  fuels,	  such	  as	  coal.	  Finally,	   the	   International	   Energy	   Agency	   (IEA)	   has	   estimated	   that	   –	   under	   the	   right	  conditions	   –	   unconventional	   gas	   may	   meet	   more	   than	   40%	   of	   the	   increased	   global	  demand	  for	  gas	  to	  the	  year	  2035.22	  This	  raises	  two	  investment-­‐related	  questions.	  First,	  if	  projections	   such	   as	   these	   come	   to	   pass,	   then	  natural	   gas	  will	   probably	   gain	   a	   greater	  share	   of	   the	   global	   energy	  mix.	   But	   what	   will	   it	   displace?	   Some	   have	   suggested	   that	  cheaper	   gas	   may	   challenge	   the	   political	   commitment	   to	   certain	   kinds	   of	   renewable	  energy	   that	   still	   require	   government	   support	   in	   order	   to	   be	   price	   competitive.	   Given	  that	  a	  shift	  to	  gas	  alone	  will	  not	  be	  sufficient	  to	  meet	  agreed	  CO2	  emission	  targets,	  this	  may	  have	  significant	   implications	   for	  climate	  change.	  Secondly,	   if	   the	  actual	  volume	  of	  future	   unconventional	   gas	   supplies	   does	   not	   meet	   expectations,	   large	   infrastructure	  investments	   could	   be	   diverted	   from	   viable	   alternatives,	   with	   related	   supply-­‐side	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Sulphur	  dioxide	  (SO2),	  nitrogen	  oxides	  (NOX)	  and	  participate	  matter	  (PM2.5),	  for	  example.	  22	  IEA,	  'Golden	  age',	  29.	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consequences.23	  In	  both	   cases,	   too	   zealous	  a	   commitment	   to	  developing	  gas	   resources	  could	   lock	   the	  EU	   into	   an	   energy	  mix	   that	   fulfils	   neither	   its	   security	   of	   supply	  nor	   its	  climate	  requirements.	  In	  light	  of	  the	  possibilities	  outlined	  above,	  questions	  have	  been	  asked	  about	  if	  and	  how	  European	  policy-­‐makers	  should	  respond	  to	  the	  opportunities	  and	  challenges	  posed	  by	  unconventional	  gas.	  The	  European	  Council	  itself	  has	  stated:	  “In	  order	  to	  further	  enhance	  its	   security	   of	   supply,	   Europe’s	   potential	   for	   sustainable	   extraction	   and	   use	   of	  conventional	  and	  unconventional	   (shale	  gas	  and	  oil	   shale)	   fossil	   fuel	  resources	  should	  be	   assessed.”24	  The	   difficulty	   faced	   by	   policy-­‐makers	   is	   that	   the	   literature	   is	   highly	  polarised,	  with	  no	  clear	  consensus	  within	  the	  expert	  community	  on	  a	  number	  of	  issues	  that	   are	   critical	   to	   understanding	  both	   the	  modalities	   and	   the	   extent	   of	   the	   impact	   of	  unconventional	  gas.	  	  One	  explanation	  for	  this	  polarisation	  is	  the	  broad	  assortment	  of	  stakeholders	  who	  either	  stand	   to	   gain	   or	   lose	   as	   a	   result	   of	   increased	   unconventional	   gas	   production.	   As	  unconventional	  gas	  may	  take	  market	  share	  from	  coal,	  nuclear	  or	  renewable	  energy	  –	  as	  well	  as	  ‘traditional’	  gas	  suppliers	  –	  commentators	  have	  suggested	  that	  the	  phenomenon	  has	   mobilised	   the	   commercial,	   political	   and	   academic	   advocates	   of	   each	   of	   these	  industries.	  By	  this	  view,	  both	  the	  proponents	  and	  opponents	  of	  unconventional	  gas	  are	  embellishing	   its	   potential	   benefits	   and	   risks	   in	   order	   to	   generate	   sufficient	   public	  concern	  to	  either	  advance	  or	  prevent	  its	  expansion.25	  Another,	  more	  tangible	  explanation	  for	  this	  polarisation	  is	  that	  the	  shale	  gas	  industry	  is	  still	  in	  its	  infancy	  and	  that	  this	  immaturity	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  inconsistent	  quality	  of	  the	  evidence	  that	  has,	  until	  now,	  been	  available.	  In	  the	  USA,	  much	  of	  the	  gas	  produced	  thus	  far	  has	  come	  from	  the	  most	  fruitful	  ‘sweet	  spots’	  that	  may	  not	  be	  representative	  of	  the	  productivity	  of	  entire	  formations.	  There	  is	  a	   lack	  of	  comprehensive	  and	  independently	  corroborated	   data	   on	   geology,	   the	   results	   of	   exploration	   drilling	   and	   the	   long-­‐term	  production	   levels	   of	   wells.26	  Industry	   practice	   is	   evolving	   so	   rapidly	   that	   ultimate	  recovery	  rates	  and	  unit	  costs	  of	  produced	  unconventional	  gas	  are	  moving	  targets,	  with	  some	   forecasts	   predicated	   on	   the	   anticipation	   of	   future	   technological	   progress.	   And	  estimating	  the	  break-­‐even	  costs	  for	  shale	  gas	  production	  is	  made	  more	  difficult	  because	  of	  the	  possible	  production	  of	  quantities	  of	  natural	  gas	  liquids	  (NGLs),	  which	  fetch	  a	  high	  market	  price,	  from	  certain	  shale	  plays.	  The	  knowledge	  deficit	   is	  even	  more	  acute	  outside	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America,	  where	  other	   key	   variables	   such	   as	   drilling	   service	   costs,	   environmental	   regulation,	   pricing	  mechanisms	   and	   the	   structure	   of	   markets	   are	   largely	   untested.	   And	   finally,	   one-­‐off	  events,	   like	   the	   global	   economic	   crisis	   and	   the	   slew	   of	   long-­‐planned	   LNG	   projects	  coming	   online	   between	   2009	   and	   2010,	   have	   so	   far	   made	   it	   difficult	   to	   assess	   the	  economic	  and	  trade	  effects	  of	  shale	  gas	  in	  isolation.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  improvements	  to	  Europe’s	  natural	  gas	  infrastructure	  are	  needed	  regardless	  of	  the	  future	  contribution	  of	  unconventional	  gas.	  24	  European	  Council,	  'Conclusions	  on	  Energy	  -­‐	  4	  February',	  (Brussels:	  2011).	  25	  Matt	  Ridley,	  'The	  Shale	  Gas	  Shock',	  (London:	  The	  Global	  Warming	  Policy	  Foundation,	  2011).	  26	  In	   France	   drilling	   data	   is	   available	   immediately	   –	   production	   data	   after	   ten	   years.	   The	   UK	   and	   the	  Netherlands	   have	   a	   four-­‐year	   confidentiality	   period	   for	   drilling	   data.	   In	   Sweden	   there	   is	   a	   five-­‐year	  waiting	   period	   –	   20	   years	   for	   offshore	   wells.	   In	   Denmark	   the	   confidentiality	   period	   is	   five	   years.	   In	  Germany	  data	  is	  never	  made	  publicly	  available.	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1.3 Objectives	  and	  scope	  of	  this	  report	  In	   the	   interest	   of	   effective	   policy-­‐making,	   this	   report	   seeks	   to	   clarify	   certain	  controversies	  and	  identify	  key	  gaps	  in	  the	  evidence-­‐base	  relating	  to	  unconventional	  gas.	  The	  scope	  of	  this	  report	  is	  restricted	  to	  the	  economic	  impact	  of	  unconventional	  gas	  on	  energy	  markets.	  As	  such,	  it	  principally	  addresses	  such	  issues	  as	  the	  energy	  mix,	  energy	  prices,	  supplies,	  consumption	  and	  trade	  flows.	  	  A	   selection	   of	   other	   topics	   that	   have	   a	   direct	   bearing	   on	   the	   economic	   impact	   of	  unconventional	  gas	  are	  also	  tackled,	  albeit	  to	  a	  less	  detailed	  extent.	  For	  instance,	  whilst	  local	   pollution	   and	   climate	   change	   considerations	   increasingly	   influence	   our	   energy	  choices,	   this	   report	   only	   touches	   on	   these	   aspects	   to	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   they	   impact	  unconventional	  gas	  production	  or	  consumption	  patterns.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  other	  Commission	  services	  are	  currently	  examining	  whether	  the	  environmental	  challenges	  of	  unconventional	   gas	   production	   can	   be	   effectively	   managed	   through	   regulation,	  monitoring	  and	  the	  application	  of	  industry	  best	  practices.	  In	  this	  vein,	  the	  JRC	  Institute	  for	  Environment	  and	  Sustainability	  is	  in	  the	  process	  of	  preparing	  a	  report	  reviewing	  the	  literature	   on	   environmental	   impacts.	   Regarding	   the	   direct	   greenhouse	   gas	   emissions	  stemming	   from	   unconventional	   gas	   mining,	   this	   report	   touches	   on	   notable	   sources.	  However,	   it	   does	   not	   engage	   in	   a	   thorough	   examination	   of	   the	  methodological	  merits	  and	  weaknesses	  of	  these	  sources.	  Whilst	  this	  study	  touches	  on	  coal-­‐bed	  methane	  and	  tight	  gas,	  its	  predominant	  focus	  is	  on	  shale	  gas,	  which	  the	  evidence	  at	  this	  time	  suggests	  will	  be	  the	  form	  of	  unconventional	  gas	  with	  the	  most	  growth	  potential	  in	  the	  short	  to	  medium	  term.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that,	  despite	   this	   focus,	   the	   processes	   used	   in	   shale	   gas	   extraction	   –	   particularly	   hydraulic	  fracturing	   and	   horizontal	   drilling	   –	   are	   to	   a	   degree	   shared	   by	   tight	   gas	   and	   coal-­‐bed	  methane,	  as	  well	  as	  conventional	  gas.	  Technological	  gains	   in	   these	  areas	  are	  therefore	  likely	  to	  also	  result	  in	  improvements	  in	  the	  extraction	  of	  natural	  gas	  from	  other	  sources.	  This	   report	   considers	   the	  prospects	   for	   the	   indigenous	  production	  of	   shale	  gas	  within	  the	  EU’s	   27	  Member	   States.	   Informed	  by	   the	   factors	   identified	   in	  Figure	  1-­‐3	  below,	   it	  evaluates	  the	  available	  evidence	  on	  resource	  size,	  extractive	  technology,	  resource	  access	  and	  market	   access.	  With	   regards	   to	   the	   regulatory	   framework,	   this	   report	   uses	   as	   an	  input	   the	   analysis	   provided	   by	   the	   legal	   study	   commissioned	   by	   the	   European	  Commission	  and	  delivered	  by	   the	   law	   firm	  Phillipe	  and	  Partners	   in	  November	  2011.27	  The	  two	  reports	  are	  thus	  complementary	  in	  their	  scope.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Philippe	  &	  Partners,	  'Final	  Report	  on	  Unconventional	  Gas	  in	  Europe',	  (Brussels:	  European	  Commission,	  2011).	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Figure	  1-­‐3:	  Factors	  determining	  the	  viability	  of	  natural	  gas	  developments28	  
	  This	  report	  also	  considers	  the	  implications	  for	  the	  EU	  of	  large-­‐scale	  unconventional	  gas	  production	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  world.	  This	  acknowledges	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  changes	  in	  the	  dynamics	  of	  energy	  supply	  can	  only	  be	  understood	  in	  the	  broader	  global	  context.	  It	  also	   acknowledges	   that	   the	   EU	   is	   a	  major	   importer	   of	   energy	   and	   that	   it	   is	   therefore	  heavily	   affected	   by	   developments	   in	   global	   energy	  markets	   that	   are	   largely	   out	   of	   its	  control.	   For	   example,	   whilst	   the	   current	   world	   gas	   trade	   is	   concentrated	   in	   three	  regional	   markets	   (Europe,	   Asia	   and	   North	   America),	   an	   anticipated	   growth	   in	   global	  LNG	  flows	  is	  likely	  to	  lead	  to	  increased	  price	  and	  supply	  interaction	  between	  regions.	  In	  spite	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   any	   significant	   shale	   gas	   production	   in	   the	   EU	   is	   not	   expected	  before	  2020,	   the	   first	   licensing	  rounds	   for	  shale	  gas	   in	  other	  major	  energy	  consuming	  countries,	   such	   as	   China,	   have	   already	   taken	   place.	   Given	   the	   large	   estimated	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Adapted	  from	  IEA,	  'Golden	  age',	  47.	  















































unconventional	   resource	   base	   in	   these	   countries,29	  their	   successful	   development	   may	  lead	   to	   supply	   effects	   on	   the	   EU	   market,	   independent	   of	   the	   course	   of	   any	   EU	  production.	  	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  time	  horizon,	  this	  report	  aims	  to	  cover	  the	  impact	  of	  unconventional	  gas	  observed	  to	  date,	  as	  well	  as	  scenario	  analysis	  up	  to	  the	  year	  2040.	  Geopolitical	   considerations	   are	   outside	   the	   scope	   of	   this	   study.	   Many	   commentators	  have	  written	   about	   the	   possibility	   of	   unconventional	   gas	   limiting	   the	   ability	   of	  major	  energy	   exporters	   to	   use	   their	   resources	   as	   an	   instrument	   to	   advance	   political	  objectives;30	  however	  this	  report	  focuses	  on	  the	  energy	  market-­‐related	  factors.	  	  The	  economic	  benefits	  to	  local	  economies	  and	  national	  authorities	  in	  terms	  of	  jobs	  and	  tax	  revenues	  are	  also	  excluded	  from	  this	  study.	  Experience	  shows	  that	  there	  may	  be	  a	  large	   demand	   for	   labourers	   at	   both	   the	   gas	   fields	   and	   support	   businesses,	   such	   as	  drilling	  contractors,	  hydraulic	   fracturing	  companies	  and	  trucking	  companies.	  Although	  estimations	  of	  the	  economic	  value-­‐added	  of	  such	  service	  sector	  developments	  are	  often	  addressed	   in	   the	   literature,	   they	   can	   be	   viewed	   as	   being	   outside	   the	   field	   of	   energy	  economics	   in	   a	   strict	   sense,	   and	   they	   require	   a	   distinct	   knowledge-­‐set	   to	   evaluate	   in	  detail.	  
1.4 The	  European	  energy	  policy	  context	  	  On	  15	  December	  2011,	  the	  European	  Commission	  adopted	  its	  Energy	  Roadmap	  2050.31	  This	  Communication	  aims	  at	  exploring	  how	  the	  EU’s	  energy	  system	  could	  become	  more	  sustainable	   and	   less	   carbon-­‐intensive	   –	   in	   line	   with	   the	   EU's	   commitment	   to	   reduce	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions	  by	  80-­‐95%	  in	  comparison	  to	  1990	  levels	  by	  205032	  –	  while	  at	  the	   same	   time	  ensuring	   security	  of	   energy	   supply	  and	  competitiveness.	  The	  Roadmap	  will	   help	   to	   increase	   the	   long-­‐term	   predictability	   of	   the	   regulatory	   framework	   for	  energy	  and	  thereby	  reduce	  uncertainty	  for	  investment	  by	  identifying	  initiatives	  that	  will	  be	  crucial	  for	  the	  decarbonisation	  process	  up	  to	  2050.	  The	  Energy	  Roadmap	  2050	  is	  the	  start	   of	   an	   iterative	   discussion	   and	   dialogue	  with	  Member	   States,	   EU	   institutions	   and	  stakeholders	  at	  large.	  Although	   forecasting	   the	   long-­‐term	   future	   is	   not	   possible,	   the	   Energy	   Roadmap	   2050	  includes	  scenarios	  aiming	  at	  exploring	  possible	  routes	  towards	  decarbonisation.	  Based	  on	  this	  analysis,	  the	  Roadmap	  identifies	  key	  conclusions	  on	  ‘no	  regrets’	  options	  (namely	  renewable	  energy,	  energy	  efficiency	  and	  infrastructure)	  in	  the	  European	  energy	  system,	  and	  outlines	  other	  key	  features	  for	  a	  transition	  to	  a	  low-­‐carbon	  energy	  system.	  The	  Roadmap	  also	   identifies	  gas	  as	  a	  critical	   fuel	   for	   the	   transformation	  of	   the	  energy	  system.	  The	  substitution	  of	  coal	  and	  oil	  with	  gas	  in	  the	  short	  to	  medium	  term	  could	  help	  to	  reduce	  emissions	  with	  existing	  technologies	  until	  at	  least	  2030-­‐2035,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  longer	   term	   with	   the	   commercially	   availability	   of	   carbon	   capture	   and	   storage	   (CCS).	  Hence,	   in	  the	  future,	  Europe	  might	  need	  more	  gas	   in	  the	  transition	  towards	  an	  energy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  EIA,	   'World	   Shale	   Gas	   Resources:	   An	   Initial	   Assessment	   of	   14	   Regions	   Outside	   the	   United	   States',	  (Washington,	  DC:	  US	  Energy	  Information	  Administration,	  2011).	  30	  See,	  for	  example,	  Kenneth	  B.	  Medlock,	  Amy	  Myers	  Jaffe	  and	  Peter	  R.	  Hartley,	  'Shale	  Gas	  and	  U.S.	  National	  Security	  ',	  (Houston,	  TX:	  The	  James	  A.	  Baker	  III	  Institute	  Energy	  Forum	  of	  Rice	  University,	  2011).	  31	  European	   Commission,	   'Communication	   from	   the	   Commission	   to	   the	   Council	   and	   the	   European	  Parliament	  –	  Energy	  Roadmap	  2050',	  ed.	  Directorate-­‐General	  for	  Energy	  (2011).	  32	  In	  the	  context	  of	  necessary	  reductions	  by	  developed	  countries	  as	  a	  group.	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system	   based	   largely	   on	   renewable	   energies.	   This	   gas	  will	   need	   to	   come	   from	   either	  domestic	  production	  or	  from	  imports	  –	  but	  most	  likely	  from	  both.	  In	  this	  context,	  this	  report	  aims	  at	  providing	  reliable	  facts	  for	  European	  policy-­‐makers	  and	   stakeholders	   on	   unconventional	   sources	   of	   natural	   gas	   which	   can,	   as	   the	   US	  example	  shows,	  have	  profound	  impacts	  on	  the	  assumptions	  and	  context	  of	  their	  work.	  
1.5 Methodology	  This	   report	   consists	   of	   two	   main	   components.	   Firstly,	   it	   closely	   examines	   the	  unconventional	   gas	   literature	   covering	   both	   Europe	   and	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   world.	   As	   a	  second	   component,	   this	   report	  will	   use	   an	   energy	  model	   to	   elaborate	   possible	   future	  scenarios	   that	   illustrate	   the	   potential	   impact	   of	   unconventional	   gas	   on	   the	   European	  energy	   system.	   It	   will	   carry	   out	   this	   analysis	   based	   on	   the	   best,	   current,	   estimated	  parameters	  as	  identified	  in	  the	  systematic	  literature	  review.	  	  
1.5.1 Evidence-­‐based	  policy	  and	  practice	  Mindful	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  unconventional	  gas	  knowledge-­‐base	  is	  highly	  polarised	  and	  currently	   incomplete,	   this	   report	   will	   identify	   select	   points	   of	   controversy	   in	   the	  literature	  that	  may	  have	  a	  bearing	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  unconventional	  gas	  in	  Europe.	  It	  will	  simply	  and	  clearly	  explain	  why	  these	  points	  of	  controversy	  are	  important	  to	  the	  debate	  and	  then	  describe	  the	  current	  prevailing	  views.	  The	  report	  will	  then	  assess	  the	  existing	  evidence	   around	   these	   key	   points;	   evaluate	   the	   degree	   of	   uncertainty	   that	   currently	  exists;	   and	   explain	   how	   possible	   future	   developments	   in	   these	   areas	  may	   impact	   our	  broader	  understanding	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  unconventional	  gas.	  	  In	   carrying	  out	   the	  above,	  Chapter	  2	  of	   this	   report	  draws	  upon	  a	   range	  of	   techniques	  referred	   to	   as	   evidence-­‐based	   policy	   and	   practice	   (EBPP).	   From	   relatively	   small	  beginnings	   within	   the	   medical	   field,	   the	   concept	   of	   EBPP	   has	   gained	   increasing	  prominence	  in	  the	  UK	  over	  the	  last	  15	  years	  and	  now	  plays	  a	  dominant	  role	  in	  a	  number	  of	   policy	   areas,	   including	   education,	   social	   work,	   criminal	   justice	   and	   urban	  regeneration.33	  Although	   the	   UK	   Energy	   Research	   Centre	   (UKERC)	   has	   successfully	  applied	  the	  methodology	  to	  the	  energy	  field	  for	  a	  number	  of	  years,	  the	  concept	  remains	  largely	  unknown	  to	  policy-­‐makers,	  researchers	  and	  practitioners	  outside	  the	  UK.	  Generally	  speaking,	  EBPP	  implies	  giving	  greater	  weight	  to	  scientific	  research	  evidence	  in	  policy-­‐making	  than	  has	  conventionally	  been	  the	  case	  in	  the	  past.	  EBPP	  spans	  a	  range	  of	  practices,	   such	  as	  a	  strategic	  approach	   to	   the	  creation	  of	  evidence	  and	   the	  effective	  dissemination	   of	   evidence	   to	   where	   it	   is	   most	   needed.	   However,	   the	   area	   that	   has	  received	   the	  greatest	  attention	   is	   the	  synthesis	  of	  existing	  evidence	   through	  a	  process	  known	  as	  a	  systematic	  review.	  	  Traditional,	  narrative	  literature	  reviews	  are	  commonly	  dogged	  by	  shortcomings	  such	  as	  poor	   specification	   of	   the	   review	   topic,	   leading	   to	   excessively	  wide-­‐ranging	   discussion	  and	   inconclusive	   results;	   the	   selective	   and	   opportunistic	   use	   of	   evidence,	   leading	   to	  selection	  bias	  and	  the	  neglect	  of	  relevant	  studies;	  inadequate	  specification	  of	  the	  criteria	  for	   including	   or	   excluding	   studies;	   limited	   attention	   to	   the	   methodological	   quality	   of	  different	   studies;	   and	   a	   lack	   of	   transparency,	   encouraging	   subjectivity	   and	  bias	   in	   the	  reporting	  of	  results.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Steve	  Sorrel,	   'Improving	   the	  evidence	  base	   for	  energy	  policy:	  The	   role	  of	   systematic	   reviews',	  Energy	  
Policy	  35	  (2007).	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Systematic	   reviews	   seek	   to	   address	   each	   of	   the	   above	   limitations	   through	   the	   use	   of	  explicit	  and	  transparent	  methodologies	  that	  are	  replicable	  and	  updateable.	  They	  involve	  clear	  specification	  of	  both	  the	  research	  question(s)	  to	  be	  addressed	  and	  the	  process	  that	  is	   to	   be	   followed;	   systematic	   and	   exhaustive	   searching	   of	   the	   available	   literature;	  explicit	   criteria	   for	   the	   inclusion	   or	   exclusion	   of	   studies;	   quality	   appraisal	   of	   the	  included	   studies	   using	   transparent	   and	   standardised	   criteria;	   objective	   summaries	   of	  the	  results,	   including	  the	  meta-­‐analysis	  of	  quantitative	  data;	  effective	  dissemination	  of	  the	  results	  to	  the	  appropriate	  audience;	  and	  regular	  updating	  of	  the	  review	  results.34	  
Table	  1-­‐1:	  Differences	  between	  systematic	  and	  narrative	  reviews35	  
Stage	  	   Good	   quality	   systematic	  
reviews	  	  
Traditional	  narrative	  reviews	  	  
Deciding	  on	  review	  questions	  	   Start	   with	   clear	   questions	   to	   be	  answered	   and/or	   hypotheses	   to	  be	  tested	  	   May	   start	   with	   a	   clear	   question	  to	   be	   answered,	   but	  more	   often	  involve	   general	   discussion	   of	  subject	   with	   no	   stated	  hypotheses	  	  
Searching	   for	   relevant	  
studies	  	  
Strive	   to	   locate	   all	   relevant	  published	   and	   unpublished	  studies	   to	   limit	   impact	   of	  selection	  bias	  	  
Do	  not	  usually	  attempt	   to	   locate	  all	  the	  relevant	  literature	  	  
Deciding	   which	   studies	   to	  
include	  or	  exclude	  	  
Include	   explicit	   description	   of	  what	   types	   of	   studies	   are	   to	   be	  included	  to	  limit	  selection	  bias	  	   Usually	   do	   not	   describe	   why	  some	   studies	   are	   included	   and	  others	  excluded	  	  
Assessing	  study	  quality	  	   Examine	   in	   systematic	   manner	  the	   methods	   used	   and	  investigate	   potential	   biases	   and	  sources	   of	   heterogeneity	  between	  study	  results	  	  
Often	   do	   not	   consider	  differences	   in	   study	  methods	   or	  study	  quality	  	  
Synthesising	  results	  	   Base	   conclusions	   on	   the	   studies	  that	   are	   considered	   to	   be	   most	  methodologically	  sound	  	   Often	   do	   not	   differentiate	  between	  methodologically	  sound	  and	  unsound	  studies	  	  
Replicating	  and	  updating	  	   Use	   protocols	   and	   explicit	  criteria	   to	   ensure	   that	   others	  would	   reach	   the	   same	  conclusions	   if	   they	   adopted	   the	  same	   methods,	   so	   the	   results	  may	  easily	  be	  updated	  
Use	   methodologies	   and	   criteria	  that	   lack	   transparency,	   leaving	  the	   interpretation	   of	   results	  open	  to	  subjectivity	  and	  bias	  
1.5.2 The	  ETSAP-­‐TIAM	  model	  This	   report	   will	   also	   use	   the	   ETSAP-­‐TIAM	   energy	  model	   to	   elaborate	   possible	   future	  scenarios	  that	   illustrate	  the	  potential	   impact	  of	  unconventional	  gas	  on	  the	  energy	  mix,	  based	  on	  the	  best,	  current,	  estimated	  parameters	  as	  identified	  in	  the	  literature	  review.	  ETSAP-­‐TIAM	   is	   the	   global	  multiregional	   incarnation	   of	   the	   well-­‐known	   TIMES	  model	  generator	   that	   was	   developed	   and	   is	   maintained	   by	   the	   Energy	   Technology	   Systems	  Analysis	  Programme	  (ETSAP)	  under	  the	  aegis	  of	  the	  IEA.36	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Ibid.	  35	  Source:	   M.	   Petticrew,	   'Systematic	   reviews	   from	   astronomy	   to	   zoology:	   myths	   and	   misconceptions',	  
British	  Medical	  Journal	  322	  (2001).	  As	  quoted	  in	  Sorrel,	  'Improving	  the	  evidence	  base	  for	  energy	  policy'.	  36 	  For	   more	   information,	   see	   The	   Energy	   Technology	   Systems	   Analysis	   Program,	   http://www.iea-­‐
etsap.org/web/index.asp	  (cited	  10/10/2011).	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ETSAP-­‐TIAM	  is	  a	  partial	  equilibrium	  model	  of	   the	  energy	  systems	  of	   the	  entire	  world,	  divided	  into	  15	  regions.	  The	  regional	  modules	  are	  linked	  by	  trade	  variables	  of	  the	  main	  energy	   forms	   (coal,	   oil,	   gas)	   and	   by	   emission	   permits.	   For	   each	   region,	   the	   model	  comprises	  explicit	  descriptions	  of	  more	  than	  1	  000	  technologies	  and	  100	  commodities	  (energy	   forms,	   materials,	   emissions),	   covering	   extraction,	   processing,	   conversion,	  trading	   and	   end-­‐uses	   of	   all	   energy	   forms.	   Such	   technological	   detail	   allows	   precise	  tracking	   of	   capital	   turnover	   and	   provides	   a	   precise	   description	   of	   technological	  competition.	  	  The	  model	  constructs	  a	  coherent	  image	  of	  the	  future	  energy	  system	  by	  choosing	  a	  mix	  of	  technologies	   to	   invest	   in	   and	   operate	   at	   each	   future	   period,	   with	   the	   objective	   of	  maximising	   total	   surplus,	   while	   respecting	   the	   many	   constraints	   of	   the	   model.	   The	  model’s	   variables	   include	   the	   investments,	   capacities	   and	   activity	   levels	   of	   all	  technologies	  at	  each	  period	  of	   time,	  plus	   the	  amounts	  of	  energy	  and	  material	   flows	   in	  and	   out	   of	   each	   technology.	   Endogenous	   trade	   of	   crude	   oil,	   petroleum	   products,	   gas,	  liquefied	   natural	   gas	   and	   coal,	   as	   well	   as	   greenhouse	   gas	   permits,	   is	   represented	   in	  ETSAP-­‐TIAM.37	  Key	  factors	  affecting	  future	  gas	  supply	  and	  demand	  are	  rendered	  into	  a	  set	  of	  workable	  assumptions	  about	  what	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  the	  primary	  determinants	  of	  future	  shale	  gas	  development.	   In	  particular,	   this	  report	   focuses	  on	  the	  size	  and	  production	  costs	  of	  shale	  gas	  resources,	  as	  well	  as	  global	  gross	  domestic	  product	  (GDP)	  growth.	  The	  model	  is	   then	  used	   to	  construct	   five	  possible	  scenarios	  of	   future	  shale	  gas	  development.	  The	  different	  trajectories	  borne	  out	  by	  these	  scenarios	  will	  be	  analysed	  and	  compared,	  with	  a	  particular	  focus	  on	  three	  main	  outputs:	  production,	  interregional	  trade	  and	  final	  use.	  In	  doing	  so,	  this	  report	  aims	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  shale	  gas	  can	  be	  integrated	  into	  the	  global	  energy	  system.38	  One	   note	   of	   caution,	   however.	   Current	   developments	   suggest	   that	   NGLs	   may	  significantly	   lower	   the	  effective	  production	  costs	  of	  natural	  gas	   from	  shale	  wells.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  reliable	  geological	  data	  on	  the	  NGL	  content	  of	  shale	  plays	  outside	  the	  USA,	   the	  modelling	   section	   of	   this	   study	   does	   not	   address	   this	   potentially	   significant	  factor	  in	  global	  shale	  gas	  development.	  
1.6 Report	  structure	  Chapter	  2	  of	  this	  report,	  prepared	  by	  members	  of	  UKERC,	  provides	  a	  systematic	  review	  of	   evidence	  around	   the	  unconventional	   gas	   resource	  base	  –	   the	   starting	  point	   for	   any	  examination	  of	   its	  economic	   impact.	  By	  examining	   the	  methods	  and	  data	   sources	   that	  have	   been	   used	   to	   produce	   various	   estimates	   of	   the	   size	   and	   characteristics	   of	   the	  unconventional	   gas	   resources	   worldwide,	   this	   chapter	   teases	   out	   the	   main	  controversies	   and	   uncertainties	   for	   policy-­‐makers,	   and	   attempts	   to	   provide	   a	   best	  estimate	  of	  the	  resource	  base.	  Chapter	   3	   of	   this	   report	   addresses	   existing	   techniques	   for	   the	   extraction	   of	  unconventional	  gas,	  including	  an	  assessment	  of	  costs	  for	  different	  stages	  of	  exploration	  and	   production,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   prospects	   for	   future	   learning.	   The	   technological	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Richard	   Loulou	   and	   Maryse	   Labriet,	   'ETSAP-­‐TIAM:	   the	   TIMES	   integrated	   assessment	   model	   Part	   I:	  Model	  structure',	  Computational	  Management	  Science	  5,	  no	  1	  (2008).	  38	  Despite	  striving	  for	  a	  systemic	  point	  of	  view,	  it	  is	  invariably	  the	  case	  that	  not	  all	  factors	  affecting	  shale	  gas	  development	  can	  be	  considered.	  Aspects	  such	  as	  environmental	  impacts	  or	  legal	  and	  regulatory	  issues	  are	  not	  considered	  in	  the	  present	  analysis.	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dimension	  of	  the	  problem	  is	  key	  to	  understanding	  how	  much	  of	  the	  resource	  base	  can	  be	  viably	  exploited	  and	  at	  what	  price.	  The	  chapter	  has	  been	  prepared	  by	  Prof.	  Gerhard	  Thonhauser	   of	   the	   University	   of	   Loeben	   (Austria)	   and	   although	   the	   subject	   material	  does	  not	   lend	   itself	   to	  a	   systematic	   review,	   the	  chapter	  provides	  a	  useful	   reference	   to	  policy-­‐makers.	  Chapter	   4	   of	   the	   report	   addresses	   key	   ‘above-­‐ground’	   factors	   that	  may	   play	   a	   role	   in	  determining	   the	   viability	   of	   indigenous	   unconventional	   gas	   production	   in	   Europe.	   In	  particular,	   it	   singles	  out	   two	  key	  areas	  of	   controversy	   in	   the	  European	   context	   –	   land	  access	  and	  market	  access.	  The	  chapter	  also	  provides	  background	  information	  for	  policy-­‐makers	  on	  the	  complex	  relationship	  between	  energy	  independence	  and	  energy	  security.	  Chapter	   5	   of	   this	   report	   provides	   an	   overview	   of	   evidence	   around	   the	   impact	   of	  unconventional	   gas	   on	   gas	   supplies,	   gas	   prices,	   the	   energy	   mix,	   transnational	   trade	  flows	  and	  gas	  pricing	   regimes.	  To	   this	  end,	   the	  chapter	   reviews	  empirical	  data	  on	   the	  effects	   of	   unconventional	   gas	   observed	   so	   far	   in	   both	   the	  USA	   and	  Europe,	   as	  well	   as	  modelling	  studies	  covering	  its	  possible	  future	  impact.	  	  Finally,	  given	  the	  paucity	  of	  the	  existing	  data	  on	  shale	  gas	  production	  outside	  the	  United	  States	   of	   America,	   Chapter	   6	   aims	   to	   use	   an	   energy	  model	   to	   illustrate	   the	   potential	  impacts	  of	  unconventional	  gas	  in	  the	  future	  in	  order	  to	  aid	  policy-­‐makers	  in	  identifying	  potential	   challenges	   and	   benefits.	   Key	   uncertainties	   are	   selected	   and	   tested,	   and	  scenarios	  are	  defined,	  based	  on	  the	  best,	  current,	  estimated	  parameters	  as	  identified	  in	  the	  literature	  review.	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2 A	   review	   of	   regional	   and	   global	   estimates	   of	  
unconventional	  gas	  resources	  	  
C.	  McGlade	  (University	  College	  London	  Energy	  Institute,	  UK)	  
S.	  Sorrell	  (Sussex	  Energy	  Group	  at	  University	  of	  Sussex,	  UK)	  
J.	  Speirs	  (Imperial	  Centre	  for	  Energy	  Policy	  and	  Technology,	  Imperial	  College	  London,	  UK)	  	  The	  development	  of	  unconventional	  gas	  resources	  is	  having	  an	  increasing	  influence	  on	  regional	  and	  global	  gas	  markets,	  most	  notably	   in	   the	  USA.	  But	   the	   future	  potential	   for	  unconventional	   gas	  production	   remains	   contentious,	  with	  questions	  over	   the	   size	  and	  recoverability	  of	  the	  physical	  resource	  being	  central	  to	  the	  debate.	  Whilst	  estimates	  of	  unconventional	  gas	  resources	  in	  the	  USA	  remain	  very	  uncertain,	  this	  is	  eclipsed	  by	  the	  much	  greater	  uncertainty	  surrounding	  unconventional	  gas	  resources	   in	  the	  rest	  of	   the	  world.	  This	   chapter	   assesses	   the	  available	   evidence	  on	   the	   size	  of	  unconventional	   gas	  resources	   at	   a	   global	   and	   regional	   level,	   including	   the	   estimates	   made	   to	   date;	   the	  methods	   by	   which	   they	   have	   been	   produced;	   the	   range	   of	   uncertainty	   in	   these	  estimates;	   and	   the	   factors	   that	   are	   relevant	   to	   their	   interpretation.	   Key	   messages	  include	  the	  very	  wide	  range	  of	  uncertainty	  that	  exists	  at	  this	  early	  stage	  of	  development	  of	   the	   resource;	   the	   confusion	   created	   by	   competing	   resource	   definitions;	   and	   the	  existence	  of	  several	  notable	  controversies	  in	  unconventional	  gas	  resource	  assessments.	  Three	  separate	  types	  of	  unconventional	  gas	  are	  considered:	  
• Tight	  gas:	  this	  is	  gas	  trapped	  in	  relatively	  impermeable	  hard	  rock,	  limestone	  or	  sandstone,	  sometimes	  with	  quantified	  limits	  of	  permeability;	  
• Coal-­‐bed	  methane	   (CBM):	   this	   is	   gas	   trapped	   in	   coal	   seams,	   adsorbed1	  in	   the	  solid	  matrix	  of	  the	  coal;	  and	  
• Shale	   gas:	   this	   is	   gas	   trapped	   in	   fine	   grained	   sedimentary	   rock	   called	   shale,	  which	  has	  a	  characteristic	  ‘flaky’	  quality.	  Shale	  gas	  and	  CBM	  are	  clearly	  defined,	  based	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  their	  occurrence	  in	  either	  coal	   seams	   or	   shale.	   The	   case	   of	   tight	   gas	   is	   more	   ambiguous	   since	   it	   exists	   in	   very	  similar	  geological	  formations	  to	  conventional	  gas,	  but	  exhibits	  relatively	  slow	  flow	  rates.	  (For	   a	   more	   detailed	   description	   of	   these	   forms	   of	   unconventional	   gas,	   see	   Section	  3.1.2.)	  The	  recent	  interest	  in	  unconventional	  gas	  has	  been	  spurred	  mainly	  by	  the	  rapid	  emergence	   of	   shale	   gas	   in	   the	   USA	   and	   so	   this	   chapter,	   while	   discussing	   all	   of	   the	  unconventional	  gases,	  will	  focus	  in	  particular	  on	  shale	  gas	  resources.	  This	  chapter	  provides	  a	  comprehensive	  review2	  of	  the	  available	  evidence	  on	  the	  size	  of	  unconventional	   gas	   resources,	   based	   upon	   an	   exhaustive	   search	   of	   the	   available	  literature.	   Greater	   reliance	   is	   placed	   upon	   the	   more	   rigorous	   studies	   when	   drawing	  conclusions.	  The	  chapter	  addresses	  the	  following	  four	  questions:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Adsorbed	   gas	   refers	   to	   gas	   molecules	   which	   have	   formed	   some	   adhesion	   to	   the	   solid	   surface	   of	   the	  medium	  in	  which	  it	  is	  contained.	  2	  M.	   Petticrew	   and	   H.	   Roberts,	   Systematic	   Reviews	   in	   the	   Social	   Sciences:	   a	   practical	   guide	   (Oxford:	  Blackwell	  Publishing,	  2005).	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1) What	   estimates	   have	   been	  made	   of	   unconventional	   gas	   resources?	   Section	   2.1	  examines	   the	   range	   of	   literature	   on	   all	   three	   types	   of	   unconventional	   gas	  resources	   in	  both	  Europe	   and	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  world,	  with	   a	  particular	   focus	  on	  shale	  gas	  resources.	  It	  also	  discusses	  the	  different	  classifications	  and	  definitions	  of	  resource	  estimates,	  indicating	  where	  these	  are	  comparable,	  where	  they	  differ	  and	  in	  which	  reports	  these	  definitions	  are	  used.	  2) How	  do	  we	  explain	   the	   variability	   in	   shale	   gas	   resource	   estimates?	   Section	  2.2	  explores	  the	  differing	  methods	  used	  to	  derive	  shale	  gas	  resource	  estimates	  and	  provides	  an	  assessment	  of	  their	  relative	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses.	  3) What	  does	  experience	  in	  the	  Unites	  States	  of	  America	  tell	  us	  about	  the	  resource	  estimation?	  Section	  2.3	  examines	  the	  relevance	  of	  production	  decline	  rates	  from	  individual	  wells,	  summarises	  some	  of	  the	  recent	  controversies	  over	  this	  issue	  in	  the	  USA,	  and	  assesses	  the	  implications	  for	  the	  robustness	  of	  resource	  estimates.	  4) What	  is	  the	  range	  of	  uncertainty	  over	  the	  size	  of	  unconventional	  gas	  resources?	  Section	  2.4	  draws	   together	   the	  evidence	   in	  preceding	  chapters	  and	  attempts	   to	  characterise	  the	  uncertainty	  surrounding	  estimates	  of	  global	  unconventional	  gas,	  and	  particularly	  shale	  gas,	  resources.	  
2.1 Estimates:	  The	  global	  unconventional	  gas	  resource	  base	  	  This	  section	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  literature	  providing	  resource	  estimates	  for	  the	  three	  unconventional	  gases.	  These	  estimates	  are	  presented	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways	  that	  are	  not	  always	  comparable,	  so	   it	   is	   first	   important	  to	  establish	  the	  meaning	  of	   the	  various	  terms	   and	   definitions	   that	   are	   employed.	   These	   definitional	   issues	   are	   discussed	   in	  detail	  in	  Section	  2.1.1.	  	  Section	   2.1.2	   provides	   a	   breakdown	   of	   the	   various	   types	   of	   literature	   that	   exist,	  categorising	   studies	   by	   date,	   region,	   unconventional	   gases	   covered	   and	  whether	   they	  have	  been	  peer	  reviewed.	  This	  is	  followed	  by	  a	  closer	  examination	  of	  the	  upward	  trend	  in	  shale	  gas	  resource	  estimates	  over	  the	  last	  two	  decades,	  which	  serves	  to	  demonstrate	  how	   rapidly	   knowledge	   is	   growing	   in	   this	   area.	   Section	   2.1.3	   examines	   the	   various	  regional	   and	   global	   estimates	   of	   shale	   gas	   resources,	   focusing	   in	   particular	   on	   those	  made	   in	  the	   last	   three	  years,	  while	  Section	  2.1.4	  puts	  these	   into	  context	  by	  comparing	  them	  with	  global	  estimates	  of	  conventional,	  tight	  and	  CBM	  resources.	  Using	  the	  mean	  of	  recoverable	  resource	  estimates,	   it	   is	  shown	  that	  shale	  gas	  may	  comprise	  some	  30%	  of	  the	  global	  technically	  recoverable	  resource	  of	  natural	  gas.	  However,	  the	  main	  lesson	  is	  the	  wide	  variability	  and	  large	  uncertainty	  in	  unconventional	  gas	  resource	  estimates.	  
2.1.1 Definitions	  
Resource	  definitions	  Estimates	   for	   unconventional	   gas	   resources	   may	   be	   provided	   for	   different	   levels	   of	  spatial	   aggregation	   (e.g.	   country,	   region,	   ‘geological	  play’,3	  fields,	  well)	   and	  may	  either	  refer	  to	  quantities	  of	  gas	  that	  are	  estimated	  to	  be	  present	  or	  quantities	  of	  gas	  that	  are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 A	  geological	  play	  is	  defined	  as	  “A	  set	  of	  known	  or	  postulated	  oil	  and	  gas	  accumulations	  sharing	  similar	  geologic,	  geographic,	  and	  temporal	  properties,	  such	  as	  source	  rock,	  migration	  pathway,	  timing,	  trapping	  mechanism,	   and	   hydrocarbon	   type.”	   United	   States	   Geological	   Survey,	   'Chapter	   GL	   Glossary',	   in	  World	  
petroleum	  assessment	  2000:	  new	  estimates	  of	  undiscovered	  oil	  and	  natural	  gas,	   including	   reserve	  growth,	  
outside	  the	  United	  States	  (Reston,	  VA:	  US	  Department	  of	  the	  Interior,	  2000).	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estimated	   to	   be	   technically	   or	   economically	   recoverable.	   In	   the	   latter	   case,	   these	  estimates	   may	   be	   expressed	   probabilistically	   and/or	   given	   to	   different	   levels	   of	  confidence	   (e.g.	   ‘probable’	   or	   ‘possible’).	   Clear	   definitions	   and	   appropriate	  interpretation	   of	   the	   figures	   stated	   is	   important	   as	   confusion	   or	   problems	   frequently	  arise	   when	   different	   estimates	   are	   incorrectly	   compared.	   Within	   this	   chapter,	   the	  specific	  definitions	  given	  below	  will	  be	  used.	  However,	   the	  wide-­‐ranging	  nature	  of	   the	  evidence	  means	  that	  not	  all	  of	  the	  reports	  use	  the	  same	  definitions.	  In	  some	  cases,	  the	  definition	  being	  used	  is	  not	  stated	  explicitly	  or	  at	  all;	   in	  others,	  similar	  terms	  are	  used	  but	  with	   slightly	   different	   interpretations;	  while	   in	   further	   reports,	   ambiguous	   terms	  that	   could	   refer	   to	   any	   of	   the	   definitions	   are	   employed	   (e.g.	   ‘recoverable	   resources’).	  This	  often	  compounds	  the	  problem	  mentioned	  above	  of	  comparing	  different	  estimates.	  Wherever	  possible,	  definitions	  have	  been	  compared	  only	  when	   they	  are	  equivalent	  or	  are	  judged	  to	  be	  effectively	  equivalent.	  	  A	   problem	   that	   frequently	   occurs	   is	   the	   use	   of	   terms	   applicable	   to	   conventional	   gas	  resources	  when	   referring	   to	  unconventional	   gas	   resources,	  where	   it	  would	  be	   clearer	  and	  less	  ambiguous	  to	  use	  alternative	  terms.	  An	  example	  of	  this	  is	  the	  use	  of	  the	  terms	  ‘discovered’	   and	   ‘undiscovered’.	   In	   contrast	   to	   conventional	  oil	   and	  gas	   resources,	   the	  location	  of	   the	  petroleum	  source	   for	  unconventional	  gas	   is	  usually	  known	  and	  so	  they	  are	   not	   ‘undiscovered’	   in	   the	   traditional	   sense:	   a	   well	   drilled	   into	   an	   area	   holding	  unconventional	   gases	   will	   probably	   yield	   some	   volumes	   of	   gas.	   However,	   if	   these	  regions	  have	  not	  been	  extensively	  drilled,	  the	  precise	  characteristics	  of	  the	  geology	  may	  not	  be	  well	  known	  and	  there	  may	  be	  corresponding	  uncertainty	  regarding	  the	  technical	  and	  economic	  feasibility	  of	  gas	  production.	  	  The	   Society	   of	   Petroleum	   Engineers	   (SPE)	   Petroleum	  Resources	  Management	   System	  (PRMS)	   indicates	   that	   ‘discovered’	   shale	   gas	   resources	   require	   ‘collected	   data	   [that]	  establish[es]	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   significant	   quantity	   of	   potentially	   moveable	  hydrocarbons’.4	  To	  meet	   this	   criterion,	   the	   SPE	   indicates	   that	   there	  must	  be	   sufficient	  evidence	  of	   the	  existence	  of	  hydrocarbons	   from	  well	   tests,	  core	  and	   log	  data,	   together	  with	  evidence	  that	  areas	  which	  are	  similar	  to	  that	  under	  investigation	  (‘analogues’)	  can	  support	   commercially	   viable	   gas	   production.	   This	   appears	   to	   be	   a	   reasonable	  requirement,	   especially	   given	   the	   heterogeneity	   found	   in	   many	   unconventional	   gas	  plays	   (see	   Section	   2.1.3).	   However	   it	   does	   not	   allow	   one	   to	   distinguish	   between	  geological	   areas	   that	   contain	   ‘Resources	   postulated	   from	   geologic	   information	   and	  theory	   to	   exist	   outside	   of	   known	   oil	   and	   gas	   fields’	   (the	   ‘traditional’	   definition	   of	  undiscovered	  conventional	  hydrocarbons	  used	  by	  the	  United	  States	  Geological	  Survey,	  USGS5)	  and	  those	  areas	  that	  are	  known	  but	  do	  not	  meet	  the	  above	  requirement.	  Unless	  otherwise	   stated,	   use	   of	   the	   term	   ‘undiscovered’	   in	   this	   chapter	   refers	   only	   to	   the	  traditional	  definition	  –	  i.e.	  gas	  that	  is	  estimated	  to	  exist	  outside	  of	  known	  formations.	  When	  reporting	  unconventional	  gas	  volumes,	  the	  largest	  figure	  that	  can	  be	  given	  is	  the	  initial	   or	   original	   gas	   in	   place	   (OGIP);	   this	   is	   the	   total	   volume	   of	   natural	   gas	   that	   is	  estimated	  to	  be	  present	  in	  a	  given	  field,	  play	  or	  region.	  This	  figure	  only	  conveys	  part	  of	  the	  necessary	  information	  to	  estimate	  recoverable	  resources,	  however.	  The	  fraction	  of	  the	  OGIP	  that	  is	  estimated	  to	  be	  recoverable	  –	  the	  recovery	  factor	  –	  is	  equally	  important	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Society	   of	   Petroleum	   Engineers,	   'Guidelines	   for	   Application	   of	   the	   Petroleum	   Resources	  Management	  System',	  (London:	  Society	  of	  Petroleum	  Engineers,	  2011).	  5	  United	  States	  Geological	  Survey,	  'Chapter	  GL	  Glossary'.	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and	  can	  vary	  substantially	  depending	  on	  the	  geological	  conditions,	  technology	  used	  and	  prevailing	  gas	  prices.	  The	  ultimately	  recoverable	  resource	  (URR)	  of	  a	  field	  or	  region	  is	  the	  sum	  of	  all	  gas	  that	  is	  expected	  to	  be	  recovered	  from	  that	  field	  or	  region	  over	  all	  time.	  This	  figure	  includes	  any	  gas	  that	  is	  estimated	  to	  be	  undiscovered	  (using	  both	  of	  the	  above	  interpretations),	  is	  not	  recoverable	   with	   current	   technology,	   and/or	   is	   not	   currently	   economic	   but	   which	   is	  expected	   to	  become	  so	  before	  production	  ceases.	  The	   fraction	  of	   the	  gas	   in	  place	   that	  can	   be	   classified	   as	   URR	   therefore	   takes	   into	   account	   anticipated	   technological	  developments,	   changes	   in	  market	   conditions	   and/or	   exploration	   efforts.	   Estimates	   of	  URR	  will	  therefore	  be	  sensitive	  to	  the	  assumptions	  used	  and	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  particularly	  uncertain	   during	   the	   early	   stages	   of	   a	   region’s	   development.	   The	   industry-­‐standard	  term	   for	   discussing	   the	   ultimate	   recovery	   from	   an	   individual	   well	   is	   the	   estimated	  
ultimate	  recovery	  (EUR)	  usually	  denoted	  as	  EUR/well	  and	  also	  sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘productivity’.	  EUR	  is	  essentially	  identical	  to	  URR,	  although	  URR	  is	  usually	  preferred	  when	  referring	  to	  areas	  or	  regions	  larger	  than	  a	  well,	  and	  so	  the	  notation	  of	  URR/well	  has	  been	  used	   throughout	   this	  report	   instead	  of	  EUR/well	   to	  avoid	  confusion.	  A	  more	  detailed	  description	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  URR	  and	  EUR	  is	  provided	  in	  Annex	  B.	  	  An	  alternative	  estimate	  that	  can	  be	  given	  is	  the	  technically	  recoverable	  resources	  (TRR).	  TRR	   is	   the	   resource	   figure	   most	   frequently	   provided	   by	   the	   literature;	   however,	  complete	   and	   clear	   definitions	   of	   TRR	   are	   rarely	   provided.	   Sources	   reviewed	   in	   this	  chapter	   agree	   that	   TRR	   is	   the	   fraction	   of	   the	   gas	   in	   place	   that	   is	   estimated	   to	   be	  recoverable	   only	  with	   current	   technology;	   however,	   ambiguity	   remains	   over	  whether	  sources	  include	  undiscovered	  volumes	  of	  gas	  from	  their	  definitions	  and	  what	  they	  mean	  by	  the	  term	  ‘undiscovered’.	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  sources	  that	  provide	  explicit	  definitions	  do	  appear	   to	   include	  undiscovered	  volumes	  of	   gas	  within	   their	   estimates	  of	  TRR.	  The	  report	   authors	   have	   therefore	   employed	   a	   definition	   whereby	   TRR	   is	   gas	   that	   is	  estimated	  to	  be	  recoverable	  with	  current	  technology	   in:	  a)	  discovered	  formations	  that	  are	  considered	  to	  meet	  the	  SPE/PRMS	  requirements;	  b)	  discovered	  formations	  that	  are	  not	  considered	  to	  meet	  the	  SPE/PRMS	  requirements;	  and	  c)	  undiscovered	  formations.	  If	  cumulative	  production	  to	  date	   is	  subtracted	   from	  the	  estimated	  TRR,	   the	  residual	   is	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  remaining	  technically	  recoverable	  resources	  (RTRR).	  In	  practice,	  given	  the	   infancy	   of	   unconventional	   gas	   production	   outside	   a	   few	   areas	   in	   North	   America,	  these	   two	   terms	   are	   effectively	   equivalent	   in	   the	  majority	   of	   regions.	  Where	   relevant	  and	  possible,	  estimates	  can	  be	  converted	  to	  the	  definition	  stated	  (TRR,	  URR,	  etc.)	  using	  the	  cumulative	  production	  data	  shown	  in	  Figure	  2-­‐5.	  Since	  not	   all	   of	   the	   technically	   recoverable	   resources	  will	   be	   economic	   to	   recover,	   for	  example	   in	   fields	   with	   low	   production	   rates	   and	   high	   costs,	   a	   further	   subset	   of	   the	  technically	  recoverable	  resources	  is	  often	  given:	  the	  economically	  recoverable	  resources	  (ERR).	  Similar	  to	  TRR,	  this	  estimate	  typically	   includes	  any	  gas	  that	   is	   in:	  a)	  discovered	  formations	   that	   are	   considered	   to	   meet	   the	   SPE/PRMS	   requirements;	   b)	   discovered	  formations	   that	   are	   not	   considered	   to	   meet	   the	   SPE/PRMS	   requirements;	   and	   c)	  undiscovered	  formations.	  However,	  unlike	  TRR,	  the	  ERR	  must	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  both	  technically	   and	   economically	   recoverable.	   In	   principle,	   if	   the	   market	   price	   was	   to	  increase	   or	   the	   production	   costs	   decrease,	   the	   estimated	   volume	   of	   economically	  recoverable	  resources	  would	  be	  expected	  to	  increase	  (and	  vice	  versa).	  The	   concept	   of	   economically	   recoverable	   resources	   of	   unconventional	   gas	   in	  undiscovered	  areas	  is	  strange:	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  little	  basis	  for	  assumptions	  about	  the	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economic	  viability	  of	  resources	  within	  regions	  which	  have	  not	  yet	  been	  found,	  have	  not	  been	  drilled	  and	  about	  which	  very	  little	  information	  is	  available.	  However,	  a	  number	  of	  sources6	  report	  the	  economically	  recoverable	  resources	  for	  conventional	  oil	  and	  gas	  in	  undiscovered	   areas.	   So	   in	   order	   to	   provide	   consistency,	   gas	   in	   undiscovered	   areas	  within	   the	   report’s	   definition	   of	   ERR	   for	   unconventional	   gas	   has	   also	   been	   included	  here,	  although	  it	  could	  equally	  be	  argued	  that	  it	  should	  be	  excluded.	  	  
Reserve	  definitions	  The	  final	  subset	  of	  resources	  is	  reserves.	  The	  exact	  definition	  of	  reserves	  varies	  from	  one	  source	  to	  another,	  but	  they	  are	  generally	  those	  portions	  of	  the	  economically	  recoverable	  resources	  that	  have	  been	  discovered	  (i.e.	  fulfil	  the	  SPE/PRMS	  criterion	  described	  above)	  and	  are	  estimated	  to	  have	  a	  specified	  probability	  of	  being	  produced.	  Reserve	  estimates	  are	  frequently	  given	  to	  three	  levels	  of	  confidence,	  namely:	  proved	  reserves	  (1P);	  proved	  
and	  probable	  reserves	  (2P);	  and	  proved,	  probable	  and	  possible	  reserves	  (3P).	  In	  principle,	  an	   estimate	   of	   economically	   recoverable	   resources	   includes	   both	   reserves	   and	   the	  estimated	   volumes	   of	   undiscovered	   gas	   that	   is	   considered	   to	   be	   economically	  recoverable.	  However,	  estimates	  of	  ERR	  are	  rarely	  given	  a	  probabilistic	  interpretation,	  so	  typically	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  whether	  they	  are	  based	  upon	  1P,	  2P	  or	  3P	  reserve	  estimates.	  Definitions	  of	  the	  1P,	  2P	  and	  3P	  reserves	  vary	  widely	  from	  one	  country	  to	  another	  and	  from	  one	  company	  to	  another,	  with	  some	  employing	  a	  deterministic	  definition	  (certain	  qualitative	  criteria	  must	  be	  satisfied)	  and	  others	  using	  a	  probabilistic	  definition	  (reserve	  estimates	  are	  based	  upon	  a	  probability	  distribution	  of	  resource	  recovery).	  For	  example,	  the	   SPE/PRMS	   allows	   one	   to	   associate	   1P,	   2P	   and	   3P	   with	   either	   deterministic	   or	  probabilistic	  definitions.	  Descriptions	  of	  the	  deterministic	  definitions	  are	  given	  with,	  for	  example,	   1P	   reserves:	   ‘those	  quantities	   of	   petroleum	  which,	   by	   analysis	   of	   geoscience	  and	   engineering	  data,	   can	  be	   estimated	  with	   reasonable	   certainty	   to	   be	   commercially	  recoverable’.	  	  Under	   the	   SPE/PRMS	   probabilistic	   definitions	   1P,	   2P	   and	   3P,	   reserve	   estimates	   are	  commonly	   expressed	   as	   P90,	   P50	   and	   P10	   respectively.	   P90	   (1P)	   estimates	   are	   then	  interpreted	  as	  the	  volume	  of	  gas	  production	  that	  is	  estimated	  to	  have	  a	  90%	  probability	  of	   being	   exceeded	   by	   the	   time	   production	   ceases.	   Similarly,	   P50	   (2P)	   and	   P10	   (3P)	  estimates	  refer	  to	  volumes	  of	  gas	  production	  that	  are	  estimated	  to	  have	  a	  50%	  and	  10%	  probability	   respectively	   of	   being	   exceeded.	   Under	   this	   interpretation,	   2P	   (P50)	   is	  equivalent	   to	   a	  median	   estimate	   of	   reserves.	   This	   leads	   to	   two	   additional	   problems,	  however.	  The	  first	   is	  whether	  available	  reserve	  estimates	  actually	  correspond	  to	  these	  precise	   statistical	   definitions. 7 	  The	   second	   relates	   to	   the	   aggregation	   of	   reserve	  estimates:	  for	  example,	  in	  deriving	  regional	  reserve	  estimates	  by	  summing	  the	  reserve	  estimates	  of	  individual	  fields.	  Statistically,	  it	  is	  only	  valid	  to	  arithmetically	  sum	  reserve	  estimates	  if	  these	  correspond	  to	  mean	  estimates	  of	  recoverable	  resources.	  If,	   instead,	  1P	  (P90)	  reserve	  estimates	  are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  E.D.	   Attanasi	   and	   P.A.	   Freeman,	   'Economic	   analysis	   of	   the	   2010	   U.S.	   Geological	   Survey	   assessment	   of	  undiscovered	   oil	   and	   gas	   in	   the	   National	   Petroleum	   Reserve	   in	   Alaska',	   (Reston,	   VA:	   United	   States	  Geological	   Survey,	   2011);	   Minerals	   Management	   Service,	   'Assessment	   of	   Undiscovered	   Technically	  Recoverable	   Oil	   and	   Gas	   Resources	   of	   the	   Nation’s	   Outer	   Continental	   Shelf',	   (Washington,	   DC:	   US	  Department	  of	  the	  Interior,	  2006).	  7	  Steve	  Sorrell	  et	  al.,	  'Global	  oil	  depletion:	  An	  assessment	  of	  the	  evidence	  for	  a	  near-­‐term	  peak	  in	  global	  oil	  production',	  (London:	  UK	  Energy	  Research	  Centre,	  2009).	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arithmetically	   summed,	   the	   aggregate	   figure	   will	   underestimate	   the	   total	   reserves.	  Similarly,	  if	  3P	  (P10)	  reserve	  estimates	  are	  arithmetically	  summed,	  the	  aggregate	  figure	  will	  overestimate	  the	  total	  reserves.8	  Aggregation	  of	  2P	  reserve	  estimates	  should	  lead	  to	  smaller	   errors,	   but	   the	   magnitude	   and	   sign	   of	   these	   errors	   will	   depend	   upon	   the	  difference	   between	  mean	   and	  median	   estimates	   and	   hence	   the	   precise	   shape	   of	   the	  underlying	  probability	  distribution	  (which	  is	  rarely	  available).	   In	  practice,	  aggregation	  of	   1P	   estimates	   is	   more	   common,	   thereby	   leading	   to	   underestimation	   of	   regional	  reserves.	  	  A	  comparison	  of	  the	  different	  resource	  definitions	  is	  presented	  in	  Table	  2-­‐1	  and	  in	  the	  form	   of	   a	   modified	   ‘McKelvey	   box’	   in	   Figure	   2-­‐1.9	  It	   should	   be	   clear	   from	   the	   above,	  however,	   that	   the	   use	   of	   resource	   and	   reserve	   terminology	   is	   inconsistent,	   imprecise	  and	   in	   need	  of	   standardisation.	  Given	   the	   early-­‐stage	  production	  of	   this	   resource	   and	  the	  very	  large	  uncertainty	  in	  all	  resource	  estimates,	  considerable	  overlap	  is	  anticipated	  between	   URR,	   TRR	   and	   ERR	   estimates	   –	   despite	   the	   conceptual	   distinction	   between	  them.	  
Table	  2-­‐1:	  Interpreting	  the	  terminology	  used	  for	  unconventional	  gas	  resource	  estimates	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Economically	  recoverable	  with	  current	  technology	   P	   	   	   	  
1P/2P/3P	  
reserves	  
Specific	  probability	  of	  being	  produced	   	   	   	   	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  R.	   Pike,	   'Have	   we	   underestimated	   the	   environmental	   challenge?',	   Petroleum	   review	   (2006):	   26-­‐27,	  Sorrell	  et	  al.,	  'Oil	  depletion'.	  9	  V.E.	  McKelvey,	  'Mineral	  resource	  estimates	  and	  public	  policy',	  American	  Scientist	  60	  (1972):	  32-­‐40.	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Figure	  2-­‐1:	  Resources	  and	  reserves10	  
	  Natural	  gas	  is	  generally	  reported	  on	  a	  volumetric	  basis	  in	  either	  imperial	  (cubic	  feet)	  or	  metric	   (cubic	  metres)	   units.	   In	   the	   imperial	   system,	   a	   prefix	   of	   ‘M’	   usually	   denotes	   a	  thousand	  (so	  MMcf	  is	  a	  million	  cubic	  feet),	  while	  in	  the	  metric	  system	  ‘m’	  corresponds	  to	  a	  million	  (so	  mcm	  is	  a	  million	  cubic	  metres).	  For	  resource	  estimates,	  the	  most	  common	  prefixes	  are	  ‘B’	  for	  a	  billion	  and	  ‘T’	  for	  a	  trillion,	  both	  of	  which	  are	  commonly	  used	  with	  cubic	  metres	  and	  feet.	  At	  60oF	  (15.56oC)	  and	  14.73	  psi	  (1	  atmosphere	  or	  101.325kPa),	  cubic	  feet	  can	  be	  derived	  by	  multiplying	  cubic	  metres	  by	  35.3,	  i.e.	  1	  Tcm	  =	  35.3	  Tcf.	  Although	  the	  majority	  of	  existing	  literature	  uses	  one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  above	  categories	  of	  resources,	   there	   is	  one	   important	  exception:	   the	  United	  States	  Geological	   Service.	  The	  USGS	   states	   that	   it	   provides	   estimates	   of	   “undiscovered”	   volumes	   of	   unconventional	  gases	  in	  different	  geological	  areas	  of	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America.	  The	  USGS	  reports	  do	  not	  provide	  a	  clear	  definition	  of	  the	  term	  ‘undiscovered’,	  but	   information	  contained	  in	  two	  USGS	  methodological	  papers11	  indicates	  that	  these	  figures	  should	  be	  interpreted	  as	  “potential	   additions	   to	   reserves”.	   The	   authors	   conclude	   that	   an	   estimate	   of	   the	  remaining	  technically	  recoverable	  resources	  for	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  USA	  may	  be	  derived	  by	  summing	  the	  available	  estimates	  of	  the	  following.	  	  
• US	  proved	  reserves;	  
• US	  inferred	  reserves;12	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Source:	  Modified	  from	  Ibid.	  11	  R.R.	   Charpentier	   and	   T.A.	   Cook,	   'Improved	   USGS	   methodology	   for	   assessing	   continuous	   petroleum	  resources',	  (Reston,	  VA:	  United	  States	  Geological	  Service,	  2010),	  22;	  J.W.	  Schmoker,	  'US	  Geological	  Survey	  Assessment	   Concepts	   for	   Continuous	   Petroleum	   Accumulations,	   in	   Petroleum	   Systems	   and	   Geologic	  Assessment	   of	   Oil	   and	   Gas	   in	   the	   Southwestern	  Wyoming	   Province,	   Wyoming,	   Colorado,	   and	   Utah.',	   (	  Denver,	  CO:	  United	  States	  Geological	  Survey,	  2005).	  12	  The	  definition	  of	  the	  term	  ‘inferred	  reserves’	  is	  unclear	  as	  it	  is	  used	  by	  different	  organisations	  to	  mean	  different	  things.	  The	  USGS	  in	  1995,	  for	  example,	  used	  it	  to	  refer	  to	  reserve	  growth	  in	  conventional	  fields,	  while	  the	  EIA	  indicated	  that	  it	  most	  likely	  corresponds	  to	  ‘probable	  reserves’.	  The	  authors	  prefer	  this	  later	  definition	   since	   it	   is	   more	   recent	   and	   more	   applicable	   to	   unconventional	   gas	   resources.	   ‘Probable	  reserves’	  appear	  to	  be	  equivalent	   to	  2P	  minus	  1P	  reserves.	  EIA,	   'Estimation	  of	  reserves	  and	  resources	  -­‐	  appendix	  G',	  in	  US	  Crude	  Oil,	  Natural	  Gas,	  and	  Natural	  Gas	  Liquids	  reserves	  report	  (Washington,	  DC:	  2009),	  D.L.	  Gautier	  and	  United	  States	  Geological	  Survey,	   '1995	  national	  assessment	  of	  United	  States	  oil	  and	  gas	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• the	  USGS	  mean	  estimates	  of	  potential	  additions	  to	  reserves	  in	  known	  formations;	  and	  
• mean	  estimates	  of	  undiscovered	  technically	  recoverable	  resources.	  The	   addition	   of	   contemporaneous	   estimates	   of	   total	   cumulative	   production	   gives	   an	  estimate	  of	  the	  total	  technically	  recoverable	  resource	  of	  the	  USA.	  
2.1.2 Sources	  of	  data	  The	   focus	   of	   this	   chapter	   is	   original	   estimates	   of	   OGIP,	   TRR	   or	   ERR	   for	   any	   of	   the	  unconventional	   gases	   –	   although	   with	   a	   particular	   focus	   on	   shale	   gas.	   An	   original	  estimate	   for	  any	  country	  or	   region	   is	  one	   from	  a	   source	   that	  has	  either	  developed	   the	  estimate	   itself	   using	   recognised	  methodologies,	   or	  adapted	   the	   estimate	   from	  existing	  sources.	   Original	   estimates	   do	   not	   need	   to	   come	   from	   independent	   or	   distinct	  organisations	   –	   indeed,	   several	   individuals	   and	   organisations	   have	   produced	  multiple	  estimates.	  However,	  the	  estimates	  must	  be	  different	  in	  order	  to	  be	  counted	  as	  original.	  	  As	   can	   be	   seen	   in	   Figure	   2-­‐2,	   there	   are	   56	   reports	   providing	   original	   country-­‐level	  estimates	  of	  unconventional	  gas	  resources,	  with	  38	  of	  these	  (~70%)	  published	  since	  the	  beginning	   of	   2007.	   The	   primary	   motivation	   for	   these	   studies	   has	   been	   the	   rapid	  development	  of	  US	  shale	  gas	  resources	  (Figure	  2-­‐5),	  with	  52	  of	  the	  56	  reports	  providing	  resource	   estimates	   for	   the	   USA	   and/or	   Canada.	   Figure	   2-­‐4	   provides	   a	   breakdown	   of	  estimates	   by	   gas	   type	   and	   region,	   indicating	   whether	   the	   reports	   have	   been	   peer	  reviewed.	  	  
Figure	  2-­‐2:	  Cumulative	  number	  of	  reports	  published	  providing	  original	  country-­‐level	  estimates	  of	  
any	  of	  the	  unconventional	  gases	  
	  Relatively	   few	  organisations	  or	   individuals	  provide	  periodic	  resource	  estimates	   for	  all	  three	   of	   the	   unconventional	   gases	   on	   a	   consistent	   basis.	  One	  notable	   exception	   is	   the	  EIA,	  whose	  Annual	  Energy	  Outlooks	   (AEO)	  have	  provided	  estimates	  of	   the	   remaining,	  technically	  recoverable,	  unconventional	  gas	  resources	  in	  the	  USA	  since	  1997.	  Each	  AEO	  reports	  the	  remaining	  recoverable	  resources	  from	  two	  years	  prior	  to	  publication,	  so	  the	  first	  estimate	  of	  remaining	  recoverable	  resources	  is	  for	  1995. Figure	  2-­‐3	  demonstrates	  that	   the	   estimates	   of	   the	   remaining	   technically	   recoverable	   tight	   gas	   and	   CBM	   have	  increased	  by	  25%	  and	  134%	  respectively	  since	  1995,	  while	  the	  estimates	  for	  shale	  gas	  have	   increased	   by	   a	   factor	   of	   15.	   The	  majority	   of	   the	   increase	   in	   tight	   gas	   and	   CBM	  resource	   estimates	   has	   occurred	   since	   2007,	   with	   estimated	   volumes	   increasing	   by	  around	  50%	  and	  100%	  respectively.	  Shale	  gas	  estimates	  have	  increased	  by	  200%	  in	  the	  same	  timeframe.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  resources	   results,	   methodology,	   and	   supporting	   data	   ',	   (Reston,	   VA:	   United	   States	   Geological	   Survey,	  1995).	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Figure	  2-­‐3:	  Estimates	  of	  remaining	  recoverable	  resources	  for	  unconventional	  gases	  in	  the	  USA	  in	  
successive	  Annual	  Energy	  Outlooks	  from	  the	  EIA13	  
	  
 
Figure	  2-­‐4:	  Distribution	  of	  literature	  providing	  original	  resource	  estimates	  by	  region,	  source	  and	  
gas	  type14	  
	  
 As	  indicated	  in	  Figure	  2-­‐4,	  a	  great	  number	  of	  reports	  have	  provided	  estimates	  for	  shale	  gas	   resources	   in	   North	   America.	   There	   is,	   however,	   a	   huge	   variation	   between	   these	  estimates	   and	   US	   estimates	   have	   risen	   dramatically	   in	   the	   past	   six	   years.	   Figure	   2-­‐5	  illustrates	   the	   trend	   in	   US	   shale	   gas	   resource	   estimates	   since	   1982.	   These	   increased	  from	  an	  average	  of	  1.8	  Tcm	  between	  1983	  and	  2005	  to	  an	  average	  of	  18.4	  Tcm	  between	  2006	  and	  2010.	  This	  rise	  coincided	  with	  a	  roughly	  tenfold	  increase	  in	  annual	  shale	  gas	  production	  over	   the	  same	  period.	  Since	   the	  rapid	   increase	   in	   the	  estimated	  volume	  of	  recoverable	  resources	  has	  coincided	  with	  a	  dramatic	  increase	  in	  drilling	  across	  the	  USA	  and	   therefore	  provided	  a	   greater	   knowledge	   and	  understanding	  of	   the	   resource	  base,	  the	  more	  recent	  estimates	  are	  likely	  to	  prove	  more	  accurate.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13 	  Source:	   EIA,	   'Annual	   Energy	   Outlook',	   (Washington,	   DC:	   US	   Energy	   Information	   Administration,	  Various).	   The	   1998	   and	   1997	   AEOs	   provided	   estimates	   of	   the	   remaining	   ERR	   while	   all	   the	   others	  provided	  estimates	  of	  the	  remaining	  TRR.	  14	  Note:	  A	  number	  of	  reports	  provide	  estimates	  for	  more	  than	  one	  country	  or	  gas	  type.	  These	  are	  reported	  separately	  in	  each	  category	  and	  so	  the	  absolute	  numbers	  within	  each	  chart	  will	  not	  be	  identical.	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Figure	  2-­‐5:	  US	  shale	  gas	  resource	  estimates	  and	  annual	  production15	  
	  
2.1.3 Estimates	  of	  shale	  gas	  resource	  
Global	  estimates	  	  This	  section	  provides	  a	  more	  detailed	  examination	  of	  the	  estimates	  made	  for	  shale	  gas	  resources	  or	  shale	  gas-­‐in-­‐place.	  It	  begins	  with	  those	  reports	  that	  have	  considered	  either	  global	  shale	  gas	  resources	  or	  the	  shale	  gas	  potential	  in	  a	  number	  of	  regions	  worldwide.	  This	   is	   followed	   by	   an	   examination	   of	   the	   estimates	   that	   have	   been	   made	   in	   North	  America,	  Europe	  and	  in	  China.	  For	  all	  other	  regions	  it	  was	  found	  that	  only	  one	  or	  two,	  if	  any,	   resource	   estimates	   were	   available	   and	   so	   it	   was	   not	   possible	   to	   provide	   any	  meaningful	  comparisons	  of	  these.	  A	   total	  of	  50	   sources	  provide	  original	   country	  or	   regional-­‐level	   estimates	  of	   shale	  gas	  resources	  (see	  Table	  B-­‐1).	  As	  indicated	  previously,	  a	  number	  of	  sources	  do	  not	  indicate	  whether	   they	   have	   included	   estimates	   of	   undiscovered	   volumes	   of	   shale	   gas	   in	   their	  estimates	  of	  TRR.	  We	  can	  deduce	  whether	  this	  is	  likely,	  however,	  by	  examining	  whether	  they	  only	  consider	  individual,	  discovered	  shale	  plays	  and/or	  make	  any	  reference	  to	  the	  potential	  for	  shale	  gas	  to	  be	  found	  outside	  these	  plays.	  INTEK16	  estimates	  that	  there	  are	  1.6	  Tcm	  of	  undiscovered	  shale	  gas	  resources	  in	  the	  USA.	  Hence,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  convert	  estimates	   of	   ‘discovered	   TRR’	   in	   the	   USA	   to	   estimates	   of	   ‘full	   TRR’	   by	   adding	   in	   the	  INTEK	  figure.	  There	  are	  no	  estimates	  of	  undiscovered	  shale	  gas	  outside	  the	  USA	  since	  the	  focus	  to	  date	  has	  been	  on	  those	  shale	  plays	  that	  are	  known	  to	  exist.	  On	  a	  global	  scale,	  the	  estimate	  made	  by	  Rogner17	  formed	  the	  basis	  of	  nearly	  all	  estimates	  of	  the	  shale	  gas	  resource	  base	  outside	  North	  America	  until	  around	  2009.	  As	  discussed	  in	  more	   detail	   in	   Section	   2.2,	   Rogner	   estimated	   the	   original	   gas	   in	   place	   for	   each	   of	   the	  unconventional	   gases	  within	   11	   continental	   regions,	   as	   shown	   in	   Table	   2-­‐2.	   Rogner’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15 	  Source:	   Production	   data	   from	   1982-­‐1989	   taken	   from	   Slutz,	   'Well	   completions	   and	   production	  challenges';	   data	   from	   1990	   onwards	   taken	   from	   EIA,	   'AEO	   2011'.	   Graph	   includes	   both	   TRR	   and	   ERR	  resource	  estimates	  from	  all	  sources.	  The	  USGS	  figure	  combines	  all	  of	   its	   latest	  resource	  assessments	  for	  shale	  plays	  of	  various	  dates	  but	  is	  plotted	  at	  August	  2011,	  the	  date	  of	  the	  most	  recent	  USGS	  assessment	  of	  the	  Marcellus	  shale.	  J.L.	  Coleman	  et	  al.,	  'Assessment	  of	  undiscovered	  oil	  and	  gas	  resources	  of	  the	  Devonian	  Marcellus	  shale	  of	  the	  Appalachian	  basin	  province',	  (Reston,	  VA:	  United	  States	  Geological	  Survey,	  2011).	  16	  INTEK,	  'Review	  of	  emerging	  resources:	  U.S.	  shale	  gas	  and	  shale	  oil	  plays',	  (Washington,	  DC:	  2011).	  17	  Rogner,	  'Assessment	  of	  World	  Resources'.	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estimate	   of	   the	   global	   OGIP	   for	   unconventional	   gas	  was	   920	  Tcm,	   of	  which	   50%	  was	  shale	  gas.	  Rogner	  neither	  provided	  a	  breakdown	  of	  OGIP	  in	  any	  individual	  countries,	  nor	  did	  he	  indicate	  the	  fraction	  of	  these	  values	  that	  were	  likely	  to	  be	  recoverable.	  However,	  numerous	   organisations	   have	   derived	   technically	   recoverable	   resource	   estimates	   by	  applying	   percentage	   recovery	   factors	   to	   Rogner’s	   figures.	   Some	   values	   suggested	   or	  used	   include	   15%	   by	   Mohr	   and	   Evans,18	  10-­‐35%	   by	   the	   Massachusetts	   Institute	   of	  Technology	  (MIT)19	  and	  40%	  by	  both	  ARI20	  and	  the	  IEA21.	  To	  put	  these	  recovery	  factors	  in	   context,	   ARI22	  uses	   a	   range	   of	   15-­‐35%	   for	   the	   recovery	   of	   shale	   gas	   from	   each	  geological	   area	   analysed,	  while	   recovery	   from	   conventional	   gas	  wells	   is	   often	   around	  70-­‐80%.23	  
Table	  2-­‐2:	  Estimates	  of	  original	  shale	  gas	  in	  place	  by	  Rogner24	  
Region	   Original	  shale	  gas	  in	  place	  (Tcm)	  North	  America	   108.3	  Latin	  America	  and	  the	  Caribbean	   59.7	  Western	  Europe	   14.4	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	   1.1	  Former	  Soviet	  Union	   17.7	  Middle	  East	  &	  North	  Africa	   71.8	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	   7.7	  Centrally	  Planned	  Asia	  &	  China	   99.4	  South	  Asia	   65.2	  Other	  Pacific	  Asia	   8.8	  Pacific	  OECD	   0	  
Total	   454.1	  	  Using	  Rogner’s	  OGIP	  estimates,	  a	  15%	  recovery	   factor	  would	  give	  a	  global	  estimate	  of	  68	  Tcm	   for	   the	  TRR	   of	   shale	   gas,	  while	   a	   40%	   recovery	   factor	  would	   increase	   this	   to	  181.3	  Tcm.	   Hence,	   the	   range	   of	   15-­‐40%	   in	   the	   recoverable	   fraction	   of	   Rogner’s	   OGIP	  corresponds	  to	  an	  uncertainty	  of	  around	  113.3	  Tcm	  on	  a	  global	  scale.	  This	  approximates	  to	  one-­‐third	  of	  the	  Bundesanstalt	  für	  Geowissenschaften	  und	  Rohstoffe	  (BGR)’s	  estimate	  of	   the	   remaining	   global,	   technically	   recoverable	   resource	   of	   conventional	   gas	  (~425	  Tcm).25	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  S.H.	   Mohr	   and	   G.M.	   Evans,	   'Shale	   gas	   changes	   N.	   American	   gas	   production	   projections',	   Oil	   and	   Gas	  
Journal	  108,	  no	  27	  (2010).	  19	  Q.	   Ejaz,	   'The	   Future	   of	  Natural	   Gas	   Supplementary	   paper	   SP2.2:	   Background	  material	   on	   natural	   gas	  resource	  assessments,	  with	  major	  resource	  country	  reviews',	  (Cambridge,	  MT:	  Massachusets	  Institute	  of	  Technology,	  2010).	  20	  V.A.	   Kuuskraa,	   'Worldwide	   gas	   shales	   and	   unconventional	   gas:	   a	   status	   report',	   (Arlington,	   VA:	  Advanced	  Resources	  International	  Inc.,	  2009).	  21	  The	  IEA	  does	  not	  explicitly	  state	  the	  recovery	   factor	  used	  for	  each	  of	   the	  three	  unconventional	  gases,	  but	  provides	  figures	  from	  which	  it	  can	  be	  calculated.	  IEA,	  'World	  Energy	  Outlook	  2009',	  in	  World	  Energy	  
Outlook	  (Paris:	  Organisation	  for	  Economic	  Co-­‐operation	  and	  Development,	  2009).	  22	  Advanced	   Resources	   International,	   'World	   shale	   gas	   resources:	   an	   initial	   assessment	   of	   14	   regions	  outside	  the	  United	  States',	  (Washington,	  DC:	  Advanced	  Resources	  International	  Inc.,	  2011).	  23	  C.	  Besson,	   'Resources	  to	  reserves:	  oil	  &	  gas	  technologies	   for	  the	  energy	  markets	  of	   the	   future',	   (Paris:	  International	  Energy	  Agency,	  2005).	  24	  Rogner,	  'Assessment	  of	  World	  Resources'.	  
25  H.J.	   Kümpel,	   'Energy	   Resources	   2009:	   Reserves,	   Resources,	   Availability',	   (Hannover,	   Germany:	  Bundesanstalt	  für	  Geowissenschaften	  und	  Rohstoffe	  (BGR)	  Federal	  Institute	  for	  Geosciences	  and	  Natural	  Resources,	   2009).	   187	   Tcm,	   or	   44%	   of	   the	   total	   remaining	   technically	   recoverable	   resources	   of	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A	  more	  recent	  report	  by	  the	  World	  Energy	  Council	  (WEC)	  in	  2010	  also	  provided	  OGIP	  figures	  for	  regions	  similar	  to	  those	  used	  by	  Rogner,26	  although	  it	  combined	  South	  Asia,	  Other	  Pacific	  Asia	  and	  OECD	  Pacific	  into	  one	  region.	  Some	  of	  the	  estimates	  provided	  are	  significantly	   different	   to	   Rogner’s,	   with	   the	   estimated	   OGIP	   for	   Latin	   America	   and	  Centrally	   Planned	  Asia	  &	  China	   decreasing	   to	   10.6	  Tcm	   and	  10.5	  Tcm	   (a	   reduction	   of	  around	  80%	  and	  90%	  respectively	  from	  Rogner’s	  figures)	  while	  the	  OGIP	  estimated	  for	  the	   Former	   Soviet	   Union	   is	   153	  Tcm	   (an	   increase	   greater	   than	   eightfold).	   Regarding	  recovery	   factors,	   it	   is	   mentioned	   that	   “nearly	   40%	   of	   this	   endowment	   would	   be	  economically	   recoverable”,	   corresponding	   to	   a	   global	   ERR	   of	   around	   170	  Tcm.	   Given	  that	  the	  costs	  of	  extraction	  and	  market	  conditions	  at	  the	  time	  when	  the	  resource	  will	  be	  extracted	  is	  highly	  uncertain,	  particularly	  in	  areas	  where	  there	  is	  currently	  no	  shale	  gas	  production,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  WEC’s	  estimate	  actually	  corresponds	  more	  closely	  to	  TRR	  rather	  than	  to	  ERR.	  Two	  other	  recent	  independent	  reports	  have	  been	  undertaken	  that	  estimate	  technically	  recoverable	   shale	   gas	   resources	   on	   a	   global	   scale.27	  Nevertheless,	   even	   these	   do	   not	  attempt	  to	  assess	  all	  shale	  plays	  and	  indicate	  that	  there	  is	  limited	  geological	  information	  available	  for	  a	  number	  of	  plays	  anticipated	  to	  hold	  shale	  gas.	  ARI,	   for	  example,	   ignores	  regions	  where	  there	  are	   large	  quantities	  of	  conventional	  gas	  reserves	  (Russia	  and	  the	  Middle	  East)	  or	  where	  there	  is	  insufficient	  information	  to	  carry	  out	  an	  assessment.28	  Similarly,	  Medlock	  et	  al.	  only	  assess	   the	  shale	  gas	  potential	   in	  six	  countries29	  outside	   North	   America	   and	   justify	   the	   exclusion	   of	   unassessed	   shales	   by	  suggesting	   that	   they	   are	   unlikely	   to	   be	   economically	   recoverable.30	  Hence,	   neither	  review	  provides	  a	  global	  estimate	  of	  technically	  recoverable	  shale	  gas	  resources.	  	  ARI	  produced	  an	  earlier	  and	  much	  smaller	  estimate	  in	  2009.	  It	  noted	  that	  a	  number	  of	  other	   shale	   plays	   were	   likely	   to	   contain	   resources	   but	   had	   not	   been	   quantitatively	  assessed,	  so	  its	  estimate	  was	  therefore	  anticipated	  to	  “grow	  with	  time	  and	  new	  data”.31	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  increase	  between	  ARI’s	  estimate	  in	  2009	  and	  2011	  comes	  from	  this	  increase	  in	  the	  geographical	  coverage	  of	  the	  later	  survey	  (see	  Figure	  2-­‐6).	  Finally,	  three	  other	   estimates	   of	   global	   shale	   resources	   have	   been	  made,	   but	   these	   were	   produced	  some	   time	   before	   the	   recent	   increase	   in	  US	   production	   and	   are	   predominantly	   based	  upon	  expert	  judgment.32	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  conventional	  gas,	  is	  classified	  as	  proved	  reserves	  in	  BP,	  'Statistical	  review	  2011'.	  Note,	  however,	  that	  this	  'proved'	   figure	   covers	   all	   four	   types	   of	   gas	   (conventional,	   tight,	   CBM	  and	   shale)	   to	   differing	   degrees	   in	  different	  countries,	  depending	  upon	  the	  state	  of	  development	  of	  the	  resource.	  26	  WEC,	  'Survey	  of	  Energy	  Resources:	  Focus	  on	  Shale	  Gas',	  (London,	  UK:	  World	  Energy	  Council,	  2010).	  27	  Advanced	  Resources	   International,	   'World	  shale	  gas	  resources',	  Medlock,	   Jaffe	  and	  Hartley,	   'Shale	  Gas	  and	  National	  Security'.	  28	  Advanced	  Resources	  International,	  'World	  shale	  gas	  resources'.	  
29 The	   nine	   countries	   analysed	   are:	   the	   United	   States	   of	   America,	   Canada,	   Mexico,	   Austria,	   Germany,	  Poland,	  Sweden,	  China	  and	  Australia.	  30	  Medlock,	  Jaffe	  and	  Hartley,	  'Shale	  Gas	  and	  National	  Security'.	  31	  Ibid.	  32	  V.A.	  Kuuskraa	  and	  R.F.	  Meyers,	  'Review	  of	  world	  resources	  of	  unconventional	  gas'	  (paper	  presented	  at	  the	   	   fifth	   IIASA	   conference	   on	   energy	   resources:	   Conventional	   and	   unconventional	   world	   natural	   gas	  resources,	   Laxenburg,	   Austria,	   1980);	   J.	   Laherrère,	   'Natural	   gas	   future	   supply',	   in	   IIASA-­‐IEW	   (Paris,	  France:	  2004);	  R.	  Sandrea,	  'Global	  natural	  gas	  reserves	  –	  a	  heuristic	  viewpoint',	  (Tulsa,	  OK:	  IPC	  Petroleum	  Consultants,	  Inc.,	  2005).	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Figure	  2-­‐6:	  Estimates	  of	  global	  shale	  gas	  resources	  by	  sources	  considering	  regions	  outside	  North	  
America33	  
	  
North	  America	  As	   can	   be	   seen	   from	   Figure	   2-­‐5,	   estimates	   of	   the	   recoverable	   resources	   of	   shale	   gas	  within	   the	   USA	   have	   been	   increasing	   rapidly,	   with	   the	   more	   recent	   reports	   likely	   to	  provide	   more	   accurate	   estimates.	   Figure	   2-­‐7	   therefore	   presents	   the	   more	   recent	  reports,	  chosen	  here	  to	  be	  those	  produced	  since	  2008,	  which	  provide	  estimates	  of	   the	  recoverable	  resources	  of	  shale	  gas	  within	  the	  USA	  and	  Canada.	  There	  have	  been	  a	  total	  of	  18	  reports	  providing	  estimates	  for	  the	  USA	  and	  12	  for	  Canada	  over	  this	  period.	  Some	  of	   these,	   for	   example	   those	   by	   ICF34	  or	   ARI,35	  are	   updates	   of	   older	   reports	   but	   are	  reported	   here	   separately.	   It	   is	   noticeable	   that	   despite	   the	   variation	   in	   resource	  estimates	  between	  these	  reports	  (even	  those	  of	  similar	  dates),	  only	  three	  of	  these	  give	  a	  range	   of	   uncertainty	   in	   the	   values	   quoted.	   Even	   within	   this	   short	   timeframe,	   the	  estimates	  made	  in	  the	  past	  year	  are	  higher	  on	  average	  than	  those	  made	  in	  2008.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Note:	  Different	  studies	  cover	  different	  countries	  and	  regions	  and	  none	  provide	  a	  truly	  global	  estimate.	  Laherrere’s	   estimate	   is	   URR,	  while	  Medlock	   et	   al.’s	   estimates	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   closer	   to	   ERR.	   The	   OGIP	  estimate	  by	  Rogner	  is	  converted	  to	  TRR	  using	  15%	  and	  40%	  recovery	  factors	  and	  the	  WEC’s	  estimate	  is	  converted	  to	  ERR	  using	  a	  40%	  recovery	  factor.	  34	  K.R.	  Petak,	  'Impact	  of	  natural	  gas	  supply	  on	  CHP	  development'	  (paper	  presented	  at	  the	  US	  Clean	  Heat	  &	  Power	  Association’s	  (USCHPA)	  Spring	  CHP	  Forum,	  Washington,	  DC,	  2011).	  35	  V.A.	   Kuuskraa,	   'Unconventional	   gas:	   an	   exportable	   North	   American	   revolution?',	   in	   The	   changing	  
fundamentals	  of	  global	  gas	  markets	  –	  Europe	  as	  the	  battleground?	   (Washington,	  DC:	  Advanced	  Resources	  International	  Inc.,	  2010).	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Figure	  2-­‐7:	  Estimates	  made	  since	  2008	  of	   the	   technically	   recoverable	   shale	  gas	   resources	   in	   the	  
United	  States	  of	  America	  (above)	  and	  Canada	  (below)36	  
	  
	  
Europe	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  USA,	  very	  few	  estimates	  are	  available	  of	  the	  recoverable	  resource	  of	  shale	  gas	  within	  Europe.	  However,	  since	  2009,	  a	  number	  of	  reports	  have	  been	  published	  that	   provide	   estimates	   of	   technically	   recoverable	   resources	  within	   Europe.	   These	   are	  presented	  in	  Figure	  2-­‐8	  and	  range	  from	  2.3	  Tcm	  to	  17.6	  Tcm,	  with	  a	  mean	  of	  7.1	  Tcm.	  Note	  that	  ARI’s	  estimate	  from	  2009	  ignored	  a	  number	  of	  plays.37	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Points	   in	   yellow	   correspond	   to	   estimates	   that	   were	   stated	   as	   referring	   to	   economically	   recoverable	  resources.	  37	  Medlock,	  Jaffe	  and	  Hartley,	  'Shale	  Gas	  and	  National	  Security'.	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Figure	  2-­‐8:	  All	  estimates	  of	  the	  technically	  recoverable	  resources	  of	  shale	  gas	  within	  Europe38	  
	  
China	  Relatively	  few	  estimates	  of	  the	  Chinese	  shale	  gas	  resource	  are	  available	  and	  even	  fewer	  provide	  an	  estimate	  of	   the	  TRR	  or	  ERR,	  preferring	   instead	  to	  estimate	  the	  OGIP.	  ARI39	  estimates	   an	   OGIP	   of	   144.5	   Tcm	   and	   a	   TRR	   of	   36.0	   Tcm,	   which	   suggests	   a	   recovery	  factor	   of	   around	  25%.	   Since	   there	   is	   little	   agreement	   on	   this	   factor,	   the	   authors	   have	  again	   converted	   any	   estimates	   of	   OGIP	   into	   TRR	   using	   a	   range	   of	   recovery	   factors	  between	  15%	  and	  40%.	  The	  range	  in	  the	  estimate	  of	  Zou	  et	  al.	  results	  from	  applying	  this	  variation	   in	   recovery	   factor	   to	   the	   range	   of	   OGIP	   provided	   by	   the	   authors	   (28.3-­‐99.1	  Tcm).40	  The	   World	   Energy	   Council’s	   estimate	   is	   for	   ‘Centrally	   Planned	   Asia’	   (which	  includes	   Cambodia,	   Hong	   Kong,	   PDR	   Korea,	   Laos,	   Mongolia	   and	   Vietnam)	   as	   well	   as	  China,	   but	   for	   illustrative	   purposes	   all	   of	   the	   resource	   was	   assigned	   to	   China.	   The	  variation	  in	  currently	  available	  estimates	  for	  TRR	  in	  China	  is	  therefore	  even	  larger	  than	  that	  in	  Europe	  and	  North	  America.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  The	  point	  in	  yellow	  corresponds	  to	  an	  estimate	  that	  was	  stated	  as	  referring	  to	  economically	  recoverable	  resources.	  The	  range	  for	  Rogner’s	  estimate	  is	  derived	  using	  a	  15-­‐40%	  recovery	  factor	  within	  Western	  and	  Eastern	   Europe.	   Values	   for	   Wood	   Mackenzie	   and	   IHS	   CERA	   come	   from	   Ruud	   Weijermars	   et	   al.,	  'Unconventional	   gas	   research	   initiative	   for	   clean	   energy	   transition	   in	   Europe',	   Journal	   of	   Natural	   Gas	  
Science	  and	  Engineering	  3,	  no	  2	  (2011).	  39	  Advanced	  Resources	  International,	  'World	  shale	  gas	  resources'.	  40	  Caineng	  Zou	  et	  al.,	   'Geological	  characteristics	  and	  resource	  potential	  of	  shale	  gas	  in	  China	  ',	  Petroleum	  
exploration	  and	  development	  37,	  no	  6	  (2010).	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Figure	  2-­‐9:	  All	  estimates	  of	  the	  technically	  recoverable	  resources	  of	  shale	  gas	  within	  China41	  
	  
2.1.4 Shale	  gas	  estimates	  in	  context	  Table	   2-­‐3	   summarises	   the	   ranges	   and	  mean	   estimates	   of	   the	   technically	   recoverable	  shale	  gas	  in	  the	  above	  regions	  and	  globally.	  Within	  each	  region,	  the	  shale	  gas	  estimates	  are	   derived	   using	   the	   sources	   shown	   in	   Figure	   2-­‐7	   to	   Figure	   2-­‐9.	   As	   explained	  previously,	  it	  is	  considered	  that	  the	  estimates	  of	  shale	  gas	  ERR	  given	  by	  ICF42	  and	  WEC43	  are	  better	  described	  as	  TRR	  and	  so	   their	   figures	  are	   included	   in	   the	  calculation	  of	   the	  mean	  resource	  estimates.	   In	  addition,	  when	  sources	  have	  provided	  multiple	  estimates	  (e.g.	   ARI/Kuuskraa),	   only	   the	   latest	   update	   is	   included	   in	   the	   calculation	   of	   the	  mean	  resource	  estimate.	  This	  table	  also	  includes	  estimates	  of	  the	  remaining	  technically	  recoverable	  resources	  of	  conventional	   gas,	   CBM	   and	   tight	   gas	   held	   by	   each	   of	   the	   regions.	   The	   conventional	  estimates	  come	  from	  BGR,44	  while	  the	  tight	  and	  CBM	  estimates	  come	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  sources	  with	  a	  different	  number	  of	  reports	  or	  articles	  available	  for	  each	  of	  the	  regions.	  	  As	  mentioned	  in	  Section	  2.1.3,	  given	  the	  focus	  on	  the	  resource	  potential	  of	  those	  shale	  plays	  that	  are	  known	  to	  exist,	  there	  have	  been	  no	  estimates	  of	  shale	  gas	  resources	  from	  shale	  plays	  outside	  the	  USA	  that	  are	  estimated,	  but	  not	  known,	   to	  exist.	   It	   is	   therefore	  difficult	   to	   determine	  what	   the	   relative	  magnitude	   of	   shale	   gas	   in	   undiscovered	   shale	  plays	   worldwide	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   compared	   to	   those	   in	   known	   shale	   plays.	   Stevens45	  indicates	  that	  shale	  gas	  plays	  tend	  to	  overlie	  conventional	  oil	  and	  gas	  wells.	  He	  therefore	  concludes	  that	  countries	  with	  a	  history	  of	  onshore	  oil	  and	  gas	  production	  (e.g.	  the	  USA)	  will	   have	   a	   higher	   degree	   of	   knowledge	   of	   the	   shale	   gas	   resource	   and	   hence	   less	  potential	   for	   undiscovered	   shale	   plays	   compared	   to	   countries	   with	   relatively	   little	  history	   of	   onshore	   production	   (e.g.	   most	   European	   countries).	   This	   can	   be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  The	  point	  in	  yellow	  corresponds	  to	  an	  estimate	  that	  was	  stated	  as	  referring	  to	  economically	  recoverable	  resources.	  42	  Petak,	  'Impact	  of	  natural	  gas	  on	  CHP'.	  43	  WEC,	  'Survey	  of	  Energy	  Resources'.	  44 	  BGR,	   'Reserves,	   resources	   and	   availability	   of	   energy	   resources:	   2010',	   (Hannover,	   Germany:	  Bundesanstalt	  für	  Geowissenschaften	  und	  Rohstoffe	  (BGR)	  Federal	  Institute	  for	  Geosciences	  and	  Natural	  Resources,	  2010).	  45	  Paul	   Stevens,	   'The	   "Shale	   Gas	   Revolution":	   Hype	   and	   Reality',	   (London:	   Chatham	   House	   (The	   Royal	  Institute	  of	  International	  Affairs),	  2011).	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demonstrated	   by	   observing	   that,	   within	   the	   USA,	   estimated	   volumes	   of	   technically	  recoverable	  resources	  of	  undiscovered	  shale	  gas	  only	  make	  up	  7%	  of	  the	  total	  shale	  gas	  TRR.	  	  Nevertheless,	   there	   has	   been	   extensive	   geological	   mapping	   of	   the	   rocks	   underlying	  many	   countries	   worldwide.	   Despite	   limited	   onshore	   drilling	   in	   the	   UK,	   for	   example,	  various	  geological	  studies	  provide	  a	  complete	  cross	  section	  of	  the	  rocks	  throughout	  the	  UK.46	  There	  is	  therefore	  unlikely	  to	  be	  any	  undiscovered	  shale	  gas	  plays	  in	  the	  UK.	  While	  this	  may	  not	  be	  the	  case	  for	  all	  countries,	  it	  suggests	  that	  the	  volumes	  of	  gas	  in	  currently	  undiscovered	   shale	   plays	   will	   likely	   be	   overshadowed	   by	   volumes	   in	   discovered	   but	  undeveloped	  plays.	  	  
Table	   2-­‐3:	   Mean	   estimates	   of	   remaining	   technically	   recoverable	   resources	   of	   conventional	   gas,	  
CBM,	  tight	  gas	  and	  shale	  gas	  provided	  by	  the	  evidence	  base	  (Tcm)47	  
Region	   Conventional	   Tight	   CBM	   Shale	  
	   	   	   	   Lowest	  estimate	   Mean	  of	  estimates	   Highest	  estimate	  
United	  States	  of	  
America	   27.2	   12.7	   3.7	   8.0	   23.5	   47.4	  
Canada	   8.8	   6.7	   2.0	   1.4	   11.1	   28.3	  
Europe	   11.6	   1.4	   1.4	   2.3	   8.9	   17.6	  
China	   12.5	   9.9	   2.8	   4.2	   19.2	   39.8	  
(Implied	  rest	  of	  world)	   (364.9)	   (14.6)	   (15.6)	   	   (34.7)	   	  
Global	   424.9	   45.4	   25.5	   7.1	   97.4	   186.4	  	  As	  noted	  previously,	  the	  global	  estimates	  do	  not	  all	  cover	  the	  same	  regions,	  do	  not	  use	  the	   same	   definitions	   and	   are	   based	   on	   a	   number	   of	   different	   methodologies	   and	  assumptions	   (e.g.	   for	   the	   recovery	   factor),	   which	   helps	   to	   explain	   the	   significant	  variation	   in	   estimates.	   The	   mean	   estimate	   for	   shale	   gas	   is	   also	   skewed	   by	   the	   low	  estimates	   of	   Sandrea48	  and	   Laherrere,49	  which	   are	   both	   relatively	   old	   and	   based	   on	  expert	   judgment	  alone.	   If	   these	  are	  excluded,	   the	  mean	  estimate	   increases	  to	  130	  Tcm	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  T.	  Harvey	  and	  J.	  Gray,	   'The	  unconventional	  hydrocarbon	  resources	  of	  Britain’s	  onshore	  basins	  –	  shale	  gas',	  (London,	  UK:	  Department	  of	  Energy	  and	  Climate	  Change,	  2011).	  47	  Sources:	   Shale	   gas	   reports	   in	   Figure	   2-­‐7,	   Figure	   2-­‐8	   and	   Figure	   2-­‐9	   as	   well	   as	   the	   following:BGR,	  'Reserves,	  resources	  and	  availability';	  F.M.	  Dawson,	  'Cross	  Canada	  check	  up	  unconventional	  gas	  emerging	  opportunities	   and	   status	   of	   activity'	   (paper	   presented	   at	   the	   CSUG	   Technical	   Luncheon,	   Calgary,	   AB,	  2010);	   EIA,	   'Annual	   Energy	   Outlook	   2010	   with	   Projections	   to	   2035',	   (Washington,	   DC:	   US	   Energy	  Information	   Administration,	   2010);	   V.A.	   Kuuskraa,	   'Economic	   and	   market	   impacts	   of	   abundant	  international	   shale	   gas	   resources',	   in	   Worldwide	   Shale	   Gas	   Resource	   Assessment	   (Washington,	   DC:	  Advanced	  Resources	  International	  2011);	  Kuuskraa,	  'Status	  report';	  S.H.	  Mohr	  and	  G.M.	  Evans,	  'Long	  term	  forecasting	  of	  natural	  gas	  production',	  Energy	  Policy	  39,	  no	  9	  (2011);	  Moniz,	  Jacoby	  and	  Meggs,	  'Future	  of	  natural	   gas';	   Potential	   Gas	   Committee,	   'Potential	   Gas	   Committee	   reports	   substantial	   increase	   in	  magnitude	   of	   US	   natural	   gas	   resource	   base',	   (Golden:	   CO:	   Colorado	   School	   of	   Mines,	   2011);	   Rogner,	  'Assessment	  of	  World	  Resources';	  Sandrea,	   'Global	  natural	  gas	  reserves';	  R.G.	  Smead	  and	  G.B.	  Pickering,	  'North	  American	  natural	   gas	   supply	   assessment',	   (Chicago,	   IL:	  Navigant	  Consulting,	   2008);	  Total,	   'Tight	  reservoirs:	   Technology-­‐intensive	   resources',	   (Paris,	   France:	   2006);	  WEC,	   'Survey	   of	   Energy	   Resources';	  Weijermars	  et	  al.,	  'Unconventional	  gas	  research	  initiative'.	  Notes:	  Implied	  rest-­‐of-­‐world	  figures	  derived	  by	  subtracting	  each	  mean	  regional	  estimate	  from	  the	  mean	  global	  estimate.	  48	  Sandrea,	  'Global	  natural	  gas	  reserves'.	  49	  Laherrère,	  'Natural	  gas	  future	  supply'.	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and	   the	   lowest	   global	   estimate	   then	   becomes	   that	   provided	   by	  Medlock	   et	   al.	   at	   42.9	  Tcm.50	  Focusing	  on	  the	  mean	  estimates	  within	  Table	  2-­‐3,	  the	  figures	  suggest	  that	  the	  USA	  holds	  around	  25%	  of	   the	   global	   TRR	  of	   shale	   gas,	  while	   Europe	   holds	   around	  10%.	   Similar	  percentages	  are	  obtained	  in	  both	  regions	  if	  the	  highest	  estimates	  are	  compared,	  but	  the	  European	  and	  USA’s	  share	  may	  be	  smaller	  than	  this	  in	  practice	  since	  many	  regions	  are	  excluded	  from	  the	  global	  estimates.	  	  It	   is	   also	   of	   interest	   to	   place	   global	   shale	   gas	   resources	   into	   context	   with	   the	   global	  remaining	  recoverable	  resources	  of	  conventional	  gas.	  The	  mean	  estimate	  given	  by	  the	  current	   literature	   of	   the	   global	   TRR	   for	   shale	   gas	   is	   around	   23%	   of	   the	   remaining	  recoverable	   resources	   of	   conventional	   gas,	   which	   increases	   to	   30%	   if	   Sandrea’s	   and	  Laherrere’s	  shale	  gas	  estimates	  are	  excluded.	  	  The	  remaining	  global	  TRR	  of	  all	  natural	  gas	  consists	  of	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  mean	  estimates	  of	  conventional	   gas	   and	   the	   three	   unconventional	   gases.	   On	   a	   global	   scale,	   shale	   gas	   is	  estimated	   to	   make	   up	   16%	   of	   the	   total	   figure	   of	   593.2	   Tcm.	   On	   a	   regional	   basis,	  however,	   shale	   gas	   can	   form	   a	   much	   larger	   proportion	   of	   the	   remaining	   TRR.	   For	  example,	   using	   the	   mean	   estimates,	   shale	   gas	   is	   estimated	   to	   represent	   43%	   of	   the	  remaining	  TRR	  of	  natural	  gas	  in	  China,	  39%	  in	  Canada,	  38%	  in	  Europe	  and	  35%	  in	  the	  USA.	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  shale	  gas	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  greater	  at	  the	  regional	  level	  than	  at	  the	  global	  level.	  
2.2 Methods	  for	  estimating	  the	  recoverable	  resources	  of	  shale	  gas	  This	  section	  provides	  an	  overview	  and	  critique	  of	  the	  methods	  employed	  to	  estimate	  the	  technically	  recoverable	  resources	  of	  shale	  gas.	  	  Four	  broad	  approaches	  have	  been	  used	   to	  estimate	   recoverable	  volumes	  of	   shale	  gas,	  namely:	  a)	  expert	   judgement;	  b)	   literature	   review/adaptation	  of	  existing	   literature;	   c)	  bottom-­‐up	   analysis	   of	   geological	   parameters;	   and	   d)	   extrapolation	   of	   production	  experience.	   A	   crossover	   between	   these	   approaches	   is	   common,	   with	   several	   reports	  employing	  and	  combining	  more	  than	  one	  approach.	  Different	  reports	  provide	  different	  degrees	  of	  explanation	  of	  the	  methods	  employed	  and	  in	  many	  cases	  little	  or	  no	  information	  is	  given	  –	  a	  major	  weakness.	  Hence,	  judgment	  is	  frequently	  required	  when	  identifying	  and	  classifying	  the	  approach	  that	  has	  been	  taken.	  Figure	  2-­‐10	  classifies	  the	  approaches	  used	  by	  each	  report.	  Reports	  labelled	  as	  ‘Method	  not	  stated’	  provide	  little	  or	  no	  description	  of	  the	  methods	  used	  and	  provide	  insufficient	  information	  to	  allow	  this	  to	  be	  identified.	  Section	  2.2.1	  provides	  a	  brief	  description	  and	  explanation	  of	  each	  of	  these	  approaches	  and	  illustrates	  this	  by	  discussing	  the	  specific	  approach	  taken	  by	  three	  reports	  in	  more	  detail.	  Not	  all	   the	  reports	  use	  an	   identical	  approach,	  however,	  and	  differences	  such	  as	  the	  definition	  and	  terminology	  used	  for	  relevant	  variables,	  the	  inclusion	  or	  exclusion	  of	  particular	   parameters,	   the	   reliance	   upon	   different	   sources	   of	   information	   and	   values	  chosen	   for	   subjective	  parameters	   are	   common.	  These	  differences	   are	   likely	   in	   turn	   to	  have	   a	   significant	   influence	   on	   the	   results.	   Section	   2.2.2	   evaluates	   and	   compares	   the	  methodological	  robustness	  of	  each	  approach;	  Section	  2.2.3	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Medlock,	  Jaffe	  and	  Hartley,	  'Shale	  Gas	  and	  National	  Security'.	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role	   technology	   could	   play	   in	   increasing	   current	   estimates	   of	   technically	   recoverable	  shale	  gas	  resources,	  while	  Section	  2.2.4	  provides	  the	  conclusion.	  
Figure	   2-­‐10	  Approaches	   used	   by	   all	   reports	   providing	   original	   country-­‐level	   shale	   gas	   resource	  
estimates51	  
	  
2.2.1 Description	  of	  approaches	  The	   four	   approaches	   to	   estimating	   resource	   size	   that	   are	   used	   in	   the	   literature	   are	  briefly	   described	   below.	   The	   order	   in	   which	   they	   are	   discussed	   reflects	   the	   relative	  weight	  that	  may	  be	  given	  to	  their	  results,	  with	  the	  least	  robust	  first.	  
Expert	  judgment	  The	   first	   category	   is	   used	   by	   only	   two	   authors	  who	   do	   not	   cite	   any	   other	   sources	   or	  indicate	  the	  method	  they	  have	  used	  to	  develop	  their	  resource	  estimate.52	  The	  estimates	  provided	   therefore	  appear	  not	   to	  have	  been	  derived	  using	  any	   rigorous	  or	   repeatable	  method	  but	  are	  rather	  based	  upon	  the	  authors’	  own	  opinions	  of	  technology	  and	  geology,	  and	  therefore	  likely	  to	  be	  very	  subjective.53	  	  
Literature	  review/adaption	  of	  existing	  literature	  A	   number	   of	   report	   authors	   rely	   upon	   estimates	   made	   by	   others,	   which	   are	   then	  collated	  or	  adapted	  to	  determine	  new	  estimates.	  Some	  sources,	   for	  example	  MIT54	  and	  Mohr	  and	  Evans,55	  analyse	  a	  number	  of	  estimates	  and	  use	  the	  variation	  between	  these	  to	   identify	   a	   range	   of	   uncertainty	   for	   regional	   or	   country	   values.	   Others	   also	   use	   a	  literature	   review	   but	   augment	   this	   data	   with	   additional	   primary	   research.	   Navigant	  Consulting,56	  for	  example,	  conducted	  a	  survey	  of	  natural	  gas	  producers	  and	  used	  this	  to	  provide	   an	   upper	   bound	   on	   its	   estimates,	   which	   it	   called	   the	   “maximum	   reported”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Note:	  the	  EIA	  AEOs	  are	  only	  included	  once.	  52	  Laherrère,	  'Natural	  gas	  future	  supply';	  Sandrea,	  'Global	  natural	  gas	  reserves'.	  
53 This	   category	   differs	   from	   those	   reports	   classified	   as	   ‘Method	   not	   stated’,	   as	   it	   is	   thought	   that	   these	  estimates	   have	   been	   derived	   using	   one	   of	   the	   four	   broad	   approaches	   described;	   it	   is	   not	   possible	   to	  determine	  which	  approach	  has	  been	  used,	  however.	  54	  Moniz,	  Jacoby	  and	  Meggs,	  'Future	  of	  natural	  gas'.	  55	  Mohr	  and	  Evans,	  'Long	  term	  forecasting';	  Mohr	  and	  Evans,	  'Shale	  gas	  changes	  production	  projections'.	  56	  Smead	  and	  Pickering,	  'North	  American	  supply	  assessment'.	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estimate	   for	   each	   shale	   play.	   The	  WEC	   appears	   to	   have	   used	   a	   literature	   review,	   but	  provides	   no	   description	   of	   its	   methodology	   other	   than	   noting	   that	   “most	   credible	  studies”	  were	  used.	   It	   also	  does	  not	  provide	  details	  of	   the	   literature	   referred	   to	  other	  than	  the	  names	  of	  the	  organisations	  that	  produced	  the	  estimates.57	  An	  alternative	  approach	  is	  followed	  by	  Medlock	  et	  al.	  who	  indicate	  that	  they	  use	  “peer-­‐reviewed,	   scientific	   assessments	   of	   the	   properties	   of	   shales	   to	   develop	   technically	  recoverable	   resources”.	  However,	  Medlock	   et	   al.	  do	   not	   specify	   the	   precise	   approach	  used	  and	  fail	  to	  cite	  the	  relevant	  peer-­‐reviewed	  sources.	  In	  addition,	  they	  note	  that:	  “A	  reduction	  of	  the	  technically	  recoverable	  shale	  gas	  resource	  base	  in	  areas	  with	  potential	  water	  constraints	  is	  primarily	  done	  because	  the	  cost	  of	  development	  has	  been	  deemed	  prohibitive.”	  In	  explaining	  the	  difference	  between	  theirs	  and	  ARI’s	  estimates,	  Medlock	  et	  al.	   also	   note	   that	   the	   clay	   content	   of	   the	   shale	   can	   constrain	   recoverability.	   Clay-­‐rich	  shales	  will	  have	  lower	  production	  rates	  and	  higher	  costs	  and	  so	  are	  excluded	  from	  their	  estimates	   of	   recoverable	   resources.	   Since	   these	   constraints	   do	   not	   appear	   to	   be	  employed	   by	   other	   sources	   estimating	   TRR,	   Medlock	   et	   al.’s	   resource	   figures	   may	  correspond	  more	  closely	  to	  ERR.58	  
Bottom-­‐up	  analysis	  of	  geological	  parameters	  This	  approach	  uses	  geological	  knowledge	  of	  the	  extent	  and	  characteristics	  of	  the	  shale	  rock	   to	   estimate	   the	   volume	   of	   shale	   gas	   that	   is	   present.	   A	   recovery	   factor	   is	   then	  applied	   to	   this	   estimate	   to	   produce	   an	   estimate	   of	   the	   technically	   recoverable	   (or	  ultimately	   recoverable)	   resources.	   ARI59	  employed	   this	   approach	   to	   determine	   the	  volumes	  of	  gas	  that	  exist	  in	  worldwide	  shales	  for	  which	  there	  was	  little,	  or	  no,	  drilling	  experience	   or	   production	   data.	   Figure	   2-­‐11	   summarises	   the	   approach,	   indicating	   the	  geological	  parameters	  used	  at	  each	  step	  in	  the	  process.	  
Figure	   2-­‐11:	   Schematic	   representation	   of	   the	   steps	   used	   in	   the	   geological-­‐based	   approach	   (see	  
Table	  3-­‐1	  for	  terminology)	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The	   first	  step	   involves	  determining	  the	   total	  areal	  extent	  of	   the	  shale	  being	  examined.	  This	   is	   next	   reduced	   to	   the	   ‘prospective	   area’,	   which,	   depending	   on	   estimates	   or	  determinations	   of	   various	   properties	   of	   the	   rock,	   describes	   the	   area	   of	   shale	   that	   is	  expected	   to	   contain	   an	   appreciably	   high	   concentration	   of	   gas	   to	   make	   development	  viable.	  The	  geographic	  location	  of	  the	  shale	  is	  also	  taken	  into	  account	  at	  this	  stage,	  with	  shale	  in	  offshore	  regions	  being	  removed	  from	  the	  prospective	  area.	  Within	   shale	   plays,	   natural	   gas	   can	   be	   stored	   either	   in	   pore	   spaces	   within	   the	   rocks	  (‘free	  gas’)	  or	  adsorbed60	  on	  to	  the	  rocks.	  Equations	  can	  be	  used	  to	  estimate	  the	  volume	  of	  this	  stored	  gas,	  which	  require	  estimates	  of	  various	  geological	  parameters,	  such	  as	  the	  pressure	  of	  the	  gas	  in	  place	  and	  the	  porosity	  of	  the	  rocks.	  	  Two	  further	  factors	  are	  then	  determined	  that	  represent	  the	  confidence	  of	  the	  authors	  in	  their	  estimates,	  given	  their	  extent	  of	  knowledge	  of	  the	  geology	  and	  the	  prior	  exploration	  and	   development	   of	   the	   play.	   These	   factors	   are	   the	   ‘play	   success	   probability	   factor’,	  which	  represents	  the	  probability	  that	  suitably	  high	  flow	  rates	  will	  be	  achieved	  from	  the	  play	   to	   make	   development	   likely,	   and	   the	   ‘prospective	   area	   success	   factor’,	   which	  represents	   the	   probability	   that	   there	   will	   not	   be	   any	   geological	   complications	   or	  problems	  in	  the	  prospective	  area	  that	  would	  reduce	  the	  volumes	  of	  gas	  present.	  For	  the	  plays	  in	  ARI’s	  report,	  the	  play	  success	  probability	  factor	  ranged	  from	  100%	  to	  30%	  with	  a	  mean	   for	   all	   of	   the	   shale	  plays	  analysed	  of	  58%,	  while	   the	  prospective	  area	   success	  factor	  ranged	  from	  75%	  to	  20%	  with	  a	  mean	  of	  50%.	  The	  application	  of	  these	  factors	  to	  the	  estimated	  gas	  in	  place	  yields	  an	  estimate	  of	  the	  ‘risked’	  gas	  in	  place.	  Using	  the	  above	  mean	  factors	  of	  58%	  and	  50%,	  the	  ‘risked’	  gas	  in	  place	  would	  therefore	  be	  29%	  of	  the	  gas	  in	  place.	  A	  number	  of	  other	  approaches	  use	  comparable	  ‘success	  factors’	  to	  reduce	  volumes	  of	  gas	  that	  are	  estimated	  to	  exist.	  Finally,	  a	  recovery	  factor	  is	  estimated	  to	  reflect	  the	  anticipated	  fraction	  of	  this	  volume	  that	   is	   likely	   to	  be	   technically	  recoverable.	  The	  product	  of	   the	  recovery	   factor	  and	  the	  ‘risked’	   gas	   in	   place	   gives	   an	   estimate	   of	   the	   technically	   recoverable	   resource.	   ARI61	  indicates	  that	  the	  recovery	  factor	  is	  established	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  shale	  mineralogy,	  the	  properties	  of	  the	  reservoir	  and	  the	  geological	  complexity.	  The	  values	  chosen	  typically	  lie	  in	  the	  range	  20-­‐30%,	  although	  factors	  of	  35%	  and	  15%	  are	  used	  in	  “a	  few	  exceptional	  cases”.	  	  As	  can	  be	  seen	  from	  Figure	  2-­‐11,	  there	  are	  a	  large	  number	  of	  parameters	  which	  must	  be	  estimated	   or	   calculated	   when	   using	   geological	   methods	   to	   determine	   recoverable	  volumes	   of	   gas.	   These	   parameters	   range	   from	   the	   area	   and	   geographical	   location	  (onshore/offshore)	   of	   the	   shale	   rock,	   to	   the	   total	   organic	   content	   (measured	   as	   a	  percentage	  of	  the	  total	  weight)	  of	  the	  shale,	  to	  the	  minerals	  (clay/quartz,	  etc.)	  contained	  within	  the	  shale.	  A	  number	  of	  these	  parameters	  are	  used	  at	  more	  than	  one	  stage	  of	  the	  process.	   There	   are	   also	   some	   factors,	   whose	   estimation,	   although	   dependent	   on	   a	  number	  of	  these	  parameters,	  is	  largely	  subjective.	  Examples	  are	  the	  recovery	  factor	  and	  the	  two	  factors	  for	  converting	  the	  OGIP	  estimate	  into	  a	  ‘risked’	  OGIP	  estimate.	  ARI	  sets	  out	   which	   factors	   have	   been	   used	   in	   an	   appendix;	   however,	   of	   the	   11	   other	   sources	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using	  this	  approach,	  only	  three62	  provide	  figures	  for	  both	  TRR	  and	  OGIP	  from	  which	  the	  assumed	  recovery	  factors	  can	  be	  determined.	  	  
Extrapolation	  of	  production	  experience	  This	  approach	  relies	  upon	  analysing	  the	  production	  experience	  in	  shales	  for	  which	  there	  is	  a	  sufficiently	  long	  history	  of	  production	  and	  then	  extrapolating	  these	  results	  to	  either	  undeveloped	  areas	  of	  the	  same	  shale	  or	  to	  new	  shales.	  There	  are	  two	  general	  methods	  employed.	   The	   first,	   commonly	   applied	   at	   the	   play	   level,	   is	   to	   estimate	   shale	   gas	  volumes,	  either	  OGIP	  or	  TRR,	  by	  multiplying	  the	  estimated	  shale	  play	  area	  (or	  mass)	  by	  an	  estimated	  yield	  per	  square	  area	  (or	  mass).	  The	  yield	  per	  unit	  area	  is	  often	  called	  the	  productivity	  and	  measured	  in	  mcm/km2.	  For	  undeveloped	  shale	  play	  areas,	  the	  values	  for	   such	   calculations	   are	   typically	   based	   upon	   measurements	   or	   estimates	   from	  geologically	  similar	  regions	  (analogues)	  where	  more	  information	  is	  available.	  	  The	  second	  method	  differs	  in	  its	  complexity:	  the	  investigated	  area	  is	  split	  into	  more	  and	  less	  productive	  sectors	  and	  more	  precise	  gas	  yields	  per	  area	  are	  determined	  by	  using	  a	  greater	   number	   of	   parameters,	   including	   the	   URR	   per	   well	   and	   the	   well	   spacing	  (number	  of	  wells	  per	  unit	  area).	  Estimates	  of	  the	  URR	  per	  well	  require	  the	  extrapolation	  of	  production	  from	  currently	  producing	  wells	  with	  the	  help	  of	  decline	  curve	  analysis	  –	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Section	  2.3.	  	  A	   key	   issue	   for	   the	   extrapolation	   of	   production	   experience	   method	   is	   the	   validity	   of	  taking	  estimates	  of	  well	  spacing	  and	  the	  URR/well	  from	  one	  area	  and	  applying	  these	  to	  a	  second,	  potentially	  very	  different,	  area.	  US	  shale	  gas	  plays	  that	  are	  currently	  producing	  are	  very	  heterogeneous,	  with	  production	  rates	  between	  neighbouring	  wells	  varying	  by	  a	  factor	  of	   three	  and	  across	  an	  entire	  shale	  play	  by	  a	   factor	  of	   ten.63	  It	   is	   commonly	   the	  case	   that	   some	   areas	   within	   the	   shale	   have	   significantly	   higher	   productivity	   and	  ultimate	   recovery	   than	   others.	   These	   are	   commonly	   referred	   to	   as	   ‘sweet	   spots’.	   In	  addition,	   there	   also	   appears	   to	   be	   significant	   variation	   in	   the	   productivity	   of	   wells	  within	   sweet-­‐spot	  areas,	   although	   this	  distinction	  partly	  depends	  on	  how	  sweet	   spots	  are	  defined.64	  Given	   this	  heterogeneity,	   it	   is	   important	  not	   to	  assume	  single	  values	   for	  the	  URR/well	  and	  well	  spacing	  across	  the	  whole	  area	  of	  a	  shale	  play.	  This	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  when	  extrapolating	  historical	  URR/well	  and	  well	  spacing	  estimates,	  since	  these	  will	  only	  be	  available	  from	  the	  areas	  of	  the	  shale	  play	  that	  have	  been	  developed	  first	  and	  which	  tend	  to	  be	  the	  most	  productive.	  Each	  of	  the	  above	  methods	  has	  been	  used	  by	  two	  reports.	  The	  first	  and	  simpler	  method	  was	  used	  by	  Rogner65	  and	  the	  UK’s	  Department	  of	  Energy	  and	  Climate	  Change	  (DECC).66	  Surprisingly,	  given	  the	  reliance	  that	  has	  been	  placed	  upon	  his	  work,	  Rogner	  appears	  to	  have	  used	  a	  relatively	  crude	  approach	  on	  which	  he	  provided	  very	  little	  information.	  He	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notes	  simply	  that:	  ‘the	  ratio	  of	  the	  US	  estimates	  for	  natural	  gas	  from	  shale	  formations	  to	  the	   in-­‐place	   shale	   volume	   was	   used	   as	   a	   guide	   to	   calculate	   the	   regional	   natural	   gas	  resource	  from	  fractured	  shale	  resource	  potentials...based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  shale	  oil	  occurrences	  outside	   the	  United	  States	  also	   contain	   the	  US	  gas	  value	  of	  17.7	  Tcf/Gt	  (gigatonne)	   of	   shale-­‐in-­‐place’.	   Rogner	   therefore	   appears	   to	   have	   used	   only	   a	   single	  analogue	  to	  estimate	  worldwide	  shale	  gas	  resources.	  DECC	  also	  used	  this	  simpler	  approach	  in	  order	  to	  estimate	  shale	  gas	  resources	  in	  the	  UK.	  More	   than	  one	  analogue	  was	  used	  with	   the	  Barnett,	  Antrim	  and	  a	   ‘more	  conservative’	  play,	  identified	  as	  possible	  analogues	  for	  the	  three	  shale	  plays	  in	  the	  UK.	  The	  choice	  of	  analogues	  significantly	  affects	  the	  resource	  estimates	  produced,	  with	  the	  productivity	  of	  the	  most	  productive	  analogue	  play	  (the	  Barnett	  at	  7.6	  mcm/km2)	  being	  13	  times	  greater	  than	   that	   of	   the	   least	   productive	   analogue	   play	   (the	   ‘more	   conservative’	   play	   at	   0.6	  mcm/km2).	  The	   second	   approach	   requires	   substantially	   more	   information	   from	   areas	   that	   are	  already	  being	  developed,	  but	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  more	  reliable.	  As	  a	  result,	  this	  approach	  has	  been	  used	  by	   two	  of	   the	  main	   sources	  providing	   shale	   gas	   resource	   estimates	   for	   the	  USA,	   namely	   INTEK	   for	   the	   EIA67	  and	   the	  USGS.68	  The	   approach	   taken	   by	   the	  USGS	   is	  described	  in	  detail	  below	  and	  serves	  to	   illustrate	  the	  types	  of	   issues	  that	  are	  raised.	  A	  map	   of	   all	   US	   shale	   gas	   plays	   and	   detailed	   description	   of	   the	   INTEK	   method	   are	  presented	  in	  Annex	  C.2.	  
Methods	  used	  by	  the	  US	  Geological	  Survey	  As	   indicated	   above	   in	   Section	   2.1.1,	   the	   USGS	   undertakes	   analysis	   of	   geological	   areas	  within	   the	   USA	   and	   provides	   estimates	   of	   the	   ‘potential	   additions	   to	   reserves’	   for	  unconventional	  gas	  from	  those	  areas.	  While	  it	  does	  not	  provide	  an	  estimate	  of	  TRR	  for	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  USA,	  such	  an	  estimate	  can	  be	  compiled	  using	  the	  following:	  	  
• USGS	   mean	   estimates	   of	   the	   potential	   additions	   to	   reserves	   for	   all	   individual	  shale	  plays;	  
• estimates	  of	  total	  proved	  US	  shale	  gas	  reserves;69	  
• estimates	  of	  ‘inferred’	  reserves	  of	  shale	  gas;70	  
• estimates	  of	  technically	  recoverable	  resources	  in	  undiscovered	  shale	  gas	  plays;71	  and	  
• cumulative	  shale	  gas	  production.	  	  The	   approach	   taken	   by	   the	  USGS	   is	   described	   in	   two	  methodological	   papers,72	  one	   of	  which	   is	   a	   2010	   update	   of	   the	   method	   used	   previously.	   These	   two	   methods	   differ	  slightly;	   the	  earlier	  method	  excludes	  any	  shale	  gas	  that	  was	  estimated	  to	  exist	   in	  non-­‐sweet-­‐spot	   areas	   from	   the	   estimates	   of	   ‘potential	   additions	   to	   reserves’	   that	   were	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  INTEK,	  'Review	  of	  emerging	  resources'.	  68	  For	  example	  Coleman	  et	  al.,	  'Assessment	  of	  undiscovered	  oil	  and	  gas'.	  69 	  Available	   from	   EIA,	   Shale	   gas:	   proved	   reserves	   (2011,	   cited	   22/11/2011);	   available	   from	  http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_enr_shalegas_a_EPG0_R5301_Bcf_a.htm	  70	  Available	  from	  INTEK,	  'Review	  of	  emerging	  resources'.	  71	  Also	  available	  from	  Ibid.	  72	  Charpentier	  and	  Cook,	  'Improved	  USGS	  methodology';	  Schmoker,	  'Assessment	  concepts	  for	  continuous	  petroleum	  accumulations'.	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produced.	  In	  addition,	  the	  earlier	  method	  refers	  to	  dividing	  the	  area	  under	  investigation	  into	   ‘cells’	  with	   particular	   drainage	   areas	   (number	   of	   cells	   per	   unit	   area)	   rather	   than	  wells;	  however,	  cells	  and	  wells	  are	  essentially	  identical.73	  Nevertheless,	   the	   general	   approach	   of	   both	  methods	   is	   similar:	   the	   shale	   play	   is	   split	  into	  individual	  areas	  and	  then	  estimates	  are	  made	  of	  the	  areal	  extent	  of	  each	  area;	  the	  drainage	  area	  of	  wells	  (or	  cells)	  within	  those	  areas;	  and	  the	  mean	  URR/cell	  or	  URR/well	  within	  those	  areas.	  A	   further	  difference	  between	   the	   two	  USGS	  methods	   is	   in	   the	  estimation	  of	  a	   ‘success	  ratio’.	   In	   the	   newer	  method,	   this	   is	   estimated	   separately	   for	   the	   sweet-­‐spot	   and	   non-­‐sweet-­‐spot	   areas	   and	   represents	   the	  percentage	  of	  wells	   that	   the	  USGS	  estimates	  will	  produce	   at	   least	   the	   minimum	   URR/well.	   It	   modifies	   the	   product	   of	   the	   above	  parameters,	   tending	   to	   reduce	   the	   volume	   of	   gas	   estimated	   to	   be	   technically	  recoverable.	  The	  earlier	  method	  also	  estimated	  a	  factor	  similar	  to	  the	  success	  ratio,	  but	  this	  was	  not	  used	  in	  the	  volumetric	  calculations.	  The	  application	  of	  the	  success	  ratio	  (if	  used)	  to	  the	  above	  parameters	  yields	  an	  estimate	  of	   the	   discovered	   technically	   recoverable	   resources.	   The	   USGS	   removes	   cumulative	  production	   and	   an	   estimate	   of	   gas	   considered	   to	   be	   reserves	   in	   order	   to	   yield	   its	  estimate	  of	  the	  ‘potential	  additions	  to	  reserves’.	  	  The	  USGS	  periodically	  updates	  its	  resource	  assessments	  for	  individual	  US	  shale	  plays	  or	  areas	   of	   the	   plays	   and	   produces	   an	   end-­‐of-­‐year	   summary	   combining	   all	   of	   the	   latest	  surveys	   it	   has	   carried	   out.	  When	   estimating	   the	   overall	   TRR	   for	   shale	   gas	   in	   the	  USA	  from	   the	   USGS	   figures,	   it	   is	   important	   that	   within	   each	   shale	   play,	   the	   figures	   to	   be	  added	   must	   be	   contemporaneous	   with	   the	   date	   on	   which	   the	   USGS	   carried	   out	   its	  assessment.	  One	  cannot,	  for	  example,	  simply	  add	  current	  estimates	  of	  proved	  reserves	  to	  the	  USGS	  figures,	  since	  volumes	  of	  gas	  that	  were	  not	  considered	  reserves	  when	  the	  USGS	  made	  its	  assessment	  but	  are	  now	  included	  as	  reserves	  would	  be	  double	  counted	  since	  they	  have	  moved	  from	  the	  USGS	  ‘potential	  additions	  to	  reserves’	  category	  into	  the	  reserves	   category.	   A	   similar	   situation	   exists	   with	   cumulative	   production.	   The	   latest	  resource	   assessments	   are	   summarised	   in	   Table	   2-­‐4.	   Although	   a	   number	   of	   these	  assessments	  were	  produced	  after	  2010,	  recently	  released	  USGS	  data74	  suggests	  that	  the	  old	  methodology	  was	  used	   for	  all	  of	   these.	  As	  described	  above,	   the	  earlier	  assessment	  methodology	  excluded	  volumes	  of	  gas	  estimated	  to	  exist	  in	  non-­‐sweet-­‐spot	  areas	  and	  so	  is	  likely	  to	  underestimate	  the	  total	  play	  TRR.	  Since	  a	  detailed	  breakdown	  of	  proved	  reserve	   figures	   is	  only	  available	   from	  2007	  and	  only	   a	   single	   aggregate	   estimate	   of	   ‘inferred’	   (i.e.	   probable	  minus	   proved)	   reserves	   is	  available,	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  derive	  a	  rigorous	  assessment	  of	  the	  USGS	  estimate	  of	  the	  TRR	  within	  each	  shale	  play.	  In	  the	  early	  2000s,	  the	  potential	  of	  shale	  gas	  production	  was	  not	  fully	  realised	  (as	  can	  be	  seen	  from	  the	  low	  level	  of	  resource	  estimates	  in	  Figure	  2-­‐5)	  and	  so	  the	  majority	  of	  shale	  plays	  assessed	  at	  that	  time	  were	  unlikely	  to	  have	  contained	  any	  proved	  reserves,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  Barnett	  and	  Antrim	  Shales.	  Therefore,	  for	  those	  shales	  which	  were	  assessed	  prior	  to	  2007,	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  proved	  reserves	  are	  zero,	  except	  in	  the	  Barnett	  and	  Antrim	  Shales.	  For	  the	  Barnett	  Shale,	  historic	  estimates	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  Charpentier	  and	  Cook,	  'Improved	  USGS	  methodology'.	  74	  USGS	  Marcellus	  Shale	  Assessment	  Team,	  'Information	  relevant	  to	  the	  U.S.	  Geological	  Survey	  assessment	  of	   the	  Middle	  Devonian	  Shale	  of	   the	  Appalachian	  Basin	  Province',	   (Reston,	  VA:	  United	  States	  Geological	  Survey,	  2011).	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of	  proved	  reserves	  are	  available,75	  however	  no	  data	   is	  available	   for	  historically	  proved	  reserves	   in	  the	  Antrim	  Shale	  and	  so	  we	  use	  the	  earliest	  data	  available	   from	  2007.	  The	  fifth	   and	   sixth	   columns	   of	   Table	   2-­‐4	   therefore	   give	   an	   approximation	   of	  contemporaneously	  proved	  shale	  gas	  reserves	  and	  cumulative	  production	  respectively.	  Summing	   the	  mean	  estimates	  of	   the	   ‘potential	   additions	   to	   reserves’,	   proved	   reserves	  and	  cumulative	  production	   for	  each	  shale	  play	   leads	   to	  an	  estimate	  of	  11	  Tcm	   for	   the	  total	  technically	  recoverable	  resource	  in	  these	  plays.	  To	  obtain	  an	  estimate	  for	  the	  total	  technically	   recoverable	   shale	   gas	   resource	   in	   the	   USA,	   estimates	   of	   undiscovered	  resources	   (1.6	   Tcm)	   and	   inferred	   reserves	   (0.56	   Tcm)	   both	   taken	   from	   INTEK76	  have	  been	   added	   in.	   This	   leads	   to	   an	   estimate	   of	   13.1	   Tcm,77	  which	   compares	   to	   a	   mean	  estimate	  of	  23.5	  Tcm	  and	  a	  range	  of	  8.0-­‐47.4	  Tcm	  from	  the	  review	  of	  studies	  presented	  in	  Section	  2.2.	  However,	  since	  the	  earlier	  USGS	  methodology	  excluded	  non-­‐sweet	  spots,	  which	   are	   now	   expected	   to	   contain	   significant	   volumes	   of	   shale	   gas,	   it	   may	   have	  underestimated	  the	  potential	  additions	  to	  reserves	  in	  those	  plays.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 See	   EIA,	   'Barnett	   shale,	   Ft	   Worth	   Basin,	   Texas.	   Wells	   by	   year	   of	   first	   production	   and	   orientation',	  (Washington	  DC:	  Department	  of	  Energy,	  2011).	  76	  INTEK,	  'Review	  of	  emerging	  resources'.	  77	  Some,	  but	  not	  all,	  double	  counting	  is	  eliminated	  by	  this	  process.	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Table	  2-­‐4:	  USGS	  estimates	  of	  shale	  gas	  resource	  in	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America78	  














assessment**	  Coleman	   et	   al.	  (2011)	   2011	   Marcellus	  shale	   2.39	   0.13	   0.01	  Dubiel	   et	   al.	  (2011)	   2010	   Haynesville	  and	  Eagle-­‐Ford	   3.62	   0.31	   0.05	  Higley	   et	   al.	  (2011)	   2010	   Woodford	  shale	   0.70	   0.18	   0.03	  Houseknecht	  et	  al.	  (2010)	   2010	   Fayetteville	  and	  Woodford-­‐Caney	   0.76	   0.25	   0.05	  Schenk	   et	   al.	  (2008)	   2007	   Barnett-­‐Woodford	   0.99	   0	   0	  Swezey	   et	   al.	  (2007)	   2007	   New	  Albany	   0.11	   0	   0	  Swezey	   et	   al.	  (2005)	   2004	   Antrim	   0.21	   0.09	   0.04	  Pollastro	   et	   al.	  (2004)	   2003	   Barnett	   0.75	   0.10	   0.02	  Higley	   et	   al.	  (2003)	   2002	   Niobrara	   0.03	   0	   0	  Milici	   et	   al.	  (2003)	   2002	   Devonian	  (Ohio)	  shale	   0.11	   0	   0.07	  
Total	   	   	   9.67	   1.07	   0.27	  
2.2.2 Methodological	  robustness	  of	  each	  method	  	  This	   section,	   which	   identifies	   some	   of	   the	   strengths	   and	   weaknesses	   of	   the	   different	  methods,	   attempts	   to	   explain	  why	   differences	   exist	   between	   estimates,	   and	   indicates	  which	  procedures	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  the	  most	  robust.	  
Literature	  review/adaptation	  of	  existing	  literature	  Studies	  relying	  upon	  literature	  reviews	  draw	  on	  information	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  sources	  and	   hence	   a	   variety	   of	   methods	   of	   resource	   estimation,	   thus	   removing	   some	   of	   the	  uncertainty	  over	   the	  choice	  of	  method.	  They	  also	  appear	  more	   likely	   to	  quantitatively	  estimate	   the	   uncertainty	   in	   their	   resource	   figure.	   For	   example,	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	  variation	   in	   resource	   estimates	   provided	   by	   sources	   for	   the	   USA,	   Mohr	   and	   Evans79	  indicate	  that	  the	  ‘best’	  estimate	  of	  URR	  for	  shale	  gas	  in	  the	  USA	  is	  17.7	  Tcm	  with	  a	  ‘high’	  value	  of	  35.9	  Tcm	  and	  a	  ‘low’	  value	  of	  9.3	  Tcm.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  Notes:	   The	   borders	   of	   the	   shale	   plays	   and	   assessment	   units	   may	   not	   always	   coincide.	   Most	   reserve	  figures	  are	  only	  available	  at	  a	  state	  level	  and	  so	  some	  judgement	  is	  required	  to	  assign	  these	  to	  the	  shale	  plays.	  	  *	  Source:	  EIA,	  'Barnett	  shale	  wells',	  EIA,	  Shale	  gas:	  proved	  reserves	  (cited).	  **	   Sources:	   Lippman	   Consulting	   (taken	   from	   J.B.	   Curtis,	   'The	   Contribution	   of	   Shale	   Gas	   to	   Future	   U.S.	  Production:	  A	  View	  of	  the	  Resource	  Base'	  (paper	  presented	  at	  the	  AAPG	  Annual	  Convention,	  Denver,	  CO,	  2009);	   R.	   Dougher,	   'Natural	   gas	   and	   America's	   energy	   future'	   (paper	   presented	   at	   the	  Marcellus	   shale	  lecture	  series,	  New	  York,	  NY,	  2011).)	  79	  Mohr	  and	  Evans,	  'Shale	  gas	  changes	  production	  projections'.	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On	   the	   other	   hand,	   reports	   relying	   on	   literature	   reviews	   are	   potentially	   open	   to	  subjectivity	  over	  which	  sources	  are	  to	  be	  included	  and	  which	  are	  relied	  on	  more	  heavily.	  The	  extent	  to	  which,	  and	  the	  reasons	  for	  which,	  certain	  sources	  have	  been	  favoured	  over	  others	   is	   rarely	  made	   clear.	   It	   is	   also	   not	   always	   clear	   how	   the	   quoted	   literature	   has	  been	  used.	  MIT	  for	  example,	  cites	  ICF,	  USGS	  and	  the	  National	  Petroleum	  Council	  (NPC)	  as	   the	   sources	  used	   for	   its	  unconventional	  gas	  estimates.80	  The	  mean	  value	  chosen	  by	  MIT	  for	  US	  shale	  gas	  corresponds	  to	  the	  values	  used	  by	  ICF;	  however	  it	  is	  unclear	  how	  MIT’s	  P10	  and	  P90	  estimates	  rely	  upon	  the	  USGS	  and	  NPC	  figures.	  
Bottom-­‐up	  analysis	  of	  geological	  parameters	  The	   geological	   approach	   employs	   well-­‐known	   and	   well-­‐understood	   equations	   to	  estimate	   the	   volumes	   of	   free	   and	   adsorbed	   gas	   in	   place.	   A	   number	   of	   problems	   exist,	  however.	  	  The	   first,	  and	  perhaps	  the	  most	   important,	   is	   the	   inherent	  subjectivity	   in	  choosing	  the	  recovery	   factor	   to	   apply	   to	   the	   estimated	   gas	   in	   place.	   It	  was	   for	   this	   reason	   that	   the	  USGS	   chose	   not	   to	   use	   this	   approach	   stating:	   “the	   estimation	   of	   an	   overall	   recovery	  factor	   must	   sometimes	   be	   quite	   qualitative”.	   ARI81	  attempted	   to	   remove	   some	   of	   the	  subjectivity	   in	   its	   estimates	   of	   recovery	   factors,	   which	   lay	   between	   20%	   and	   30%	   in	  most	   circumstances,	   by	   linking	   this	   to	   the	   mineralogy	   of	   the	   source	   rocks;	   however,	  recovery	  factors	  of	  15-­‐40%	  have	  been	  used	  by	  other	  authors,82	  while	  Strickland	  et	  al.83	  report	   that	  some	  recoveries	  can	  be	  as	   low	  as	  1-­‐2%.	  When	  the	  volumes	  of	  gas	   in	  place	  are	   so	   large,	   this	   corresponds	   to	   a	   huge	   range	   of	   uncertainty	   in	   the	   technically	  recoverable	  resources.	  	  An	  additional	  problem	  relates	  to	  the	  estimation	  of	  the	  geological	  variables	  required	  for	  this	  method.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  data	  may	  only	  be	  available	  for	  a	  subset	  of	  these,	   and	   for	   unexplored	   shale	   plays	   such	   estimates	   must	   necessarily	   have	   large	  confidence	   bounds.	   Hubbert	   remarked	   that	   for	   conventional	   petroleum	   resource	  estimates:	   “it	   is	   easy	   to	   show	   that	   no	   geological	   information	   exists	   other	   than	   that	  provided	   by	   drilling...that	   has	   a	   range	   of	   uncertainty	   of	   less	   than	   several	   orders	   of	  magnitude.”84	  Even	  when	  exploratory	  drilling	  has	  taken	  place,	  the	  range	  of	  uncertainty	  may	  still	  be	  wide.	  For	  example,	  it	  is	  often	  difficult	  to	  estimate	  the	  gas	  saturation85	  from	  well-­‐log	  data,	  a	  key	  parameter	  in	  the	  estimation	  of	  the	  gas	  in	  place.86	  	  A	   third	   problem	   relates	   to	   the	   issue	   of	   ‘sweet	   spots’.	   As	   mentioned	   above,	   there	   is	  significant	   heterogeneity	   between	   sweet	   spots	   and	   non-­‐sweet	   spots.	   Simply	  extrapolating	   geological	   values	   from	   certain	   areas	   within	   the	   sweet	   spot	   across	   the	  entire	   extent	   of	   the	   shale	   is	   likely	   to	   overestimate	   the	   resource	  potential;	   segregating	  the	   shale	   play	   area	   is	   necessary	   to	   avoid	   this.	   ARI’s	   concept	   of	   ‘prospective	   area’	  indicates	  an	  attempt	  to	  disregard	  areas	  of	  shale	  that	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  less	  productive.	  The	  next	   step	  would	   be	   to	   delineate	   the	   prospective	   area	   into	   sweet-­‐spot	   and	  non-­‐sweet-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  Ejaz,	  'Background	  material	  on	  natural	  gas	  resource	  assessments'.	  81	  Advanced	  Resources	  International,	  'World	  shale	  gas	  resources'.	  82	  IEA,	  'WEO	  2009';	  Kuuskraa,	  'Status	  report';	  Mohr	  and	  Evans,	  'Long	  term	  forecasting'.	  83	  Strickland,	  Purvis	  and	  Blasingame,	  'Reserves	  Determinations'.	  84	  M.K.	   Hubbert,	   'Techniques	   of	   prediction	   as	   applied	   to	   the	   production	   of	   oil	   and	   gas',	   in	  Oil	   and	   gas	  
supply	  modeling	  (Washington,	  DC:	  1982).	  
85 The	  gas	  saturation	  is	  the	  fraction	  of	  the	  porosity	  of	  the	  shales	  filled	  with	  gas	  rather	  than	  water.	  	  86	  Hubbert,	  'Techniques	  of	  prediction';	  W.J.	  Lee	  and	  R.	  Sidle,	  'Gas-­‐Reserves	  Estimation	  in	  Resource	  Plays'	  (paper	  presented	  at	  the	  SPE	  Unconventional	  Gas	  Conference,	  Pittsburgh,	  PA,	  2010).	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spot	  sectors,	  but	  ARI	  was	  unable	  to	  do	  this.	  The	  frequency	  and	  extent	  of	  sweet	  spots	  and	  the	  degree	  of	  variation	  between	  sweet	  spots	  and	  other	  areas	  remains	  uncertain,	  even	  in	  comparatively	  well-­‐developed	  shales.	  	  A	  fourth	  point	  is	  that	  this	  approach	  does	  not	  depend	  particularly	  upon	  prior	  production	  experience.	  Drilling	   is	   the	  only	   reliable	  means	  of	   assessing	   the	   extent	   and	  volumes	  of	  shale	  gas	  that	  exists,	  as	  can	  be	  seen	  by	  the	  large	  number	  of	  wells	  that	  have	  been	  drilled	  outside	  the	  sweet-­‐spot	  areas	  within	  the	  USA.	  This	  shows	  that	  the	  productivity	  of	  these	  areas	  can	  vary	  enormously	  and,	  although	  displaying	  some	  correlation	  with	  parameters	  such	  as	  the	  shale	  thickness,	  is	  not	  really	  known	  until	  drilling	  is	  well	  under	  way.87	  The	   final	   and	   most	   important	   problem	   is	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   rigorous	   approach	   to	  uncertainty.	  While	  some	  reports	  mention	  the	  uncertainty	  in	  values	  in	  passing	  or	  give	  a	  range	   in	   final	   resource	   estimates,	   no	   reports	   placed	   in	   this	   category	   provided	   a	  thorough	   description	   of	   the	   uncertainties	   that	   had	   been	   analysed	   or	   present	   their	  results	   in	   the	   form	  of	  a	  probability	  distribution.	  There	   is	  no	  reason,	  except	  potentially	  because	  of	   an	  absence	  of	   relevant	  data,	  why	   the	  uncertainties	   in	   individual	   geological	  parameters	  (particularly	  those	  used	  more	  than	  once	  or	  which	  are	  especially	  uncertain,	  such	  as	  the	  areal	  extent	  of	  the	  shale),	  cannot	  be	  estimated,	  stated	  and	  accounted	  for.	  	  
Extrapolation	  of	  production	  experience	  This	  approach	  avoids	  some	  of	   the	  above	  problems	  but	  unfortunately	   introduces	  some	  more,	   one	  of	  which	   is	   currently	   somewhat	   controversial.	   It	   is	   first	   interesting	   to	  note	  that	  the	  only	  source	  providing	  a	  detailed	  methodology,	  the	  USGS,	  chose	  to	  employ	  this	  approach.	  	  The	  key	  general	  additional	  problem	  introduced	  regards	  the	  methods	  for	  estimating	  the	  URR	  from	  individual	  wells.	  As	  explained	  in	  detail	  in	  Section	  2.3,	  these	  methods	  rely	  upon	  modelling	   the	   anticipated	   decline	   in	   the	   rate	   of	   production	   from	   individual	   wells.	  Different	  choices	  are	  available	  for	  the	  ‘shape’	  and	  rate	  of	  future	  production	  decline,	  and	  the	  limited	  historical	  experience	  at	  present	  does	  not	  constrain	  these	  choices	  especially	  well	  –	  with	  different	  choices	  potentially	  leading	  to	  very	  different	  estimates	  of	  the	  URR.	  As	  explained	  in	  Section	  2.3	  there	  is	  concern	  that	  current	  practice	  may	  be	  overestimating	  the	  URR	  for	  individual	  wells.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  these	  form	  the	  basis	  of	  regional	  resource	  estimates,	  these	  too	  could	  be	  overestimated.	  An	   additional	   problem	   that	   applies	   to	   the	   simple	   analogy-­‐based	   approach	   used	   by	  DECC88	  and	  Rogner89	  concerns	  which	  analogue	  to	  choose.	  The	  choice	  of	  an	  analogue	  is	  extremely	  important:	  as	  noted	  DECC’s	  choices	  of	  analogues	  varied	  by	  a	  factor	  of	  ten.	  The	  USGS	  suggested	  using	  a	  probabilistic	  approach	  with	  more	  than	  one	  analogue	  to	  reduce	  this	   problem,90	  which	   appears	   to	   be	   a	   sensible	   approach	   given	   the	   uncertainties	   that	  exist.	  	  A	   further	   problem,	   given	   both	   the	   complexity	   and	   heterogeneity	   of	   the	   geological	  determinants	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  long	  history	  of	  production	  data,	  is	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  R.R.	  Charpentier	  and	  T.A.	  Cook,	  'Applying	  probabilistic	  well-­‐performance	  parameters	  to	  assessments	  of	  shale	   gas	   resources'	   (paper	   presented	   at	   the	   American	   Association	   of	   Petroleum	   Geologists	   annual	  convention	  and	  exhibition,	  New	  Orleans,	  LA,	  2010);	  Kuuskraa,	  'Case	  study	  #1.	  Barnett	  Shale:	  The	  start	  of	  the	  gas	  shale	  revolution'.	  88	  Harvey	  and	  Gray,	  'Unconventional	  resources	  of	  Britain'.	  89	  Rogner,	  'Assessment	  of	  World	  Resources'.	  90	  Charpentier	  and	  Cook,	  'Probabilistic	  well-­‐performance	  parameters'.	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assumptions	  made	  for	  the	  productivity	  of	  areas	  outside	  those	  currently	  being	  produced.	  As	  mentioned	   in	   Section	   2.2.1,	   historic	   production	   has	   focused	   upon	   sweet	   spots	   and	  upon	   the	   most	   productive	   areas	   within	   those	   sweet	   spots.	   Extrapolating	   a	   mean	  URR/well	  from	  this	  area	  to	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  sweet	  spot	  could	  potentially	  overestimate	  the	  resource	  potential.	  If	  these	  estimates	  are	  then	  extended	  across	  the	  entire	  shale	  play,	  the	  resource	  potential	  of	  the	  region	  could	  be	  greatly	  overestimated.	  	  The	  USGS	  attempted	  to	  mitigate	  this	  problem	  by	  mapping	  a	  range	  of	  geological	  factors	  and	  using	  these	  to	  estimate	  the	  possible	  productivities	  outside	  the	  area	  currently	  being	  produced,	  although	  it	  has	  not,	  in	  the	  assessments	  it	  has	  performed	  so	  far,	  attempted	  to	  estimate	   the	   productivity	   of	   non-­‐sweet-­‐spot	   areas.	   Nevertheless,	   its	   approach	   is	  relatively	  transparent	  and	  has	  the	  advantage	  that	  uncertainties	  are	  explicitly	  accounted	  for.	  	  It	   is	   clear,	   therefore,	   that	   careful	   delineation	   of	   the	   shale	   play	   is	   necessary	   to	   avoid	  overestimating	  productivity	   in	  undeveloped	  areas,	  but	  delineation	  is	   itself	  challenging.	  This	   is	   particularly	   relevant	   when	   splitting	   the	   shale	   play	   into	   sweet-­‐spot	   and	   non-­‐sweet-­‐spot	   areas.	  Given	   the	  heterogeneity	   even	  within	   sweet	   spots,	   it	   is	   preferable	   to	  define	   and	   isolate	   the	   shale	   into	   an	   even	   greater	   number	   of	   areas	   of	   differing	  productivity:	   a	  procedure	  used	  by	   the	  USGS	   through	   the	  differentiation	  of	   shale	  plays	  into	  smaller	  assessment	  units.	  	  As	  mentioned	  above,	   INTEK	  also	  used	  this	  approach	  to	  derive	  estimates	  of	   the	  TRR	  in	  the	  USA	  for	  the	  EIA.91	  Its	  method	  is	  described	  in	  Annex	  C	  which	  also	  provides	  a	  detailed	  comparison	  of	   these	   two	  methods;	  however,	   a	  brief	   examination	  of	   their	   assessments	  for	  the	  Marcellus	  Shale	  play	  is	  given	  in	  Box	  2-­‐1.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  INTEK,	  'Review	  of	  emerging	  resources'.	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Box	  2-­‐1:	  Comparison	  of	  Marcellus	  Shale	  play	  assessments	  Recently	  released	  data92	  from	  the	  USGS	  allows	  one	  to	  attempt	  a	   ‘like-­‐with-­‐like’	  comparison	  between	  the	  assessments	   carried	   out	   by	   the	   USGS93	  and	   INTEK94	  of	   the	   Marcellus	   Shale.	   The	   USGS	   estimate	   is	   of	  “potential	   additions	   to	   reserves”	   while	   INTEK’s	   estimate	   is	   of	   “unproved	   discovered	   technically	  recoverable	  resources”.	  Despite	  these	  different	  names,	  both	  exclude	  any	  volumes	  of	  proved	  reserves	  from	  their	  estimates	  and	  it	  is	  assumed	  both	  exclude	  “inferred	  reserves”.	  The	  two	  estimates	  should	  therefore	  be	  comparable.	  	  The	   authors	   include	   below	   only	   the	   mean	   estimates	   of	   the	   data	   provided	   by	   USGS:	   reproducing	   the	  estimates	  provided	  would	  require	  a	  rigorous	  handling	  of	   the	  ranges	   it	  provides.	  There	  are	  some	  errors	  introduced	  by	  this	  but	  the	  overall	  difference	  between	  the	  calculated	  value	  and	  quoted	  figure	  provided	  by	  the	  USGS	  is	  only	  0.4%.	  There	  are	  two	  major	  differences	  that	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  table	  below	  that	  result	  in	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  ‘headline’	  figures	  of	  2.4	  Tcm	  by	  the	  USGS	  and	  11.6	  Tcm	  by	  INTEK.	  First,	  the	  USGS	  excludes	  shale	  gas	  in	  non-­‐sweet-­‐spot	   areas,	   which	   INTEK	   indicates	   makes	   up	   57%	   its	   estimate.	   INTEK’s	   resource	   estimate	  within	  its	  sweet-­‐spot	  area	  is	  still	  110%	  larger	  than	  USGS’s,	  however,	  and	  so	  the	  second	  major	  difference	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  the	  values	  used	   for	  URR/well.	   INTEK’s	  URR/well	   is	  over	   three	  times	  the	  productivity	  within	  the	  Interior	  assessment	  unit,	  the	  most	  productive	  of	  USGS’s	  assessment	  units.	  In	  fact,	  INTEK’s	  non-­‐sweet-­‐spot	  productivity	  is	  equivalent	  to	  the	  mean	  productivity	  within	  the	  sweet-­‐spot	  area	  of	  the	  USGS’s	  most	  productive	  assessment	  unit.	  Countering	   this	   to	  an	  extent	   is	  USGS’s	   larger	  overall	   sweet-­‐spot	  area,	  which	   is	   around	   90%	   greater	   than	   that	   used	   by	   INTEK.	   The	   two	   non-­‐sweet-­‐spot	   areas	   are	   almost	  identical.	  	   INTEK	   USGS	  
Assessment	  unit	   	   Foldbelt	   Interior	   Western	  Margin	   Total	  
Sweet-­‐spot	  area	   	   	   	   	   	  Area	  (km2)	   27	  511	   2	  469	   42	  840	   7	  151	   52	  460	  Well	  spacing	  (wells/km2)	   3.1	   1.7	   1.7	   2.1	   	  URR/well	  (mcm/well)	   99.2	   5.9	   32.6	   3.7	   	  Success	  factor	   60%	   Not	  used	  
Calculated	   gas	   volume	  
(Tcm)	   5.06	   0.024	   2.315	   0.056	   2.395	  
Quoted	  gas	  volume	  (Tcm)	   5.06	   0.022	   2.305	   0.058	   2.385	  
Non-­‐sweet-­‐spot	  area	   	   	   	   	   	  Area	  (km2)	   218	  261	   46	  903	   74	  114	   96	  043	   217	  060	  Well	  spacing	  (wells/km2)	   3.1	  
Not	  assessed	  URR/well	  (mcm/well)	   32.6	  Success	  factor	   30%	  Calculated	  gas	  volume	  
(Tcm)	   6.59	  
Quoted	  gas	  volume	  (Tcm)	   6.59	  
Total	  (Tcm)	   11.65	   	   2.385	  
	  
2.2.3 Impact	  of	  technology	  on	  resource	  estimates	  The	  studies	  reviewed	  above	  have	  focused	  upon	  estimating	  the	  volume	  of	  shale	  gas	  that	  could	  be	  recovered	  using	  currently	  available	   technology.	  As	   indicated	   in	  Section	  2.1.1,	  assessment	  methods	  that	  explicitly	  allow	  for	  future	  technological	  advances	  are	  likely	  to	  lead	  to	  substantially	  larger	  estimates	  of	  recoverable	  resources.	  Only	  three	  reports	  that	  attempt	  to	  quantify	  the	  effects	  of	  future	  technology	  development	  have	  been	  identified,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  USGS	  Marcellus	  Shale	  Assessment	  Team,	  'Information	  relevant	  to	  assessment	  of	  Appalachian	  Basin'.	  93	  Coleman	  et	  al.,	  'Assessment	  of	  undiscovered	  oil	  and	  gas'.	  94	  INTEK,	  'Review	  of	  emerging	  resources'.	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namely:	  a	  2004	  report	  by	  Kuuskraa,95	  a	  paper	  by	  the	  US	  National	  Petroleum	  Council96	  and	  a	  number	  of	  the	  EIA	  AEOs.97	  In	  each	  case,	  technological	  progress	  is	  represented	  by	  annual	  percentage	  increases	  in	  the	  URR/well.	  	  It	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   it	   was	   not	   the	   introduction	   of	   ‘new’	   technologies,	   i.e.	  technologies	  that	  had	  not	  been	  employed	  elsewhere	  and	  whose	  potential	  was	  unknown,	  but	   the	   adaptation	   and	   utilisation	   of	   existing	   technologies	   that	   has	   led	   to	   the	   large	  increases	  seen	  in	  the	  URR/well	  recently	  (ARI98	  for	  example	  indicates	  that	  the	  URR/well	  within	  the	  Barnett	  Shale	  between	  1985	  and	  1990	  averaged	  around	  11.3-­‐14.1	  mcm/well,	  but	   in	   2007-­‐2008	   had	   increased	   to	   around	   65.2	   mcm/well).	   New	   technological	  breakthroughs	  can	  never	  be	  ruled	  out,	  however.	  	  Two	   technologies	   identified	  by	   the	  EIA	  AEOs,	   stimulation99	  and	  horizontal	  drilling,	  are	  now	  much	  more	  widely	  used	   than	   in	  2000.	   It	   therefore	  seems	   likely	   that	   there	   is	   less	  potential	  for	  a	  step	  increase	  through	  switching	  from	  vertical	  wells	  without	  stimulation	  to	   horizontal	   wells	   with	   stimulation,	   in	   addition	   to	   there	   now	   being	   a	   better	  understanding	  of	  the	  current	  and	  future	  potential	  of	  these	  technologies.	  There	  has	  also	  been	   a	   significant	   body	   of	   work	   analysing	   the	   geology	   of	   individual	   shale	   plays.	   One	  would	  therefore	  expect	  shale	  geology	  to	  be	  now	  also	  much	  better	  understood	  and	  hence	  the	   scope	   for	   future	   improvements	   in	   URR/well	   to	   be	   better	   appreciated.	   These	   two	  factors	  suggest	  that	  such	  a	  step	  change	  in	  URR/well	  as	  witnessed	  between	  1985	  and	  the	  present	  is	  less	  likely	  to	  occur	  again	  in	  the	  future.	  	  However,	  another	  way	  to	  look	  at	  the	  role	  of	  technology	  is	  by	  examining	  the	  influence	  of	  changes	   in	   shale	  gas	   recovery	   factors.	  Even	  a	  very	   small	   increase	   in	  average	   recovery	  factors	   can	   have	   very	   significant	   impacts	   on	   estimated	   global	   recoverable	   volumes	   of	  shale	  gas.	  For	  example,	  using	  ARI’s	  global	  estimate	  of	   shale	  gas	  OGIP	  of	  around	  708.2	  Tcm,100	  a	  1%	   increase	   in	   recovery	   factors	  globally	  would	   lead	   to	  an	   increase	   in	  global	  URR	  of	  7.1	  Tcm	  –	  over	  twice	  the	  global	  production	  of	  all	  natural	  gas	  in	  2010.101	  The	   significant	   impact	   that	   even	   a	   small	   improvement	   in	   technology	   can	   have	   on	   the	  URR,	   and	   the	   possibility	   of	   major	   future	   technological	   breakthroughs,	   means	   that	  estimates	   of	   future	   technological	   progress	   must	   always	   be	   interpreted	   with	  considerable	  caution.	  
2.2.4 Summary	  Nearly	  all	   of	   the	   sources	  examined	  acknowledge	   that	   the	  estimates	   they	  provided	  are	  liable	  to	  change.	  Despite	  this,	  the	  majority	  present	  their	  results	  as	  single	  figures	  rather	  than	  a	   range	   (see	   for	  example	  Figure	  2-­‐7	   to	  Figure	  2-­‐9).	  Given	   the	   limited	  production	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  V.A.	   Kuuskraa,	   'Natural	   gas	   resources,	   unconventional',	   in	   Encyclopedia	   of	   Energy,	   ed.	   C.J.	   Cleveland	  (London:	  Elsevier,	  2004).	  96	  S.A.	   Holditch,	   'Unconventional	   gas	   topic	   paper	   #29',	   (Washington,	   DC:	   National	   Petroleum	   Council,	  2007).	  97	  See,	  for	  example,	  EIA,	  'AEO	  2010'.	  98	  Kuuskraa,	  'Case	  study	  #1.	  Barnett	  Shale:	  The	  start	  of	  the	  gas	  shale	  revolution'.	  
99 Stimulation,	   also	   known	   as	   hydraulic	   fracturing,	   involves	   ‘“pumping	   fluids”	   consisting	   primarily	   of	  water	  and	  sand...injected	  under	  high	  pressure	  into	  the	  producing	  formation,	  creating	  fissures	  that	  allow	  resources	  to	  move	  freely	  from	  rock	  pores	  where	  it	  is	  trapped’.	  American	  Petroleum	  Institute,	   'Hydraulic	  fracturing:	  unlocking	  America’s	  natural	   gas	   resources',	   (Washington,	  DC:	  American	  Petroleum	   Institute,	  2010).	  100	  Advanced	  Resources	  International,	  'World	  shale	  gas	  resources'.	  101	  BP,	  'Statistical	  review	  2011'.	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experience	  with	   shale	   gas,	   the	   limitations	   of	   the	   resource	   assessment	  methodologies,	  the	  level	  of	  uncertainty	  associated	  with	  many	  of	  the	  relevant	  variables,	  the	  high	  degree	  of	  subjectivity	  involved	  and	  the	  huge	  changes	  that	  have	  occurred	  in	  US	  estimates	  over	  the	  past	  few	  years,	  this	  greatly	  overemphasises	  the	  certainty	  with	  which	  the	  estimates	  should	  be	  interpreted.	  	  The	  table	  below	  summarises	  some	  of	  the	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages	  of	  the	  two	  main	  resource	   assessment	  methodologies.	   The	   choice	   between	   them	  will	   depend	   upon	   the	  extent	   of	   development	   of	   the	   region,	   the	   level	   of	   access	   to	   the	   relevant	   data,	   and	   the	  human	  and	  financial	  resources	  available.	  While	  a	  high-­‐level	  of	  uncertainty	  is	  inevitable	  at	   this	   stage	   of	   the	   development	   of	   the	   resource,	   this	   can	   be	   addressed,	   or	   at	   least	  mitigated,	  through	  the	  use	  of	  probabilistic	  methods.	  The	  absence	  of	  such	  methods	  is	  the	  primary	  weakness	  of	  the	  available	  literature.	  
Table	   2-­‐5:	   Advantages	   and	   disadvantages	   of	   geological	   and	   extrapolation	   approaches	   to	  
estimating	  shale	  gas	  resources	  
Bottom-­‐up	  analysis	  of	  geological	  parameters	   Extrapolation	  of	  production	  experience	  
Advantages	   Disadvantages	   Advantages	   Disadvantages	  Robust	   and	   well-­‐established	   geological	  approach	   Limited	  data	  and	  wide	  range	  of	  uncertainty	   in	   many	   of	   the	  geological	  parameters	  
No	   need	   to	  assume	   a	  recovery	  factor	   Decline	  rate	  problem	  for	  URR/well	  Reduces	   emphasis	   on	  the	  use	  of	  analogues	   Difficulties	   in	   delineating	  sweet-­‐spot	  areas	   	   Difficulties	  in	  delineating	  sweet-­‐spot	  areas	  	   Subjectivity	   in	   choice	   of	  recovery	  factor(s)	   	   Subjectivity	   in	   choice	   of	  key	   variables	   such	   as	  ‘success	  factor’	  	  	   Not	   directly	   based	   on	   actual	  drilling	  data	   	   Estimation	   of	  productivity	   in	  undeveloped	  areas	  	  	   	   	   Risk	   of	   using	  inappropriate	  analogues	  Within	   the	   analysis	   of	   geological	   parameters	   category,	   ARI’s102	  report	   is	   not	   only	   the	  most	  ambitious	  in	  scope	  but	  also	  provides	  the	  most	  detailed	  description	  of	  the	  methods	  used.	   It	   also	   attempts	   to	   address	   some	   of	   the	   general	   disadvantages	   of	   the	   approach	  discussed	  above.	  One	  criticism,	  however,	  is	  its	  lack	  of	  handling	  of	  uncertainty.	  	  Within	  the	  extrapolation	  category,	  the	  INTEK	  report	  is	  widely	  cited	  and	  influential,	  but	  has	  a	  number	  of	  important	  limitations	  as	  described	  in	  Annex	  C,	  including:	  the	  inaccurate	  delineation	  of	   sweet-­‐spot	  areas;	   the	   subjective	   choice	  of	   ‘success	   factors’;	   the	   reliance	  upon	  out-­‐of-­‐date	   information;	  and	   the	   inadequate	   treatment	  of	  uncertainty.	  The	  USGS	  approach	  is	  significantly	  more	  transparent	  and	  robust,	  but	  there	  are	  difficulties	  in	  using	  the	  available	  USGS	  literature	  to	  estimate	  the	  overall	  US	  TRR.	  All	   of	   the	   USGS	   assessments	   were	   undertaken	   using	   a	   methodology	   that	   excluded	  resources	   contained	   within	   non-­‐sweet-­‐spot	   areas.	   The	   absence	   of	   suitably	  disaggregated	   reserve	   and	   production	   data	   also	   creates	   the	   risk	   of	   double	   counting.	  These	  two	  effects	  could	  however	  potentially	  act	  in	  opposite	  directions,	  the	  first	  leading	  to	  an	  underestimate	  and	   the	  second	   to	  an	  overestimate	  of	   recoverable	   resources.	  The	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most	   commendable	   feature	   of	   the	   USGS	   approach	   is	   the	   explicit	   treatment	   of	  uncertainty,	  which	  is	  one	  reason	  why	  the	  results	  may	  be	  considered	  more	  reliable	  than	  those	  from	  INTEK.	  Furthermore,	  reliability	  should	  improve	  once	  updates	  using	  the	  new	  USGS	  methodology	  are	  undertaken	  for	  the	  shale	  plays	  that	  have	  not	  been	  assessed	  for	  some	  time.	  	  One	   major	   drawback	   of	   both	   the	   geological	   and	   extrapolation	   methods	   are	   their	  sensitivity	   to	   a	   single	   parameter,	   namely	   the	   recovery	   factor	   with	   the	   geological	  approach	   and	   the	   assumed	   functional	   form	   for	   the	   production	  decline	   curve	  with	   the	  extrapolation	   approach	   (see	   Section	   2.3).	   Both	   of	   these	   parameters	   are	   poorly	  understood	  with	  regard	  to	  shale	  gas	  production	  and	  remain	  controversial.	  It	  is	  generally	  accepted	   that	   estimation	   of	   the	   recovery	   factor	   is	   challenging,	   but	   little	   progress	  appears	   to	   have	   been	   made	   regarding	   its	   estimation	   in	   shale	   areas,	   even	   when	   the	  geology	   is	   relatively	   well	   understood.	   The	   controversy	   regarding	   estimation	   of	   the	  URR/well	   is	   more	   recent	   and	   the	   reasons	   behind	   the	   differing	   assumptions	   used	   by	  reporting	   organizations	   are	   not	  well	   understood.	   It	   is	   for	   this	   reason	   that	   Section	   2.3	  below	  examines	  the	  issue	  in	  more	  detail	  and	  attempts	  to	  find	  common	  ground	  between	  the	   polarised	   views.	   In	   principle,	   the	   reliability	   of	   the	   extrapolation	   method	   should	  improve	  as	  production	  experience	  increases.	  Hence,	  we	  would	  expect	  approaches	  based	  upon	  actual	  production	  experience	   to	  provide	  more	  reliable	  resource	  estimates	   in	   the	  medium	  term.	  At	  present,	  however,	  the	  level	  of	  uncertainty	  from	  these	  methods	  appears	  to	  be	  comparable	  to	  that	  from	  geological	  methods.	  As	  recommended	  by	  Lee	  and	  Sidle,103	  future	  studies	  that	  seek	  to	  derive	  mean	  estimates	  of	  the	  TRR	  for	  a	  region,	  should	  use	  as	  many	  different	  approaches	  as	  possible.	  	  Given	   these	  multiple	   limitations,	   it	   is	   essential	   to	   address	   and	   report	   on	   the	   level	   of	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  estimates,	  whichever	  approach	  is	  adopted.	  The	  failure	  of	  the	  majority	  of	   the	   existing	   literature	   to	   do	   this	   is	   a	  major	   limitation.	   To	   date,	   only	   the	   USGS	   has	  handled	   uncertainty	   in	   a	   rigorous	  manner,	   but	   there	   is	   no	   reason	  why	   other	   studies	  could	  not	  do	  so.	  	  
2.3 Decline	  curve	  analysis	  and	  the	  estimation	  of	  recoverable	  resources	  Production	   from	  shale	   gas	  wells	  declines	   continuously	   and	   rapidly	  within	   a	  month	  or	  two	  of	  initial	  production	  (IP)	  (see	  schematic	  in	  Figure	  2-­‐12).	  Estimating	  the	  future	  rate	  of	  production	  decline	  is	  therefore	  central,	  both	  to	  forecasting	  future	  production	  and	  to	  estimating	   the	   URR	   of	   the	   well	   –	   a	   key	   determinant	   of	   profitability.	   Appropriate	  methodologies	   for	   forecasting	   future	   decline	   rates	   are	   therefore	   needed	   to	   develop	  robust	  estimates	  of	  these	  two	  variables.	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Figure	  2-­‐12:	  Illustrative	  chart	  of	  typical	  decline	  in	  shale	  gas	  production	  
	  Such	   methodologies,	   termed	   decline	   curve	   analysis	   (DCA),	   are	   well-­‐established	   and	  widely	   used.104	  However,	   the	   appropriateness	   of	   specific	  methodologies	   for	   shale	   gas	  plays	   has	   been	   questioned,	   with	   suggestions	   that	   future	   decline	   rates	   have	   been	  underestimated,	  and	  both	  well	  longevity	  and	  ultimate	  recovery	  overestimated.105	  These	  individual	   well	   URR	   estimates	   form	   a	   key	   input	   into	   the	   extrapolation	   of	   production	  experience	  approach	  for	  estimating	  the	  regional	  URR	  of	  shale	  gas	  described	  in	  Section	  2.3.	  Hence,	  if	  the	  URR/well	  is	  being	  overestimated,	  there	  is	  a	  risk	  that	  the	  regional	  URR	  will	   be	   overestimated	   also.	   However,	   other	   commentators	   contest	   this	   interpretation	  and	   point	   to	   the	   impressive	   recent	   history	   of	   shale	   gas	   production	   as	   evidence	   that	  future	  estimates	  are	  realistic.106	  While	  the	  roots	  of	  this	  disagreement	  lie	  in	  the	  technical	  assumptions	  underpinning	  decline	  curve	  analysis,	  the	  economic	  importance	  of	  shale	  gas	  has	  led	  to	  a	  very	  public	  and	  politicised	  debate.107	  In	  brief,	  DCA	  involves	  statistically	  fitting	  a	  hyperbolically	  declining	  curve	  to	  a	  time	  series	  of	  historical	  production	  data	  from	  a	  well.	  This	  fitted	  curve	  can	  then	  be	  extrapolated	  to	  derive	   the	   future	   production	   estimate	   or	   URR	   for	   that	   well.	   The	   typical	   hyperbolic	  equation	  used	   involves	   three	  key	   terms:	   the	   initial	  production	   rate;	   the	   initial	  decline	  rate;	  and	  a	  constant	  termed	  b,	  which	  defines	  the	  rate	  at	  which	  decline	  rate	  arrests	  (see	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Annex	   A).	   Both	   initial	   production	   and	   initial	   decline	   can	   be	   measured	   from	   a	   short	  production	  experience.	  The	  appropriate	  b	  constant,	  however,	  is	  significantly	  less	  certain	  until	  several	  years	  production	  experience	   is	  available.	  The	   impact	  of	   increasing	  b	   is	   to	  increase	   the	   production	   rate	   to	  which	   the	   fitted	   curve	   is	   asymptotically	   approaching.	  Therefore	  a	  higher	  b	  constant	  leads	  to	  higher	  estimates	  of	  URR	  for	  that	  well.	  Typically	  b	  varies	  between	  0	  and	  1,	  but	  the	  initial	  production	  from	  wells	  with	  a	  high	  initial	  decline	  rate	   (such	   as	   shale	   gas)	   can	   be	   approximated	   by	   hyperbolic	   curves	   with	   b	   constants	  greater	  than	  unity.	  At	  present,	  it	  remains	  unclear	  whether	  subsequent	  production	  rates	  from	  these	  wells	  will	  remain	  consistent	  with	  these	  fitted	  curves.	  Hence,	   the	   ‘correct’	  b	  constant	  for	  such	  wells	  has	  become	  a	  focus	  of	  controversy.	  Based	  on	  both	  simulated	  and	  empirically	  observed	  well	  behaviour,	  some	  authors	  have	  suggested	  that	  assuming	  b	  >	  1	  results	  in	  resource	  estimates	  that	  are	  2-­‐100	  times	  greater	  than	   the	   ‘reasonable’	   values	   derived	   from	   completed	   wells	   or	   other	   estimation	  techniques.108	  Shale	  gas	  companies	  currently	  active	  in	  the	  four	  main	  US	  shale	  gas	  plays	  have	  used	  hyperbolic	  decline	  curves	  with	  b	  constants	  of	  between	  1.4	  and	  1.6.109	  Analysis	  of	  1957	  horizontal	  wells	  in	  Barnett,	  Fayetteville	  Woodford,	  Haynesville	  and	  Eagle	  Ford	  shale	  plays110	  suggests	  that	  b	  constants	  above	  1	  may	  be	  appropriate	  for	  unconventional	  gas	  in	  some	  instances,	  though	  b	  constants	  such	  as	  the	  1.4	  to	  1.6	  indicated	  above	  are	  not	  supported.	  Guidelines	  from	  SPE	  identify	  a	  possible	  range	  for	  the	  b	  constant	  of	  between	  0	  and	  1.5	  for	  shale	  gas,	  but	  suggest	  that	  a	  conservative	  decline	  rate	  (lower	  b)	  be	  used	  to	  derive	  proved	  reserve	  estimates.	  A	  more	  optimistic	  decline	  rate	  (higher	  b)	  may	  be	  used	  for	  proved	  and	  probable	  (2P)	  reserves.111	  Critics	  of	  the	  use	  of	  decline	  rates	  in	  shale	  gas	  have	  suggested	  that	  operators	  may	  assume	  overly	  optimistic	  b	   constants112	  based	  upon	  only	   limited	  production	  experience.	   In	   an	  analysis	   of	   44	   wells	   with	   over	   12-­‐months	   production	   experience	   in	   the	   Haynesville	  shale,113	  a	  hyperbolic	  curve	  was	  fit	   to	  the	  average	  production	  with	  a	  b	  constant	  of	  1.1.	  This	   resulted	   in	   a	  mean	  URR	   estimate	   for	   the	   44	  wells	   of	   185	  mcm/well.	   Some	   have	  argued	  that	  this	  estimate	  is	  optimistic	  and	  it	  has	  been	  shown	  that	  curves	  with	  a	  range	  of	  different	   b	   constants	   fit	   the	   data	   comparably	   well	   (see	   Annex	   A).	   For	   example,	   a	  hyperbolic	  curve	  with	  a	  b	   constant	  of	  0.5	  would	  give	  a	  mean	  URR	  estimate	  of	  only	  85	  mcm/well.	   It	   has	   already	   been	   seen	   that,	   under	   some	   circumstances,	   a	   b	   constant	   of	  over	  1	  may	  be	  estimated.	  However,	  it	  can	  be	  shown	  that	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  URR	  estimates	  to	  b	  increases	  with	  the	  assumed	  value	  of	  b,	  suggesting	  that	  small	  variations	  in	  b	  where	  b	  >1	  have	  more	  impact	  on	  URR	  estimates	  than	  similar	  variations	  in	  b	  where	  b	  <	  1.	  Shale	  gas	  analyst	  Arthur	  Berman	  examined	  the	  implications	  of	  this	  analysis	  for	  shale	  gas	  economics	  and	  suggested	  that	  a	  well	  with	  an	  estimated	  URR	  of	  85	  mcm	  (the	  outcome	  for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  108	  L.	  Mattar,	  'Production	  Analysis	  and	  Forecasting	  of	  Shale	  Gas	  Reservoirs:	  Case	  History-­‐Based	  Approach',	  in	  SPE	  Shale	  Gas	  Production	  Conference,	   ed.	  Society	  of	  Petroleum	  Engineers	   (Fort	  Worth,	  TX:	  2008);	   J.A.	  Rushing	  et	  al.,	  'Estimating	  Reserves	  in	  Tight	  Gas	  Sands	  at	  HP/HT	  Reservoir	  Conditions:	  Use	  and	  Misuse	  of	  an	   Arps	   Decline	   Curve	  Methodology',	   in	   SPE	  Annual	  Technical	  Conference	  and	  Exhibition,	   ed.	   Society	   of	  Petroleum	  Engineers	  (Anaheim,	  CA:	  2007).	  109	  Chesapeake	  Energy,	  'Institutional	  investor	  and	  analyst	  meeting',	  (2010).	  110	  Jason	   Baihly	   et	   al.,	   'Shale	   Gas	   Production	   Decline	   Trend	   Comparison	   Over	   Time	   and	   Basins'	   (paper	  presented	  at	  the	  SPE	  Annual	  Technical	  Conference	  and	  Exhibition,	  Florence,	  Italy,	  2010).	  111	  Society	  of	  Petroleum	  Engineers,	   'Guidelines	   for	  Application	  of	   the	  Petroleum	  Resources	  Management	  System'.	  112	  Berman,	  'Shale	  Gas-­‐Abundance	  or	  Mirage?	  Why	  The	  Marcellus	  Shale	  Will	  Disappoint	  Expectations'.	  113	  Chesapeake	  Energy,	  'Investor	  and	  analyst	  meeting'.	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b=0.5	   in	   the	   case	  of	   average	  Haynesville	  production	  decline)	   is	   likely	   to	   require	  a	  gas	  price	  of	  ~$7	  per	  thousand	  cubic	  feet	  (Mcf),	  which	  compares	  to	  current	  US	  gas	  prices	  of	  only	  ~$3.5.114	  This	  debate	  has	  subsequently	  been	  explored	  by	  the	  press,	  with	  articles	  in	  the	  Financial	  Times	  and	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  discussing	  the	  argument	  over	  b	  constants	  and	   the	  range	  of	  opinion	  over	   the	  economic	  viability	  of	   shale	  gas	   in	   the	  USA.115	  These	  articles	   have	   in	   turn	   prompted	   response	   from	   some	   analysts	   defending	   the	   future	  profitability	   of	   shale	   production	   in	   the	   USA.116	  However,	   even	   from	   this	   defensive	  position,	   it	   is	   highlighted	   that	   a	   gas	   price	   of	   between	   $5.5	   and	   $6	   per	   Mcf	   of	   gas	   is	  required	  to	  support	  shale	  gas	  production	  in	  most	  of	  the	  US	  regions.	  A	  recent	  analysis	  of	  8	  700	  horizontal	  wells	  in	  the	  Barnett	  Shale117	  lends	  some	  support	  to	  a	  more	  optimistic	  position.	  This	  analysis	  groups	  wells	  by	  the	  number	  of	  years	  they	  have	  been	  in	  production	  and	  uses	  non-­‐linear	  regression	  to	  find	  the	  best	  fit	  decline	  curve	  for	  each	  group.	  The	  results	  suggest	  hyperbolic	  decline	  with	  b	  values	  ranging	  from	  1.3	  to	  1.6,	  with	   a	  mean	   of	   1.5.	   This	   leads	   to	   a	  mean	  URR/well	   of	   56.6	  mcm	  when	   extrapolating	  production	  over	  an	  assumed	  30-­‐year	  lifetime.	  The	  same	  analysis	  also	  shows	  that	  older	  wells	  perform	  better	  (i.e.	  decline	  less	  rapidly)	  and	  speculates	  that	  this	  may	  be	  due	  both	  to	  newer	  wells	   targeting	  poor	  quality	   rock	   and/or	   to	   reduced	   spacing	  between	  wells.	  ‘Re-­‐stimulation’	  of	  wells	  leads	  to	  higher	  production	  in	  the	  short	  term,	  but	  it	  is	  too	  early	  to	  tell	  whether	  this	  also	  leads	  to	  higher	  ultimate	  recovery.	  In	   summary,	   if	  b	   constants	   are	  overestimated,	   the	  US	   shale	   gas	   reserve	   is	   likely	   to	  be	  overstated	  by	  studies	  relying	  upon	  the	  extrapolation	  of	  historical	  production	  experience	  (e.g.	   the	   USGS).	   But	   the	   empirical	   evidence	   remains	   equivocal	   at	   present	   and	   several	  more	  years	  of	  production	  experience	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  required	  before	  any	  firm	  judgement	  can	  be	  made.	  In	  the	  interim,	  continued	  controversy	  can	  be	  anticipated.	  
2.4 Best	  estimates:	  characterising	  the	  uncertainty	  
2.4.1 Estimates	  of	  shale	  gas	  resources	  Drawing	  together	  the	  above,	  Table	  2-­‐6	  provides	  a	  range	  of	  estimates	  of	  the	  technically	  recoverable	   shale	   gas	   resources	  within	   15	   global	   regions.	   In	   some	   regions	   it	  was	   not	  possible	  to	  provide	  a	  central	  estimate	  due	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  sufficient	  information.	  It	  is	  also	   important	   to	   note	   the	   numerous	   and	   important	   caveats	   to	   these	   estimates,	  summarised	   in	   the	   table	   and	   in	   the	   following	   section.	  The	   reasons	   for	   choosing	   these	  particular	   estimates	   and/or	  manner	   in	  which	   they	  were	   derived	   are	   indicated	   in	   the	  table.	  Since	  all	  estimates	  refer	  to	  technically	  recoverable	  resources,	  they	  take	  no	  account	  of	  economic	  viability	  or	  any	  other	  constraints	  on	  resource	  recovery.	  Hence,	  there	  is	  no	  guarantee	  that	  these	  resources	  will	  be	  produced.	  	  As	   discussed	   in	   Section	   2.2,	   resource	   estimates	   based	   upon	   the	   extrapolation	   of	  production	   experience	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   more	   robust.	   However,	   with	   very	   limited	  production	  experience	  in	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  world’s	  regions,	   it	   is	  more	  appropriate	  at	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 On	  15	  December	  2011,	  Bloomberg.com	  stated	   that	   the	  NYMEX	  Henry	  Hub	  1M	   future	  was	   $3.11,	   the	  Henry	  Hub	  Spot	  was	  $3.08,	  and	  the	  New	  York	  City	  Gate	  Spot	  was	  $3.33.	  These	  prices	  are	  all	  per	  million	  BTU,	  which	  when	  converted	  to	  Mcf	  become	  $3.02,	  $3.00	  and	  $3.24	  respectively.	  115	  Dizard,	  'Debate';	  Urbina,	  'Insiders	  Sound	  Alarm'.	  116	  Featherston	  et	  al.,	  'NYT	  Allegations	  Exaggerated'.	  117	  Li	   Fan	   et	   al.,	   'The	   Bottom-­‐Line	   of	   Horizontal	   Well	   Production	   Decline	   in	   the	   Barnett	   Shale'	   (paper	  presented	  at	  the	  SPE	  Production	  and	  Operations	  Symposium,	  Oklahoma	  City,	  OA,	  2011).	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this	  stage	  to	  incorporate	  estimates	  from	  studies	  that	  use	  a	  range	  of	  methodologies.	  Since	  experience	   with	   production	   and	   resource	   estimation	   is	   growing	   rapidly,	   it	   is	   also	  important	  to	  use	  the	  most	  recent	  estimates.	  Organisations	  that	  have	  provided	  multiple	  estimates	  for	  single	  regions	  (e.g.	  Kuuskraa/ARI118	  and	  the	  EIA119)	  have	  consistently,	  and	  often	  significantly,	  increased	  their	  estimates	  over	  time.	  As	   shown	   in	  Table	  2-­‐6,	   it	  was	  only	  possible	   to	  obtain	  high,	   best	   and	   low	  estimates	  of	  recoverable	   resources	   for	   four	   regions	   –	   namely,	   Canada,	   USA,	   China	   and	   Other	  developing	  Asia.	  For	   these	  regions,	   the	  high	  estimate	   is,	  on	  average,	  250%	  of	   the	  best	  estimate,	   while	   the	   low	   estimate	   is	   31%	   of	   the	   best	   estimate.	   In	   the	   USA,	   the	  corresponding	  figures	  are	  230%	  and	  64%.	  This	  serves	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  range	  of	  uncertainty	   in	   these	   estimates	   is	   extremely	   large,	   even	   for	   the	   USA.	   Given	   the	  comparative	  absence	  of	  production	  experience	  in	  most	  other	  regions	  of	  the	  world,	  the	  resource	  estimates	  should	  be	  treated	  with	  considerable	  caution.	  
Table	  2-­‐6:	  Estimates	  of	  shale	  gas	  resources	  (Tcm)	  
	   High	   Best	   Low	   Notes/sources	  
Africa	   	   29.5	   	   ARI120	  
Australia	   	   6.3	   	   Average	  of	  Medlock	  et	  al.121	  and	  ARI.	  Cannot	  assume	  that	  estimate	  from	  ARI	  is	  the	  ‘high’	  estimate	  as	  this	  is	  reported	  as	  a	  conservative	  assessment	  
Canada	   28.3	   12.5	   4.7	   Only	   estimates	   from	   2010	   and	   after	   have	   been	   chosen	  High:	  Highest	  estimate	  provided	  in	  Skipper122	  Best:	  mean	  of	  several	  studies123	  (ICF	  estimate	  assumed	  to	  be	  TRR)	  Low:	  Medlock	  et	  al.	  
China	   39.8	   21.2	   1.6	   High:	   All	   of	   ‘Centrally	   planned	   Asia’	   from	   Rogner124	  with	   40%	  recovery	  factor	  Best:	  Average	  of	  Medlock	  et	  al.	  and	  ARI	  Low:	   All	   of	   ‘Centrally	   planned	   Asia’	   from	   WEC125 	  with	   15%	  recovery	  factor	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  118	  Advanced	   Resources	   International,	   'World	   shale	   gas	   resources';	   Kuuskraa,	   'Economic	   and	   market	  impacts';	   V.A.	   Kuuskraa,	   'Gas	   shales	   drive	   the	   unconventional	   gas	   revolution'	   (paper	   presented	   at	   the	  Washington	   energy	   policy	   conference:	   the	   unconventional	   gas	   revolution,	   Washington,	   DC,	   2010);	  Kuuskraa,	   'Gas	   resources,	   unconventional';	   Kuuskraa,	   'An	   exportable	  North	  American	   revolution?';	   V.A.	  Kuuskraa,	  'Unconventional	  gas:	  Resource	  potential	  estimates	  likely	  to	  change',	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  Journal	  105,	  no	  35	  (2007);	  Kuuskraa,	   'Status	  report';	  Kuuskraa	  and	  Meyers,	   'Review	  of	  world	  resources';	  V.A.	  Kuuskraa	  and	  T.	  Van	  Leeuwen,	   'Economic	  and	  market	   impacts	  of	  abundant	  shale	  gas	  resources,	   in	  Global	  Leaders	  Forum:	   'The	   natural	   gas	   revolution:	   U.S.	   and	   global	   impacts'',	   (Arlington,	   VA:	   Advanced	   Resources	  International	  Inc.,	  2011).	  119	  EIA,	  'Annual	  Energy	  Outlook	  2008	  with	  Projections	  to	  2030',	  (Washington,	  DC:	  US	  Energy	  Information	  Administration,	   2008);	   EIA,	   'AEO	  2010';	   EIA,	   'AEO	  2011';	   S.A.	   Jikich	   and	  A.S.	   Popa,	   'Hyperbolic	  Decline	  Parameter	   Identification	  Using	  Optimization	  Procedures,	   (paper	  presented	  at	   the	  SPE	  Eastern	  Regional	  Meeting,	  Morgantown,	  WV,	  2000).	  120	  Advanced	  Resources	  International,	  'World	  shale	  gas	  resources'.	  121	  Medlock,	  Jaffe	  and	  Hartley,	  'Shale	  Gas	  and	  National	  Security'.	  122	  K.	  Skipper,	  'Status	  of	  global	  shale	  gas	  developments,	  with	  particular	  emphasis	  on	  North	  America',	  in	  IIR	  
inaugural	  shale	  gas	  briefing	  (Brisbane:	  2010).	  123	  Advanced	  Resources	  International,	   'World	  shale	  gas	  resources';	  K.	  Downey,	   'Fueling	  North	  America’s	  energy	  future:	  The	  unconventional	  natural	  gas	  revolution	  and	  the	  carbon	  agenda	  -­‐	  Executive	  summary',	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	   IHS	  CERA,	  2010);	  Medlock,	   Jaffe	  and	  Hartley,	   'Shale	  Gas	  and	  National	  Security';	  Moniz,	  Jacoby	  and	  Meggs,	  'Future	  of	  natural	  gas';	  Petak,	  'Impact	  of	  natural	  gas	  on	  CHP';	  Skipper,	  'Status	  of	  global	  shale	  gas	  developments'.	  124	  Rogner,	  'Assessment	  of	  World	  Resources'.	  125	  WEC,	  'Survey	  of	  Energy	  Resources'.	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   High	   Best	   Low	   Notes/sources	  
Central	  
and	   South	  
America	  
	   34.7	   	   ARI	  
Eastern	  




61.2	   	   2.7	   High:	  WEC	  with	  40%	  recovery	  factor	  Low:	  Rogner	  with	  15%	  recovery	  factor	  
India	   	   1.8	   	   ARI	  
Japan	   	   0	   	   No	  sources	  report	  any	  shale	  gas	  to	  be	  present	  in	  Japan	  
Middle	  
East	   28.7	   	   2.8	   High:	  whole	   of	   Rogner’s	  MENA	   region	  with	   40%	   recovery	   factor.	  Low:	   half	   of	   WEC	   MENA	   region	   (as	   assumed	   by	   ARI)	   with	   15%	  recovery	  factor	  




22.1	   	   1.3	  
WEC	   reported	   OECD	   Asia	   and	   ‘Other	   Asia’	   collectively	   cannot	   be	  used	  High:	   Rogner	   ‘Other	   Pacific	   Asia’	   and	   ‘Centrally	   Planned	   Asia’	  regions	   with	   40%	   recovery	   factor	   minus	   best	   estimate	   of	   China	  from	  above	  Low:	   ‘Other	   Pacific	   Asia’	   only	   (as	   assume	   all	   of	   Rogner’s	   ‘Central	  Planned	  Asia’	   is	  China)	  and	  assuming	  a	  15%	  recovery	  factor.	  This	  is	  similar	  to	  estimate	  for	  Pakistan	  only	  from	  ARI	  
South	  
Korea	   	   0	   	   No	  sources	  report	  any	  shale	  gas	  to	  be	  present	  in	  South	  Korea	  
United	  
States	   of	  
America	  
47.4	   20.0	   13.1	   Only	   estimates	   from	   2010	   and	   after	   have	   been	   chosen	  High:	   highest	   estimate	   available	   –	   ICF127	  (assumed	   to	   be	   TRR)	  Best:	   mean	   of	   three	   estimates	   from	   each	   category	   judged	   to	   be	  most	  suitable128	  Low:	  lowest	  estimate	  available	  –	  USGS	  
Western	  
Europe129	   	   11.6	   	   Average	  of	  Medlock	   et	   al.	   and	  ARI	   for	   Sweden	  and	  Germany,	   and	  ARI	   and	   DECC130	  for	   the	   UK.	   ARI	   for	   France,	   the	   Netherlands,	  Norway	  and	  Denmark	  and	  Medlock	  et	  al.	  for	  Austria	  
2.4.2 Confidence	  in	  current	  estimates	  and	  conclusions	  This	   section	   summarises	   some	   of	   the	  main	   findings	   from	   the	   preceding	   sections,	   and	  assesses	  whether	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  these	  resource	  estimates	  are	  likely	  to	  change	  in	  the	  future.	  The	  focus	  of	  this	  chapter	  has	  been	  on	  original	  estimates	  of	  unconventional	  gas	  resources	  –	   and	   especially	   shale	   gas	   resources	   –	   for	   different	   countries	   and	   regions.	   Original	  estimates	   are	   defined	   as	   those	   that	   have	   been	   developed	   using	   recognised	  methodologies	   or	   derived	   by	   adapting	   figures	   from	   existing	   sources.	   This	   criterion	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  126 	  Including	   Albania,	   Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina,	   Bulgaria,	   Croatia,	   Czech	   Republic,	   Hungary,	   Macedonia,	  Montenegro,	  Poland,	  Romania,	  Serbia	  (Kosovo),	  Slovenia,	  Slovakia	  127	  Petak,	  'Impact	  of	  natural	  gas	  on	  CHP'.	  128	  Kuuskraa,	   'Economic	   and	   market	   impacts';	   Medlock,	   Jaffe	   and	   Hartley,	   'Shale	   Gas	   and	   National	  Security'.	  As	  well	  as	  USGS.	  129	  Including	  Austria,	  Belgium,	  Cyprus,	  Denmark,	  Finland,	  France,	  Germany,	  Greece,	  Iceland,	  Ireland,	  Italy,	  Luxembourg,	  Malta,	  the	  Netherlands,	  Norway,	  Portugal,	  Spain,	  Sweden,	  Switzerland,	  United	  Kingdom.	  130	  Harvey	  and	  Gray,	  'Unconventional	  resources	  of	  Britain'.	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excludes	  the	  resource	  estimates	  published	  in	  an	  influential	  study	  by	  the	  IEA.131	  The	  IEA	  takes	  most	  of	  its	  shale	  gas	  resource	  estimates	  directly	  from	  ARI,132	  while	  for	  the	  Middle	  East	   the	   estimates	   are	   based	   upon	   the	   seminal	   study	   by	   Rogner133	  assuming	   a	   20%	  recovery	   factor.	   Rogner	   is	   also	   the	   source	   of	   the	   IEA	   tight	   gas	   and	   CBM	   resource	  estimates,	   assuming	   a	   40%	   and	   25%	   recovery	   factor	   respectively.	   Whether	   such	  reliance	  upon	  Rogner	  is	  reasonable	  is	  discussed	  below.	  	  Only	  within	   North	   America,	   and	   predominantly	   the	   USA,	   are	   any	   shale	   gas	   resources	  considered	   proved	   reserves	   and	   these	   comprise	   only	   a	   small	   proportion	   of	   the	  estimated	  technically	  recoverable	  resources.134	  It	   is	  thus	  very	  important	  not	  to	  confuse	  reserves	   with	   resources.	   As	   indicated	   above,	   resource	   estimates	   are	   inherently	  uncertain	   and	   all	   the	   more	   so	   for	   a	   resource	   that	   is	   at	   such	   an	   early	   stage	   of	  development.	   Moreover,	   this	   uncertainty	   is	   compounded	   by	   the	   use	   of	   imprecise	   or	  ambiguous	   terminology.	  This	  often	   results	   from	  employing	   terminology	   that	  has	  been	  derived	   for	   conventional	   hydrocarbons	   but	   is	   not	   necessarily	   appropriate	   for	  unconventional	   resources	   (e.g.	   ‘undiscovered	   resources’).	  Hence,	   uncertainty	   could	  be	  reduced	  by	  more	  careful	  and	  consistent	  use	  of	  terms	  and	  definitions	  or,	  better	  still,	  the	  development	  of	  an	  appropriate	  standard	  such	  as	  the	  SPE/PRMS.	  Four	   general	   methods	   have	   been	   used	   to	   generate	   resource	   estimates	   of	   shale	   gas,	  namely:	   expert	   judgement;	   literature	   review;	   bottom-­‐up	   assessment	   of	   geological	  parameters	  and	  extrapolation	  of	  production	  experience.	  These	  have	  been	  described	  in	  detail	  and	  the	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  of	  each	  discussed.	  While	   the	  extrapolation	  of	  production	  experience	   is	  potentially	   the	  most	   robust	  methodology,	   it	   relies	  upon	  data	  that	   is	   unavailable	   for	   most	   regions	   of	   the	   world.	   While	   analogues	   can	   be	   used,	   the	  results	  are	  sensitive	  to	  the	  particular	  analogue	  that	  is	  chosen.	  With	   the	   current	   state	   of	   development	   of	   the	   literature,	   the	   differences	   in	   resource	  estimates	   between	   institutions	   using	   a	   similar	   methodological	   approach	   are	   as	  significant	   as	   the	   differences	   between	   those	   using	   different	   approaches.	   For	   example,	  looking	  at	  estimates	  of	  the	  US	  TRR,	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  estimates	  of	  the	  USGS	  and	   INTEK135	  within	   the	   extrapolation	   category	   are	   as	   great	   as	   between	   Medlock	   et	  al.136	  (literature	  review),	  USGS	  (extrapolation)	  and	  ICF137	  (geological).	  A	  primary	  source	  of	   these	   differences	   is	   the	   uncertainty	   over	   the	   recovery	   factor	   and	   the	   URR/well.	  Hence,	   emphasis	   needs	   to	   be	   placed	   on	   constraining	   these	   parameters	   to	   a	   greater	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  131	  IEA,	  'Golden	  age'.	  Most	  of	  the	  IEA	  shale	  gas	  resource	  estimates	  were	  taken	  directly	  from	  ARI,	  while	  the	  Middle	  Eastern	  estimates	  were	  based	  upon	  Rogner	  assuming	  20%	  recovery	  factor.	  The	  tight	  gas	  resource	  estimates	   for	   all	   regions,	   and	   the	  CBM	  resource	  estimates	   for	  North	  America	   and	  Asia/Pacific,	  were	  all	  taken	  from	  Rogner	  assuming	  40%	  and	  25%	  recovery	  factors	  respectively.	  The	  IEA	  also	  provides	  a	  CBM	  resource	  estimate	  for	  Eastern	  Europe/Eurasia,	  but	  it	   is	  not	  clear	  how	  this	  was	  derived.	  The	  figure	  of	  85	  Tcm	  would	  require	  a	  75%	  recovery	  factor	  to	  correlate	  to	  Rogner’s	  estimate	  of	  CBM	  OGIP. Alternatively,	  an	  OGIP	  of	  340	  Tcm	  would	  be	  required	  if	  a	  25%	  recovery	  factor	  is	  assumed	  –	  which	  is	  significantly	  greater	  than	   any	   other	   estimate	   of	   global	   CBM	   OGIP.	   Advanced	   Resources	   International,	   'World	   shale	   gas	  resources',	  Rogner,	  'Assessment	  of	  World	  Resources'.	  132	  Advanced	  Resources	  International,	  'World	  shale	  gas	  resources'.	  133	  Rogner,	  'Assessment	  of	  World	  Resources'.	  
134 Proved	   reserves	   reported	   by	   the	   EIA	   for	   2009	   are	   1.7	   Tcm	   and	   so	   comprise	   only	   9%	   of	   the	   best	  estimate	  of	  TRR	  given	  in	  Table	  2-­‐6.	  EIA,	  Shale	  gas:	  proved	  reserves	  (cited).	  135	  INTEK,	  'Review	  of	  emerging	  resources'.	  136	  Medlock,	  Jaffe	  and	  Hartley,	  'Shale	  Gas	  and	  National	  Security'.	  137	  K.R.	   Petak,	   D.	   Fritsch	   and	   E.H.	   Vidas,	   'North	   American	   Midstream	   Infrastructure	   Through	   2035	   -­‐	   A	  Secure	  Energy	  Future',	  (ICF	  International,	  2011).	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degree	   than	  at	  present	   and	  on	   incorporating	  probabilistic	   techniques	   to	   capture	   their	  inherent	  uncertainty.	  There	   is	  an	  absence	  of	  rigorous	  studies	   for	  a	  number	  of	  key	  regions	  across	   the	  world.	  This	  includes	  Russia	  and	  the	  Middle	  East,	  which	  are	  estimated	  to	  hold	  potentially	  very	  large	   resource	  volumes	   (Table	  2-­‐6).	  While	  Rogner138	  and	   the	  World	  Energy	  Council139	  provide	  independent	  estimates	  for	  these	  regions,	  they	  provide	  very	  little	  information	  on	  their	  methodology	  and	  their	  methods	  are	  potentially	  flawed.	  For	  example,	  Rogner	  used	  a	   single	   analogue	   from	   the	   USA	   to	   estimate	   recoverable	   resources	   across	   the	   whole	  world.	   But	   since	   subsequent	   US	   experience	   has	   demonstrated	   a	   wide	   variation,	   both	  within	  and	  between	  shale	  plays,	  the	  choice	  of	  a	  different	  analogue	  could	  have	  led	  to	  very	  different	  results.	  The	  WEC	  provides	  no	  references	  for	  the	  literature	  relied	  upon	  for	   its	  study.	  This	  makes	  reliance	  on	  other	  studies	  preferable	  whenever	  possible,	  although	  in	  many	  regions	  Rogner	  and	  the	  WEC	  are	  the	  only	  sources	  that	  are	  available.	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  the	  estimates	  produced	  by	  bottom-­‐up	  geological	  assessments	  are	  very	   sensitive	   to	   the	   assumed	   recovery	   factor.	   While	   it	   is	   generally	   accepted	   that	  estimating	  recovery	  factors	  is	  challenging,	  little	  progress	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  made	  in	  establishing	   such	   factors	   for	   shale,	   even	   when	   the	   geology	   is	   well	   understood.	  Uncertainty	  over	  this	  factor,	  which	  is	  currently	  estimated	  to	  be	  between	  15%	  and	  40%	  for	   shale	   gas	   production,	   makes	   an	   accurate	   estimate	   of	   TRR	   very	   difficult	   –	   even	  assuming	  the	  OGIP	  can	  be	  established	  with	  any	  confidence.	  	  In	   a	   similar	   manner,	   many	   of	   the	   estimates	   produced	   by	   extrapolation	   methods	   are	  sensitive	  to	  the	  assumed	  URR/well	  and	  hence	  to	  the	  choice	  and	  parameterisation	  of	  the	  relevant	   decline	   curves.	   The	   application	   of	   decline	   curve	   analysis	   to	   shale	   gas	  production	   is	   contested,	   with	   no	   consensus	   on	   how	   quickly	   the	   rate	   of	   production	  decline	  will	  slow.	  Of	  particular	  concern	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  small	  change	  in	  assumptions	  in	  these	  analyses	  may	  have	  a	  large	  effect	  on	  the	  estimated	  URR	  of	  a	  well	  and	  hence	  on	  the	  estimated	  URR	  for	  a	  region.	  It	  is	  therefore	  important	  to	  focus	  attention	  on	  refining	  these	  techniques	  and	  developing	  comprehensive	  assessments	  of	  their	  accuracy.	  A	  significant	  amount	   of	   work	   has	   been	   conducted	   in	   recent	   years	   into	   refining	   extrapolation	  methods,	  but	  further	  work	  is	  needed	  to	  prove	  these	  new	  methods	  and	  establish	  them	  as	  best	  practice	  if	  genuine	  improvement	  is	  to	  be	  achieved.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  while	  bottom-­‐up	  estimates	  are	  uncertain,	  they	  are	  informed	  by	  some	  level	  of	  historical	  experience	  and	  are	  often	  bounded	  at	   the	   individual	  well	  or	  play	   level.	   This	   may	   limit	   the	   uncertainty	   relative	   to	   that	   for	   top-­‐down	   estimates	   of	  regions	  or	  countries	  where	   there	   is	   limited	  or	  no	  historical	  experience	  and	  where	   the	  estimates	  of	  URR	  or	  TRR	  may	  be	  sensitive	  to	  small	  changes	  in	  assumptions.	  Another	  uncertainty	  influencing	  shale	  gas	  estimates	  is	  the	  practice	  of	  simply	  delineating	  shale	   play	   areas	   into	  more	   and	   less	   productive	   areas.	   Splitting	   a	   shale	   play	   into	   only	  these	   two	   areas	   implies	   that	   comparable	   production	   rates	   and	   URR/well	   will	   be	  experienced	   across	   the	   whole	   of	   these	   areas.	   This	   assumption	   belies	   the	   true	  heterogeneity	   of	   shale	   plays.	   In	   addition,	   production	   to	   date	   has	   focused	   upon	   areas	  with	   the	   highest	   productivity	   and	   URR/well.	   Assuming	   that	   comparable	   production	  rates	   will	   be	   experienced	   across	   the	   remainder	   of	   the	   play	   is	   likely	   to	   lead	   to	  overestimates	   of	   the	   TRR.	   The	   large	   areal	   extent	   of	   many	   shale	   plays	   means	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  138	  Rogner,	  'Assessment	  of	  World	  Resources'.	  139	  WEC,	  'Survey	  of	  Energy	  Resources'.	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inadequate	  delineation	  could	  a	  have	  large	  effect	  on	  the	  results,	  although	  this	  source	  of	  uncertainty	  should	  reduce	  as	  drilling	  continues	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  different	  areas	  can	  be	  grouped	  together	  becomes	  more	  obvious.	  	  A	   related	  uncertainty	   is	   the	   validity	  of	   assumptions	   for	  URR/well	   and	  well	   spacing	   in	  areas	   outside	   those	   from	   which	   production	   is	   currently	   taking	   place.	   Even	   though	  assumptions	   for	   these	   areas	   are	   necessary	   to	   estimate	   the	   resource	   potential	   of	   the	  whole	  shale	  play,	  the	  level	  of	  confidence	  in	  these	  assumptions	  is	  much	  lower	  than	  that	  for	  developed	  areas.	  There	   is	   also	   uncertainty	   over	   the	   impact	   that	   technology	   will	   have	   on	   increasing	  current	   estimates	   of	   TRR.	   Previous	   forecasts	   of	   the	   potential	   impact	   of	   technological	  improvements	  failed	  to	  anticipate	  the	  increase	  in	  URR/well	  that	  has	  occurred	  since	  the	  1980s.	   The	   technologies	   currently	   being	  used	   for	   shale	   gas	   extraction	   are	   now	  better	  understood,	   having	   been	   much	   more	   widely	   studied	   and	   utilised	   than	   previously.	   In	  addition,	   shale	   geology	   is	   now	   much	   better	   understood,	   suggesting	   that	   potential	  improvements	   in	   technology	   can	   now	   be	   better	   characterised.	   Nevertheless,	  technological	  progress,	  even	  if	  only	  leading	  to	  a	  small	  increase	  in	  URR/well	  or	  recovery	  factor,	  can	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  the	  estimated	  ultimately	  recoverable	  resources	  and	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  rule	  out	  future	  major	  technological	  breakthroughs.	  	  Finally,	  the	  potential	  for	  shale	  gas	  in	  as	  yet	  undiscovered	  basins	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  low	  but	  probably	  not	  insignificant	  and	  requires	  further	  investigation.	  In	   conclusion,	   there	   are	   multiple	   and	   substantial	   uncertainties	   in	   assessing	   the	  recoverable	   volumes	   of	   shale	   gas	   at	   both	   the	   regional	   and	   global	   level.	   Even	   in	   areas	  where	  production	   is	  currently	   taking	  place,	   there	  remains	  significant	  uncertainty	  over	  the	   size	   of	   the	   resource	   and	   considerable	   variation	   in	   the	   available	   estimates.	   For	  undeveloped	   regions	   where	   less	   research	   has	   been	   conducted,	   one	   estimate	   of	  resources	   may	   be	   all	   that	   is	   available	   and	   the	   range	   of	   uncertainty	   cannot	   be	  characterised.	   For	   several	   regions	   of	   the	  world	   there	   are	   no	   estimates	   at	   all,	   but	   this	  does	   not	   necessarily	   mean	   that	   such	   regions	   contain	   only	   insignificant	   resources.	  Therefore,	  given	  the	  absence	  of	  production	  experience	  in	  most	  regions	  of	  the	  world,	  and	  the	   number	   and	   magnitude	   of	   uncertainties	   described	   above,	   current	   resource	  estimates	  should	  be	  treated	  with	  considerable	  caution.	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3 Shale	  and	  tight	  gas	  development	  for	  Europe	  	  
G.	  Thonhauser	  (Mining	  University	  of	  Leoben,	  AT)	  	  This	   chapter	   provides	   a	   technical	   overview	   of	   shale	   gas	   development	   in	   Europe.	   The	  state	  of	  the	  art	  and	  future	  drilling,	  hydraulic	  fracturing	  and	  producing	  technologies	  for	  shale	  gas	  wells	  are	  discussed.	  The	  cost	  impact	  of	  some	  of	  these	  technologies	  is	  evaluated	  and	   future	   potential	   improvements	   are	   explained.	   The	   data	   generated	   can	   be	   used	   to	  support	  models	  to	  evaluate	  shale	  gas	  development	  scenarios.	  
3.1 Introduction	  to	  unconventional	  gas	  technology	  Conventional	   gas	   and	   unconventional	   gas	   are	   two	   terms	   that	   are	   widely	   used	   in	   the	  industry.	  It	  is	  not	  the	  produced	  gas	  that	  distinguishes	  the	  categories.	  It	  is	  the	  rock	  that	  makes	  the	  difference.	  The	  most	  important	  property	  to	  mention	  here	  is	  the	  permeability	  of	  the	  source	  rock	  and	  secondly,	  but	  less	  important,	  its	  porosity.	  Permeability	  is	  the	  measure	  of	  a	  reservoir’s	  capacity	  to	  transmit	  fluids.1	  Porosity	   can	   be	   regarded	   the	   measure	   of	   a	   rock’s	   fluid	   storage	   capacity.	   Porosity	   is	  dimensionless.2	  
3.1.1 Conventional	  gas	  Conventional	   gas	   is	   typically	   found	   in	   reservoirs	   with	   permeabilities	   greater	   than	   1	  millidarcy	  (mD)	  and	  can	  be	  extracted	  via	   traditional	   techniques.	  A	   large	  proportion	  of	  the	  gas	  produced	  globally	  to	  date	  is	  conventional	  and	  is	  relatively	  easy	  and	  inexpensive	  to	   extract.	   By	   contrast,	   unconventional	   gas	   is	   found	   in	   reservoirs	   with	   relatively	   low	  permeabilities	   (less	   than	   1	   mD)	   and	   therefore	   cannot	   be	   extracted	   via	   conventional	  methods.	  
3.1.2 Definition	  of	  shale	  and	  tight	  gas	  and	  coal-­‐bed	  methane	  There	  are	  several	   types	  of	  unconventional	  gas	  resources	   that	  are	  produced	   today,	  but	  the	  three	  most	  common	  types	  are	  tight	  gas,	  coal-­‐bed	  methane	  and	  shale	  gas.	  Given	  the	  low	   permeability	   of	   the	   reservoirs	   yielding	   such	   gas,	   the	   gas	   must	   be	   developed	   via	  special	   techniques,	   including	   fracture	   stimulation,	   in	   order	   to	   be	   produced	  commercially.3	  
Shale	  gas	  A	  gas	  shale	  is	  an	  organically-­‐rich	  shale	  formation,	  which	  in	  the	  classical	  definition	  can	  be	  both	  the	  source	  rock	  and	  cap	  rock	  of	  an	  oil	  or	  gas	  reservoir.	  The	  production	  of	  shale	  gas	  seemed	  to	  be	  impossible	  because	  gas	  is	  so	  tightly	  confined	  within	  the	  shale	  rock	  matrix.	  However,	   some	   years	   ago,	   technologies	   and	   procedures	  were	   developed	   that	   allowed	  industry	  to	  economically	  produce	  shale	  gas.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Tarek	   Ahmed,	  Reservoir	   Engineering	  Handbook,	   Fourth	   edition	   ed.	   (Burlington,	   MA:	   Gulf	   Professional	  Publishing,	  2010).	  2	  Ibid.	  3	  3	  Legs	  Resources,	  'An	  Introduction	  to	  Shale	  Gas',	  (Isle	  of	  Man:	  2011).	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Shale	   is	  a	  sedimentary	  rock	   that	   is	  predominantly	  comprised	  of	  consolidated	  clay	  and	  silt-­‐sized	   particles.	   Compaction	   of	   the	   clay	   particles	   occurs	   during	   post-­‐deposition	   as	  additional	  materials	  accumulate	  above	  these	  particles,	  resulting	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  thin,	  laminated	   layers.	  Laminated	   layers	  are	   formed	  because	  clay	  grains	  align	  as	  a	  result	  of	  compaction.	  The	  thin	  layers	  that	  make	  up	  shale	  result	  in	  a	  rock	  with	  limited	  horizontal	  and	  vertical	  permeability.4	  Gas	  can	  be	  sorbed	  on	  to	  organic	  material	  or	  can	  exist	  as	  free	  gas	  in	  natural	  fractures	  and	  micro	  porosity.	  
Tight	  gas	  Tight	   gas	   refers	   to	   natural	   gas	   produced	   from	   reservoirs	   that	   have	   very	   low	  porosity	  and	  permeability.	  Such	  reservoirs	  are	  usually	  sandstone,	  although	  carbonate	  rocks	  can	  also	  be	  tight	  gas	  producers.	  The	  standard	  industry	  definition	  for	  a	  tight	  gas	  reservoir	  is	  a	  rock	   with	   matrix	   porosity	   of	   10%	   or	   less	   and	   permeability	   of	   0.1	   millidarcy	   or	   less,	  exclusive	  of	  fracture	  permeability.5	  
Coal-­‐bed	  methane	  Coals	   are	   sedimentary	   rocks	   containing	   more	   than	   50wt%	   organic	   matter,	   whereas	  shales	  contain	  less	  than	  50wt%	  organic	  matter.	  Methane	  is	  either	  generated	  by	  bacterial	  (biogenic	  gas)	  or	  geochemical	   (thermogenic	  gas)	  processes	  during	  burial.	  The	  gas	  can	  be	  stored	  by	  multiple	  mechanisms,	  including	  as	  free	  gas	  in	  micro-­‐pores	  and	  sorbed	  gas	  on	  the	  internal	  surfaces	  of	  the	  organic	  matter.	  Nearly	  all	  coal-­‐bed	  gas	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  sorbed	  gas,	  whereas	  shale	  gas	  is	  a	  combination	  of	  those	  two	  mechanisms.	  	  Coal-­‐bed	   gas	   reservoirs	   contain	   an	   orthogonal	   fracture	   set	   called	   cleats	   that	   are	  orientated	  perpendicular	  to	  the	  bedding	  and	  provide	  the	  primary	  conduit	  for	  fluid	  flow.	  Gas	   diffuses	   from	   the	   matrix	   into	   the	   cleats	   and	   flows	   to	   the	   wellbore.	   In	   shale	   gas	  reservoirs,	   gas	   is	   sometimes	   produced	   through	   more	   permeable	   sand	   or	   silt	   layers,	  interbedded	  with	  the	  shale	  through	  natural	  fractures	  or	  from	  the	  shale	  matrix	  itself.	  	  In	   coal-­‐bed	   reservoirs,	   the	   key	   parameters	   controlling	   the	   amount	   of	   gas	   in	   place	  include	   coal-­‐bed	   thickness,	   coal	   composition,	   gas	   content	   and	   gas	   composition.	   Coal	  composition	  refers	  to	  the	  amount	  and	  type	  of	  organic	  constituents	  in	  the	  coal,	  which	  has	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  the	  amount	  of	  gas	  that	  can	  be	  sorbed.	  Gas	  contents	  in	  coal	  seams	  vary	  widely	   (<1	   to	   >25m³/ton)	   and	   are	   a	   function	   of	   composition,	   thermal	  maturity,	  burial	   and	   uplift	   history,	   and	   the	   addition	   of	   migrated	   thermal	   and	   biogenic	   gas.	  Production	  rates	  are	  mainly	   influenced	  by	   the	  coal-­‐bed’s	  permeability,	  which	   is	   in	   the	  order	  of	  millidarcies	  or	  tens	  of	  millidarcies.	  	  Shale	   gas	   reservoirs	   typically	   are	   thicker,	   and	  have	   lower	   sorbed	  and	   freer	   gas	   in	   the	  pore	   space.	   In	   addition,	   shale	   gas	   reservoirs	   usually	   have	  much	   lower	   permeabilities,	  commonly	  in	  the	  nanodarcy	  range.	  	  Both	  are	  not	  density-­‐stratified,	  do	  not	  contain	  a	  gas-­‐water	  contact	  and	  may	  be	  spread	  over	  a	  very	  large	  geographic	  area.	  The	  challenge	  is	  not	  to	  find	  gas	  but	  to	  find	  areas	  that	  will	  produce	  gas	  commercially.	  See	  Table	  3-­‐1	  for	  the	  most	  critical	  reservoir	  evaluation	  parameters.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  J.	   Daniel	   Arthur	   et	   al.,	   'Evaluating	   Implications	   of	   hydraulic	   fracturing	   in	   Shale	   Gas	   Resevoirs',	   in	  SPE	  
Americas	  E&P	  Environmental	  and	  Safety	  Conference	  (San	  Antonio,	  TX:	  2009	  ).	  5	  Leslie	  Haines,	  'Tight	  Gas',	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  Investor	  2006.	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Table	  3-­‐1:	  Summary	  of	  critical	  data	  used	  to	  appraise	  coal-­‐bed	  and	  shale	  gas	  reservoirs	  
Analysis	   Results	  
Gas	  content	  	   Provides	  volumes	  of	  desorbed	  gas	  (from	  coal	  samples	  placed	  in	  canisters),	  residual	  gas	  (from	   crushed	   coal)	   and	   lost	   gas	   (calculated).	   The	   sum	   of	   these	   is	   the	   in-­‐situ	   gas	  content	  of	  a	  given	  coal	  seam.	  	  Rock-­‐evaluation	  pyrolysis	  	  
Assesses	  the	  petroleum-­‐generative	  potential	  and	  thermal	  maturity	  of	  organic	  matter	  in	  a	   sample.	   Determines	   the	   fraction	   of	   organic	   matter	   already	   transformed	   to	  hydrocarbons	   and	   the	   total	   amount	   of	   hydrocarbons	   that	   could	   be	   generated	   by	  complete	  thermal	  conversion.	  	  Total	   organic	  carbon	  	   Determines	   the	   total	   amount	   of	   carbon	   in	   the	   rock	   including	   the	   amount	   of	   carbon	  present	  in	  free	  hydrocarbons	  and	  the	  amount	  of	  kerogen.	  	  Gas	  composition	  	   Determines	   the	   percentage	   of	   methane,	   carbon	   dioxide,	   nitrogen	   and	   ethane	   in	   the	  desorbed	   gas.	   Used	   to	   determine	   gas	   purity	   and	   to	   build	   composite	   desorption	  isotherms.	  	  Core	  description	  	   Visually	   captures	   coal	   brightness,	   banding,	   cleat	   spacing,	   mineralogy,	   coal	   thickness	  and	   other	   factors.	   Provides	   insights	   about	   the	   composition,	   permeability	   and	  heterogeneity	  of	  a	  coal	  seam.	  	  Sorption	  isotherm	  	   A	   relationship,	   at	   constant	   temperature,	   describing	   the	   volume	   of	   gas	   that	   can	   be	  sorbed	  to	  a	  surface	  as	  a	  function	  of	  pressure.	  Describes	  how	  much	  gas	  a	  coal	  seam	  is	  capable	  of	  storing	  and	  how	  quickly	  this	  gas	  will	  be	  liberated.	  	  Proximate	  analysis	  	   Provides	   the	   percentage	   of	   ash,	   moisture,	   fixed	   carbon	   and	   volatile	   matter.	   Used	   to	  correct	  gas	  contents	  and	  sorption	  isotherms	  to	  an	  ash-­‐free	  basis,	  correct	  the	  isotherms	  for	  moisture	  and	  determine	  the	  maturity	  of	  high-­‐rank	  coals.	  	  Mineralogical	  analyses	  	   Determines	   bulk	   mineralogy	   using	   petrography	   and/or	   X-­‐ray	   diffraction	   and	   clay	  mineralogy	  using	  X-­‐ray	  diffraction	  and/or	  scanning	  electron	  microscopy.	  	  Vitrinite	  reflectance	  	   A	  value	  indicating	  the	  amount	  of	  incidental	  light	  reflected	  by	  the	  vitrinite	  maceral.	  This	  technique	  is	  a	  fast	  and	  inexpensive	  means	  of	  determining	  coal	  maturity	  in	  higher	  rank	  coals.	  	  Calorific	  value	  	   The	  heat	  produced	  by	  combustion	  of	  a	  coal	  sample.	  Used	  to	  determine	  coal	  maturity	  in	  lower	  rank	  coals.	  	  Maceral	  analysis	  	   Captures	   the	   types,	   abundance	   and	   spatial	   relationships	   of	   various	   maceral	   types.	  These	  differences	  can	  be	  related	  to	  differences	  in	  gas-­‐sorption	  capacity	  and	  brittleness,	  which	  affect	  gas	  content	  and	  permeability.	  	  
Bulk	  density	  	   Relationships	   between	   bulk	   density	   and	   other	   parameters	   (such	   as	   ash	   content	   and	  gas	  content)	  can	  be	  used	  to	  establish	  a	  bulk-­‐density	  cut-­‐off	  for	  counting	  coal	  and	  shale	  thicknesses	  using	  a	  bulk-­‐density	  log.	  	  Conventional	  logs	  	   Self-­‐potential,	   gamma	   ray,	   shallow	   and	   deep	   resistivity,	   microlog,	   caliper,	   density,	  neutron	  and	   sonic	   logs.	  Used	   to	   identify	   coals	   and	   shales,	   and	   to	  determine	  porosity	  and	  saturation	  values	  in	  shales.	  	  Special	  logs	  	   Image	  logs	  to	  resolve	  fractures	  and	  wireline	  spectrometry	  logs	  to	  determine	  in-­‐situ	  gas	  content.	  	  Pressure-­‐	  transient	  tests	  	   Pressure	   build-­‐up	   or	   injection	   fall-­‐off	   tests	   to	   determine	   reservoir	   pressure,	  permeability,	  skin	  factor	  and	  to	  detect	  fractured	  reservoir	  behaviour.	  	  3D	  seismic	  	   Used	  to	  determine	  fault	  locations,	  reservoir	  depths,	  variations	  in	  thickness	  and	  lateral	  continuity,	  and	  coal/shale	  properties.	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Drilling	   in	   shallow	   coal-­‐bed	   methane	   reservoirs	   is	   often	   done	   with	   underbalanced	  percussion	   drilling,	   which	   has	   the	   advantage	   of	   a	   high	   drilling	   rate	   and	   nearly	   no	  formation	  damage.	  	  For	  coal-­‐bed	  reservoirs,	   coiled	   tubing	  or	  multiple	  cased-­‐hole	   fracture	  stimulations	  are	  conducted	  on	   thin	   individual	  seams	  by	  use	  of	  gelled	   fluids	  with	  sand	  as	   the	  proppant.	  Water	  is	  usually	  flushed	  at	  rates	  of	  <5bbl/min.6	  
3.1.3 Generation	  of	  contact	  surface	  in	  the	  shale	  Unfractured	   shales	   typically	   have	   permeabilities	   in	   the	   order	   of	   0.01	   to	   0.001	  microdarcies.	   This	   low	   natural	   permeability	   is	   a	   limiting	   factor	   in	   producing	   the	   gas	  resource;	  however,	  natural	  fractures	  are	  key	  sources	  of	  flow	  paths.	  They	  develop	  when	  overburdened	   pressure	   is	   reduced	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   erosion	   of	   overlying	   rock	  formations	  and/or	  other	  tectonic	  activities.7	  The	   lack	   of	   sufficient	   permeability,	   or	   in	   other	  words	   the	   lack	   of	   a	   flow	   path,	   can	   be	  overcome	  by	  drilling	  horizontal	  wells	  and	  hydraulic	   fracturing	   in	  order	   to	  expand	   the	  contact	  area	  and	  increase	  the	  flow	  into	  the	  well.8	  
3.2 Definition	  of	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  shale	  gas	  technology	  	  The	   combination	   of	   two	   technological	   advances,	   namely	   ‘horizontal	   drilling’	   and	  ‘hydraulic	   fracturing’,	   mainly	   drove	   the	   breakthrough	   in	   shale	   gas	   production	   in	   the	  USA.9	  
3.2.1 Drilling	  As	  already	  stated,	  horizontal	  drilling	   is	  one	  of	   the	  keys	   that	  made	  unconventional	  gas	  economically	  viable.10	  Since	   the	   thickness	   of	   the	   pay	   zone	   is	   often	   insufficient,	   horizontal	   wells	   are	   drilled	  within	  each	  shale	  layer.11	  Figure	  3-­‐1	  compares	  a	  vertical	  and	  a	  horizontal	  well	  that	  are	  producing	  from	  a	  shale	  formation.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Creties	   D.	   Jenkins	   and	   Charles	   M.	   Boyer,	   'Coalbed-­‐	   and	   Shale-­‐Gas	   Reservoirs',	   Journal	   of	   Petroleum	  
Technology	  February	  (2008).	  7	  Arthur	  et	  al.,	  'Evaluating	  Implications	  of	  hydraulic	  fracturing	  in	  Shale	  Gas	  Resevoirs'.	  8	  Don	  R.	  Watson	  et	  al.,	  'One-­‐Trip	  Multistage	  Completion	  Technology	  for	  Unconventional	  Gas	  Formations',	  in	   CIPC/SPE	   Gas	   Technology	   Symposium	   2008	   Joint	   Conference	   (Calgary,	   Alberta:	   Society	   of	   Petroleum	  Engineers,	  2008).	  9	  ALL	   Consulting,	   'Modern	   Shale	   Gas	   development	   in	   the	   United	   States	   -­‐	   a	   primer',	   (Tulsa,	   OK:	   ALL	  Consulting,	  2009).	  10	  Ibid.	  11	  Mark	  Zoback,	  Saya	  Kitasei	  and	  Brad	  Copithorne,	   'Addressing	  the	  Environmental	  Risks	   from	  Shale	  Gas	  Development',	  in	  Briefing	  Paper	  (Washington,	  DC:	  Worldwatch	  Institute,	  2010).	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Figure	  3-­‐1:	  Vertical	  vs.	  horizontal	  well	  comparison12	  
	  In	  addition	  to	  horizontal	  drilling,	  drilling	  from	  pads	  is	  a	  field	  development	  strategy	  that	  can	  reduce	  the	  surface	  footprint,	  environmental	  disturbance,	  logistical	  issues,	  etc.13	  US	   drilling	   activity	   highlights	   the	   importance	   of	   horizontal	   drilling	   technology.	   In	   the	  Barnett	   Shale,	   the	  number	  of	  horizontal	  wells	  drilled	  has	   increased	   from	  76	   in	  March	  2001	  to	  1	  810	  in	  August	  2007	  (see	  Figure	  3-­‐3).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  vertical	  wells	  have	  decreased	  from	  2	  001	  to	  131	  in	  the	  same	  time	  period.14	  The	  latest	  data	  from	  the	  USA	  shows	  that,	  over	  the	  period	  2005-­‐2010,	  the	  percentage	  of	  horizontal	  rigs	  has	  increased	  from	  10%	  to	  58%	  of	  the	  total	  rig	  count.15	  
Horizontal	  drilling	  technology	  In	  order	  to	  drill	  within	  the	  horizontal	   layers,	  directional	  drilling	  technology	  is	  applied.	  This	   is	   conventionally	   done	   by	   using	   standard	  down-­‐hole	  motors.	  New	  developments	  also	  utilise	  directional	  drilling	  automation	  or	  rotary	  steerable	  systems.	  As	   can	   be	   seen	   from	   Figure	   3-­‐2,	   a	   typical	  well	   is	   drilled	   nearly	   vertically	   (depending	  upon	   the	   situation)	   from	   surface	   down	   to	   the	   kick-­‐off	   point	   (KOP).	   At	   the	   KOP,	   the	  trajectory	   starts	   deviating	   from	   the	   vertical	   with	   build	   rates	   of	   about	   10°/30m	   to	  20°/30m.	  In	  practice	  this	  means	  that	  the	  KOP	  is	  about	  100m	  to	  200m	  vertically	  above	  the	   horizontal	   section.	   In	   the	   USA	   the	   length	   of	   the	   horizontal	   section	   of	   the	   well	   is	  between	  1	  000m	  to	  2	  000m	  on	  average.	  Horizontal	   lengths	  of	  up	  to	  6	  000m	  have	  been	  reported.16	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Chief	   Oil	   and	   Gas,	  Why	   Multiple	   Horizontal	   Wells	   from	   centralized	   well	   pads	   should	   be	   used	   for	   the	  
Marcellus	  Shale	  (West	  Virginia	  Surface	  Owner's	  Rights	  Organization,	  2012,	  cited	  04/05/2012);	  available	  from	  http://www.wvsoro.org/resources/marcellus/horiz_drilling.html	  13	  Krisanne	  L.	  Edwards	  et	  al.,	  'Marcellus	  Shale	  Hydraulic	  Fracturing	  and	  Optimal	  Well	  Spacing	  to	  Maximize	  Recovery	  and	  Control	  Costs',	  in	  SPE	  Hydraulic	  Fracturing	  Technology	  Conference	  (Woodlands,	  TX:	  Society	  of	  Petroleum	  Engineers,	  2011);	  Florence	  Gény,	  'Can	  Unconventional	  Gas	  be	  a	  Game	  Changer	  in	  European	  Markets?',	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  Institute	  for	  Energy	  Studies,	  2010).	  14	  3	  Legs	  Resources,	  'Introduction	  to	  Shale	  Gas'.	  15	  Abu	  M.	  Sani	  and	  Efe	  A.	  Ejefodomi,	  'Horizontal	  Wells	  Drilling	  Activity	  in	  South	  Texas	  Unconventional	  Gas	  Resources	  and	  Micro-­‐seismic	  Hydraulic	  Fracturing	  Montioring	  Application	   to	  Reduce	  Risk	  and	   Increase	  the	  Success	  Rate',	  in	  SPE/DGS	  Saudi	  Arabia	  Section	  Technical	  Symposium	  and	  Exhibition	  (Al-­‐Khobar,	  Saudi	  Arabia:	  Society	  of	  Petroleum	  Engineers	  2011).	  16	  Sandeep	   Janwadkar	   et	   al.,	   'Innovative	  Design	  Rotary	   Steerable	   Technologies	  Overcome	  Challenges	   of	  Complex	   Well	   Profiles	   in	   a	   Fast	   Growing	   Unconventional	   Resource—Woodford	   Shale',	   in	   SPE/IADC	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Figure	  3-­‐2:	  Typical	  wellbore	  trajectory17	  
	  	  State-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	   technologies	  currently	   in	  use	   include	  down-­‐hole	  motors,	  often	  utilised	  in	  conjunction	  with	  directional	  drilling	  automation	  or	  rotary	  steerable	  systems	  (RSS).	  	  A	   downhole	   motor,	   as	   shown	   in	   Figure	   3-­‐3,	   mainly	   consists	   of	   two	   parts	   connected	  through	   a	   joint	   that	   permits	   the	   lower	   end	   to	   be	   directed	   by	   some	   degrees,	   allowing	  directional	  drilling.	  The	  rotational	  energy	  used	  to	  turn	  the	  motor,	  and	  hence	  the	  drill	  bit	  connected	   to	   it,	   is	   provided	   by	   the	   drilling	   fluid.	   To	   enable	   directional	   control,	  parameters	   such	   as	   stand	   pipe	   pressure	   and	   torque	   are	   closely	   and	   constantly	  monitored.	  Finally,	  to	  get	  feedback	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  wellbore	  being	  drilled	  matches	  the	  planned	  trajectory,	  measurement-­‐while-­‐drilling	  tools	  (MWD)	  are	  used.18	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   System	   Enhances	   Drilling	   Performance	   on	  Horizontal	  Shale	  Wells',	  in	  International	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  Conference	  and	  Exhibition	  in	  China	  (Beijing:	  Society	  of	  Petroleum	  Engineers,	  2010);	   S.	   Zargari	   and	  S.	  D.	  Mohaghegh,	   'Field	  Development	  Strategies	   for	  Bakken	  Shale	   Formation',	   in	   SPE	  Eastern	  Regional	  Meeting	   (Morgantown,	  WV:	   Society	   of	   Petroleum	   Engineers,	  2010).	  17	  geology.com,	  Mineral	  Rights:	  Basic	  information	  about	  mineral,	  surface,	  oil	  and	  gas	  rights	  (2012,	  cited	  15	  March	  2012).	  18	  Baker	   Hughes	   INTEQ,	   Drilling	   Engineering	   Workbook:	   A	   Distributed	   Learning	   Course	   (Houston,	   TX:	  Baker	  Hughes	  INTEQ,	  1995);	  William	  C.	  Lyons,	  Working	  Guide	  to	  Drilling	  Equipment	  and	  Operations,	  First	  Edition	  ed.	  (Burlington,	  MA:	  Gulf	  Publishing,	  2010);	  H.R.	  Motahhari,	  G.	  Hareland	  and	  J.A.	  James,	  'Improved	  Drilling	   Efficiency	   Technique	   Using	   Integrated	   PDM	   and	   PDC	   Bit	   Parameters',	   Journal	   of	   Canadian	  
petroleum	   Technology	   49,	   no	   10	   (2010);	   Schlumberger	   Ltd.,	   Oilfield	   Glossary:	   ©Steerable	   Motor	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One	   option	   for	   increasing	   horizontal	   drilling	   efficiency	   and	   improving	   directional	  control	   is	   utilising	   directional	   drilling	   automation	   technology.	   A	   rocking	   motion	   is	  applied	  from	  the	  top	  where	  the	  torque	  measurement	  is	  monitored,	  hence	  breaking	  the	  drag	  down	  the	  hole	  and	  using	  the	  torque	  as	  a	  feedback	  to	  control	  motion.19	  	  
Figure	  3-­‐3:	  Horizontal	  drilling	  technology20	  
	  In	   principle,	   RSS	   provides	   the	   same	   control	   of	   wellbore	   trajectory;	   however,	   no	  directional	   drilling	   automation	   technology	   is	   required	   to	   overcome	   drag,	   and	   thus	  curved	  sections	  can	  be	  drilled	  faster	  and	  more	  accurately.	  Despite	  these	  significant	  and	  highly	  desired	  advantages,	  downhole	  motors	  are	  found	  to	  be	  more	  practical	  due	  to	  their	  lower	  cost.21	  
Drilling	  from	  pads	  In	   shale	  drilling,	   it	   is	  becoming	   increasingly	   common	   to	  use	  a	   single	  pad,	   as	   in	  Figure	  3-­‐4,	  to	  develop	  as	  much	  subsurface	  area	  as	  possible	  from	  one	  spot.	  One	  surface	  location	  can	  be	  used	   for	  multiple	  wells.	  Pad	  drilling	   increases	   the	  operational	   efficiency	  of	   gas	  production	  and	  reduces	  infrastructure	  costs,	  land	  use	  and	  environmental	  impacts.22	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Schlumberger	   Ltd,	   	   2011,	   cited	   27	   March	   2012);	   available	   from	  http://www.slb.com/resources/publications/oilfield_review/ori/ori002/01/01a.aspx	  19	  Eric	   Maidla,	   Marc	   Haci	   and	   Daniel	  Wright,	   'Case	   History	   Summary:	   Horizontal	   Drilling	   Performance	  Improvement	   Due	   to	   Torque	   Rocking	   on	   800	   Horizontal	   Land	   Wells	   Drilled	   for	   Unconventional	   Gas	  Resources',	   in	   SPE	  Annual	  Technical	   Conference	  and	  Exhibition	   (New	   Orleans,	   LA:	   Society	   of	   Petroleum	  Engineers,	  2009).	  20	  Eric	   Maidla	   and	   Marc	   Haci,	   'Understanding	   Torque:	   The	   Key	   to	   Slide	   Drilling	   Directional	   Wells',	   in	  
IADC/SPE	  Drilling	  Conference	  (Dallas,	  TX:	  Society	  of	  Petroleum	  Engineers,	  2004).	  21	  Steve	   Jones,	   Junichi	   Sugiura	   and	   Steve	  Barton,	   'Finding	   optimal	   balance	   in	   rotary	   steerable	   systems',	  
Offshore	  Magazine	  68,	  no	  9	  (2008).	  22	  3	  Legs	  Resources,	  'Introduction	  to	  Shale	  Gas'.	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Figure	  3-­‐4:	  Multi-­‐well	  pad	  development23	  
	  The	   footprint	   of	   a	   pad	   usually	   ranges	   from	   12	  000m²	   (100m	   x	   120m)	   to	   20	  000m².	  Wells	  are	  often	  placed	  next	  to	  each	  other	  at	  distances	  of	  between	  7m	  and	  8m.	  A	  typical	  pad	  includes	  upwards	  of	  6	  wells,	  with	  up	  to	  24	  being	  reported.24	  The	  wells	  are	  drilled	  parallel	  in	  the	  shale	  for	  a	  distance	  of	  about	  200m	  to	  500m,	  with	  a	  horizontal	  length	  of	  about	  1	  000m	  to	  2	  000m.	  	  The	  difference	  in	  total	  surface	  footprint	  between	  vertical	  and	  horizontal	  wells	  is	  shown	  in	  Table	  3-­‐2.	  
Table	  3-­‐2:	  Ten-­‐square-­‐mile	  total	  surface	  disturbance	  of	  vertical	  and	  horizontal	  wells25	  
Spacing	  option	   Multi-­‐well	  640	  acres	   Single	  well	  40	  acres	  Number	  of	  pads	  	   10	   160	  Total	  disturbance–	  drilling	  phase	  	   50	  acres	  (5	  ac.	  per	  pad)	   480	  acres	  (3	  ac.	  per	  pad)	  %	  Disturbance	  –	  drilling	  phase	  	   0.78	   7.5	  
3.2.2 Hydraulic	  fracturing	  Hydraulic	   fracture	   stimulation,	  or	   ‘fracking’,	   is	   a	  process	   that	   is	  used	   to	   create	  a	   large	  number	  of	   fractures	   in	  the	  rock,	   in	  order	  to	  allow	  the	  natural	  gas	  trapped	   in	  shales	  to	  move	   to	   the	   wellbore.	   Fracking	   can	   both	   increase	   production	   rates	   and	   increase	   the	  total	  amount	  of	  gas	   that	  can	  be	  recovered.	  Pump	  pressure	  causes	   the	  rock	   to	   fracture	  and	  water	  carries	  sand	  (‘proppant’)	  into	  the	  hydraulic	  fracture	  to	  prop	  it	  open,	  allowing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Ruth	  Wood	  et	  al.,	   'Shale	  gas:	  a	  provisional	  assessment	  of	  climate	  change	  and	  environmental	   impacts',	  (Manchester:	  Tyndall	  Centre,	  University	  of	  Manchester,	  2011).	  24	  Travis	  Garza	  et	  al.,	   'Gyro	  Guidance	  Techniques	  and	  Telemetry	  Methods	  Prove	  Economical	   in	  Onshore	  Multiwell	  Pad	  Drilling	  Operations	   in	   the	  Piceance	  Basin',	   in	   IADC/SPE	  Drilling	  Conference	  and	  Exhibition	  (New	  Orleans,	  LA:	  Society	  of	  Petroleum	  Engineers,	  2010);	  Gény,	  'Unconventional	  Gas';	  M.M.	  Reynolds	  and	  D.L.	   Munn,	   'Development	   Update	   for	   an	   Emerging	   Shale	   Gas	   Giant	   Field	   -­‐	   Horn	   River	   Basin,	   British	  Columbia,	  Canada',	  in	  SPE	  Unconventional	  Gas	  Conference	  (Pittsburgh,	  PA:	  Society	  of	  Petroleum	  Engineers,	  2010).	  25	  New	  York	  State	  Department	  of	  Environmental	  Conservation,	  'Draft	  SGEIS'.	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the	   flow	  of	  gas.	  Whilst	  water	  and	  sand	  are	  the	  main	  components	  of	  hydraulic	   fracture	  fluid,	  chemical	  additives	  are	  often	  added	  in	  small	  concentrations.26	  	  
Figure	  3-­‐5:	  Vertical	  well	  and	  horizontal	  well	  fracture	  views	  
	  
Conventional	  fracturing	  fluid	  Table	  3-­‐3	  illustrates	  that	  the	  chemicals	  used	  can	  have	  a	  range	  of	  toxicities.	  For	  instance,	  sand,	   polyacrylamide,	   guar	   gum	   and	   hydroxyethyl	   cellulose	   are	   relatively	   benign	  materials.	   Acids	   and	  bases	  may	   cause	   an	   irritant	   response	   upon	  dermal	   or	   inhalation	  exposure,	  but	  more	  acute	  responses	  are	  possible.	  Chronic	  toxicity	  has	  been	  associated	  with	   some	   identified	   chemicals,	   such	   as	   ethylene	   glycol,	   glutaraldehyde	   and	   N,N-­‐dimethyl	  formamide.	  Naturally	   occurring	   metals	   also	   exert	   various	   forms	   of	   toxicity	   even	   at	   low	  concentrations.27	  
Table	  3-­‐3:	  An	  example	  of	  the	  volumetric	  composition	  of	  hydraulic	  fracturing	  fluid	  
Product	  
category	   Main	  ingredient	   Purpose	   Other	  common	  uses	  Water	   Approximately	  99.5%	  water	  and	  sand	  
Expand	  fracture	  and	  deliver	  sand	   Landscaping	  and	  manufacturing	  Sand	   Allows	  the	  fractures	  to	  remain	  open	  so	  the	  gas	  can	  escape	   Drinking	  water	  filtration,	  play	  sand,	  concrete	  and	  brick	  mortar	  
Other	   Approximately	  0.5%	  Acid	   Hydrochloric	  acid	  or	  muriatic	  acid	   Helps	  dissolve	  minerals	  and	  initiates	  cracks	  in	  the	  rock	   Swimming	  pool	  chemical	  and	  cleaner	  Antibacterial	  agent	   Glutaraldehyde	   Eliminates	  bacteria	  in	  the	  water	  that	  produces	  corrosive	  by-­‐products	   Disinfectant,	  steriliser	  for	  medical	  and	  dental	  equipment	  Breaker	   Ammonium	  persulfate	   Allows	  a	  delayed	  breakdown	  of	  the	  gel	   Used	  in	  hair	  colouring,	  as	  a	  disinfectant	  and	  in	  the	  manufacture	  of	  common	  household	  plastics	  Corrosion	  inhibitor	   N,N-­‐dimethyl	  formamide	   Prevents	  the	  corrosion	  of	  the	  pipe	   Used	  in	  pharmaceuticals,	  acrylic	  fibres	  and	  plastics	  Crosslinker	   Borate	  salts	   Maintains	  fluid	  viscosity	  as	  temperature	  increases	   Used	  in	  laundry	  detergents,	  hand	  soaps	  and	  cosmetics	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  3	  Legs	  Resources,	  'Introduction	  to	  Shale	  Gas'.	  27	  Environmental	  Protection	  Agency,	  'Draft	  Plan	  to	  Study	  the	  Potential	  Impacts	  of	  Hydraulic	  Fracturing	  on	  Drinking	  Water	  Resources	  ',	  (Washington,	  DC:	  Environmental	  Protection	  Agency,	  2011).	  
	  65	  
Product	  
category	   Main	  ingredient	   Purpose	   Other	  common	  uses	  Friction	  reducer	   Petroleum	  distillate	   ‘Slicks’	  the	  water	  to	  minimise	  friction	   Used	  in	  cosmetics	  including	  hair,	  make-­‐up,	  nail	  and	  skin	  products	  Gel	   Guar	  gum	  or	  hydroxyethyl	  cellulose	   Thickens	  the	  water	  in	  order	  to	  suspend	  the	  sand	   Thickener	  used	  in	  cosmetics,	  baked	  goods,	  ice	  cream,	  toothpaste,	  sauces	  and	  salad	  dressings	  Iron	  control	   Citric	  acid	   Prevents	  precipitation	  of	  metal	  oxides	   Food	  additive,	  food	  and	  beverages,	  lemon	  juice	  ~7%	  citric	  acid	  Clay	  stabiliser	   Potassium	  chloride	   Creates	  a	  brine	  carrier	  fluid	   Used	  in	  low-­‐sodium	  table	  salt	  substitute,	  medicines	  and	  IV	  fluids	  pH	  adjusting	  agent	   Sodium	  or	  potassium	  carbonate	   Maintains	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  other	  components,	  such	  as	  crosslinkers	   Used	  in	  laundry	  detergents,	  soap,	  water	  softener	  and	  dishwasher	  detergents	  Scale	  inhibitor	   Ethylene	  glycol	   Prevents	  scale	  deposits	  in	  the	  pipe	   Used	  in	  household	  cleansers,	  de-­‐icer,	  paints	  and	  caulks	  Surfactant	   Isopropanol	   Used	  to	  increase	  the	  viscosity	  of	  the	  fracture	  fluid	   Used	  in	  glass	  cleaner,	  multi-­‐surface	  cleansers,	  antiperspirant,	  deodorants	  and	  hair	  colour	  	  
Table	   3-­‐4:	   Naturally	   occurring	   substances	   that	   may	   be	   found	   in	   hydrocarbon-­‐containing	  
formations	  
Type	  of	  contaminant	   Examples	  Formation	  fluid	   Brine	  Gases	   Natural	   gas	   (e.g.	   methane,	   ethane),	   carbon	   dioxide,	   hydrogen	  sulphide,	  nitrogen,	  helium	  Trace	  elements	   Mercury,	  lead,	  arsenic	  Naturally	   occurring	   radioactive	  material	   Radium,	  thorium,	  uranium	  Organic	  material	   Organic	   acids,	   polycyclic	   aromatic	   hydrocarbons,	   volatile	   and	   semi-­‐volatile	  organic	  compounds	  	  The	   US	   Environmental	   Protection	   Agency	   (EPA)	   anticipates	   that	   an	   initial	   database	  search	  and	  ranking	  of	  high,	  low	  and	  unknown-­‐priority	  chemicals	  will	  be	  completed	  for	  a	  2012	  interim	  report.	  Additional	  work	  using	  high-­‐throughput	  screening	  tools	  is	  expected	  to	   be	   available	   in	   a	   2014	   report,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   development	   of	   chemical-­‐specific	  Provisional	  Peer	  Reviewed	  Toxicity	  Values	  (PPRTVs)	  for	  high-­‐priority	  chemicals.28	  It	  must	  be	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  fracturing	  fluid	  composition	  presented	  here	  reflects	  the	  fluids	   used	   in	   the	   USA;	   however,	   in	   Europe	   this	   composition	   could	   be	   different,	   with	  hazardous	  elements	  eliminated	  or	  their	  concentrations	  reduced.	  
Multi-­‐stage	  fracturing	  Due	  to	  the	   length	  of	   the	   lateral	  section,	   it	   is	  usually	  not	  possible	  to	  maintain	  sufficient	  downhole	   pressure	   to	   stimulate	   its	   entire	   length	   in	   a	   single	   event.	   Thus,	   in	   shale	   gas	  wells,	   stimulation	   is	   achieved	   by	   isolating	   portions	   of	   the	   lateral	   and	   performing	  treatments	  in	  multiple	  stages.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Ibid.	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Each	   fracture	   stage	   is	   performed	   within	   an	   isolated	   interval	   of	   the	   lateral,	   where	   a	  cluster	   of	   perforations	   is	   created	  using	   a	   perforation	   tool	   to	   establish	   communication	  between	  the	  formation	  and	  the	  wellbore.	  The	  fracture	  stages	  are	  isolated	  with	  packers.	  In	   the	   area	   of	   Eagle	   Ford	   Shale,	   the	   range	   of	   fracturing	   stages	   is	   between	   12	   and	   21	  stages	  per	  horizontal	  well,	  with	  an	  average	  of	  17	  stages	  per	  well.29	  
Alternative	  fracturing	  fluids	  Fluids	  for	  fracturing	  operations	  that	  do	  not	  require	  high-­‐purity	  fresh	  water	  as	  a	  base	  are	  being	   developed.	   Various	   components	   that	   allow	   for	   the	   reuse	   of	   fracturing	   flowback	  water	   have	   been	   developed,	   such	   as	   salt	   compatible,	   nano-­‐particle	   friction	   reducers;	  neutral	   pH	   iron	   controls;	   blended	   and	   targeted	   scale	   controls;	   aqueous	   biomass	  controls;	  and	  low-­‐toxicity	  clay	  stabilisers.30	  Alternative	  chemicals	  have	  been	  created	  to	  replace	  toxic	  2-­‐butoxyethanol,	  which	  have	  a	  far	   superior	   environmental	   profile	   and	   perform	   even	   better	   in	   well	   flowback	  enhancement.31	  Apart	   from	   this,	   liquefied	   petroleum	   gas	   and	   foam	   fluids	   are	   being	   developed	   and	  utilised.	  Liquefied	  petroleum	  gas	  (LPG)	  is	  a	  mixture	  of	  petroleum	  gases	  existing	  in	  a	  liquid	  state	  at	  ambient	   temperature	  and	  moderate	  pressure.	  Once	   the	  well	   treatment	   is	   complete,	  the	   propane	   and	   natural	   gas	   in	   the	   LPG	   remains	   in	   either	   a	   multi-­‐phase	   or	   a	   single	  vapour	  phase	  at	  formation	  conditions.32	  Foam	   fluids	   are	   essentially	   two-­‐phase	   fluids	   that	   consist	   of	   an	   inner	   phase,	   which	   is	  either	   liquid	   (N2)	   or	   vapour/gaseous	   (CO2),	   and	   an	   outer	   phase,	   which	   is	   primarily	  composed	  of	  a	  saline-­‐water	  mixture	  with	  either	  a	  surfactant	  or	  gallant.33	  	  
Alternative	  fracturing	  methods	  Channel	   fracturing	   is	   claimed	   to	   provide	   significantly	   higher	   fracture	   conductivity,	  better	   fracture	   cleanup,	   lower	   pressure	   loss	   within	   the	   fracture	   and	   longer	   effective	  fracture	  half-­‐length.	  The	  idea	  is	  basically	  to	  substitute	  the	  homogeneous	  proppant	  pack	  in	  the	   fracture	  with	  a	  heterogeneous	  structure	  containing	  a	  network	  of	  open	  channels	  (Figure	   3-­‐6).	   The	   fracture	   is	   held	   open	   by	   discrete	   conglomerations	   of	   propping	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Sergio	   Centurion,	   'Eagle	   Ford	   Shale:	   A	   Multistage	   Hydraulic	   Fracturing,	   Completion	   Trends	   and	  Production	   Outcome	   Study	   Using	   Practical	   Data	   Mining	   Techniques',	   in	   SPE	   Eastern	   Regional	   Meeting	  (Columbus,	  OH:	  Society	  of	  Petroleum	  Engineers,	  2011).	  30	  M.E.	   Blauch,	   'Developing	   Effective	   and	   Environmentally	   Suitable	   Fracturing	   Fluids	   Using	   Hydraulic	  Fracturing	  Flowback	  Waters',	  in	  SPE	  Unconventional	  Gas	  Conference	  (Pittsburgh,	  PA:	  Society	  of	  Petroleum	  Engineers,	  2010).	  31	  Jonathan	  J.	  Wylde	  and	  Bill	  O'Neil,	  'Environmentally	  Acceptable	  Replacement	  of	  2-­‐Butoxyethanol	  with	  a	  High	   Performance	   Alternative	   for	   Fracturing	   Applications',	   in	   SPE	   International	   Symposium	   on	   Oilfield	  
Chemistry	  (Woodlands,	  TX:	  Society	  of	  Petroleum	  Engineers,	  2011).	  32	  Eric	  H.	  Tudor	  et	  al.,	  '100%	  Gelled	  LPG	  Fracturing	  Process:	  An	  Alternative	  to	  Conventional	  Water-­‐Based	  Fracturing	  Techniques',	  in	  SPE	  Eastern	  Regional	  Meeting	  (Charleston,	  WV:	  Society	  of	  Petroleum	  Engineers,	  2009).	  33	  A.	  Kumar	  et	  al.,	   'Prospects	  of	  Foam	  Stimulation	   in	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  Wells	  of	   India',	   in	  Trinidad	  and	  Tobago	  
Energy	  Resources	  Conference	  (Port	  of	  Spain,	  Trinidad:	  Society	  of	  Petroleum	  Engineers,	  2010).	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materials.	   The	   open	   channels	   act	   as	   low-­‐resistance	   paths	   for	   the	   flow	   of	   reservoir	  fluids.34	  
Figure	  3-­‐6:	  Representation	  of	  the	  new	  fracturing	  approach	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  conventional	  fracture	  
	  Hydra-­‐jetting	   (Figure	   3-­‐7)	   represents	   another	   notable	   alternative	   fracturing	   process.	  Tensile	  failure	  of	  the	  rock	  occurs	  at	  the	  jetting	  point	  without	  exposing	  the	  wellbore	  to	  breakdown	   pressures.	   This	   enables	   precise	   control	   of	   the	   location	   of	   the	   fracture	  initiation.	  Multiple	  fractures	  can	  be	  created	  by	  simply	  moving	  the	  jetting	  tool.35	  	  
Figure	   3-­‐7:	   Hydra–jet	   perforation	   and	   proppant	   plug	   diversion	   to	   fracture	   multiple	   intervals,	  
vertically	  and	  horizontally	  
	  
Best	  practices	  in	  water	  management	  Water	  used	  for	  drilling	  and	  making	  up	  frac	  fluids	  can	  come	  from	  surface	  water	  bodies,	  groundwater,	  municipal	  portable	  water	  supplies,	  or	   flowback	  water	   from	  a	  previously	  fractured	  well.	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  M.	   Gillard	   et	   al.,	   'A	   New	   Approach	   to	   Generating	   Fracture	   Conductivity',	   in	   SPE	   Annual	   Technical	  
Conference	  and	  Exhibition	  (Florence,	  Italy:	  Society	  of	  Petroleum	  Engineers,	  2010).	  35	  Glenda	  Wylie,	  Mike	  Eberhard	  and	  Mike	  Mullen,	   'Trends	  in	  Unconventional	  Gas',	  Oil	  &	  Gas	  Journal	  105,	  no	  47	  (2007	  ).	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The	  water	  required	  for	  drilling	  a	  typical	  shale	  gas	  well	  ranges	  from	  2	  300	  to	  4	  000	  m³.	  The	  volume	  needed	  to	  fracture	  a	  well	  range	  is	  from	  8	  700m³	  to	  14	  500m³.36	  Once	   the	   frac	   job	   is	   finished,	   the	   pressure	   is	   released.	   Then,	   flowback	   and	   produced	  water	   (30%	   to	  70%	  of	   the	   fluid	   injected),	  which	   typically	   contains	  very	  high	   levels	  of	  total	  dissolved	  solids	  (TDS)	  and	  other	  constituents	  (possibly	  including	  heavy	  metals	  and	  naturally	  occurring	  radioactive	  materials)	  returns	  to	  the	  surface.37	  Flowback	   may	   be	   directed	   to	   tanks	   or	   lined	   pits	   and	   centralised	   impoundments	   for	  management.	   These	   impoundments	   should	   provide	   structural	   integrity	   and	   have	   a	  natural	   or	   artificial	   liner	   designed	   to	   prevent	   downward	   flow.	   They	   should	   also	   be	  placed	   at	   an	   appropriated	   distance	   from	   surface	   water	   to	   prevent	   overflows	   from	  reaching	  the	  surface	  water.38	  Generally,	   the	   TDS	   concentration	   of	   flowback	   and	   produced	  water	   is	   higher	   than	   the	  desired	   TDS	   range	   for	   new	   frac	   fluids.	   Thus,	   thermal	   distillation	   can	   be	   used,	   or	   the	  flowback	   and	   produced	   water	   can	   be	   blended	   with	   fresh	   water,	   to	   reduce	   TDS	  concentration	  and	  other	  constituents.39	  Operators	  must	  manage	   flowback	  and	  produced	  water	   in	  a	  cost-­‐effective	  manner	   that	  complies	  with	  regulatory	  requirements.	  The	  primary	  options	  are:	  
• Injection	  underground	  through	  a	  disposal	  well	  (not	  possible	  under	  EU	  law);	  
• Discharge	   to	   a	   nearby	   surface-­‐water	   body	   (permission	   and	   treatment	   are	  required);	  
• Haul	   to	   a	   municipal	   wastewater	   treatment	   plant	   (limitations	   due	   to	   issues	  with	  TDS	  treatment);	  
• Haul	   to	   a	   commercial	   industrial	   wastewater	   treatment	   facility	   (limited	   to	  allow	  TDS	  discharges	  without	  violating	  surface	  water	  quality);	  
• Reuse	  for	  a	  future	  frac	  job,	  either	  with	  or	  without	  treatment.40	  Disposal	  options	  are	  dependent	  on	  the	  availability	  of	  suitable	  zones	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  obtaining	  permits	   for	   injection	   into	   these	  zones;	   the	  capacity	  of	  commercial	  and/or	  municipal	  water	  treatment	  facilities;	  and	  the	  ability	  of	  either	  operators	  or	  such	  plants	  to	  successfully	  obtain	  surface-­‐water	  discharge	  permits.41	  Municipal	   sewage	   treatment	   facilities	   must	   have	   a	   state-­‐approved	   pretreatment	  programme	   for	   accepting	   any	   industrial	  waste.	   Facilities	  must	   also	  notify	   appropriate	  regulatory	  authorities	  of	  any	  new	  industrial	  waste	  they	  plan	  to	  receive,	  and	  certify	  that	  their	   facility	   is	   capable	   of	   treating	   the	   pollutants	   that	   are	   expected	   to	   be	   in	   that	  industrial	  waste.	  They	  are	  generally	  required	  to	  perform	  certain	  analyses	  to	  ensure	  they	  can	   handle	   the	   waste	   without	   problems	   to	   ensure	   that	   water	   quality	   standards	   are	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  John	  A.	  Veil,	   'Water	  Management	  Technologies	  Used	  by	  Marcellus	  Shale	  Gas	  Producers',	   (Washington,	  DC:	  Department	  of	  Energy,	  2010).	  37	  Ibid.	  38	  American	   Petroleum	   Institute,	   'Water	   Management	   Associated	   with	   Hydraulic	   Fracturing',	   in	   API	  
Guidance	  Document	  (Washington,	  DC:	  American	  Petroleum	  Institute,	  2010).	  39	  Veil,	  'Water	  Management	  Technologies'.	  40	  Ibid.	  41	  American	  Petroleum	  Institute,	  'Water	  Management'.	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maintained	   at	   all	   times.	   Thus,	   it	  may	   be	   required	   that	   operators	   provide	   information	  pertaining	  to	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  fluid.42	  In	   Figure	   3-­‐8,	   water	   consumption	   among	   different	   industries	   is	   presented.	   Using	   an	  initial	  drilling	  rate	  of	  200	  wells	  in	  a	  one-­‐year	  period	  with	  an	  average	  consumptive	  water	  use	  of	  12	  500	  m³per	  well	  would	  yield	  a	  volume	  of	  250	  000	  m³of	  water,	  which	  would	  be	  consumptively	  used	  for	  natural	  gas	  development	  on	  an	  annual	  basis.43	  
Figure	  3-­‐8:	  Consumptive	  water	  uses	  in	  the	  Delaware	  Basin	  
	  Although	   the	   water	   required	   for	   hydraulic	   fracturing	   is	   only	   partially	   recovered	  (contrary	   to	   other	   industrial	   uses),	   such	   water	   is	   typically	   a	   small	   percentage	   of	   the	  water	  use	   in	  any	  shale	  basin.	  While	  other	   industries	  use	  water	  on	  a	   continuous	  basis,	  hydraulic	  treatment	  only	  requires	  water	  for	  short	  periods.44	  
Table	  3-­‐5:	  Water	  use	  by	  sector	  in	  shale	  gas	  basins	  










Barnett	   82.70%	   4.50%	   3.70%	   6.30%	   2.30%	   0.40%	   1.77	  
Fayetteville	   2.30%	   1.10%	   33.30%	   62.90%	   0.30%	   0.10%	   5.07	  
Haynesville	   45.90%	   27.20%	   13.50%	   8.50%	   4.00%	   0.80%	   0.34	  
Marcellus	   11.97%	   16.13%	   71.70%	   0.12%	   0.01%	   0.06%	   13.51	  	  Given	  the	  constraints	  on	  both	  underground	  injection	  and	  discharge	  in	  the	  USA,	  serious	  investments	  will	  be	  needed	  to	  advance	  treatment	  technologies	  that	  enable	  companies	  to	  reuse	  fluids	  for	  subsequent	  fracturing	  jobs.	  Recycling	  water	  minimises	  both	  the	  overall	  amount	   of	  water	   used	   for	   fracturing	   and	   the	   amount	   that	  must	   be	   disposed	   of.	  Many	  water	   treatment	   processes	   are	   currently	   being	   investigated	   that	   could	   potentially	   be	  used	  on	  a	  large	  scale	  with	  the	  ultimate	  goal	  of	  developing	  a	  closed-­‐loop	  system.45	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Ibid.	  43	  J.	   Daniel	   Arthur	   and	   David	   J.	   Bockelmann,	   'Analysis	   Of	   Delaware	   River	   Basin	   Commission	   Proposed	  (Article	  7)	  Natural	  Gas	  Development	  Regulations',	  (Tulsa,	  OK:	  ALL	  Consulting,	  2011).	  44	  J.D.	  Arthur	  and	  B.J.	  Coughlin,	  'Cumulative	  Impacts	  of	  Shale-­‐Gas	  Water	  Management:	  Considerations	  and	  Challenges',	   in	   SPE	   Americas	   E&P	   Health,	   Safety,	   Security,	   and	   Environmental	   Conference	   (Houston,	   TX:	  Society	  of	  Petroleum	  Engineers,	  2011).	  45	  Zoback,	  Kitasei	  and	  Copithorne,	  'Environmental	  Risks	  from	  Shale	  Gas'.	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3.2.3 Monitoring	  Due	  to	  the	  fluids	  in	  each	  fracturing	  treatment	  containing	  a	  different	  subset	  of	  chemicals	  and	  because	   some	  of	   these	  chemicals	   could	  be	  hazardous	   in	   sufficient	   concentrations,	  baseline	  water	  testing	  conducted	  at	  each	  site	  might	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  ensuring	  that	   possible	   exposure	   is	   detected.	   This	   would	   help	   to	   limit	   the	   environmental	   and	  health	   risks	  posed	  by	   fracturing	   fluids	   in	   the	   case	  of	   contamination.	  Monitoring	   could	  also	  play	  an	  important	  role	  regarding	  the	  surface	  footprint	  of	  drilling	  activities,	  the	  safe	  transport	  and	  disposal	  of	  drilling	  fluids	  and	  cuttings,	  and	  air	  and	  noise	  pollution.	  
Microseismic	  fracture	  monitoring	  Microfractures	   inducing	   shear-­‐slip	   or	   microseismic	   events	   that	   generally	   have	  magnitudes	  of	   less	   than	  1.5	  on	   the	  Richter	   scale	   (see	  Figure	  3-­‐9)	  have	  about	  as	  much	  energy	  as	  that	  released	  by	  a	  bowl	  of	  milk	  dropped	  from	  chest	  height	  to	  the	  floor.	  Due	  to	  the	   small	  magnitudes	   of	   these	   events,	  which	   represent	  micro-­‐earthquakes	   about	   one-­‐millionth	  the	  size	  of	  tremors	  that	  might	  be	  detected	  by	  inhabitants	  of	  a	  populated	  area,	  operators	  must	  deploy	  ultrasensitive	   seismometers	   in	  nearby	  wells	   in	  order	   to	  detect	  them.46	  
Figure	  3-­‐9:	  Distribution	  of	  magnitudes	  of	  microseismic	  events	  in	  Barnett	  Shale	  
	  Microseismic	   mapping	   (MSM)	   provides	   insight	   into	   the	   development	   of	   fracture	  propagation	   and	   the	  mechanisms	  by	  which	   this	   is	   occurring,	   permitting	   the	   real-­‐time	  analysis	  of	  fracture	  treatments	  and	  thereby	  reducing	  risks	  and	  challenges.	  	  A	  hydraulic	  fracture	  induces	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  formation	  stress	  proportional	  to	  the	  net	  fracturing	  pressure,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  increase	  in	  pore	  pressure	  due	  to	  fracture	  fluid	  leak-­‐off.	  Large	   tensile	   stresses	   are	   generated	   ahead	   of	   the	   crack’s	   tip,	   thus	   generating	   large	  amounts	   of	   shear	   stress.	   Pore	   pressure	   and	   formation	   stress	   increases	   affect	   the	  stability	   of	   the	   planes	   of	   weakness	   surrounding	   the	   hydraulic	   fracture,	   causing	   these	  planes	   of	   weakness	   to	   undergo	   shear	   slippage	   and	   emit	   seismic	   energy,	   which	   is	  detectable	   as	   compressional	   (P)	   and	   shear	   (S)	  waves	   by	   receivers	   placed	   in	   a	   nearby	  well.	  In	   recent	   years,	   MSM	   has	   become	   a	   critical	   technology	   for	   imaging,	   quantifying	   and	  evaluating	   fracture	   geometry	   dynamics.	   It	   also	   provides	   useful	   information	   on	   the	  fracture	  azimuth	   (which	   is	  beneficial	   for	  well	   spacing	  and	   in-­‐fill	  drilling	  programmes)	  and	  gives	  good	  indications	  regarding	  the	  hydraulic	  fracture	  complexity,	  which	  helps	  in	  the	   estimation	   of	   the	   volume	   of	   the	   reservoir	   that	   has	   been	   stimulated.	  Microseismic	  mapping	   has	   also	   been	   vital	   in	   observing	   the	   interaction	   or	   communication	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Ibid.	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created	  fractures	  with	  other	   fractures	  and	  with	  geohazards	  that	  can	  be	  detrimental	   to	  the	  productivity	  of	  the	  wellbore.	  MSM	  has	  been	  used	  in	  conjunction	  with	  wellbore	  images,	  resistivity	  logs	  and	  sonic	  logs	  to	   characterise	   different	   geological	   intervals	   in	   relation	   to	   natural	   fractures,	   induced	  fractures	   near	   the	   wellbore	   and	   stress	   contrast	   regions.	   This	   helps	   to	   identify	   the	  appropriate	   perforation	   location	   and	   spacing,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   best	   fracture	   stimulation	  staging	  and	  technique	  to	  deploy	  (Figure	  3-­‐10).47	  	  
Figure	  3-­‐10:	  Typical	  hydraulic	  fracture	  monitoring	  configurations	  for	  horizontal	  treatment	  wells	  
	  
Figure	  3-­‐11:	  Map	  view	  of	  hydraulic	   fracture	  
intersecting	  a	  pre-­‐existing	  fault48	  
	  
Figure	  3-­‐12:	  Location	  and	  orientation	  of	  the	  
fault	   identified	   by	   microseismic	  
monitoring49	  
	  
Monitoring	  of	  surface	  leakages	  	  The	  traditional	  gas	  detection	  systems	  available	  today	  are	  based	  on	  two	  main	  concepts,	  which	  are	  called	  sniffing	  technologies:	  
• Point	  detectors,	  where	  the	  gas	  has	  to	  be	  in	  physical	  contact	  with	  the	  detector;	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Sani	   and	  Ejefodomi,	   'Horizontal	  Wells	  Drilling	  Activity	   in	   South	  Texas	  Unconventional	  Gas	  Resources	  and	  Micro-­‐seismic	  Hydraulic	  Fracturing	  Montioring	  Application	  to	  Reduce	  Risk	  and	  Increase	  the	  Success	  Rate'.	  48	  Ibid.	  49	  Ibid.	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• Open	   path	   detectors,	   where	   the	   gas	   has	   to	   be	   within	   a	   predefined	   path	   of	  infrared	  light	  to	  be	  detected.	  Both	   detection	   concepts	   are	   based	   on	   LEL	   (lower	   explosive	   level)	   measurements.	  However,	   in	  outdoor	  installations,	  the	  gas	  cloud	  from	  a	  gas	  leak	  often	  either	  dilutes	  or	  drifts	  away	  in	  the	  wind	  before	  it	  reaches	  the	  gas	  detection	  point.	  Another	  gas	  leak	  detector	  utilised	  is	  an	  ultrasonic	  gas	  leak	  detector,	  which	  is	  based	  on	  airborne	  ultrasound	  emitted	  from	  the	  gas	  leak.	  It	  gives	  an	  instant	  alarm	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  leak	   is	   detected.	   However,	   if	   the	   hole	   through	   which	   the	   gas	   leaks	   is	   too	   large,	   the	  pressure	  drop	  across	  the	  hole	  will	  be	  too	  small	  and	  no	  ultrasound	  will	  be	  detected.50	  Hydrocarbon	  processing	  facilities	  are	  equipped	  with	  gas	  detection	  system	  with	  sensors.	  There	  are	  two	  types	  of	  detectors:	  1)	  flammable	  gas	  detectors,	  which	  detect	  leakages	  of	  flammable	  gas	  exceeding	  20%	  LEL	  of	  concentration;	  and	  2)	   toxic	  gas	  detectors,	  which	  detect	  leakages	  of	  H2S	  exceeding	  10	  ppm.51	  
Underground	  flow	  monitoring	  Distributed	  temperature	  sensing	  (DTS)	  is	  a	  method	  for	  downhole	  leak	  detection,	  where	  the	   thermal	  profile	   can	  be	   instantaneously	  detected	  along	   the	  entire	  wellbore	   in	   real-­‐time.	  This	  allows	  the	  precise	  identification	  of	  when	  and	  where	  thermal	  events	  occur.	  An	  enclosed	   fibre-­‐optic	   cable	   is	   deployed	   into	   the	   well	   to	   allow	   a	   continuous,	   real-­‐time	  snapshot	  of	  the	  well’s	  temperature	  profile.52	  Other	  methods	  are	  spinners,	   temperature	   logs,	  downhole	  cameras,	   thermal-­‐decay	   logs	  and	  noise	  logs.	  It	  is	  rather	  difficult	  to	  detect	  small	  leaks	  with	  these	  tools,	  because	  small	  leaks	  result	  in	  velocity	  and	  temperature	  changes	  that	  may	  be	  less	  than	  the	  resolution	  of	  these	   logging	   tools.	   Noise	   logs	   can	   detect	   fluid	   movement	   but	   must	   be	   used	   in	   a	  stationary	  mode	  and	  more	  distant	  noise	  sources	  may	  confuse	  interpretation.	  Downhole	  cameras	  can	  be	  useful	  in	  finding	  a	  variety	  of	  leaks	  but	  require	  the	  wellbore	  to	  be	  filled	  with	  optically	  clear	  fluid.	  For	  the	  detection	  of	  small	  leaks,	  ultrasonic	  leak-­‐detection	  is	  used.	  It	  is	  known	  that	  leaks,	  regardless	   of	   phase,	  will	   produce	   an	   ultrasonic	   frequency	  when	   active.	   The	   sensor	   is	  capable	  of	  detecting	  the	  sound	  generated	  by	  a	  leak	  through	  various	  media	  encountered	  in	  a	  downhole	  environment.53	  In	   August	   2009,	   the	   EPA	   released	   the	   results	   of	   a	   site	   investigation	   near	   Pavillion,	  Wyoming,	  USA:	  EPA	  found	  elevated	  levels	  of	  arsenic,	  methane,	  petroleum	  hydrocarbons	  and	  other	  chemicals	  in	  drinking	  water	  wells.	  The	  presence	  of	  2-­‐butoxyethanol,	  a	  known	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  Martin	   T.	   Olesen,	   'Can	   the	   Petrochemical	   Industry	   Feel	   Safe	   with	   Traditional	   Gas	   Leak	   Detection?',	  (Ballerup,	  Denmark:	  Innova	  Gassonic).	  51	  Fares	  Al	  Mansouri	  and	  Mohammad	  Aftab	  Alam,	  'Sources	  of	  Hydrocarbon	  Leaks	  &	  Spills	  in	  Upstream	  Oil	  Industries	   -­‐	   Its	   Potential	   Reasons	   &	   Preventive	   Measures',	   in	   SPE	   International	   Conference	   on	   Health,	  
Safety,	   and	   Environment	   in	   Oil	   and	   Gas	   Exploration	   and	   Production	   (Nice,	   France:	   Society	   of	   Petroleum	  Engineers,	  2008).	  52	  J.Y.	  Julian	  et	  al.,	   'Downhole	  Leak	  Determination	  Using	  Fiber-­‐Optic	  Distributed-­‐Temperature	  Surveys	  at	  Prudhoe	   Bay,	   Alaska',	   in	   SPE	   Annual	   Technical	   Conference	   and	   Exhibition	   (Anaheim,	   CA:	   Society	   of	  Petroleum	  Engineers,	  2007).	  53	  J.E.	  Johns	  et	  al.,	  'Applied	  Ultrasonic	  Technology	  in	  Wellbore-­‐Leak	  Detection	  and	  Case	  Histories	  in	  Alaska	  North	  Slope	  Wells',	  SPE	  Production	  &	  Operations	  24,	  no	  2	  (2009).	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constituent	  in	  hydraulic	  fracturing	  fluids,	  was	  confirmed	  by	  EPA.	  EPA	  will	  continue	  the	  investigation.54	  In	  January	  2009,	  there	  were	  several	  reports	  of	  methane	  gas	  migrating	  to	  the	  surface	  and	  at	   least	  one	  report	  of	  a	  drinking	  water	  well	  exploding	  in	  Dimock,	  Pennsylvania,	  USA.55	  However,	   as	   indicated	   in	   the	   reports,	   the	   causes	   of	   contamination	   were	   poor	   well	  integrity,	  surface	  spills,	  etc,	  rather	  than	  fracking.	  In	   order	   to	   provide	   more	   accurate	   and	   continuous	   underground	   flow	   monitoring,	  sniffing	   well	   technology	   is	   currently	   being	   developed.	   These	   are	   basically	   slim-­‐hole	  wells	   that	   are	   drilled	   to	   the	   groundwater	   level.	   Sensors	   are	   run	   in,	   so	   that	   they	   can	  monitor	   underground	   conditions	   prior	   to	   drilling	   for	   base-­‐line	  measurements,	   during	  fracking	  and	  during	  production	  until	   the	  end	  of	  the	  well’s	   life.	  These	  wells	  can	  also	  be	  used	  for	  running	  microseismic	  geophones.	  
3.3 Evaluation	  of	  technical	  and	  operational	  assumptions	  for	  shale	  gas	  
development	  scenarios	  in	  Europe	  In	   the	   following	   subsection,	  we	  discuss	   the	  development	  of	   shale	  gas	   fields	   in	  Europe	  and	   the	   related	   cost	   scenarios.	   These	   scenarios	   may	   be	   used	   to	   show	   the	   impact	   of	  technological	  developments	  on	  the	  overall	  development	  of	  shale	  gas	  in	  Europe	  as	  part	  of	  a	  technological	  gap	  analysis.	  They	  are	  based	  on	  the	  sources	  cited	  and	  the	  author’s	  own	  assessment	   of	   future	   developments	   in	   Europe.	   (For	   a	   review	   of	   how	   others	   have	  attempted	   to	   quantify	   the	   impact	   of	   technological	   improvements	   on	   shale	   gas	  extraction,	  see	  Section	  2.2.3.)	  
3.3.1 Field	  development	  pad	  sizing	  and	  well	  configuration	  scenario	  In	  order	   to	  evaluate	   the	  requirements	   for	   the	  number	  of	  wells	   to	  be	  drilled	   in	  a	  given	  field,	  assumptions	  on	  the	  geometrical	  distribution	  of	  the	  well	  pads	  from	  which	  the	  wells	  are	  drilled	  have	  to	  be	  made.	  The	   size	   of	   the	   area	   which	   can	   be	   reached	   from	   one	   pad	   location	   depends	   on	   the	  directional	   reach	   of	   the	   wells	   being	   drilled,	   which	   in	   return	   leads	   to	   a	   certain	   well	  density	  per	  drilling	  pad.	  Typical	  drilling	  densities	   in	  shale	  gas	  developments	   lead	   to	  one	  well	  being	  drilled	  per	  0.16	  to	  0.65	  km2	  based	  on	  the	  experience	  from	  the	  USA.56	  On	  the	  basis	  of	   this	  assumption,	   the	  development	  of	  a	   field	  with	  the	  size	  of	  1	  000	  km2	  would	  require	  about	  1	  540	  to	  6	  250	  wells	  to	  be	  drilled.	  An	  average	  scenario	  of	  0.4	  km2	  coverage	  per	  well	  would	  lead	  to	  2	  500	  wells.	  The	  required	  equipment	  capacity	  (number	  of	   drilling	   rigs	   and	   fracturing	   units)	   depends	   on	   the	   average	   length	   of	   the	   wellbore,	  drilling	  and	  fracturing	  efficiency,	  and	  the	  projected	  total	  field	  development	  duration.	  If	  a	  pad	  is	  designed	  to	  allow	  25	  to	  36	  wells	  to	  be	  drilled,	  such	  an	  average	  scenario	  would	  lead	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  about	  70	  to	  100	  drilling	  pads	  in	  the	  field.	  There	   are	   variations	   to	   these	   values	   for	   the	   first	   complex	   developments	   planned	   in	  Europe.	  For	  example,	  OMV	  in	  Austria	   is	  currently	  planning	  to	  drill	  25	  deep	  directional	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Riverkeeper	  Inc.,	  'Industrial	  Gas	  Drilling	  Reporter	  -­‐	  Vol.	  4',	  (Ossining,	  NY:	  Riverkeeper	  Inc.,	  2009).	  55	  Craig	  Michaels,	   James	   L.	   Simpson	   and	  William	  Wegner,	   'Fractured	   Communities:	   Case	   Studies	   of	   the	  Environmental	  Impacts	  of	  Industrial	  Gas	  Drilling',	  (Ossining,	  NY:	  Riverkeeper	  Inc.,	  2010).	  56	  Stig-­‐Arne	  Kristoffersen,	  Gas	  Shale	  Potential	  in	  Ukraine	  (lulu.com,	  2010).	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wells	  with	  vertical	  reservoir	  sections	  per	  pad,	  with	  a	  well	  density	  of	  one	  well	  per	  km2.	  Complex,	  deep	  wells	  may	  take	  up	  to	  180	  days	  of	  drilling	  time	  initially.	  
Future	  pad	  sizing	  developments	  The	  area	  to	  be	  covered	  from	  one	  pad	  may	  be	  extended	  by	  drilling	  longer	  horizontal	  well	  sections	   for	   each	  well.	   Laterals	   up	   to	   5	   km	   in	   length,	   for	   example,	   would	   extend	   the	  theoretical	   reach	   from	   one	   pad	   to	   100	   km2.	   Extended	   reach	   wells	   may	   be	   drilled	   to	  departures	  of	  10	  km	  and	  more,	  but	  their	  feasibility	  is	  limited	  by	  the	  ability	  to	  complete	  and	  hydraulically	  fracture	  these	  long	  wellbores.	  The	  required	  areal	  density	  of	  wells	  will	  set	  the	  limit	  of	  the	  number	  of	  pads	  required	  for	  a	  field	  development.	  In	  addition,	  the	  size	  of	  a	  pad	  will	  be	  limited	  by	  the	  number	  of	  wells	  that	  can	  be	  drilled	  from	  a	  single	  pad.	  The	  consequence	  of	  drilling	  longer	  departure	  wells	  is	  a	  greater	  average	  length	  per	  well,	  thus	  not	  directly	   reducing	  drilling	   time.	  More	  wells	  are	   required	  per	  pad	   to	   reach	   the	  same	   areal	   density	   but	   the	   impact	   on	   the	   environment	  will	   be	   reduced	   by	   the	   use	   of	  more	  concentrated	  surface	  infrastructure.	  
3.3.2 Drilling	  and	  completion	  capacity	  scenario	  The	  scenario	  outlined	  here	  explains	  the	  typical	  well	  construction	  time	  breakdown	  and	  defines	  improvement	  potential.	  The	  capacity	  to	  drill	  is	  defined	  by	  the	  average	  number	  of	  metres	  which	  a	  rig	  can	  drill	  per	  day,	  calculated	  by	  dividing	  the	  total	  length	  of	  the	  well	  by	  the	  number	  of	  days	  required	  to	  drill,	  case	  and	  cement	  the	  well.	  The	  drilling	  and	  completion	  capacity	  is	  directly	  related	  to	  the	  drilling	  efficiency,	  which	  is	  expressed	  in	  the	  ability	  to	  complete	  as	  many	  wells	  as	  possible	  in	  the	  shortest	  possible	  time.	  
Figure	  3-­‐13:	  Development	  of	  drilling	  performance	  in	  Europe57	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  Ketil	   Andersen	   et	   al.,	   'Case	   History:	   Automated	   Drilling	   Performance	   Measurement	   of	   Crews	   and	  Drilling	  Equipment',	  in	  SPE/IADC	  Drilling	  Conference	  (Amsterdam,	  The	  Netherlands:	  Society	  of	  Petroleum	  Engineers,	  2009).	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Drilling	  and	  completion	  operational	  aspects	  One	  key	  element	  in	  drilling	  capacity	  management	  is	  the	  mitigation	  of	  drilling	  problems	  and	   the	   reduction	   of	   operational	   inefficiency.	   The	   total	   potential	   improvement	   in	   this	  area	  may	  be	  quantified	  as	  up	  to	  50%	  of	  overall	  drilling	  time.	  






Time 	  The	  time	  required	  to	  drill	  a	  well	  may	  be	  broken	  down	  into	  the	  following	  categories:	  
Productive	  time	  (PT)	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  bit-­‐on-­‐bottom	  time,	  where	  the	  hole	  is	  drilled.	  PT	  may	  be	  improved	  by	  using	  better	  bit	  technology	  or	  finding	  better	  operating	  parameters	  to	  enhance	  performance.	  Generally	  PT	  may	  range	  from	  as	  low	  as	  10%	  to	  above	  40%	  of	  overall	  well	  construction	  time.	  
Non-­‐productive	   time	   (NPT)	   comprises	   the	   time	   required	   for	   solving	   problems	   that	  cause	  deviations	   from	  the	  plan.	  NPT	  may	  be	  within	  a	  range	  of	  15-­‐25	  %	  of	  overall	  well	  construction	  time	  and	  represents	  one	  of	  the	  major	  improvement	  potentials	  for	  drilling	  performance.	  
Invisible	  lost	  time	  (ILT)	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  difference	  between	  actual	  operation	  duration	  and	  a	  best	  practice	  or	  benchmark	  performance.	  ILT	  may	  be	  within	  a	  range	  of	  15-­‐25	  %	  of	  overall	  well	  construction	  time	  and	  represents	  another	  major	  improvement	  potential	  for	  drilling	  performance.	  
Flat	   time	   (FT)	   comprises	   the	   time	   required	   for	   operations	   not	   directly	   implied	   in	  drilling,	  e.g.	   running	  casing,	   tripping	   the	  drill	   string	   in	  and	  out	  of	  hole,	  etc.	  FT	  may	  be	  improved	   by	   managing	   the	   critical	   path	   and	   optimising	   operating	   procedures.	   These	  keep	  NPT	  and	  ILT	  as	  low	  as	  possible.	  In	  order	   to	   translate	  drilling	  performance	   to	  useable	   figures,	   the	  drilling	  performance	  statistics	   from	  Figure	  3-­‐13	  are	  used.	  The	   average	  well	   construction	   time	   for	   a	  well	   of	  about	  5	  000	  m	  total	  depth	  (including	  an	  average	  1	  500	  m	  horizontal	  section)	  should	  be	  in	  the	  range	  of:	  
• 62.5	  days/well	  for	  low	  performance,	  assuming	  an	  average	  rate	  of	  penetration	  of	  about	  80	  m/day	  as	  reached	  in	  the	  years	  1989	  to	  1998;	  
• 45	  days/well	  as	  medium	  performance,	  a	  level	  at	  about	  100	  m/day;	  	  
• 38	   days/well	   as	   a	   high	   -­‐performance”	   scenario,	   where	   the	   average	  performance	   of	   the	   years	   2000	   to	   2006	   is	   attained	   –	   approximately	   130	  m/day.	  Future	   well	   construction	   performance	   targets	   can	   be	   reached	   by	   utilising	   existing	  savings	  potential	  in	  terms	  of	  NPT	  and	  ILT.	  This	  could	  be	  accomplished	  by	  means	  of	  the	  industrialisation	   of	   the	   field	   development	   process	   and	   specialisation,	   in	   combination	  with	   purpose-­‐built	   well	   designs,	   which	   are	   discussed	   in	   the	   next	   section.	   The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Hermann	   Spoerker,	   Gerhard	   Thonhauser	   and	   Eric	  Maidla,	   'Rigorous	   Identification	   of	   Unplanned	   and	  Invisible	   Lost	   Time	   for	   Value	   Added	   Propositions	   Aimed	   at	   Performance	   Enhancement',	   in	   SPE/IADC	  
Drilling	  Conference	  (Amsterdam,	  The	  Netherlands:	  Society	  of	  Petroleum	  Engineers,	  2011).	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development	  of	  new	  drilling	  technologies,	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  compact	  rig	  designs,	  minimal	  environmental	   footprint	   combined	   with	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   automation,	   will	   be	   key	  enablers	  to	  achieve	  these	  performance	  targets	  in	  terms	  of	  cost,	  but	  more	  importantly,	  in	  terms	  of	  environmental	  compliance.	  
Drilling	  and	  completion	  well	  design	  aspects	  One	   key	   element	   for	   the	   efficient	   development	   of	   shale	   gas	   resources	   is	   purpose-­‐designed	   wells,	   which	   have	   the	   potential	   to	   add	   significant	   cost	   savings	   to	   a	   field	  development	  campaign.	  Exploration	   or	   scouting	   wells	   can	   be	   leaner	   in	   diameter	   and	   size,	   and	   specifically	  designed	   to	   find	   geological	   information.	   If	   purpose-­‐built	   equipment	   is	   used	   (for	  example,	  using	  slim-­‐hole	  drilling	  technology	  for	  exploration)	  savings	  potentials	  of	  up	  to	  30%	  of	  well	  cost	  may	  be	  realised.	  
Equipment	  building	  capacity	  A	   key	   element	   of	   effective	   shale	   gas	   field	   development	   in	   Europe	   is	   the	   ability	   to	  increase	  the	  drilling	  and	  fracturing	  equipment	  building	  capacity.	  The	  current	  European	  land	   rig	   count	   is	   approximately	   70	   rigs	   of	   different	   specifications.59	  The	   majority	   of	  these	  rigs	  are	  based	  on	  traditional	  technology.	  
Table	  3-­‐6:	  Baker	  Hughes	  worldwide	  rig	  count60	  
	   December	  2011	   Change	   November	  2011	   Last	  year	  
	  	   Land	   Offshore	   Total	   	   Land	   Offshore	   Total	   Land	   Offshore	   Total	  North	  America	   2	  440	   43	   2	  483	   -­‐15	   2	  460	   38	   2	  498	   2	  084	   24	   2	  108	  Europe	   70	   42	   112	   -­‐10	   74	   48	   122	   56	   49	   105	  Middle	  East	   263	   41	   304	   -­‐4	   269	   39	   308	   236	   31	   267	  Africa	   48	   31	   79	   -­‐7	   55	   31	   86	   53	   26	   79	  Latin	  America	   349	   89	   438	   16	   335	   87	   422	   313	   72	   385	  Asia	  Pacific	   151	   96	   247	   0	   150	   97	   247	   157	   125	   282	  
World	  Total	   3	  321	   342	   3	  663	   -­‐20	   3	  343	   340	   3	  683	   2	  899	   327	   3	  226	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  Energy	   Digger,	   European	   Rig	   Count	   Data	   (Feb.	   2012)	   (Energy	   Digger,	   2012,	   cited	   27	   March	   2012);	  available	  from	  http://www.energydigger.com/rig-­‐counts/european-­‐rig-­‐counts.aspx;	  Upstream,	  Rig	  Pulse	  (Upstream,	   2012,	   cited	   27	   March	   2012);	   available	   from	  http://www.upstreamonline.com/marketdata/rigmarket/?view=rigpulse/worldrigcount	  60	  Baker	   Hughes	   Inc.,	   International	   Rotary	   Rig	   Count	   (Baker	   Hughes	   Inc.,	   2012,	   cited	   27	   March	   2012);	  available	   from	   http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/BHI/1749209798x0x550380/982E1735-­‐B2EB-­‐4DC7-­‐9629-­‐2462B7A6E8B8/International_Rig_Count_February_2012.xlsx	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Table	  3-­‐7:	  Baker	  Hughes	  rig	  count	  Europe	  	   December	  2011	   Change	   November	  2011	   Last	  year	  
	   Land	   Offshore	   Total	   	   Land	   Offshore	   Total	   Land	   Offshore	   Total	  Albania	   4	   0	   4	   0	   4	   0	   4	   1	   0	   1	  Austria	   2	   0	   2	   0	   2	   0	   2	   3	   0	   3	  Bulgaria	   2	   0	   2	   0	   2	   0	   2	   0	   0	   0	  Croatia	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	  Czech	   1	   0	   1	   0	   1	   0	   1	   2	   0	   2	  Denmark	   0	   3	   3	   1	   0	   2	   2	   2	   0	   2	  France	   1	   0	   1	   0	   1	   0	   1	   0	   0	   0	  Germany	   5	   0	   5	   -­‐1	   6	   0	   6	   7	   0	   7	  Greece	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	  Greenland	   0	   0	   0	   -­‐1	   0	   1	   1	   0	   0	   0	  Hungary	   1	   0	   1	   0	   1	   0	   1	   2	   0	   2	  Iceland	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	  Italy	   2	   2	   4	   -­‐3	   5	   2	   7	   3	   1	   4	  Lithuania	   1	   0	   1	   0	   1	   0	   1	   0	   0	   0	  Netherlands	   0	   4	   4	   2	   0	   2	   2	   2	   5	   7	  Norway	   0	   10	   10	   -­‐9	   0	   19	   19	   0	   19	   19	  Poland	   11	   0	   11	   1	   10	   0	   10	   6	   1	   7	  Portugal	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	  Romania	   10	   0	   10	   0	   10	   0	   10	   13	   0	   13	  Sakhalin	  (RU)	   3	   7	   10	   1	   3	   6	   9	   2	   2	   4	  Slovakia	   1	   0	   1	   0	   1	   0	   1	   1	   0	   1	  Spain	  (1)	   0	   1	   1	   -­‐1	   1	   1	   2	   1	   0	   1	  Switzerland	   0	   0	   0	   -­‐1	   1	   0	   1	   1	   0	   1	  Turkey	  	   24	   1	   25	   0	   23	   2	   25	   10	   1	   11	  United	  Kingdom	   2	   14	   16	   1	   2	   13	   15	   0	   20	   20	  
Europe	   70	   42	   112	   -­‐10	   74	   48	   122	   56	   49	   105	  	  Full-­‐scale	  shale	  gas	   field	  development	  will	  require	  the	  design	  and	  construction	  of	  new	  drilling	  rigs.	  Assuming	  a	  field	  development	  scenario	  of	  2	  500	  wells,	  with	  an	  average	  well	  length	  of	   5	  000	  metres,	   it	  would	   require	  drilling	  12.5	  million	  metres	   of	   hole	   (average	  reservoir	  depth	  3	  000	  metres,	  with	  an	  assumed	  build	  section	  and	  a	  horizontal	  section	  of	  about	  1	  500	  metres).	  With	  an	  average	  performance	  scenario,	  as	  outlined	  above,	  113	  600	  drilling	   days	   will	   be	   required,	   which	   equates	   to	   about	   334	   rig	   years	   (assuming	   340	  productive	   drilling	   days	   a	   year).	   Thirty	   rigs	   will	   work	   for	   about	   11	   years	   in	   this	  particular	  field.	  Each	  pad	  (25	  to	  36	  wells)	  would	  see	  drilling	  activities	  for	  about	  3.5	  to	  5	  years.	  If	   50	   such	   fields	  were	   to	   be	   developed	   in	   Europe,	   500	   rigs	  would	  work	   for	   33	   years,	  respectively.	   Two	   hundred	   and	   fifty	   rigs	  would	  work	   for	   66	   years.	   These	   values	   only	  hold	  if	  all	  rigs	  would	  be	  available	  immediately	  from	  the	  start	  of	  the	  campaign.	  In	   order	   to	   build	   this	   required	   rig	   fleet	   within	   a	   reasonable	   time,	   the	   capacity	   to	  manufacture	   20	   rigs	   per	   year	   would	   lead	   to	   25	   years	   of	   fleet	   building.	   To	   achieve	   a	  reasonable	  timeframe,	  a	  building	  capacity	  of	  30	  to	  40	  rigs	  per	  year	  would	  be	  required.	  
	  78	  
Similar	  numbers	  apply	  for	  fracturing	  units.	  
Personnel	  building	  capacity	  Assuming	   the	  above	  scenarios	   for	  a	   large-­‐scale	  development	  of	   shale	  gas	   in	  Europe,	  a	  significant	  increase	  of	  human	  resources	  is	  required.	  A	  typical	  rig	  crew	  today	  consists	  of	  five	   people	   per	   shift	   plus	   supervisors,	   rig	   mechanic	   and	   electrician.	   Assuming	   three	  shifts	   per	   day,	   a	   total	   of	   about	   30	   people	   is	   required	   to	   run	   a	   rig.	   Using	   the	   above	  number	  of	  500	  rigs	  operating,	  about	  15	  000	  people	  would	  be	   required	   to	  man	   the	  rig	  crews.	   In	   addition,	   a	   similarly	   large	   number	   of	   service	   company	   personnel	   will	   be	  required	  for	  operational	  tasks.	  With	  equipment	  manufacturing,	  supplier	  personnel	  etc.,	  it	  can	  be	  expected	  that	  more	  than	  100	  000	  jobs	  would	  have	  to	  be	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  created	  and	  the	  required	  training	  provided.	  
3.3.3 Drilling	  technology	  and	  cost	  scenario	  
Rig	  technology	  Besides	  the	  improvement	  of	  the	  drilling	  process	  as	  such,	  innovative	  drilling	  technology	  utilising	   manufacturing	   principles	   (industrialised	   drilling)	   and	   a	   high	   degree	   of	  automation	  will	  lead	  to	  a	  more	  efficient	  technology.	  A	  key	  aspect	  of	  this	  requirement	  is	  the	  development	  and	  utilisation	  of	  drilling	  rigs	  with	  the	   smallest	   possible	   environmental	   footprint	   combined	   with	   the	   highest	   possible	  efficiency.	  
Figure	  3-­‐15:	  Rig	  drilling	  in	  The	  Hague	  (NL)	  
	  
Figure	  3-­‐16:	  Rig	  location	  close	  to	  a	  hospital	  
	  Examples	   show	   that	   such	   technology	   is	   already	   partly	   deployed	   utilising	   European	  engineering	  and	  manufacturing	  know-­‐how	  (see	  Figure	  3-­‐15	  and	  Figure	  3-­‐16	  above).61	  It	  is	  possible	  today	  to	  drill	  in	  densely	  populated	  areas	  if	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  technology	  is	  used	  and	  the	  emissions	  and	  environmental	  footprint	  are	  minimised.	  Concepts	  of	   lightweight	  drilling	  equipment	   (for	  example,	  aluminum	  or	  composite	  drill	  pipes	  as	  well	  as	  casings)	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  reduce	  the	  required	  lifting	  capacity,	  thus	  enabling	   the	   use	   of	   significantly	   smaller	   rigs.	   Hole	   size	   requirements	   have	   to	   be	  reviewed,	   as	   smaller	   hole	   sizes	   reduce	   the	   consumption	   of	   mud,	   cement	   and	   casing,	  which	  in	  return	  reflects	  a	  significant	  savings	  potential.	  




This	   development	   should	   go	   hand	   in	   hand	   with	   the	   specialisation	   of	   the	   drilling	  machine.	  Parts	  of	   the	  well	   construction	  and	   field	  development	   should	  be	  managed	  by	  dedicated	  equipment,	  e.g.	  surface	  section	  drilling	  rigs,	  horizontal	  well	  drilling	  rigs,	  etc.	  



































Rig	  site	  construction	  As	   rig	   and	   fracturing	   operations	   will	   span	   over	   multiple	   years	   on	   individual	   drilling	  pads,	   new	   concepts	   of	   constructing	   rig	   sites	   should	   be	   adopted.	   Drilling	   pads	   will	  require	  a	  certain	  size	  as	  they	  are	  used	  to	  drill	  a	   large	  number	  of	  wells.	  The	  rig	  site,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  rig	  itself,	  should	  be	  embedded	  in	  the	  environment	  in	  the	  least	  intrusive	  way.	  Wellhead	   installations	   and	   other	   permanent	   surface	   installation	   should	   ideally	   be	  moved	  sub-­‐surface.	  Rigs	  may	  be	  completely	  housed	   in	  order	   to	  avoid	  noise	  emissions	  and	  light	  emissions	  during	  the	  night.	  Well	   sites	   should	   possibly	   have	   access	   to	   the	   power	   grid	   to	   avoid	   the	   use	   of	   diesel-­‐generated	   power	   on-­‐site.	   Noise	   would	   thereby	   be	   reduced	   and	   power	   could	   be	   used	  from	   environmentally	   friendly	   sources.	   The	   rig	   site	  may	   be	   constructed	   as	   a	  more	   or	  less	   permanent	   installation	   and	   fully	   housed	  where	   drilling	   activities	   on	   a	   pad	   are	   to	  span	  over	  multiple	  years.	  This	  allows	   for	   the	  development	  of	  completely	  new	  rig	  sites	  and	  rig	  concepts	  as	  a	  small	  industrial	  plant,	  rather	  than	  a	  conventional	  rig	  site.	  The	  means	  to	  reduce	  truck	  trips	  to	  and	  from	  the	  rig	  site	  have	  to	  be	  found;	  for	  example,	  through	  the	  use	  of	  pipelines	  to	  supply	  the	  rig	  with	  fluids.	  Closed-­‐loop	  systems	  should	  be	  investigated,	  which	  offer	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  reinjecting	  formation	  water	  and	  cuttings	  into	  suitable	  formations.	  
Directional	  drilling	  technology	  Directional	  and	  horizontal	  wells	   today	  are	  drilled	  with	  a	  down-­‐hole	  motor	  or	  a	  rotary	  steerable	   system.	   Using	   the	   rotary	   steerable	   system,	   the	   drill	   string	   and	   the	   bit	   are	  rotated	  simultaneously	  during	  the	  drilling	  process.	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For	   technological	   reasons,	   the	   mud	   motor	   can	   be	   used	   either	   in	   a	   ‘sliding’	   or	   in	   a	  ‘rotating’	  mode.	  In	  the	  rotating	  mode,	  the	  drill	  string	  and	  the	  down-­‐hole	  motor	  with	  the	  bit	  are	  rotated,	  but	  to	  increase	  or	  decrease	  the	  hole	  inclination	  (=	  angle	  measured	  from	  vertical),	   the	   assembly	   has	   to	   be	   used	   in	   a	   sliding	  mode,	   which	  means	   that	   only	   the	  down-­‐hole	  motor	  and	  the	  bit	  rotate.	  	  In	  longer,	  deviated	  or	  horizontal	  sections,	  the	  friction	  borehole,	  which	  results	  from	  the	  drill	   string	   lying	   on	   the	   bottom	  of	   the	   borehole,	   creates	   technical	   problems	  with	  well	  path	  control.	  In	   order	   to	   overcome	   these	   friction	   problems,	   alternative	   or	   additional	   systems	  were	  developed,	   namely	   axial	   oscillation	   technology, 62 	  friction-­‐reducing	   oscillation	  technology63	  and	   directional	   drilling	   automation,64	  all	   aiming	   in	   a	   ‘quasi	   rotated’	   drill	  string,	  as	  in	  the	  rotating	  mode	  of	  a	  mud	  motor.	  	  
Downhole	  communication	  and	  measurement	  systems	  In	  order	   to	  enable	  a	  high	   level	  of	  rig	  automation	  and	  to	  mitigate	  non-­‐productive	   time,	  the	  means	  to	  link	  down-­‐hole	  measurement	  systems	  with	  surface	  rig	  automation	  system	  have	   to	   be	  developed	   and	   implemented.	   The	   early	   recognition	   of	   downhole	   problems	  will	   lead	   to	   alarms	   and	   allow	   the	   rig	   crew	   or	   future	   rig	   control	   systems	   to	   take	  mitigation	  measures.	  Technological	   developments,	  which	  will	   lead	   to	   such	   improvements,	  will	   have	   to	   take	  place	   in	   the	   area	   of	   heavy	   machinery	   automation,	   autonomous	   machines,	   machine	  learning,	  high-­‐temperature	  and	  high-­‐pressure	  electronics	  and	  sensor	  systems.	  Such	   technologies	  will	   allow	   for	   a	   significantly	   reduced	  NPT	   and	   ILT,	   and	   lead	   to	   the	  required	   performance	   improvements.	   Converted	   to	   a	   large-­‐scale	   European	   shale	   gas	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development	  initiative,	  a	  10%	  increase	  of	  efficiency	  can	  be	  equated	  to	  50	  rigs	  operating	  for	  30	  years,	  or	  €45	  billion	  in	  potential	  cost	  savings	  (at	  current	  drilling	  spread	  cost).	  	  
Drilling	  cost	  The	  following	  cost	  items	  form	  the	  major	  elements	  of	  drilling-­‐related	  cost	  for	  typical	  land	  rig	   operations	   in	   Europe.	   As	   a	   general	   rule,	   the	   total	   cost	   can	   be	   estimated	   to	   range	  between	  €75	  000	  and	  €126	  000	  per	  day	  as	  the	  spread	  cost	  (overall	  well	  cost	  divided	  by	  number	  of	  drilling	  days).	  This	  cost	  is	  the	  sum	  of	  a	  number	  of	  key	  cost	  items,	  which	  are	  given	  in	  greater	  detail	  below.	  Cost	  items	  can	  be	  split	  into	  rig	  site	  cost,	  depth-­‐based	  cost	  and	  day	  rate-­‐based	  cost.	  As	  can	  be	  seen,	  the	  drilling	  cost	   is	  driven	  by	  day	  rates,	  which	  highlights	  the	  importance	  of	  improving	  drilling	  efficiency	  in	  terms	  of	  drilling	  duration.	  
Rig	  site	  cost	  The	  rig	  site	  cost	  per	  well	   is	  a	  function	  of	  pad	  size	  and	  number	  of	  wells	  drilled	  per	  pad.	  Construction	  costs	   in	  Europe	  can	  be	  estimated	  to	  be	  three	  to	  five	  times	  higher	  than	  in	  the	   USA	   due	   to	   rigorous	   regulations	   concerning	   surface	   water	   protection	   and	   waste	  management.	   Rigs	   site	   costs	   for	   shale	   gas	   may	   have	   to	   include	   the	   cost	   for	   building	  complete	   housing	   for	   the	   rigs	   and	   the	   equipment	   for	   noise	   and	   light	   protection.	   This	  may	  be	  particularly	  necessary	  for	  rig	  sites	  where	  activities	  will	  span	  over	  a	  considerable	  period	  of	  time.	  
Day	  rate	  cost	  The	  rig	  cost	  is	  typically	  charged	  as	  a	  day	  rate	  service	  with	  rig	  rates	  for	  relevant	  size	  rigs	  ranging	   from	   €15	  000	   to	   €28	  000	   depending	   on	   the	   rig	   capacity.	   The	   rig	   cost	   has	   a	  strong	   personnel	   and	   maintenance	   cost	   component,	   which	   has	   the	   potential	   to	   be	  reduced	  by	  automation	  and	  the	  highest	  equipment	  quality	  standards,	  as	  well	  as	  rigorous	  maintenance	  programmes.	  The	  directional	  drilling	  cost	  is	  a	  day	  rate	  service,	  which	  is	  available	  at	  different	  levels	  of	  complexity,	   ranging	   from	   €10	  000	   to	   €15	  000.	   Service	   includes	   directional	   drilling	  equipment	   rental	   as	   well	   as	   service	   personnel.	   If	   vertical	   drilling	   is	   possible	   in	   thick	  reservoirs,	   the	   cost	   may	   be	   significantly	   reduced	   to	   basic	   measurement	   services.	  Utilising	   rotary	   steerable	   system	   technology	   may	   more	   than	   double	   typical	   rates.	  Alternative	  directional	  drilling	   technologies,	   as	  described	  above,	   have	   the	  potential	   to	  significantly	   lower	   drilling	   costs,	   meaning	   that	   the	   quality	   levels	   of	   rotary	   steerable	  systems	  can	  be	  achieved	  in	  the	  ‘most	  likely’	  scenarios	  used	  in	  this	  study.	  The	  evaluation	  cost	  is	  the	  cost	  to	  perform	  formation	  evaluation	  and	  other	  measurement	  services	  during	  the	  well	  construction	  process.	  This	  cost	  strongly	  depends	  on	  the	  type	  of	  measurements	   performed	   and	   is	   typically	   based	   on	   service	   day	   rates	   for	   individual	  tools,	  especially	  when	  used	  as	  a	  logging-­‐while-­‐drilling	  service.	  
Depth	  based	  cost	  
Casing,	  cementing	  and	  wellhead	  costs	  constitute	  a	  significant	  cost	  item,	  which	  is	  hole-­‐size	  and	  wellbore-­‐length	  dependent.	  This	  cost	  is	  typically	  dominated	  by	  material	  costs	  (e.g.	  for	  steel	  or	  bulk	  volumes	  of	  mud	  material),	  where	  the	  cost	  depends	  on	  the	  quantity	  used	  per	  well	  and	  the	  market	  price.	  Overall,	  this	  cost	  item	  contributes	  to	  20-­‐30%	  of	  the	  total	  well	  cost.	  The	  mud	  cost	  may	  be	  split	  into	  a)	  bulk	  material	  costs,	  with	  base	  fluid;	  and	  b)	  additives	  and	   the	   mud	   service	   cost.	   Mud	   cost	   may	   vary	   between	   €400	   and	   €2	  000	   per	   m3	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depending	   on	   the	   type	   of	   mud.	   Mud	   service	   cost	   is	   dependent	   on	   the	   number	   of	  personnel	  involved.	  A	  decisive	  factor	  in	  predicting	  mud	  cost	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  reuse	  mud	  for	  multiple	  wells,	  which	   in	   return	  depends	  on	   the	  ability	   to	   recycle	  a	  maximum	  mud	  volume.	  The	   bit	   cost	  has	   lost	   its	   former	  significance	  over	  the	  years	  and	  may	  only	  contribute	  a	  few	  per	  cent	  to	  the	  total	  well	  cost.	  The	  evaluation	   cost	   covers	  performing	   formation	  evaluation	  and	  other	  measurement	  services	  during	  the	  well	  construction	  process.	  This	  cost	  strongly	  depends	  on	  the	  type	  of	  measurements	  performed.	  The	  waste	   and	   water	   management	   cost	   is	   the	   cost	   related	   to	  managing	  waste	   and	  water,	  which	   is	   dependent	   on	   the	   volume	  used	   and	   the	   type	   of	  waste	   generated.	   The	  waste	  management	  cost	  is	  related	  to	  hole	  diameter	  and	  wellbore	  (cuttings)	  volume,	  and	  thus	  linked	  to	  the	  mud	  volume	  required.	  For	  the	  drilling	  and	  development	  costs	  of	  shale	  gas	  resources	  in	  the	  USA,	  please	  refer	  to	  the	  table	  below.	  
Table	  3-­‐8:	  Comparison	  of	  drill	  bit	   finding	  and	  development	   cost	  per	  1	  000	  cubic	   feet	   equivalent	  
(Mcfe)	  (three-­‐year	  average)	  for	  different	  US	  operators65	  	   Drill	  bit	  F&D	  cost	  per	  Mcfe	  (3-­‐year	  average)	  Ultra	  Petroleum	  	   $0.75	  Quicksilver	  Resources	  	   $1.15	  XTO	  Energy	  	   $1.67	  Range	  Resources	  	   $1.89	  Cabot	  Oil	  &	  Gas	  	   $1.99	  EOG	  Resources	  	   $2.10	  EnCana	  	   $2.12	  Southwestern	  Energy	  Company	  	   $2.21	  Devon	  Energy	  	   $2.44	  Apache	  	   $2.53	  Denbury	  Resources	  	   $2.92	  Newfield	  Exploration	  	   $3.08	  Forest	  Oil	  	   $3.66	  Noble	  Energy	  	   $4.09	  St.	  Mary	  Land	  &	  Exploration	  	   $4.30	  Pioneer	  Natural	  Resources	  	   $4.41	  Cimarex	  Energy	  	   $4.42	  Swift	  Energy	  	   $6.08	  Anadarko	  Petroleum	  	   $6.09	  Chesapeake	  Energy	  	   $6.18	  
Future	  developments	  in	  drilling	  cost	  The	  improvement	  of	  drilling	  efficiency	  may	  contribute	  to	  a	  drilling	  cost	  reduction	  of	  20	  to	  40%	  by	  mitigating	  ILT	  and	  NPT,	  which	  is	  directly	  reflected	  in	  better	  overall	  drilling	  performance.	   This	   will	   be	   possible	   by	   introducing	   manufacturing-­‐type	   principles	   to	  large	  well	  construction	  campaigns.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  Southwestern	   Energy	   Company,	  Form	  8-­‐K	   (US	   Securities	   and	   Exchanges	   Commission,	   2009,	   cited	   27	  March	  2012);	  available	  from	  http://investor.shareholder.com/swn/secfiling.cfm?filingID=7332-­‐09-­‐8	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Additional	  contributions	  from	  rig	  automation	  and	  alternative	  drilling	  technologies	  (for	  example,	   directional	   drilling	   and	   evaluation)	   have	   the	   potential	   to	   add	   savings	   of	  another	  10-­‐20%	  of	  the	  overall	  drilling	  cost.	  These	   savings	   can	   potentially	   go	   hand	   in	   hand	  with	   a	   reduction	   of	   well	   construction	  elements,	  such	  as	  the	  cost	  for	  casing,	  cementing	  and	  the	  well	  head,	  if	  novel	  well	  designs	  are	   used	   and	   steps	   towards	   the	   specialisation	   of	   well	   designs	   are	   taken.	   For	   specific	  cases,	  additional	  reductions	  of	  drilling	  costs	  of	  up	  to	  30%	  may	  be	  expected.	  
3.3.4 Fracturing	  technology	  and	  cost	  scenario	  
Fracturing	  technology	  The	  key	  issues	  related	  to	  hydraulic	  fracturing	  are	  the	  management	  of	  water,	  the	  use	  of	  chemicals,	  air	  pollution,	  the	  potential	  of	  induced	  seismic	  activity	  as	  well	  as	  surface	  and	  groundwater	  contamination.	  Clean	   fracturing	   technologies,	   where	   potentially	   harmful	   chemical	   additives	   are	   not	  used	   as	   part	   of	   the	   fracturing	   fluid,	   are	   being	   investigated	   by	   the	   author.	   Such	  technologies	  combine	  closed-­‐loop	   fluid	  systems	  with	  simple	   fluid	   recipes	  using	  water,	  viscosifier	  and	  proppant	  only.	  Water	  treatment	  and	  recycling	  is	  performed	  by	  means	  of	  technologies	   used	   in	   drinking-­‐water	   treatment.	   The	   cost	   of	   such	   fluids	   should	  tentatively	  be	  below	  the	  cost	  of	  current	  fracturing	  fluid	  technology,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  may	  lead	  to	  reduced	  fracturing	  efficiency.	  The	  investigation	  of	  effects	  of	  clean	  fracturing	  fluids	   on	   fracture	   efficiency	   and	   ultimate	   production	   is	   a	   topic	   of	   currently	   on-­‐going	  research.	  In	  order	  to	  monitor	  the	  development	  of	  fractures,	  improved	  technologies	  for	  modelling,	  monitoring	   and	   continuously	   improving	   the	   fracture	   process	   should	   be	   developed.	   In	  terms	  of	  research	  and	  development	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  combine	  the	  mechanical	  behaviour	  of	   the	   rock	   with	   fluid-­‐flow	   phenomena	   and	   chemical	   reactions	   that	   take	   place	   when	  fracturing	   fluid	   contacts	   the	   formation.	  Ultimately	   such	   an	   understanding	  will	   lead	   to	  the	   definition	   of	   the	   ideal	   hydraulic	   fracture	   to	  maximise	   production,	   thus	   optimising	  cost.	  	  New	  fracking	  technologies	  are	  being	  applied	  in	  the	  USA	  that	  may	  yield	  significant	  time	  savings.	  One	  particular	  technology	  claims	  to	  reduce	  fracturing	  job	  durations	  from	  four	  to	  five	  days	  to	  some	  ten	  hours	  for	  jobs	  with	  up	  to	  60	  fracture	  stages,	  where	  four	  stages	  are	   pumped	   simultaneously.	   In	   addition,	   this	   technology	   promises	   to	   significantly	  reduce	  the	  volume	  of	  fracturing	  fluid	  used.66	  
Fracturing	  cost	  The	   fracturing	   cost	   is	   driven	  by	   the	   cost	   of	   fracturing	  units,	   the	   volume	  of	  water	   and	  proppant,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   volume	   of	   fracturing	   additives	   used.	   The	   cost	   is	   typically	  expressed	  in	  terms	  of	  cost	  per	  fracturing	  stage	  or	  fracturing	  job.	  There	  is	  no	  large-­‐scale	  experience	  with	  shale	  gas	  type	  fracturing	  in	  Europe.	  Cost	  figures	  given	  here	  are	  derived	  from	  US	  examples.	  	  The	  average	   costs	   for	  hydraulic	   fracturing	   in	   the	  USA	   is	  between	  $3.3	  million	  and	  3.7	  million	  assuming	  ten	  fracture	  stages	  per	  well.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66 	  Packers	   Plus,	   QuickFRAC	   (Packers	   Plus,	   2012,	   cited	   27	   March	   2012);	   available	   from	  http://www.packersplus.com/products/quickfrac.php	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A	   well	   with	   ten	   fracturing	   stages	   produces	   25	  000	   bbl	   of	   back	   flow.	   Numbers	   for	  disposal	  and	  treatment	  costs	  are	  in	  the	  range	  of	  $7.5	  per	  bbl.	  Industry	  analysts	  have	  assumed	  $1.56	  million	  for	  one	  transverse	  fracture	  and	  $70	  000	  per	  each	  additional	  fracture	  interval	  for	  economic	  analysis.67	  In	  Horn	  River	  Basin,	  British	  Columbia,	  Canada,	  fracturing	  costs	  were	  estimated	  around	  $300	  000	  per	  stage.68	  In	  the	  cost	  scenario	  presented	  in	  this	  report,	  hydraulic	   fracturing	  costs	  for	  Europe	  are	  divided	   into	   a	   fixed	   cost	   element	   and	   a	   stage-­‐based	   cost.	   A	   value	   of	   €250	  000	   to	  €350	  000	  has	   been	  used	  per	   stage.	  Mobilisation	   and	  demobilisation,	   as	  well	   as	  water	  supply	   costs	   and	   water	   disposal	   costs,	   with	   the	   management	   of	   backflow	   water	  (€250	  000),	  are	  estimated	  to	  be	  between	  €500	  000	  and	  €700	  000	  per	  well.	  The	  scenario	  considers	  large-­‐scale	  fracture	  jobs,	  which	  have	  not	  yet	  been	  performed	  in	  Europe.	  
Future	  developments	  in	  fracturing	  cost	  Investigations	  of	  fracturing	  efficiency	  using	  production	  logging	  in	  the	  USA	  showed	  that	  in	   the	   cases	   investigated,	   70%	   of	   the	   production	   came	   from	   only	   30%	   of	   the	  perforations	  of	  a	  well.69	  This	  indicates	  that	  there	  is	  heterogeneity	  in	  the	  productivity	  of	  different	   formation	   intervals.	   As	   a	   consequence,	   technology	   has	   to	   be	   developed	   to	  identify	  the	  zones	  of	  highest	  productivity	  for	  fracturing.	  Such	  technology	  will	  depend	  on	  a	   deep	   geo-­‐mechanical	   understanding	   of	   the	   reservoir	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   physical	  properties	  of	  the	  rock	  and	  the	  local	  stress	  field	  in	  the	  relevant	  region	  near	  the	  wellbore.	  The	   recent	   developments	   of	   multiport	   fracturing	   technology	   allows	   surface-­‐pumped	  fracture	   stages	   to	   be	   reduce	   from	   8	   to	   15	   stages,	   with	   a	   parallel	   reduction	   in	   fluid	  volumes	  used.	  If	  such	  technology	  could	  be	  successfully	  deployed,	  a	  significant	  reduction	  in	  fracturing	  cost	  could	  be	  achieved	  by	   less	   fracturing	  stages,	   ideally	  with	  only	  a	  small	  reduction	   in	  production.	   Combining	   more	   efficient	   fracture	   stage	   location	   selection	   with	   highly	  efficient	   fracture	   technology	   (see	   above)	   has	   the	   potential	   to	   significantly	   reduce	   the	  environmental	  impact	  of	  fracturing,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  cost.	  
3.3.5 Field	  development	   infrastructure	  and	  gas	  processing	  and	   treatment	  
scenario	  
Technology	  The	   pad-­‐based	   development	   of	   shale	   gas	   field	   infrastructure	   will	   lead	   to	   such	  infrastructure	  being	  more	  concentrated.	  Surface	   installations	  should	   ideally	  be	  moved	  subsurface	   where	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   avoid	   an	   impact	   on	   the	   environment	   in	   terms	   of	  visibility,	   noise,	   etc.	   Gas	   processing	   and	   treatment	   should	   be	  managed	   in	   centralised	  facilities.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  Watson	  et	  al.,	  'One-­‐Trip	  Multistage	  Completion	  Technology	  for	  Unconventional	  Gas	  Formations'.	  68	  European	   Energy	   Exchange	   AG,	  Strom	  Terminmarkt	   (European	   Energy	   Exchange	   AG,	   cited	   27	  March	  2012);	  available	  from	  http://www.eex.com/de	  69	  G.	  Waters	  et	  al.,	  'Use	  of	  Horizontal	  Well	  Image	  Tools	  to	  Optimize	  Barnett	  Shale	  Reservoir	  Exploitation',	  in	   SPE	   Annual	   Technical	   Conference	   and	   Exhibition	   (San	   Antonio,	   TX:	   Society	   of	   Petroleum	   Engineers,	  2006).	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Cost	  It	   can	  be	   expected	   that	   infrastructure	   costs	   in	  Europe	  will	   be	  higher	   than	   in	   the	  USA.	  This	  is	  based	  on	  the	  higher	  cost	  of	  labour,	  geographic	  situation,	  population	  density	  and	  environmental	   regulations.	   For	   typical	   conventional	   field	   developments,	   the	  infrastructure	  cost	  may	  be	  considered	   to	  be	  equal	   to	   the	  drilling	  and	  completion	  cost,	  which	   may	   also	   be	   used	   as	   a	   first	   initial	   approach	   for	   modelling	   shale	   gas	   field	  developments.	  Due	   to	   the	   investment-­‐intensive	   nature	   of	   shale	   gas	   drilling	   and	   fracturing,	   and	   the	  highly	  concentrated	  infrastructure,	  it	  may	  be	  considered	  to	  assume	  lower	  cost	  figures	  in	  relation	   to	  drilling	   and	   completion.	  Actual	   cost	   values	  will	   highly	  depend	  on	   the	   local	  situation	  and	  the	  availability	  of	  existing	  infrastructure,	  e.g.	  in	  areas	  with	  a	  hydrocarbon	  exploration	  and	  production	  history.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  the	  cost	   is	  estimated	  to	  be	  30%	  of	  the	  drilling	  and	  completion	  cost.	  The	  numbers	  in	  the	  table	  below	  outline	  lifting	  costs	  for	  a	  number	  of	  shale	  gas	  operators	  in	  the	  USA.	  They	  can	  be	  put	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  drilling	  and	  development	  cost	  in	  Table	  3-­‐8	  to	  calculate	  a	  cost	  ratio.	  
Table	  3-­‐9:	  Comparison	  of	  lifting	  cost	  per	  Mcfe	  of	  production	  (three-­‐year	  average)	  for	  different	  US	  
operators70	  	   Lifting	  cost	  per	  Mcfe	  of	  production	  (3-­‐year	  average)	  Southwestern	  Energy	  Company	  	   $0.88	  Noble	  Energy	  	   $1.12	  Chesapeake	  Energy	  	   $1.16	  Ultra	  Petroleum	  	   $1.17	  EOG	  Resources	  	   $1.19	  EnCana	  	   $1.23	  Range	  Resources	  	   $1.24	  Pioneer	  Natural	  Resources	  	   $1.37	  Devon	  Energy	  	   $1.53	  XTO	  Energy	  	   $1.54	  Newfield	  Exploration	  	   $1.60	  Forest	  Oil	  	   $1.63	  Cimarex	  Energy	  	   $1.73	  Cabot	  Oil	  &	  Gas	  	   $1.75	  Anadarko	  Petroleum	  	   $1.77	  Apache	  	   $1.78	  Quicksilver	  Resources	  	   $1.84	  St.	  Mary	  Land	  &	  Exploration	  	   $1.87	  Swift	  Energy	  	   $1.88	  Denbury	  Resources	  	   $2.56	  
3.3.6 Gas	  production	  scenario	  from	  shale	  developments	  On	   average,	   production	   or	   ultimate	   recovery	   is	   assumed,	   based	   on	   typical	   US	   figures	  (with	   1	   cubic	   foot	   =	   0.028	   cubic	   metres).71	  The	   assumption	   made	   in	   the	   scenario	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  Southwestern	  Energy	  Company,	  Form	  8-­‐K	  (cited).	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calculation	  in	  the	  next	  section	  is	  based	  on	  the	  values	  depicted	  in	  Table	  3-­‐10	  and	  Table	  3-­‐11.	  The	  most	  likely	  scenario	  used	  here	  considers	  an	  ultimate	  recovery	  of	  57	  mcm	  or	  0.68	  million	  MWh.	  The	  production	  profile	  for	  a	  typical	  well	  is	  not	  discussed	  here.	  Only	  commercial	  development	  will	  demonstrate	  how	  long	  the	  productive	  life	  of	  a	  well	  can	  be	  sustained	  in	  Europe	  before	  the	  well	  reaches	  its	  economic	  limit.	  Current	  examples	  from	  the	   USA	   indicate	   an	   economic	   limit	   at	   a	   production	   rate	   of	   100	   Mcf	   per	   day,	   but	  production	   histories	   hardly	   exceed	   ten	   years	   (Barnett	   Shale).	   The	   economic	   limit	   is	  defined	  as	   the	  production	  rate	  at	  well	  operating	  cost	  break-­‐even.	  However,	  optimistic	  projections	  may	  reach	  three	  to	  four	  decades	  (see	  Figure	  4-­‐5).	  





Area	  (sq.	  miles)	   Average	  EUR	  




(MBO/well)	  Marcellus	   410.34	   ...	   10	  622	   84	  271	   1.18	   ...	  Big	  Sandy	   7.4	   ...	   8	  675	   1	  994	   0.33	   ...	  Low	  Thermal	  Maturity	   13.53	   ...	   45	  844	   	   0.3	   ...	  Greater	  Siltstone	   8.46	   ...	   22	  914	   	   0.19	   ...	  New	  Albany	   10.95	   ...	   1	  600	   41	  900	   1.1	   ...	  Antrim	  	   19.93	   ...	   12	  000	   	   0.28	   ...	  Cincinnati	  Arch	  	   1.44	   ...	   NA	   	   0.12	   ...	  Total	  Northeast	  	   472.05	   ...	   101	  655	   128	  272	   0.74	   ...	  Haynesville	   74.71	   ...	   3	  574	   5	  426	   3.57	   ...	  Eagle	  Ford	   20.81	   ...	   1	  090	   	   5	   ...	  Floyd-­‐Neal	  &	  Conasauga	   4.37	   ...	   2	  429	   	   0.9	   ...	  Total	  Gulf	  Coast	   99.99	   ...	   7	  093	   5	  426	   2.99	   ...	  Fayettsville	   31.96	   ...	   9	  000	   	   2.07	   ...	  Woodford	   22.21	   ...	   4	  700	   	   2.98	   ...	  Cana	  Woodford	   5.72	   ...	   688	   	   5.2	   ...	  Total	  Mid-­‐Continent	   59.88	   ...	   14	  388	   	   2.45	   ...	  Barnett	   43.38	   ...	   4	  075	   2	  383	   1.42	   ...	  Barnett	  Woodford	   32.15	   ...	   2	  691	   	   3.07	   ...	  Total	  Southwest	   75.52	   ...	   6	  766	   2	  383	   1.85	   ...	  Hilliard-­‐Baxter-­‐Mancos	   3.77	   ...	   16	  416	   	   0.18	   ...	  Lewis	   11.63	   ...	   7	  506	   	   1.3	   ...	  Williston-­‐Shallow	  Niobraran	   6.61	   ...	   NA	   	   0.45	   ...	  Mancos	   21.02	   ...	   6	  589	   	   1	   ...	  Total	  Rocky	  Mountain	   43.03	   ...	   30	  511	   	   0.69	   ...	  
Total	   Lower	   48	   United	  
States	  	   750.38	   ...	   160	  413	   36	  081	   1.02	   ...	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  Robert	  B.	  Kennedy,	   'Shale	  Gas	  Challenges	  /	  Technologies	  Over	  the	  Asset	  Life	  Cycle',	   (Washington,	  DC:	  United	  States	  Energy	  Association,	  2010).	  72	  INTEK,	  'Review	  of	  emerging	  resources'.	  However,	  see	  Chapter	  2	  for	  the	  weaknesses	  in	  the	  methodology	  of	  this	  study.	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(MBO/well)	  Eagle	  Ford	  	   ...	   3.35	   3	  323	   	   ...	   300	  Total	  Gulf	  Coast	  	   ...	   3.35	   3	  323	   	   ...	   300	  Avalon	  &	  Bone	  Springs	  	   ...	   1.58	   1	  313	   	   ...	   300	  Total	  Southwest	  	   ...	   1.58	   1	  313	   	   ...	   300	  Bakken	  	   ...	   3.59	   6	  522	   	   ...	   550	  Total	  Rocky	  Mountain	  	   ...	   3.59	   6	  522	   	   ...	   550	  Monterey/Santos	  	   ...	   15.42	   1	  752	   	   ...	   550	  Total	  West	  Coast	  	   ...	   15.42	   1	  752	   	   ...	   550	  
Total	   Lower	   48	   United	  
States	  	   ...	   23.94	   12	  910	   	   ...	   460	  	  Liquid	  production	  from	  gas	  shale	  is	  steadily	  increasing	  and	  plays	  a	  key	  role	  in	  shale	  gas	  economics	  in	  the	  USA,	  as	  depicted	  in	  Figure	  3-­‐18	  below.73	  
Figure	  3-­‐18:	  Liquid	  production	  from	  shale	  gas	  plays	  in	  Texas	  
	  
3.3.7 Summary	  and	  conclusions	  In	  the	  following	  pages,	  a	  model	  for	  the	  potential	  development	  of	  shale	  gas	  in	  Europe	  is	  outlined,	   covering	   the	   minimum,	   most	   likely	   and	   maximum	   scenarios	   of	   the	   key	  variables	   contributing	   to	   the	   cost	   of	   shale	   gas	   (including	   potential	   liquid	   production)	  translated	   to	   €/MWh	   as	   the	   bottom	   line.	   It	   is	   not	   the	   objective	   of	   this	   chapter	   to	  estimate	  gas	  price	  scenarios.	  Other	  sources	  are	  used	  as	  a	  reference.74	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  Evaluate	   Energy	   Ltd.,	   How	   Texas	   Shale	   Gas	   Producers	   are	   Ramping	   up	   Liquids	   Production	   (Evaluate	  Energy	  Ltd.,	   2012,	   cited	  27	  March	  2012);	   available	   from	  http://www.oil-­‐blog.com/by-­‐sector/shale-­‐gas-­‐by-­‐sector/texas-­‐shale-­‐gas-­‐producers-­‐ramping-­‐liquids-­‐production/	  74	  European	  Energy	  Exchange	  AG,	  Strom	  Terminmarkt	  (cited).	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More	   information	   about	   the	   individual	   cost	   elements	   can	   be	   found	   in	   the	   respective	  chapter	  references	  column	  in	  the	  tables	  below.	  
Table	  3-­‐12:	  Typical	  well	  configurations	  
Typical	  Well	  
Configurations	  
	   	   	   	  
Low	   Most	  
likely	  







Comments	  and	  dependencies	  
3	  000	   5	  000	   7	  000	   m	   Average	  well	  length	   3.3.1	   The	   wellbore	   length	   will	   depend	  on	   the	   local	   geological	   situation	  and	   reservoir	   depth.	   It	   will	   also	  depend	   on	   the	   length	   of	   the	  horizontal	   hole	   sections	   (if	  required).	  385	   641	   898	   m3	   Mud	  volume	  per	  well	   3.3.3	   Hole	   size	   is	   assumed	   to	   be	   an	  average	   12.25	   inch	   hole	   over	   the	  entire	   wellbore	   length.	   Based	   on	  this	  hole	  size	  assumption,	  the	  total	  mud	  volume	   is	  assumed	  to	  be	  1.5	  hole	   volumes	   on	   average	  (whereas	   a	   factor	   2	   would	  typically	   be	   used	   with	   accurate	  hole	  size	  numbers).	  	  The	  typical	  well	  configurations	  reflect	  a	  range	  of	  wellbore	  length	  scenarios	  as	  they	  may	  be	  drilled	   for	  different	  geological	  situations.	  For	   the	  cost	  scenarios	  outlined	  below	  the	  ‘most	   likely’	  well	   configuration	  scenario	  was	  considered	   to	  establish	  a	  number	  of	  cost	  scenarios.	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Table	  3-­‐13:	  Typical	  rig	  site	  configurations	  
Typical	  rig	  site	  configurations	   	   	   	   	  
Low	   Most	  
likely	  










3	  500	  000	   4	  000	  000	   5	  000	  000	   €	   Construction	  cost	  per	  pad	   3.3.1	   Estimated	   cost	   per	   pad	  considering	   a	   concrete	   rig	  site,	   surface	   water	  management	   system,	   etc.	  Pad	   may	   have	   to	   be	  maintained	  for	  3	  to	  15	  years	  for	  drilling	  and	  the	  following	  production.	   Additional	   cost	  is	   considered	   for	   housing	   of	  the	   rig	   and	   equipment	  components	   to	   minimise	  noise	   and	   light	   emissions.	  Roads,	  etc.	  are	  considered	  in	  infrastructure	  cost.	  15	   25	   36	   wells	   Number	   of	  wells	   per	  pad	   3.3.1	   Numbers	   of	   wells	   drilled	  depends	   on	   the	   local	  geological	   and	   surface	  location	  situations.	  233	  333	   160	  000	   138	  889	   €/well	   Cost	  per	  well	   3.3.1	   The	   rig	   site	   cost	   per	   well	   is	  calculated	   based	   on	  assuming	   a	   certain	   pad	   size	  and	   the	   number	   of	   wells	  drilled	  per	  pad.	  	  The	  rig	  site	  configuration	  scenarios,	  shown	  in	  Table	  3-­‐13,	  range	  for	  pads	  from	  15	  to	  36	  wells.	  These	  numbers	  are	  based	  on	  wells	  with	  longer	  lateral	  extensions	  and	  the	  need	  to	  minimise	  the	  number	  of	  rig	  sites.	  In	  the	  following,	  only	  the	  ‘most	  likely’	  scenario	  with	  25	  wells	  per	  pad	  is	  considered.	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Table	  3-­‐14:	  Depth-­‐based	  cost	  scenarios	  
Drilling	  depth-­‐based	  cost	   	   	   	   	  
Optimistic	   Most	  
likely	  










250	   275	   300	   €/m	   Casing,	  cementing	  and	  wellhead	  cost	  
3.3.3	   The	  cost	  of	  well	  installations	  in	  terms	  of	  casing,	  cement	  and	  wellhead	  are	  assumed	  to	  be	  rather	  constant	  as	  they	  are	  dominated	  by	  prices	  of	  steel,	  cement	  and	  additives.	  More	  expensive	  cement	  additives	  may	  increase	  the	  cementing	  efficiency.	  7	   5	   3	   -­‐	   Mud	   re-­‐use	  factor	   3.3.3	   Mud	  may	  be	  re-­‐used	  for	  multiple	  wells,	  so	  cost	  is	  distributed	  over	  multiple	  wells.	  This	  number	  could	  potentially	  be	  increased	  significantly	  with	  investment	  in	  mud	  management	  and	  centralised	  mud	  supply	  facilities	  in	  the	  field.	  Limits	  are	  given	  by	  mud	  which	  is	  deposited	  with	  cuttings	  and	  mud	  losses,	  which	  may	  be	  encountered.	  400	   1	  000	   2	  000	   €/m3	   Mud	  material	  cost	   3.3.3	   Higher	  mud	  cost	  will	  typically	  lead	  to	  higher	  performance	  due	  to	  a	  reduction	  in	  wellbore-­‐related	  problems.	  A	  strong	  link	  to	  drilling	  performance	  can	  be	  expected.	  264	   660	   1	  320	   €/m3	   Waste	   and	  water	  management	  cost	  
3.3.3	   Waste	  management	  cost	  is	  estimated	  to	  be	  reflected	  by	  considering	  66%	  of	  mud	  cost	  required	  to	  manage	  the	  volume	  of	  generating	  cuttings.	  The	  type	  of	  mud	  plays	  a	  central	  role	  in	  defining	  the	  ability	  to	  recycle	  versus	  deposition.	  	  Based	  on	  the	  depth	  and	  day	  rate	  alternatives,	  we	  will	  consider	  three	  scenarios,	  with	  the	  ‘conservative’	   scenario	   reflecting	   today’s	   costs	  by	  utilising	  current	   technology	  and	   the	  current	  average	  drilling	  performance	  in	  Europe.	  In	  this	  context	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  depth	  and	  size	  of	  the	  well	  drives	  in	  Depth-­‐based	   cost	   (Table	   3-­‐14)	   and	   the	   drilling	   performance	   is	   the	   driver	   of	   Day	   rate-­‐based	  costs	  in	  Table	  3-­‐15.	  The	  amount	  of	  metres	  a	  rig	  is	  capable	  of	  drilling	  per	  day	  on	  average	  defines	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  drilling	  project	  (see	  Table	  3-­‐16	  and	  Table	  3-­‐17).	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The	   ‘most	   likely’	   scenario	   reflects	   a	   cost	   situation	   which	   should	   be	   reasonably	  achievable	  with	  cost-­‐effective	  well	  designs	  and	  an	  achievable	   increase	   in	  efficiency	  by	  drilling	   process	   improvements	   reducing	   non-­‐productive	   and	   invisible	   lost	   time.	  Technology	   development	   in	   this	   first	   phase	  will	   focus	   on	   developing	   environmentally	  acceptable	  ways	  to	  drill	  and	  perform	  hydraulic	  fracturing.	  Technology	  development	  will	  also	  have	  to	  aim	  at	  generating	  cost-­‐effective	  technology.	  It	  should	  be	  realistic	  to	  achieve	  this	  level	  of	  technological	  improvement,	  as	  well	  as	  performance	  and	  cost	  levels	  within	  a	  timeframe	  of	  five	  years.	  	  The	   ‘optimistic’	   scenario	   assumes	   a	   future	   scenario	   where	   field	   development	   has	  undergone	   industrialisation	   utilising	   manufacturing-­‐type	   processes	   and	   technologies	  with	   a	  high	  degree	  of	   specialisation	  of	   rigs	   and	  equipment.	   Fields	   are	  developed	  with	  large-­‐scale	  drilling	  campaigns	  and	  with	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  optimisation.	  New	  technologies	  minimalise	   drilling	   risks;	   for	   example,	   downhole	   sensing,	   real-­‐time	   communication	  between	   down-­‐hole	   sensors	   and	   the	   rig,	   highly	   automated	   rigs,	   which	   enable	   early	  detection	   of	   drilling	   problems.	   Drilling	   crews	   are	   highly	   trained	   specialists,	   who	   use	  highly	   automated	   drilling	   machines.	   They	   consistently	   work	   in	   the	   same	   field,	  combining	   local	   geological	   expertise	   and	   benefiting	   from	   learning	   curve	   effects	   and	   a	  high	   degree	   of	   process	   optimisation.	   Technologies	   used	   are	   cost-­‐effective	   as	   they	   can	  also	  be	  manufactured	  in	  industrial	  quantities.	  It	  seems	  plausible	  to	  assume	  that	  building	  large-­‐scale	  drilling	   activities	   in	  Europe,	   combined	  with	   the	  necessary	   investment,	  will	  allow	  the	  development	  of	  such	  processes	  and	  technology	  within	  a	  timeframe	  of	  10	  to	  15	  years	  from	  now	  and	  reach	  widespread	  deployment.	  
Table	  3-­‐15:	  Drilling	  performance	  scenarios	  
Drilling	  performance	   	   	   	  
Optimistic	   Most	  
likely	  










130	   110	   80	   m/day	   Drilling	  performance	   3.3.2	   Drilling	   performance	   is	  derived	  from	  past	  European	  experience.	   There	   is	   the	  potential	   to	   increase	  performance,	   which	   will	  tentatively	   lead	   to	   higher	  depth-­‐based	   and	   day	   rate-­‐based	  drilling	  costs	  as	  more	  technology	   and	   higher	  performance	   products	   and	  services	  are	  used.	  	  For	   the	   following	   cost	   scenarios,	   different	   process	   and	   technological	   assumptions	   are	  combined.	  Summarising	  the	  above,	  the	  results	  show	  the	  following:	  
• Conservative	  scenario	  essentially	  reflecting	  today’s	  cost;	  
• Most	  likely	  scenario	  achievable	  within	  a	  five-­‐year	  time	  frame;	  
• Optimistic	   scenario	   assuming	   10	   to	   15	   years	   of	   technology	   and	   process	  development.	  The	  first	  row	  in	  Table	  3-­‐16	  below	  shows	  the	  values	  (in	  bold)	  for	  the	  total	  day	  rate-­‐based	  cost	  for	  wells.	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Table	  3-­‐16:	  Drilling	  operations	  day-­‐rate-­‐based	  cost	  scenarios	  
Drilling	  operations	  day	  rate	  cost	   	   	   	   	  
Optimistic	   Most	  
likely	  
Conservative	   Unit	  of	  
measure	  
Description	  







34	  800	   49	  500	   78	  000	   €/day	   Drilling	  
operations	  
day	   rate	  
cost	  (total)	  
3.3.3	   Total	   cost	   as	   sum	   of	   the	  cost	  items	  below.	  
15	  000	   20	  000	   28	  000	   €/day	   Rig	  cost	   3.3.3	   Shallower	   wells	   require	  significantly	   smaller	   rigs	  with	  lower	  day	  rates.	  6	  000	   8	  000	   15	  000	   €/day	   Directional	  drilling	  cost	   3.3.3	   Vertical	   wells	   may	   not	  need	   directional	   drilling	  costs,	   whereas	   highly	  deviated	   or	   horizontal	  drilling	   would	   require	  directional	   drilling	   tools	  and	  services.	  3	  000	   5	  000	   8	  000	   €/day	   Mud	   service	  cost	   3.3.3	   Costs	   to	  maintain	   the	  mud	  system	   and	   to	   perform	  solid	   control	   work.	   The	  cost	   depends	   on	   the	   mud	  system	  complexity.	  800	   1	  500	   2	  000	   €/day	   Bit	  cost	   3.3.3	   The	   bit	   cost	   is	   considered	  as	  part	  of	  the	  day	  rate	  cost	  in	  a	  range	  between	  1%	  and	  2%	   of	   total	   well	   cost.	   Bit	  cost	  itself	  does	  not	  reflect	  a	  significant	  cost	  driver.	  The	  drilling	  performance	  in	  the	  productive	   time	   (PT)	   as	   a	  consequence	   of	   bit	  selection	   has	   a	   significant	  impact.	  10	  000	   15	  000	   25	  000	   €/day	   Evaluation	  cost	   3.3.3	   Evaluation	   cost	  may	   range	  from	   standard	   wire-­‐line	  logging	   to	   using	   logging	  while	  drilling	   systems.	  For	  highly	   deviated	   wells,	  evaluation	  tools	  have	  to	  be	  run	   on	   the	   drill	   string,	   so	  using	   LWD	   is	   a	   viable	  option.	  	  In	  the	  cost	  model	  below,	  the	  ‘most	  likely’	  rig	  scenario	  is	  combined	  with	  the	  ‘most	  likely’	  cost	  and	  performance	  scenarios.	  
	  93	  
Table	  3-­‐17:	  Drilling	  cost	  scenario	  per	  well	  
Cost	  scenarios	   	   	  
Optimistic	   Most	  likely	   Conservative	   Unit	  of	  measure	   	  160	  000	   160	  000	   160	  000	   €	   Site	  cost	  per	  well	  (25	  wells	  per	  pad)	  5	  000	   5	  000	   5	  000	   m	   Depth	  301	   385	   506	   €/m	   Drilling	  depth-­‐based	  cost	  34	  800	   49	  500	   78	  000	   €/day	   Drilling	  operations	  day	  rate	  cost	  38	   45	   63	   days	   Well	  duration	  
3	  003	  000	   4	  337	  000	   7	  565	  000	   €	   Total	  well	  drilling	  cost	  (rounded)	  
78	  078	   95	  414	   121	  040	   €/day	   Average	  cost	  per	  day	  
601	   867	   1	  513	   €/m	   Average	  cost	  per	  metre	  	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  fracturing	  cost,	  a	  similar	  approach	  is	  taken	  where	  numbers	  of	  stages,	  as	  well	   as	   cost	   are	   considered	   in	   three	   scenarios,	   which	   show	   a	   technological	   evolution	  over	  a	  timeframe	  that	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  drilling	  technology	  above.	  
	  94	  
Table	  3-­‐18:	  Fracturing	  cost	  scenario	  per	  well	  
Typical	  fracturing	  configurations	   	   	   	   	  
Optimistic	   Most	  
likely	  
Conservative	   Unit	  of	  
measure	  
Description	  







8	   12	   15	   	  stages	   Number	   of	  surface	  fracture	  stages	  pumped	   per	  well	   using	  multiport	  fracturing	  technology	  
3.3.4	   A	   reduction	   in	   number	   of	  fracturing	  stages	  is	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	   that	   reports	  show	  that,	  in	  examples,	  70%	  of	   the	   production	   is	   coming	  from	   30%	   of	   the	  perforations.	  
	  
Fracturing	  cost	   	   	   	   	  
Optimistic	   Most	  
likely	  
Conservative	   Unit	  of	  
measure	  
Description	  







500	  000	   600	  000	   700	  000	   €	   Fixed	   cost	  per	   fracture	  job	   3.3.4	   A	   fixed	   cost	  per	   shale	   gas	  well	   is	   assumed	   to	  account	   for	   infrastructure	  set-­‐up,	   mobilisation,	   etc.	  and	   water	   management	  cost.	   Using	   closed-­‐loop	  fracture	  fluid	  systems	  and	  reuse	   of	   fluid	   will	   have	   a	  significant	   impact	   on	  waste	  management	  cost.	  250	  000	   300	  000	   350	  000	   €/stage	   Cost	   per	  stage	   3.3.4	   A	  variable	  cost	  is	  assumed	  to	   account	   for	   cost	   of	  materials	  and	  services	  per	  fracture	   stage.	   The	   cost	  per	   stage	   will	   greatly	  depend	   on	   the	   type	   of	  fracturing	   fluid	   that	   is	  utilised.	   No	   estimate	   for	  potential	   reuse	   of	   fluid	   is	  made.	  	  
‘Most	  likely’	  well	  with	  three	  cost	  scenarios	   	   	  
Optimistic	   Most	  likely	   Conservative	   Unit	  of	  measure	  12	   12	   12	   stages	   Number	  of	  stages	  
3	  500	  000	   4	  200	  000	   4	  900	  000	   €	   Fracturing	  cost	  	  Field	   development	   and	   infrastructure	   costs	   will	   be	   highly	   dependent	   on	   the	   local	  situation	   in	   the	   individual	   field.	   Cost	   scenarios	  will	   vary	  with	   complexity	   and	  existing	  infrastructure	   in	   terms	  of	   pipeline	   and	  processing	   capacity.	   The	  possibility	   of	   reusing	  existing	   pipeline	   and	   processing	   capabilities	   will	   allow	   for	   cost	   reductions	   in	   certain	  shale	   gas	   regions	   in	   Europe.	   Larger	   sized	   pads	   will	   allow	   for	   more	   centralised	  
	  95	  
infrastructure,	  which	  in	  turn	  leads	  to	  reduced	  costs.	  In	  the	  following	  study,	  a	  simplified	  approach	  is	  taken	  to	  the	  estimation	  of	  costs.	  Considering	   the	   high	   degree	   of	   uncertainty	   and	   the	   potential	   cost	   savings	   from	  manufactur-­‐ing-­‐type	  developments	  with	  highly	  centralised	  infrastructure,	  the	  estimated	  cost	   for	   field	   development	   and	   infrastructure	   is	   reflected	   as	   30%	   of	   drilling	   and	  completion	  cost	  in	  Table	  3-­‐19.	  
Table	  3-­‐19:	  Field	  development,	  infrastructure	  and	  processing	  costs	  by	  scenario	  
Field	  development	  and	  infrastructure	  and	  
processing	  costs	  
	   	   	  
Optimistic	   Most	  
likely	  
Conservative	   Unit	  of	  
measure	  
Description	  of	  












3.3.5	   Lifting	   cost	   is	  assumed	   to	   be	   30%	  of	   drilling	   and	  production	   costs.	  Cost	   is	   estimated	   on	  the	   basis	   of	  assuming	   pad	   type	  development	   with	  concentrated	  surface	  infrastructure.	  	  In	   the	   following,	   a	   cost	   summary	   is	   provided	   (with	   optimistic,	   most	   likely	   and	  conservative	  cost	  estimates),	  based	  on	  the	  considered	  scenarios.	  The	  cost	  scenarios	  are	  combined	  with	  three	  production	  scenarios	  to	  reflect	  a	  range	  of	  possible	  outcomes	  for	  a	  specific	  well	  and	  rig	  site	  configuration.	  Using	   liquid	   production	   values	   from	   Table	   3-­‐11,	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   impact	   of	  condensate	  production	  on	  the	  overall	  economics	  of	  shale	  gas	  plays	  is	  shown.,	  The	  cost	  per	   MWh	   is	   significantly	   influenced	   by	   the	   high	   energy	   content	   per	   barrel	   of	   liquid	  production.	  The	   numbers	   given	   below	   demonstrate	   the	   high	   economic	   interest	   in	   resources	  with	  liquid	   potential	   in	   the	   USA.	   The	   production	   estimates	   below	   combine	   liquid	   and	   gas	  production	  rates	  per	  well	  using	  different	  scenarios.	  The	   amount	   of	   liquid	   potential	   depends	   on	   the	   maturity	   of	   the	   resource	   as	   a	  consequence	   of	   geological	   situation	   and	   deposition	   history.	   A	   realistic	   assessment	   of	  gas-­‐liquid	   ratios	   that	   could	  possibly	  be	   achieved	   in	  Europe	  will	   have	   to	  be	  proven	  by	  intensive	  exploration.	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Table	  3-­‐20:	  Production	  cost	  scenario	  combining	  optimistic,	  most	  likely	  and	  conservative	  cost	  and	  
production	  scenarios	  
Production	  scenario	   	   	   	   	  
Optimistic	   Most	  
likely	  
Conservative	   Unit	  of	  
measure	  
Description	  







85	   57	   21	   mcm	   Estimates	   of	  technically	  recoverable	  resources	  from	   a	   gas	  shale	  
3.3.6	   Ultimate	   gas	   recovery	  scenarios	   based	   on	   US	  references.	  




per	   well	  
from	  gas	  
3.3.6	   Conversion	   of	   gas	  production	  to	  energy	  
500	  000	   300	  000	   100	  000	   bbl	   Estimates	   of	  technically	  recoverable	  resources	  from	  a	  shale	  oil	  well	  
3.3.6	   Ultimate	   liquid	   recovery	  scenarios	   based	   on	   US	  references.	  
0.84	   0.50	   0.17	   Million	  
MWh	  
Energy	   produced	   per	  
well	  from	  liquids	  
Conversion	   of	   liquid	  production	  to	  energy	  






3.3.6	   	  
	  
‘Most	  likely	  well	  and	  rig	  site	  scenario	  versus	  Three	  cost	  and	  production	  scenarios’	  without	  liquid	  
production	  
Optimistic	   Most	  likely	   Conservative	   Unit	  of	  
measure	  
	  9	  754	  500	   12	  805	  500	   18	  697	  500	   €	   Total	  cost	  per	  well	  
9.64	   18.87	   74.79	   €/MWh	   Cost	  per	  MWh	  not	  considering	  
liquid	  production	  	  
‘Most	  likely	  well	  and	  rig	  site	  scenario	  versus	  Three	  cost	  and	  production	  scenarios’	  with	  liquid	  
production	  
Optimistic	   Most	  likely	   Conservative	   Unit	  of	  
measure	  
	  9	  754	  500	   12	  805	  500	   18	  697	  500	   €	   Total	  cost	  per	  well	  
5.28	   10.86	   44.84	   €/MWh	   Cost	   per	   MWh	   considering	  
liquid	  production	  	  If	  the	  ‘most	  likely’	  production	  is	  combined	  with	  the	  three	  cost	  scenarios,	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  how	  the	  production	  cost	  may	  develop	  over	  a	  timeframe	  of	  5	  to	  15	  years.	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Table	   3-­‐21:	   Production	   cost	   scenarios	   based	   on	   the	   ‘most	   likely’	   production	   and	   three	   cost	  
scenarios	  
‘Most	  likely	  well	  and	  rig	  site	  scenario	  versus	  Three	  cost	  and	  “most	  likely”	  production	  
scenarios’	  with	  liquid	  production	  
Optimistic	   Most	  likely	   Conservative	   Unit	  of	  measure	   	  1.18	   1.18	   1.18	   Million	  MWh	   Total	  energy	  produced	  from	  the	  well	  ‘most	  likely’	  9	  754	  500	   12	  805	  500	   18	  697	  500	   €	   Total	  cost	  per	  well	  
8.27	   10.86	   15.85	   €/MWh	   Cost	   per	   MWh	  
considering	   liquid	  
production	  
	  This	   comparison	   can	   be	   done	   in	   a	   similar	   manner	   for	   ‘optimistic’	   and	   ‘conservative’	  production	  scenarios,	  as	  depicted	  in	  the	  following	  two	  figures	  below.	  
Table	  3-­‐22:	  Production	  cost	  scenarios	  based	  on	  ‘optimistic’	  production	  and	  three	  cost	  scenarios	  
‘Most	  likely	  well	  and	  rig	  site	  scenario	  versus	  Three	  cost	  and	  “optimistic”	  production	  
scenarios’	  with	  liquid	  production	  
Optimistic	   Most	  likely	   Conservative	   Unit	  of	  measure	   	  1.85	   1.85	   1.85	   Million	  MWh	   Total	  energy	  produced	  from	  the	  well	  ‘most	  likely’	  9	  754	  500	   12	  805	  500	   18	  697	  500	   €	   Total	  cost	  per	  well	  
5.28	   6.93	   10.12	   €/MWh	   Cost	   per	   MWh	  
considering	   liquid	  
production	  	  
Table	  3-­‐23:	  Production	  cost	  scenarios	  based	  on	  ‘conservative’	  production	  and	  three	  cost	  scenarios	  
‘Most	  likely	  well	  and	  rig	  site	  scenario	  versus	  Three	  cost	  and	  “conservative”	  production	  scenarios’	  
with	  liquid	  production	  
Optimistic	   Most	  likely	   Conservative	   Unit	  of	  
measure	  
	  0.42	   0.42	   0.42	   Million	  MWh	   Total	  energy	  produced	  from	  the	  well	  ‘most	  likely’	  9	  754	  500	   12	  805	  500	   18	  697	  500	   €	   Total	  cost	  per	  well	  
23.39	   30.71	   44.84	   €/MWh	   Cost	   per	   MWh	   considering	  
liquid	  production	  	  
Global	  development	  scenarios	  The	  development	  of	  technology	  and	  processes	  to	  produce	  shale	  gas	  will	  globally	  move	  in	   a	   similar	   direction.	   The	   scenarios	  will	   be	   characterised	  by	   very	   cost	   conscious	   and	  performance	  orientated	  field	  developments.	  In	   the	   current	   operator/contractor/service	   company	   business	   model,	   technology	   in	  terms	  of	  tools	  and	  processes	  will	  be	  available	  on	  the	  global	  market	  place.	  Variation	  will	  most	  likely	  be	  driven	  by	  different	  personnel	  costs	  and	  local	  price	  variations	  influenced	  by	   tax	   regimes	   or	   the	   like.	   An	   additional	   potentially	   dominating	   factor,	   leading	   to	  technology	  and	  cost	  variations,	  will	  be	  variations	  in	  environmental	  standards.	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An	   alternative	   may	   develop.	   Based	   on	   US	   examples,	   it	   seems	   very	   likely	   that	   the	  business	  model	  may	  undergo	  changes.	  Operators	  will	   return	   from	  an	  almost	  exclusive	  outsourcing	  policy,	  which	  they	  followed	  over	  the	  past	  decades,	  to	  insourcing	  again.	  The	  drive	  for	  that	  is	  to	  combine	  the	  highest	  possible	  efficiency	  with	  competitive	  advantage.	  Business	   success	   in	   shale	   gas	   plays	   is	   not	   driven	   by	   exploration	   risk	   but	   by	  manufacturing	   competence	   at	   the	   highest	   possible	   environmental	   standards.	   Such	  capability	  will	  be	  key	  for	  economic	  success	  and	  potentially	  the	  biggest	  differentiator	  for	  companies	   competing	   for	   reserves.	   Operators,	   developing	   unique	   capabilities	   in	   this	  direction,	  will	  have	  an	  advantage	  globally	  in	  successfully	  exploiting	  shale	  gas.	  
3.4 Conclusions	  The	  success	  of	  shale	  gas	  development	  in	  Europe	  will	  greatly	  depend	  on:	  	  1) the	   ability	   to	   increase	   the	   efficiency	   of	   drilling	   by	   industrialising	   the	   drilling	  process,	   and	   utilising	   rig	   automation	   technology	   and	   equipment	   by	   aiming	   at	  zero	   harmful	   emissions,	   thus	   producing	   the	   lowest	   possible	   environmental	  footprint;	  2) the	  related	  reduction	  of	  drilling	  and	  fracturing	  cost,	  with	  could	  aim	  at	  50%	  cost	  reductions	  for	  large-­‐scale	  drilling	  campaigns;	  	  3) the	   development	   of	   clean	   fracturing	   technology	   in	   combination	   with	   a	   deep	  understanding	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  geomechanical	  properties	  of	  the	  rock,	  fluid	   flow	   and	   chemical	   interactions,	   and	   between	   formation	   and	   stimulation	  fluid;	  4) the	  required	  investment	  in	  research	  and	  development	  to	  establish	  and	  build	  the	  required	  technology	  in	  Europe;	  5) the	   building	   of	   human	   resource	   capacity	   to	   support	   large-­‐scale	   field	  developments	   with	   several	   hundreds	   of	   rigs	   operating	   in	   Europe	   for	   many	  decades,	  and	  to	  develop	  and	  build	  the	  required	  infrastructure.	  The	  development	  of	  shale	  gas	  will	  only	  be	  successful	  in	  Europe	  if	  the	  environmental	  and	  economic	  boundary	  conditions	  can	  be	  fulfilled.	  	  The	  chapter	  concludes	  with	  developing	  cost	  scenarios	  for	  future	  shale	  development	  in	  Europe	   leading	   to	   the	   following	   total	   cost	   per	  MWh.	   These	   cost	   estimates	   are	   in	   line	  with	  the	  current	  break-­‐even	  costs	  for	  shale	  gas	  production	  in	  Europe	  proposed	  by	  other	  notable	  studies,	  which	  lie	  between	  either	  €13.5-­‐32/MWh	  or	  $5-­‐12/MBtu	  given	  January	  2012	  market	  conditions	  (see	  Figure	  5-­‐12).	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Table	  3-­‐24:	  Shale	  gas	  cost	  scenarios	  for	  Europe	  
‘Most	  likely	  well	  and	  rig	  site	  scenario	  versus	  Three	  cost	  and	  production	  scenarios’	  without	  liquid	  
production	  
Optimistic	   Most	  likely	   Conservative	   Unit	  of	  
measure	  
	  	  
9	  754	  500	   12	  805	  500	   18	  697	  500	   €	   Total	  cost	  per	  well	  
9.64	   18.87	   74.79	   €/MWh	   Cost	   per	   MWh	   not	   considering	  
liquid	  production	  	  
‘Most	  likely	  well	  and	  rig	  site	  scenario	  versus	  Three	  cost	  and	  production	  scenarios’	  with	  liquid	  
production	  
Optimistic	   Most	  likely	   Conservative	   Unit	  of	  
measure	  
	  	  
9	  754	  500	   12	  805	  500	   18	  697	  500	   €	   Total	  cost	  per	  well	  
5.28	   10.86	   44.84	   €/MWh	   Cost	   per	   MWh	   considering	   liquid	  
production	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4 Land	  and	  market	  access	  	  
I.	  Pearson	  and	  P.	  Zeniewski	  (European	  Commission,	  JRC	  F.3)	  	  The	   rate	   of	   production	   of	   a	   resource	   is	   influenced	   by	   the	   physical	   features	   of	   that	  resource,	  the	  technology	  available	  to	  exploit	  the	  resource	  and	  the	  various	  economic	  and	  political	  factors	  that	  affect	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  organisations	  involved.	  Whilst	  the	  first	  two	   of	   the	   abovementioned	   factors	   have	   already	   been	   addressed	   in	   this	   report,	   this	  section	  aims	  to	  give	  a	  notional	  overview	  of	  some	  of	  the	  remaining	  ‘above	  ground’	  issues	  for	   one	   form	   of	   unconventional	   gas	   –	   specifically,	   shale	   gas	   –	   using	   language	   that	   is	  accessible	  to	  readers	  who	  do	  not	  necessarily	  have	  a	  technical	  background.	  In	  light	  of	  the	  very	   small	   amount	   of	   research,	   exploration	   and	   production	   data	   that	   are	   publicly	  available	   on	   European	   unconventional	   gas,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   study	   cases	   from	  North	  America	  and	  elsewhere	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  to	  identifying	  the	  likely	  scale,	  timeframe	  and	  necessary	  conditions	  for	  unconventional	  gas	  production	  in	  Europe.	  	  As	  the	  following	  pages	  illustrate,	  a	  very	  wide	  range	  of	  factors	  may	  potentially	  affect	  land	  and	  market	   access	   for	   unconventional	   gas	   developments.	   Because	   of	   the	   difficulty	   of	  defining	   a	   scope	   for	   the	   review	   of	   the	   evidence	   on	   these	   topics	   that	   would	   be	   both	  rigorous	  and	  comprehensive	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  this	  chapter	  does	  not	  attempt	  to	  provide	  a	   systematic	   review,	   as	   Chapter	   2	   does	   for	   reserve	   estimates.	   In	   particular,	   although	  steps	  have	  been	  taken	  to	  locate	  the	  most	  relevant	  studies,	  to	  limit	  selection	  bias	  and	  to	  assess	   the	   methodological	   quality	   of	   sources	   used,	   the	   application	   of	   protocols	   and	  explicit	  criteria	  to	  these	  ends	  is	  unviable.	  Readers	  should	  therefore	  regard	  the	  chapter	  as	  an	  exploratory	  survey	  of	  the	  econometric,	  modelling	  and	  qualitative	  evidence	  around	  land	  or	  market	  access	  issues	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  identifying	  areas	  of	  further	  research	  or	  contextually	  informing	  the	  interpretation	  of	  future	  developments	  on	  these	  key	  topics.	  
4.1 Land	  access	  The	   purpose	   of	   this	   section	   is	   to	   discuss	   land	   access	   issues	   and	   the	   regulatory	  framework	   governing	   unconventional	   gas.	   It	   corresponds	   with	   the	   third	   and	   fourth	  factors	  determining	  the	  viability	  of	  natural	  gas	  production	  presented	  in	  Figure	  1-­‐3.	  The	  ability	  to	  access	  deposits	  of	  shale	  gas	  starts	  on	  the	  surface	  and	  is	  crucially	  determined	  by	   a	   number	   of	   physical,	   social	   and	   environmental	   constraints.	   Should	   the	   size	   and	  commercial	  viability	  of	  technically	  recoverable	  resources	  in	  Europe	  translate	  into	  large	  scale	  production,	   there	  will	  be	  a	  wide	  range	  of	   issues	   in	  need	  of	  attention.	  The	  aim	  of	  this	   section,	   therefore,	   is	   to	  answer	   two	  key	  questions.	  First,	  what	   is	   the	   surface-­‐level	  impact	  of	   shale	  gas	  operations	  compared	  with	   that	  of	   conventional	  gas?	  Second,	  what	  are	   the	   primary	   regulatory	   factors	   that	   can	   or	   will	   affect	   shale	   gas	   operations,	  particularly	  in	  Europe?	  	  The	  first	  question	  requires	  an	  analysis	  of	  land	  access	  issues	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  well-­‐head.	  Accordingly,	  the	  first	  section	  will	  begin	  by	  comparing	  the	  surface	  requirements	  of	  three	  different	   types	   of	   onshore	   gas	  wells	   –	   single	   vertical	   gas	  wells,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	  single	  horizontal	  wells	  and	  multi-­‐well	  pads	  (in	  which	  several	  horizontal	  wellbores	  stem	  from	   a	   single	   pad)	   on	   the	   other.	   The	   analysis	   will	   then	   focus	   on	   well	   densities,	  highlighting	  the	  distinction	  drawn	  in	  much	  of	  the	  literature	  between	  conventional	  and	  unconventional	   well	   spacing	   requirements.	   Having	   provided	   a	   general	   picture	   of	   the	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extent	  of	  land	  use	  required	  by	  unconventional	  gas	  development,	  the	  second	  section	  will	  discuss	   the	   wide	   range	   of	   regulatory	   issues	   in	   Europe	   that	   may	   constrain	   or	   enable	  these	  surface-­‐level	  operations.	  Of	  primary	   interest	   is	   the	  extent	   to	  which	  surface-­‐level	  issues,	  whether	  technical,	  legal	  or	  socioeconomic	  in	  nature,	  can	  be	  effectively	  managed	  by	   a	   robust	   regulatory	   framework.	   The	   key	   question	   in	   this	   context	   is	   whether	   the	  interests	  of	   three	  broader	  sets	  of	  actors	  (market,	   state	  and	  societal)	  can	  be	  effectively	  balanced	   by	   such	   a	   framework,	   and	   what	   major	   issues	   have	   been	   identified	   in	   the	  literature	  as	  being	  critical	  to	  successful	  shale	  gas	  exploitation	  activities.	   Many	   of	   the	   references	   used	   for	   this	   section	   have	   been	   drawn	   from	   detailed	   impact	  assessments	  of	  shale	  gas	  development	  in	  different	  US	  states.	  These	  reports	  are	  based	  on	  the	  cumulative	  knowledge	  and	  feedback	  of	  industrial	  players,	  community	  stakeholders,	  independent	   consultancies,	   scientific	   experts	   and	  public	  policymakers;	   therefore,	   they	  serve	  as	  a	  relatively	  authoritative	  source	  of	  information.	  By	  drawing	  on	  such	  reports	  as	  well	   as	   their	   supporting	   documentation/annexes,	   it	   has	   been	   possible	   to	   extract	   a	  relatively	   clear	   picture	   of	   the	   surface-­‐level	   impact	   of	   shale	   gas	   development.	   This	  picture	  has	  been	   further	   refined	  by	  an	  extensive	   review	  of	  other	   literature	   specific	   to	  Europe.	  
4.1.1 Resource	  access	  
Surface	  requirements	  and	  well	  densities	  	  Surface	  disturbances	  are	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  natural	  gas	  development.	  Land	  is	  required	  to	  find,	  develop,	  produce	  and	  transport	  gas.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  immediate	  infrastructure	  forming	  what	  is	  known	  as	  the	  ‘well	  pad’,	  the	  most	  common	  surface	  level	  requirements	  include	   access	   roads,	   utility	   corridors	   (e.g.	  water	   and	   electricity	   lines),	   transportation	  and	   processing	   units	   (e.g.	   gas	   gathering	   lines,	   field	   compressor	   stations)	   and	   water	  management	   facilities.	   The	   amount	   of	   land	   necessary	   for	   such	   infrastructure	   varies	  principally	  according	  to	  the	  type	  of	  well	  drilled	  (shallow	  or	  deep;	  vertical	  or	  horizontal;	  single	   or	   multi-­‐pad)	   and	   the	   phase	   of	   operation	   (e.g.	   exploration,	   development	   or	  completion	  of	  the	  well).	  The	  example	  of	  Poland	  is	  instructive.	  The	  total	  area	  occupied	  by	  existing	   conventional	   natural	   gas	   fields	   in	   Poland	   amounts	   to	   approximately	   1	  600	  square	   kilometres,	   comprising	   260	   deposits	   ranging	   in	   size	   from	   4.6	   –	   7.6	   square	  kilometres.1	  The	  current	  area	  covered	  by	  shale	  gas	  exploration	  licences	  is	  much	  larger,	  constituting	   roughly	  57	  000	   square	  kilometres,	   or	   about	  20%	  of	  Polish	   territory.2	  The	  eventual	   area	   that	   will	   be	   submitted	   to	   industrial	   activity	   will,	   of	   course,	   be	   much	  smaller.	   Thus,	   there	   is	   clearly	   a	   distinction	   to	   be	   drawn	   between	   land	   access	   for	  exploration,	  and	   land	  access	   for	  development	  and	  exploitation	  of	  natural	  gas	  deposits.	  At	   the	   level	   of	   an	   individual	   well,	   this	   is	   illustrated	   by	   figures	   provided	   by	   a	   US	  Department	  of	  Interior	  study	  of	  gas	  and	  oil	  development	  in	  Arkansas.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Source:	  Deloitte,	  Arcmap	  GIS.	  2	  Advanced	  Resources	   International,	   'World	   shale	   gas	   resources',	   V-­‐2,	   Cleantech,	   'Shale	   Gas	   Investment	  Guide',	  (Warsaw:	  Cleantech	  Poland	  Sp.,	  2011),	  41.	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Table	  4-­‐1:	  Surface	  usage	  for	  natural	  gas	  well	  pads	  and	  associated	  facilities,	  hectares	  (ha)	  per	  well3	  	   Exploration	   Development	   Production	  
Single	  vertical	  (<2	  000	  ft)	   0.98	   1.93	   0.73	  
Single	  vertical	  (5	  000-­‐12	  000	  ft)	   1.60	   2.72	   0.91	  
Single	  horizontal	   1.39	   2.79	   0.89	  
Multi-­‐horizontal	  (4	  wells	  per	  pad)	   2.69	  (0.67	  per	  well)	   4.64	  (1.16	  per	  well)	   1.39	  (0.35	  per	  well)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Includes	  size	  of	  well	  pads,	  access	  roads,	  utility	  and	  transportation	  lines	  and	  processing	  units.	  Bureau	  of	  Land	  Management,	  'Arkansas:	  Reasonably	  foreseeable	  development	  scenario	  for	  fluid	  minerals',	  (Jackson,	  MS:	  Dept	  of	  Interior,	  2008),	  50-­‐55.	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Figure	  4-­‐1:	  Phases	  and	  key	  steps	  in	  developing	  a	  Marcellus	  shale	  well4	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  William	   E.	   Hefley	   et	   al.,	   'The	   Economic	   Impact	   of	   the	   value	   chain	   of	   a	   Marcellus	   shale	   well',	   in	   Pitt	  
Business	  Working	  Papers,	  ed.	  Katz	  Graduate	  School	  of	  Business	  (Pittsburgh,	  PA:	  University	  of	  Pittsburgh,	  2011).	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The	   development	   cycle	   of	   a	   typical	   horizontal	   well,	   together	   with	   its	   economic	  implications,	  has	  been	  explored	  by	  a	  team	  of	  researchers	  at	  Pittsburgh	  University	  (US).	  As	   depicted	   in	   Figure	   4-­‐1	   above,	   a	   considerable	   amount	   of	   inputs	   are	   necessary	   to	  prepare,	   construct	   and	   develop	   a	   single	   drill	   site.	   Once	   all	   the	   necessary	   permitting	  procedures	  have	  been	  completed,	  site	  preparation	  commences	   in	  the	   form	  of	   levelling	  and	  access	  road	  construction	  to	  make	  way	  for	  multiple	  trucks	  carrying	  diverse	  drilling	  equipment.	  Power	  generators,	  living	  quarters	  with	  sanitary	  facilities	  and	  security	  gates	  must	   be	   constructed,	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   construction	   of	  water	   pipes	   and	   other	   utility	  lines.	   Drilling	   ‘mud’	   –	   principally	   water	   but	   also	   chemicals	   and	   additives	   –	   must	   be	  purchased	  and	  transported	  in	  order	  for	  drilling	  to	  commence.	  Flowback	  water	  must	  be	  processed,	   treated	   and	   recycled,	  while	   casing	   operations	   are	   applied	   to	   the	  wellbore.	  The	   fracturing	   process,	   once	   begun	   in	   earnest,	   requires	   significant	   and	   continuous	  activities	  in	  the	  form	  of	  water	  and	  wastewater	  hauling,	  the	  construction	  of	  water	  ponds	  to	   hold	   frac	   fluids	   and	   the	   eventual	   installation	   of	   a	   gathering	   system	   of	   pipes	   and	  compressors	  to	  accommodate	  gas	  flows	  from	  the	  permanent	  wellhead.	  The	  production	  life	   cycle	   is	   subject	   to	   continuous	   monitoring	   and	   maintenance	   whilst	   partial	   site	  reclamation	  operations	  are	  initiated.	  Workover	  and	  well	  stimulation	  efforts	  may	  include	  additional	   fracturing	   operations,	   which	   require	   roughly	   the	   same	   level	   of	   initial	  development	  activity	  as	  the	  original	  fracturing	  process.	  	  As	  shown	  in	  Figure	  4-­‐2	  below,	  horizontal	  well	  pads	  require	  a	  greater	  surface	  area	  than	  single	  vertical	  wells.	  This	  is	  due	  to	  the	  need	  for	  a	  larger	  pad	  to	  accommodate	  horizontal	  drilling	  equipment,	  as	  well	  as	  more	  water	  management	  facilities	  given	  the	  necessity	  to	  use	   water-­‐intensive	   well	   fracturing	   technologies	   during	   development.	   Other	   studies	  providing	  estimates	  of	  total	  surface	  area	  requirements	  tend	  to	  corroborate	  the	  finding	  that	  pads	  containing	  multiple	  wellbores	  occupy	  the	  greatest	  total	  surface	  area	  on	  a	  per	  well-­‐pad	  basis.	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Figure	  4-­‐2:	  Total	  surface	  area	  requirements	  for	  developing	  natural	  gas	  wells5	  
	  However,	  a	  point	  is	  often	  raised	  that	  overall	  surface	  disturbance	  of	  multi-­‐well	  pads	  is	  in	  fact	  much	  smaller	  than	  for	  single	  vertical	  wells.	   Indeed,	  much	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  land	  access	   for	   unconventional	   gas	   production	   has	   highlighted	   the	   importance	   of	   well	  spacing,	  e.g.	  the	  maximum	  area	  that	  one	  well	  would	  efficiently	  and	  economically	  extract	  gas	  from	  based	  on	  geologic	  and	  engineering	  characteristics.6	  It	  is	  often	  pointed	  out	  that	  there	   are	   different	   well	   spacing	   requirements	   for	   horizontal	   drilling	   operations	   that	  target	  continuous	  rock	  formations	  rather	  than	  conventional	  reservoirs.	  Whereas	  single	  vertical	  well	   pads	   are	   said	   to	   be	   spaced	   at	   16	   sites	   per	   square	  mile,	   single	   horizontal	  pads,	   by	   virtue	   of	   accessing	   longer	   subsurface	   laterals,	   can	   reduce	   this	   figure	   to	  approximately	   nine	   pads	   per	   square	   mile.	   Further	   reduction	   can	   be	   attained	   by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Robert	  M.	  Anderson,	   'Environmental	  Assessment	   of	   Southwestern	  Production	  Corp's	   proposed	  8	  well	  horizontal	  drilling	  programme	  in	  the	  Hornbuckle	  Field,	  Wyoming',	  (Casper,	  WY:	  Anderson	  Environmental	  Consulting,	  2009);	  Arthur	  and	  Bockelmann,	  'Analysis	  of	  Proposed	  Article	  7	  ',	  Bureau	  of	  Land	  Management,	  'Arkansas';	  Bureau	  of	  Land	  Management,	  'Reasonably	  Foreseeable	  Development	  Scenario	  for	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  for	   the	  George	  Washingtion	  National	   Forest	  Virginia	   and	  West	  Virginia',	   (Jackson,	  MS:	  Dept	   of	   Interior,	  2011);	  Bureau	  of	  Land	  Management,	  'Surface	  Disturbance	  associated	  with	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  Activities',	  in	  Draft	  
Resource	   Management	   Plan	   for	   Pinedale,	   Wyoming	   (Jackson,	   MS:	   Dept	   of	   Interior,	   2007);	   Cuadrilla	  Resources,	  'Economic	  Impact	  of	  Shale	  Gas	  Exploration	  &	  Production	  in	  Lancashire	  &	  the	  UK',	  (Altrincham,	  Cheshire:	   Regeneris	   Consulting,	   2011);	   Hefley	   et	   al.,	   'Economic	   Impact',	   Nels	   Johnson	   et	   al.,	   'Marcellus	  Shale	   Natural	   Gas	   and	   Wind',	   in	   Pennsylvania	   Energy	   Impacts	   Assessment	   (Arlington,	   VA:	   The	   Nature	  Conservancy,	  2010);	  National	  Park	  Service,	   'Potential	  Development	  of	   the	  Natural	  Gas	  Resources	   in	   the	  Marcellus	   Shale	   New	   York,	   Pennsylvania,	   West	   Virginia,	   and	   Ohio',	   (Denver,	   CO:	   Department	   of	   the	  Interior,	   2008);	   NTC	   Consultants,	   'Impacts	   on	   Community	   Character	   of	   Horizontal	   Drilling	   and	   High	  Volume	  Hydraulic	  Fracturing	  in	  Marcellus	  Shale	  and	  Other	  Low-­‐Permeability	  Gas	  Reservoirs,	  Final	  Report	  Prepared	  for	  NYSERDA',	  (Saratoga	  Springs,	  NY	  2009).	  6	  In	  the	  United	  States,	  minimum	  well	  spacing	  requirements	  are	  determined	  by	  state	  and	  local	  authorities;	  in	  some	  cases,	  however,	  these	  regulations	  have	  not	  adapted	  to	  the	  characteristics	  of	  horizontal	  wellbores,	  whose	  lateral	  length	  can	  reach	  up	  to	  3	  000	  metres.	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constructing	   a	  multi-­‐well	   configuration	   in	  which	   six	   to	   eight	   (or	  possibly	  more)	  wells	  are	   drilled	   from	   a	   single	   pad.7	  This	   can	   yield	  well	   densities	   as	   low	   as	   one	   per	   square	  mile.	   Based	   on	   these	   assumptions,	   a	   Supplemental	   Generic	   Environmental	   Impact	  Assessment	  (SGEIS)	  for	  the	  Marcellus	  shale	  play	  by	  the	  New	  York	  State	  Department	  of	  Environmental	   Conservation	   (NYSDEC)	   concludes	   that	   ‘there	   clearly	   is	   a	   smaller	   total	  area	   of	   land	   disturbance	   associated	   with	   horizontal	   wells	   for	   shale	   gas	   development	  than	  that	  for	  vertical	  well’.8	  This	  difference	  is	  largely	  explained	  by	  the	  reduced	  need	  for	  individual	   well	   pads	   and	   associated	   access	   roads,	   gathering	   lines	   and	   other	   utility	  corridors	  (as	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  4-­‐3	  below).	  
Figure	  4-­‐3:	  Theoretical	  well	  densities	  of	  vertical	  and	  multi-­‐well	  horizontal	  pads9	  
	  	  However,	  there	  is	  a	  point	  of	  contention	  in	  the	  literature	  concerning	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  multi-­‐well	  pad	  drilling	  actually	  reduces	  overall	  surface	  disturbance	  associated	  with	  gas	  development	   and	   production.	   Indeed,	   most	   of	   the	   above	   figures	   on	   shale	   gas	   well	  spacing	   are	   ultimately	   derived	   from	   a	   single	   consulting	   firm,	   which	   has	   published	  several	   reports	   presenting	   essentially	   the	   same	   data.10	  A	   caveat	   is	   therefore	   in	   order	  about	   the	   assumptions	  made	   regarding	   reduced	  well	   density	   and	   surface	   disturbance	  brought	   about	   by	   multi-­‐well	   horizontal	   drilling.	   Indeed,	   another	   set	   of	   literature	   has	  argued	  that,	  though	  it	  may	  be	  the	  case	  that	  multi-­‐well	  pad	  spacing	  begins	  at	  one	  site	  per	  square	  mile,	  this	  does	  not	  preclude	  vertical	  infill	  drilling	  between	  such	  areas.11	  The	  US	  case	   demonstrates	   that	   once	   an	   area	   proves	   to	   be	   commercially	   viable,	   there	   is	   a	  tendency	  for	  firms	  to	  perform	  infill	  drilling,	  creating	  what	  is	  known	  as	  ‘downspacing’.	  As	  one	   report	   points	   out,	   “spacing	   histories	   of	   the	   Barnett,	   Fayetteville,	   Antrim,	   New	  Albany,	  Ohio	  and	  Woodford	  shales	  all	  trend	  from	  larger	  to	  smaller	  spacing	  units.	  For	  the	  Marcellus	  Shale,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  expect	  320-­‐acre	  [130	  ha]	  or	  160-­‐acre	  [65	  ha]	  spacing	  initially	  and	  eventually	  some	  areas	  experiencing	  infill	  drilling	  to	  80-­‐acre	  [32	  ha]	  or	  even	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  J.	   Daniel	   Arthur	   et	   al.,	   'Hydraulic	   Fracturing	   Considerations	   for	   Natural	   Gas	  Wells	   of	   the	   Fayetteville	  Shale',	  (Tulsa,	  OK:	  ALL	  Consulting,	  2008).	  8	  New	  York	  State	  Department	  of	  Environmental	  Conservation,	  'Draft	  SGEIS'.	  9	  Matthew	  D.	  Alexander	  et	  al.,	   'Considerations	   for	  Responsible	  Gas	  Development	  of	   the	  Frederick	  Brook	  Shale	  in	  New	  Brunswick',	  (Saint	  John,	  NB:	  Fundy	  Engineering	  and	  Atlantica	  Centre	  for	  Energy,	  2011).	  10	  ALL	   Consulting,	   'Modern	   Shale	   Gas	   development';	   Arthur	   and	   Bockelmann,	   'Analysis	   of	   Proposed	  Article	   7	   ';	   Arthur	   et	   al.,	   'Hydraulic	   Fracturing	   Considerations';	   J.	   Daniel	   Arthur	   and	   Dave	   Cornue,	  'Technologies	   Reduce	   Pad	   Size	   Waste',	   American	   Oil	   and	   Gas	   Reporter	   2010,	   August	   edition	   (2010	   ).	  Reports	  that	  draw	  heavily	  on	  this	  literature	  include	  Alexander	  et	  al.,	  'Considerations	  for	  Responsible	  Gas	  Development',	   New	   York	   State	   Department	   of	   Environmental	   Conservation,	   'Draft	   SGEIS';	  Wood	   et	   al.,	  'Shale	  gas	  provisional	  assessment'.	  11	  NTC	  Consultants,	  'Impacts	  on	  Community	  Character',	  7.	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40-­‐acre	   spacing	   [16	   ha]	   should	   infill	   drilling	   be	   economic.”12	  This	   is	   corroborated	   by	  other	   reports	   citing	   common	   spacing	   of	   one	   well	   every	   40-­‐160	   acres	   (16-­‐65	   ha).13	  Figures	  from	  a	  recent	  EIA	  Report	  on	  emerging	  shale	  plays	  in	  the	  USA	  show	  a	  range	  of	  2-­‐11	   wells	   per	   square	   mile,	   with	   a	   mean	   of	   6.5.14	  The	   figure	   below	   indicates	   that	   well	  densities	   in	  shale	  plays	  do	   indeed	   increase	  over	  the	  course	  of	  development.	  Moreover,	  due	  to	  more	  dispersed	   ‘gas	   in	  place’	   for	  shale	  plays,	  one	  report	  notes	  that,	  “with	  shale	  gas	   plays	   covering	   large	   areas	   and	   requiring	   a	   greater	   number	   of	   wells	   drilled	  more	  closely	   together	   compared	   with	   conventional	   fields,	   this	   implies	   a	   greater	   surface	  footprint	  over	  a	  wider	  area	  for	  shale	  gas.”15	  
Figure	  4-­‐4:	  Current	  well	  density	  in	  US	  counties	  of	  comparable	  shale	  gas	  plays,	  200916	  
	  
Duration	  and	  intensity	  of	  well	  drilling	  The	   argument	   that	   multi-­‐well	   pad	   horizontal	   drilling	   reduces	   surface	   disturbance	   is	  based	   on	   a	   calculation	   of	   total	   surface	   area	   and	   average	   well	   spacing	   which,	   by	  themselves,	   do	   not	   necessarily	   serve	   as	   sufficient	   indicators	   for	   overall	   land	   use	  requirements.	   A	  more	   comprehensive	  method	  would	   consider	   both	   the	   duration	   and	  intensity	  of	  drilling	  and	  completion	  activities.	  Due	  account	  must	  be	  taken	  of	  factors	  such	  as	   water	   consumption,	   truck	   trips,	   noise	   levels	   and	   visual	   impacts,	   all	   of	   which	   may	  significantly	  affect	  the	  land	  access	  issue,	  particularly	  in	  Europe.	  	  The	  duration	  of	  development	  for	  a	  multi-­‐well	  pad	  differs	  significantly	  according	  to	  the	  number	  of	  wells	  drilled.	  Many	  drilling	  activities,	  such	  as	  fracking	  or	  clean-­‐up	  operations,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12 	  National	   Park	   Service,	   'Potential	   Development	   of	   Marcellus	   Shale';	   Joel	   Parshall,	   'Barnett	   Shale	  Showcases	   Tight-­‐Gas	  Development',	   Journal	  of	  Petroleum	  Technology	   September	   (2008):	   55;	   Lisa	   Sumi,	  'Shale	  Gas:	  Focus	  on	  the	  Marcellus	  Shale',	  (Washington,	  DC:	  Earthworks,	  2008),	  18.	  13	  Of	   course,	   there	   are	   spacing	   arrangements	   as	   high	   as	   one	   per	   square	  mile;	   ALL	   Consulting,	   'Modern	  Shale	  Gas	  development';	  National	  Park	  Service,	   'Potential	  Development	  of	  Marcellus	  Shale';	  Sumi,	   'Shale	  Gas'.	  	  14	  See	  INTEK,	  'Review	  of	  emerging	  resources',	  Appendix	  B.	  	  15	  Howard	  Rogers,	  'Shale	  Gas	  -­‐	  the	  unfolding	  story',	  Oxford	  Review	  of	  Economic	  Policy	  27,	  no	  1	  (2011):	  128.	  16	  Hazen	   and	   Sawyer,	   'Final	   Impact	  Assessment	   of	  Natural	   Gas	   Production	   in	   the	  New	  York	  City	  Water	  Supply	  Watershed',	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  New	  York	  City	  Department	  of	  Environmental	  Protection,	  2009),	  23.	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can	  only	  be	   carried	  out	   for	   one	  well	   at	   a	   time;	   thus,	   the	   greater	  number	  of	  wells,	   the	  longer	   pre-­‐production	   operations	   are	   liable	   to	   take.	   Since	   drilling	   and	   completion	  activities	  are	  also	  contingent	  on	  a	  number	  of	  geological,	  logistical	  and	  regulatory	  factors,	  estimates	   of	   their	   duration	   tend	   to	   vary.	   Moreover,	   whereas	   some	   studies	   provide	  figures	   for	   the	   total	   amount	   of	   time	   necessary	   to	   develop	   an	   entire	   well-­‐pad	   (e.g.	  including	  the	  construction	  of	  access	  roads	  and	  utility	  lines),	  others	  focus	  on	  the	  duration	  of	  drilling	  and	  fracking	  activities.	  Table	  4-­‐2	  below	  summarises	  the	  figures	  provided	  by	  these	  various	  reports.	  Despite	  these	  differences,	  a	  point	  of	  agreement	   in	  the	   literature	  rests	   on	   the	   fact	   that	   drilling	   horizontally	   generally	   takes	   around	   double	   the	   amount	  time	  as	  for	  a	  vertical	  well.17	  
Table	  4-­‐2:	  Duration	  of	  drilling	  and	  completion	  activities	  
Source	   Duration	   Type	  Wood	  et	  al.	  (2011)	   500-­‐1	  500	  days	   6-­‐well	  pad	  Downey	  (2010)	   Up	   to	   18	  months	   Multi-­‐well	  +	  pad	  Energy	  Resources	  Conservation	  Board	  (2011)	   12-­‐36	  months	   Multi-­‐well	  +	  pad	  New	  York	  State	  Department	  of	  Environmental	  Conservation	  (2009)	   6-­‐13	  months	   Single	   horizontal	   well	   +	  pad	  Cuadrilla	  Resources	  (2011a)	   6-­‐8	  months	   Single	   horizontal	   well	   +	  pad	  Hazen	  and	  Sawyer	  (2009)	   4-­‐10	  months	   Single	   horizontal	   well	   +	  pad	  ICF	  International	  (2009)	   2-­‐4	  months	   Single	  horizontal	  well	  Anderson	  (2009)	   2	  ½	  months	   Single	  horizontal	  well	  NTC	  Consultants	  (2009)	   1-­‐2	  months	   Single	  horizontal	  well	  	  
Figure	  4-­‐5:	  Timeline	  for	  shale	  gas	  development	  and	  production	  (single	  well)18	  
	  The	  duration	  of	  drilling	  for	  each	  horizontal	  well	  is	  particularly	  important	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Europe,	  which	  has	  far	  fewer	  active	  land-­‐based	  gas	  drilling	  rigs	  than	  the	  USA.	  This	  means	  that	   should	   several	   shale	   gas	   plays	   in	   different	   countries	   be	   deemed	   commercially	  viable,	  competition	  over	  bookings	  for	  well	  drilling	  can	  become	  a	  crucial	  developmental	  bottleneck.	   In	  addition,	  one	  overlooked	  point	   in	  determining	  well	  drilling	   times	   is	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  NTC	  Consultants,	  'Impacts	  on	  Community	  Character',	  18.	  18	  Downey,	  'Fueling	  North	  America's	  future'.	  It	  must	  be	  borne	  in	  mind	  that	  the	  life-­‐span	  of	  a	  shale	  gas	  well	  is	  yet	  unknown,	  and	  that	  various	  estimates	  have	  been	  presented	  in	  the	  literature	  study.	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delay	  caused	  by	  force	  majeure,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  surface	  level	  disturbances	  (e.g.	  weather-­‐related	   delays)	   or	   unforeseen	   sub-­‐surface	   difficulties.	   Indeed,	   Cuadrilla	   Resources	  experienced	   all	   of	   these	   developmental	   bottlenecks	   whilst	   attempting	   to	   build	   a	   test	  well	  in	  Lancashire.19	  	  In	  New	  York	  state,	   the	  regulatory	   limit	  on	  well	  drilling	  activity	  per	  site	   is	   three	  years,	  which	   is	   indicative	   of	   the	   maximum	   time	   it	   may	   take	   for	   a	   single	   site	   to	   experience	  drilling	  and	  completion	  activities.20	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  consider	  that	  within	  this	  span	  some	  pads	  may	  not	  be	  fully	  developed	  in	  one	  consecutive	  period	  of	  time.	  According	  to	  a	  consultancy	  report	  for	  the	  New	  York	  State	  Energy	  Research	  and	  Development	  Authority	  (NYSERDA),	  operators	  may	  drill	  one	  or	  two	  wells	  on	  a	  pad	  to	  determine	  its	  productivity	  before	  deciding	  to	  drill	  the	  remaining	  wells;	  the	  decision	  to	  further	  develop	  a	  site	  may	  also	   be	   contingent	   on	   favourable	   market	   conditions.21	  Finally,	   if	   re-­‐fracking	   or	   other	  stimulation	   and	  workover	   efforts	   are	   deemed	   necessary	   to	   prolong	   the	   life-­‐span	   of	   a	  well,	  a	  renewed	  period	  of	  intense	  development	  activity	  may	  occur	  several	  months	  after	  the	  production	  phase	  has	   started.	  Thus,	   given	   that	   six	   to	   ten	  wells	   are	  expected	   to	  be	  required	   to	   fully	   exploit	   the	   natural	   gas	   resources	   in	   a	   640-­‐acre	   spacing	   unit,	   it	   is	  reasonable	   to	   expect	   that	   a	   given	   well	   site	   will	   be	   undergoing	   a	   relatively	   high	   and	  constant	  level	  of	   industrial	  activity	  for	  at	   least	  one	  and	  up	  to	  three	  years.22	  Thereafter,	  one	  study	  maintains	  that	  drilling	  operations	   ‘continue	  for	  the	  whole	  field	   life	  and	  they	  are	  required	  to	  maintain	  the	  production	  plateau’.23	  Shale	  gas	  development	  requires	  heavy	  truck	  traffic	  to	  and	  from	  the	  site	  for	  this	  period	  of	  time.	  Few	  figures	  on	  the	  intensity	  of	  road	  traffic	  during	  well	  construction	  are	  available.	  One	   of	   the	   few	   original	   estimates	   available	   stems	   from	   NYSDEC,	   which	   estimates	  approximately	   4	  300-­‐6	  600	   truck	   visits	   for	   a	   multiple	   horizontal	   well-­‐pad	   in	   the	  development	   phase	   of	   a	   shale	   gas	   project.24	  For	   single	   horizontal	  well	   pads,	   a	   related	  analysis	   carried	   out	   for	   NYSERDA	   estimates	   two	   scenarios	   of	   1	  420	   and	   2	  000	   truck	  trips.25	  The	  majority	  of	  this	  transportation	  activity	  is	  for	  water	  and	  wastewater	  hauling	  during	   the	   development	   and	   fracking	   phase,	   which	   is	   relatively	   unique	   to	   shale	   gas	  development.	   The	   report	   concludes	   that	   because	   of	   this	   “the	   truck	   traffic	   associated	  with	   drilling	   a	   horizontal	   well	   with	   high-­‐volume	   hydraulic	   fracturing	   is	   2	   to	   3	   times	  higher	   than	   the	   truck	   traffic	   associated	  with	  drilling	   a	   vertical	  well.”26	  In	   terms	  of	   the	  timeframe	  of	   trucking	  activities,	   the	  table	  below	  shows	  the	  daily	  distribution	  of	   traffic	  over	  a	  50-­‐day	  period	  during	   initial	  well	  pad	  development	  of	  horizontal/vertical	  wells.	  However,	   it	   has	   been	   argued	   that	   the	  marked	   increase	   in	   truck	   traffic	   for	   horizontal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Cuadrilla	   Resources,	   'Planning	   Application	   for	   Preese	   Hall	   Exploration	   Site:	   Temporary	   Planning	  Permission	  for	  a	  Hydrocarbon	  Exploration	  Borehole',	  (Lichfield,	  West	  Sussex:	  2011).	  20	  New	   York	   State	   Department	   of	   Environmental	   Conservation,	   'Draft	   SGEIS',	   3-­‐4,	   5-­‐30.	   The	   Tyndall	  Centre’s	  report	  uses	  NYSDEC	  figures	  to	  arrive	  at	  a	  duration	  of	  500-­‐1	  500	  days	  for	  all	  operations	  prior	  to	  production	   of	   a	   six-­‐well	   pad.	   It	   is	   unclear	   how	   these	   figures	   were	   calculated.	   Wood	   et	   al.,	   'Shale	   gas	  provisional	  assessment'.	  21	  ICF	  International,	  'Well	  Permit	  Issuance	  for	  Horizontal	  Drilling	  and	  High-­‐Volume	  Hydraulic	  Fracturing	  to	  Develop	  the	  Marcellus	  Shale	  and	  Other	  Low	  Permeability	  Gas	  Reservoirs',	  (Albany,	  NY:	  New	  York	  State	  Energy	  Research	  and	  Development	  Authority,	  2009),	  9.	  22New	  York	  State	  Department	  of	  Environmental	  Conservation,	  'Draft	  SGEIS',	  Section	  4.	  23	  M.	  Guarnone	  et	  al.,	   'An	  unconventional	  mindset	   for	  shale	  gas	  surface	   facilities',	   Journal	  of	  Natural	  Gas	  
Science	  and	  Engineering	  6	  (2012).	  24	  Wood	  et	  al.,	  'Shale	  gas	  provisional	  assessment',	  24.	  25	  NTC	  Consultants,	  'Impacts	  on	  Community	  Character',	  13.	  26	  New	  York	  State	  Department	  of	  Environmental	  Conservation,	  'Draft	  SGEIS',	  6-­‐301.	  
	  110	  
wells	  would	  be	  offset	  by	  the	  fewer	  number	  of	  pads	  necessary	  to	  develop	  a	  given	  shale	  play,	  given	  that	  rigs	  and	  equipment	  would	  only	  need	  to	  be	  delivered	  and	  removed	  one	  time	   for	   the	   drilling	   and	   stimulation	   of	   all	   the	  wells	   on	   a	   given	   pad.27	  This	   argument,	  however,	  can	  be	  contested	  by	  the	  earlier	  reference	  made	  to	  the	  practice	  of	  drilling	  one	  or	  two	  wells	  to	  determine	  productivity	  before	  further	  developing	  a	  well	  site.	  	  
Figure	  4-­‐6:	  Estimated	  daily	  heavy	  and	  light	  truck	  round-­‐trip	  traffic	  by	  well	  type28	  
	  Two	   additional	   issues	   associated	   with	   land	   use	   intensity	   and	   lengthier	   construction	  periods	  are	  noise	  and	  visual	  impacts.	  Noise	  sources,	  which	  are	  most	  prominent	  during	  the	  drilling	  phase,	   include	  various	  rigging	  operations,	  pipe	  handling,	   compressors	  and	  operations	  of	  trucks,	  backhoes,	  tractors	  and	  cement	  mixing.	  In	  most	  cases,	  moderate	  to	  significant	  noise	  impacts	  may	  be	  felt	  within	  300	  metres	  of	  a	  well	  site.29	  In	  more	  highly	  developed	   or	   more	   densely	   populated	   areas,	   these	   noise	   impacts	   may	   serve	   as	  constraints	   to	   the	  24-­‐hour	  drilling	  activity	   that	   is	   typical	   for	  several	  weeks	  during	   the	  drilling	  phase	  of	  a	  single	  horizontal	  well.	   In	  any	  case,	  noise	  impacts	  are	  best	  mitigated	  through	  well	  site	  location	  and	  design.	  As	  for	  visual	  impacts,	  it	  is	  common	  for	  horizontal	  drilling	   rigs	   to	   reach	   over	   40	   metres,	   compared	   with	   10-­‐30	   metres	   for	   conventional	  vertical	  well-­‐drilling	   equipment	   and	   for	   their	   substructure	   to	   occupy	   a	   larger	   surface	  area.30	  Thus,	  although	  the	  noise	  and	  visual	  impact	  stemming	  from	  horizontal	  drilling	  are	  both	   larger	   and	   lengthier	   than	   those	   arising	   from	   vertical	   well	   construction,	   the	  theoretically	   reduced	   number	   of	   well-­‐pads	   for	   a	   given	   spacing	   unit	   may	   offset	   the	  discrepancy.	  There	  are	  other	   technological	  developments	   that	  have	  been	   identified	  as	  potential	  mitigating	  factors	  on	  future	  levels	  of	  surface	  disturbance;	  for	  example,	  reuse	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Ibid.,	  6-­‐304.	  28	  Ibid.	  29	  NTC	  Consultants,	  'Impacts	  on	  Community	  Character',	  15.	  30	  Ibid.,	  18.	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water	   that	   can	   reduce	   the	   requisite	   trucking	   or	   horizontal	   drilling	   technology	   that	  allows	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  flexibility	  in	  pad	  placement.31	  
Associated	  infrastructure	  Beyond	   the	   immediate	   surface-­‐level	   requirements	   for	   constructing	   and	   operating	   a	  shale	   gas	   well	   pad,	   it	   is	   also	   necessary	   to	   consider	   the	   surrounding	   infrastructure	  necessary	  to	  support	  potentially	  large-­‐scale	  development	  of	  a	  much	  wider	  area.	  As	  one	  report	   notes,	   large	   scale	   development	   of	   shale	   gas	   resources	   in	   a	   continuous	   play	  requires	   facilities	   to	   support	  high-­‐volume	  hydraulic	   fracturing	   (e.g.	  water	  withdrawal,	  storage	  and	  treatment	  facilities).	  Besides	  the	  access	  roads	  and	  utility	  lines	  required	  for	  individual	  well	  pads,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  develop	  gas	  gathering	  systems,	  offsite	  production	  and	  processing	  facilities,	  and	  transmission	  lines,	  as	  well	  as	  ‘other	  activities	  to	  bring	  the	  gas	  resource	  into	  production…on	  a	  more	  consolidated	  and	  centralized	  basis	  because	  of	  the	  overall	  vision	  for	  development	  and	  the	  potential	  for	  achieving	  economies	  of	  scale’.32	  Depending	  on	  the	  proximity	  to	  areas	  of	  gas	  demand,	  drilling	  companies	  may	  opt	  either	  to	  construct	  additional	  pipelines	  to	  connect	  into	  the	  main	  gas	  pipeline	  network	  or	  create	  on-­‐site	  electricity	  generation	  which	  is	  then	  connected	  to	  the	  grid.	  According	  to	  a	  report	  commissioned	  by	  Cuadrilla	  Resources	  UK,	  “under	  either	  approach	  a	  substantial	  body	  of	  additional	   labour	   and	   equipment	   is	   required	   to	   put	   in	   place	   the	   necessary	  infrastructure,	   which	   will	   grow	   in	   scale	   as	   the	   number	   of	   wells	   in	   any	   one	   location	  increases.”33	  	  In	  comparative	  terms,	  the	  dearth	  of	  upstream	  onshore	  gas	  production	  infrastructure	  in	  Europe	  is	  commonly	  identified	  as	  an	  impediment	  to	  large-­‐scale	  shale	  gas	  production.34	  In	   the	   USA,	   by	   contrast,	   two	   of	   the	   larger	   shale	   plays	   are	   overlaid	   by	   extensive	   gas	  transport	   and	   processing	   infrastructure	   (e.g.	   in	   New	   York	   and	   Texas,	   respectively)	  owing	   to	   these	   states’	   previous	  historical	   development	   of	   conventional	   gas	   resources.	  Even	   in	   these	   well-­‐developed	   markets,	   necessary	   investments	   in	   mid-­‐stream	  infrastructure	   to	   support	   additional	   gas	   production	   have	   incurred significant additional 
costs. For example, construction of gas gathering systems and processing facilities 
constituted 15% of industry spending by Marcellus gas producers in Pennsylvania in 2009.35 A	  recent	  study	  on	  the	  surface	  facilities	  needed	  to	  accommodate	  shale	  gas	  production	  in	  Europe	   makes	   the	   valid	   point	   that	   the	   identification	   of	   sweet	   spots	   on	   the	   basis	   of	  geological	   and	   reservoir	   parameters	   alone	   may	   not	   sufficiently	   reflect	   the	   optimal	  location	  for	  shale	  gas	  extraction.36	  Rather,	  a	   ‘multi-­‐disciplinary’	  mindset	  is	  required	  for	  anticipating	  the	  need	  for	  transport	  and	  processing	  infrastructure,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  surface-­‐level	  restrictions	  brought	  about	  by	  environmental	  or	  other	  land	  use	  regulations.	  These	  issues	   of	   surface-­‐level	   downstream	   transport	   capacity	  will	   be	   taken	  up	   in	   Section	   4.2	  through	  a	  discussion	  of	  pipeline	  transmission	  and	  distribution	  grid	  density.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Ibid.,	  26.	  32	  Ibid.,	  4.	  This	  type	  of	  centralised	  infrastructure	  roll-­‐out	  also	  importantly	  affects	  the	  commercial	  viability	  of	  a	  given	  play.	  	  33	  Cuadrilla	  Resources,	  'Economic	  Impact	  in	  Lancashire'.	  34	  ‘Memorandum	  submitted	  by	  Shell’	  in	  House	  of	  Commons,	  'Shale	  Gas:	  Fifth	  Report	  of	  Session	  2010-­‐12',	  ed.	  Energy	  and	  Climate	  Change	  Committee	  (London:	  House	  of	  Commons,	  2011),	  points	  17,	  19	  and	  21.	  35	  Timothy	   J.	  Considine,	  Robert	  Watson	  and	  Seth	  Blumsack,	   'The	  Economic	   Impacts	  of	   the	  Pennsylvania	  Marcellus	  Shale	  Natural	  Gas	  Play:	  An	  Update',	  (Altoona,	  PA:	  Pennsylvania	  State	  University,	  2010),	  5.	  36	  Guarnone	  et	  al.,	  'Unconventional	  mindset'.	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Figure	  4-­‐7:	  Natural	  gas	  processing	  plants	  and	  production	  basins	  in	  the	  USA,	  200937	  
	  	  
Cumulative	  impacts	  This	  section	  has	  presented	  the	  land	  access	  requirements	  for	  shale	  gas	  development	  in	  a	  bottom-­‐up	  manner	  by	  employing	  a	  per	  well	  approach.	  However,	  in	  order	  to	  adequately	  consider	   shale	   gas	   surface	   requirements	   and	   associated	   land	   access	   issues,	   it	   is	  necessary	   to	   consider	   the	   cumulative	   impact	   of	   several	   horizontal	   wells	   being	   drilled	  annually	  over	  a	  longer	  period	  of	  development.	  Cumulative	  impacts	  are	  the	  effects	  of	  two	  or	   more	   single	   projects	   considered	   together.	   Since	   some	   countries	   may	   have	  considerable	  quantities	  of	  the	  resource,	  some	  studies	  have	  speculated	  on	  the	  cumulative	  effects	   of	   large-­‐scale	   build-­‐outs.	   For	   example,	   a	   recent	   study	   of	   potential	   shale	   gas	  development	  in	  the	  UK	  has	  provided	  an	  estimate	  of	  the	  resources	  required	  to	  produce	  10%	   of	   UK	   gas	   consumption	   from	   shale;	   it	   argues	   that,	   “to	   sustain	   this	   level	   of	  production	   for	  20	  years	   in	   the	  UK	  would	  require	  around	  2,500-­‐3,000	  horizontal	  wells	  spread	  over	  some	  140-­‐400km2	  and	  some	  27	   to	  113	  million	   tonnes	  of	  water.”38	  Such	  a	  large-­‐scale	  activity,	  with	  multiple	  rigs	  operating	  at	  the	  same	  time	  in	  a	  continuous	  area,	  may	  lead	  to	  a	  number	  of	  potentially	  negative	  impacts	  on	  water	  quality,	  land	  use,	  wildlife	  and	   natural	   resources,	   agriculture,	   tourism	   and	   the	   overall	   quality	   of	   life	   in	   a	  community.	  These	  impacts,	  of	  course,	  may	  differ	  depending	  on	  the	  scale	  of	  development	  which,	  as	  Section	  4.1.2	  will	  address,	   can	  be	  monitored	  or	  potentially	   restricted	  by	   the	  regulatory	  regime	  in	  place.	  Whatever	  rules	  are	  in	  place,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  recognise	  that	  cumulative	   impacts	   could	   be	   considered	   excessive,	   even	   when	   individual	   operators	  meet	  or	  even	  exceed	  regulatory	  requirements.	  Indeed,	  “the	  combination	  of	  impacts	  from	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  EIA,	  'Natural	  Gas	  Processing	  Plants	  in	  the	  United	  States:	  2010	  Update',	  (Washington,	  DC:	  2011).	  38	  Wood	  et	  al.,	  'Shale	  gas	  provisional	  assessment',	  53.	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multiple	   drilling	   and	   production	   operations,	   support	   infrastructure	   (pipelines,	   road	  networks,	  etc.)	  and	  related	  activities	  can	  overwhelm	  ecosystems	  and	  communities.”39	  For	   Europe,	   what	   would	   be	   the	   cumulative	   impact	   of	   a	   large-­‐scale	   roll-­‐out	   of	  unconventional	   gas	   development	   and	   production?	   A	   birds-­‐eye	   view	   of	   the	   most	  productive	   shale	  plays	   in	   the	  USA	  may	  be	  an	   instructive	   analogue.	   Indeed,	   comparing	  the	  two	  maps	  below	  of	  the	  Barnett	  Shale	   in	  Texas	   illustrates	  the	  scale	  of	  development	  currently	  in	  operation.	  	  
Figure	  4-­‐8:	  Barnett	  Shale	  drilling	  in	  1997	  and	  2009,	  Ft.	  Worth	  Basin,	  Texas,	  USA40	  
	   	  	  However,	  several	  ‘positive’	  factors	  would	  likely	  militate	  against	  such	  a	  large-­‐scale	  build-­‐out	  in	  Europe,	  principal	  among	  which	  is	  the	  improvement	  in	  technology	  that	  allows	  for	  multi-­‐well	   pad	   drilling.	   Other	   technological	   developments,	   such	   as	   efficiency	   gains	  acquired	   through	   refined	   fracking	   and	   water	   management	   techniques,	   as	   well	   as	  improved	   seismic	   evaluation	  methods	   that	   avoid	   the	  need	   to	   drill	  multiple	   test	  wells,	  may	  alter	   the	  degree	  of	  surface-­‐level	  disturbance	  as	   fewer	  sites	  with	   less	   lengthy	  well	  construction	  activities	  become	   the	  norm.41	  This	   issue	  of	   technological	   learning	  and	   its	  impact	  on	  future	  development	  activities	  is	  further	  explored	  in	  Chapter	  3	  and	  Section	  C.4	  of	  the	  Annexes.	  
4.1.2 Regulatory	  framework	  This	  section	  will	  consider	  the	  most	  common	  issues	  identified	  in	  the	  literature	  regarding	  the	  spatial	   constraints	   to	  shale	  gas	  development,	  with	  a	  particular	   focus	  on	  Europe.	  A	  successful	   regulatory	   regime	   governing	   the	   exploitation	   of	   any	   sub-­‐surface	   mineral	  must	   reconcile	   the	   objectives	   of	   three	   main	   sets	   of	   actors:	   governments,	   with	   their	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Subcommittee	   on	   Shale	   Gas	   Production,	   'The	   SEAB	   Shale	   Gas	   Production	   Subcommittee	   Ninety-­‐Day	  Report',	  (Washington,	  DC:	  Secretary	  of	  Energy	  Advisory	  Board,	  2011).	  	  40	  Richard	   Newell,	   'Shale	   Gas	   and	   the	   Outlook	   for	   US	   Natural	   Gas	   Markets	   and	   Global	   Gas	   Resources'	  (paper	  presented	  at	  the	  Organization	  for	  Economic	  Co-­‐operation	  and	  Development	  Paris,	  2011).	  41	  Gény,	  'Unconventional	  Gas',	  60.	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desire	  to	  maximise	  rents	  while	  achieving	  socioeconomic	  objectives;	  market	  players	  and	  their	  desire	  for	  a	  return	  on	  investment	  that	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  risk	  associated	  with	  the	  project;	  and	   finally,	   the	  needs	  of	  societal	  actors	   to	  preserve	  or	   improve	  welfare	   in	  social,	   monetary	   or	   environmental	   terms. 42 	  The	   regulatory	   framework	   must	  accommodate	   these	   overlapping	   spheres	   of	   interest	   that	   often	  may	   conflict	   with	   one	  another	   (see	   Figure	   4-­‐9).	   This	   is	   largely	   because	   the	   three	   sets	   of	   actors	   tend	   to	   use	  different	  criteria	  for	  evaluating	  their	  respective	  needs.	  For	  example,	  societal	  actors	  will	  judge	  the	  desirability	  of	  shale	  gas	  development	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  welfare	  effects	  and	   related	   indicators,	   such	   as	   the	   provision	   of	   public	   goods	   or	   the	   environmental	  impact	  of	  gas	  drilling,	  whereas	  market	  actors	  will	  assess	  their	  investments	  on	  the	  basis	  of	   the	   net	   present	   value	   of	   assets	   or	   the	   internal	   rate	   of	   return	   for	   a	   given	   project.	  Regulatory	   frameworks	   governing	   hydrocarbon	   production	   must	   balance	   these	  interests	   so	   as	   to	   encourage	   investment,	   prevent	   environmental	   degradation	   and	  distribute	  the	  gains	  (and	  losses)	  of	  shale	  gas	  development	  fairly.	  In	   most	   European	   countries	   –	   particularly	   those	   with	   indigenous	   hydrocarbon	  production	   –	   there	   exists	   a	   raft	   of	   regulations	   and	   procedures	   governing	   the	   various	  operations	   associated	   with	   sub-­‐surface	   mining	   activities.	   Given	   the	   partial	   degree	   of	  overlap	  between	  conventional	  and	  unconventional	  gas	  development,	  several	  of	  the	  legal	  regimes	   in	   place	   apply	   to	   activities	   associated	   with	   the	   latter.	   There	   are,	   of	   course,	  regulatory	   challenges	   unique	   to	   unconventional	   gas.	   Additional	   national	   and	   EU	  legislation	  may	  apply	  to	  activities	  associated	  with	  advanced	  well	  stimulation	  techniques,	  such	   as	   that	   governing	   water	   management	   and	   the	   use	   of	   chemicals.43 	  However,	  detailing	  the	  requisite	  EU,	  national	  and	  local	  permits,	  concessions,	  licences	  and	  potential	  gaps	   in	   legislation	   for	   each	   European	   country	   is	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   this	   section.	   A	  preliminary	   investigation	   of	   these	   issues	   has	   been	   provided	   by	   a	   legal	   study	  commissioned	  by	  DG	  ENER.44	  However,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  note	   that	   this	   study	  did	  not	  assess	   the	   applicable	   EU	   requirements	   and	   covered	   permitting	   and	   licensing	  requirements	  in	  a	   limited	  number	  of	  Member	  States	  (DE,	  FR,	  PL	  and	  SE);	   further	   legal	  assessment	   is	  on-­‐going	   in	  the	   frame	  of	  a	  study	  commissioned	  by	  DG	  ENV.	  Drawing	  on	  this	  and	  other	  literature,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  highlight	  the	  key	  points	  that	  have	  been	  raised	  in	  relation	  to	  surface	  accessibility	  for	  shale	  gas	  development.	  These	  regulatory	  issues	  can	  be	  broadly	  summarised	  according	  to	  their	  technical/logistical,	  legal	  and	  socioeconomic	  dimensions.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Adapted	  from	  Silvana	  Tordo,	  'Fiscal	  Systems	  for	  Hydrocarbons,	  WP	  123,'	  in	  World	  Bank	  Working	  Paper	  (Washington,	  DC:	  World	  Bank,	  2007).	  43	  See	  Stefan	  Lechtenböhmer	  et	  al.,	  'Impacts	  of	  shale	  gas	  and	  shale	  oil	  extraction	  on	  the	  environment	  and	  on	  human	  health',	  (Brussels:	  European	  Parliament,	  2011).	  44	  Philippe	  &	  Partners,	  'Unconventional	  Gas	  in	  Europe'.	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Figure	  4-­‐9:	  Key	  elements	  of	  an	  unconventional	  gas	  regulatory	  framework45	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Technical/logistical	  issues	  Once	  a	  prospective	  drilling	  area	  is	  deemed	  commercially	  viable,	  companies	  must	  secure	  a	  concession	  and	  a	  right	   to	  drill	   from	  the	  owners	  of	   the	  mineral	  resources	  (which	  are	  usually	   administered	   in	   Europe	   by	   state	   departments	   –	   e.g.	   mining	   authorities	   or	  equivalent).	  At	   the	  same	  time,	  drillers	  must	  also	  acquire	  consent	   to	  access	   the	  surface	  area	  overlaying	   the	   shale	  gas	  play;	   this	   involves	  negotiations	  with	   local	   authorities	   as	  well	  as	  private	  landowners.	  	  According	  to	  Florence	  Gény,	  there	  are	  three	  methods	  whereby	  land	  can	  be	  accessed	  in	  Europe,	  namely	  through	  negotiating	  a	   fee	   for	  renting	  the	   land,	  a	  compulsory	  purchase	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Based	  on	  analysis	  by	  ALL	  Consulting,	  'Modern	  Shale	  Gas	  development';	  Sally	  Kornfeld,	  'Socio-­‐Economic	  Considerations	  in	  Shale	  Gas	  Development'	  (paper	  presented	  at	  the	  Atlantic	  Council	  Meeting,	  2011);	  New	  York	   State	   Department	   of	   Environmental	   Conservation,	   'Draft	   SGEIS';	   Tordo,	   'Fiscal	   Systems	   for	  Hydrocarbons'.	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by	  government	  (or,	  in	  extreme	  cases,	  via	  eminent	  domain)	  or	  through	  acquisition	  of	  the	  land	   by	   the	   drilling	   company.46	  Gény	   claims	   that	   concessions	   granted	   by	   European	  governments	  are	  small,	  with	  one	  block	  generally	  comprising	  2.6	  km2,	  making	   it	  highly	  difficult	   to	   conduct	   exploration	   activities.47	  However,	   it	   is	   unclear	   how	   this	   figure	   has	  been	   calculated	   and	   there	   may	   in	   fact	   be	   much	   variation	   hidden	   behind	   such	   a	  generalisation.	  For	  example,	  a	  report	  on	  shale	  gas	  by	  the	  British	  Geological	  Survey	  notes	  that	  the	  UK	  uses	  100km2	  blocks	  in	  its	  licensing	  rounds	  (the	  most	  recent	  13th	  Onshore	  Licence	  Round	  awarded	  55	  new	   licences	   covering	  more	   than	  7	  000	  km2).48	  In	  Poland,	  too,	   the	   rule	   is	   that	  a	   single	  concession	  cannot	  exceed	  an	  area	  of	  1	  200	  km2,	  but	  even	  here	  there	  is	  no	  limit	  as	  to	  the	  number	  of	  concessions	  one	  entity	  can	  hold.49	  Nonetheless,	  even	  such	  larger	  dimensions	  for	  concession	  holders	  may	  not	  be	  sufficient	  to	  evaluate	  shale	  gas	  plays	  to	  the	  scale	  witnessed	  in	  the	  US	  case.	  A	  report	  by	  IHS	  CERA	  contrasts	   a	   typical	   240	   km2	   concession	   block	   in	   Europe	   with	   a	   single	   US	   operator’s	  concession	  area	  in	  the	  Fayetteville	  shale	  covering	  over	  3	  500	  km2.50	  This	  has	  a	  bearing	  on	   the	   amount	   of	   landowners	   that	   drilling	   companies	   must	   engage	   with	   in	   order	   to	  secure	  access	  to	  land,	  not	  only	  for	  purposes	  of	  drilling	  but	  also	  for	  play	  evaluation	  and	  thoroughfare	   (for	   example,	   extensive	   use	   of	   access	   roads).	   Indeed,	   since	   open	  agricultural	  areas	  are	  the	  most	  likely	  candidates	  for	  shale	  gas	  drilling,	  it	  has	  been	  noted	  that	  the	  size	  of	  farming	  plots	  in	  Europe	  are	  much	  smaller	  than	  in	  the	  USA.51	  Returning	  to	  the	  example	  of	  Poland,	  most	  farms	  are	  10-­‐20	  hectares	  in	  size,	  meaning	  that	  drillers	  will	  ‘have	  to	  engage	  several	   landowners	   for	  permission	  to	  construct	  a	  drilling	  pad	  and	  the	  type	   of	   factory-­‐scale	   production	   where	   well	   pads	   are	   placed	   at	   regular	   intervals	   is	  impossible’.52	  This	   is	   compounded	  by	   the	  oft-­‐repeated	  point	   that	  exploration	   for	  shale	  gas	  requires	  a	  much	  larger	  initial	  surface	  area	  than	  for	  conventional	  gas.	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  of	  crucial	   importance	   to	   locate	   a	   shale	   play’s	   ‘sweet	   spots’	   from	   which	   the	   gas	   can	   be	  extracted	  under	  the	  most	  favourable	  geological	  conditions.	  	  Moreover,	  in	  this	  context	  comparisons	  are	  often	  made	  between	  the	  population	  densities	  surrounding	  US	  shale	  formations	  versus	  those	  found	  in	  Europe.	  It	  is	  commonly	  argued	  that	   the	   comparatively	   low	   population	   density	   in	   the	   United	   States	   is	   particularly	  amenable	   to	   land-­‐intensive	   exploration	   and	   drilling	   operations.53	  To	  make	   this	   point,	  many	   studies	   are	   content	   to	   overlay	   national	   spatial	   population	   density	   data	   with	  prospective	  shale	  plays	  or	  compare	  the	  population	  densities	  of	  US	  states	  with	  those	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Gény,	  'Unconventional	  Gas'.	  47	  Ibid.	  48	  Harvey	  and	  Gray,	  'Unconventional	  resources	  of	  Britain'.	  49 	  Ewa	   Zalewska,	   'The	   Concession	   granting	   policy	   for	   prospecting,	   exploration	   and	   production	   of	  hydrocarbons	  in	  Poland',	  Przeglad	  Geologiczny	  55,	  no	  12/1	  (2007).	  50	  IHS	  CERA,	  'Gas	  from	  Shale:	  Potential	  Outside	  North	  America?',	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  IHS	  CERA,	  2009).	  51	  Centrica	   Energy,	   'Unconventional	   Gas	   in	   Europe:	   Response	   to	   DECC	   Consultation',	   (Windsor:	   2010),	  House	   of	   Commons,	   'Shale	   Gas:	   Fifth	   Report	   of	   Session	   2010-­‐12',	   ed.	   Energy	   and	   Climate	   Change	  Committee	  (London:	  House	  Of	  Commons,	  2011).	  This	  document	  contrasts	  the	  average	  farm	  size	  of	  12	  ha	  in	   Poland	  with	   160	  ha	   or	   210	  ha	   in	  Oklahoma	   and	  Texas,	   respectively;	   see	   also	   Gény,	   'Unconventional	  Gas',	  74.	  52	  Cleantech,	  'Investment	  Guide',	  59.	  53	  Rick	   Carr	   and	   Chuck	   Chakravarthy,	   'Natural	   Gas:	   Revoluiton	   or	   evolution',	   (New	   York,	   NY:	   Deloitte	  Development	  LLC	  2011);	   Centrica	  Energy,	   'Unconventional	  Gas	   in	  Europe';	  Gény,	   'Unconventional	  Gas';	  Andreas	  Korn,	   'Prospects	  for	  unconventional	  gas	  in	  Europe',	  (Düsseldorf:	  E.ON,	  2010);	  Maximilian	  Kuhn	  and	  Frank	  Umbach,	  'Strategic	  Perspectives	  of	  Unconventional	  Gas:	  A	  Game	  Changer	  with	  Implications	  for	  the	   EU’s	   Energy	   Security',	   in	   EUCERS	   Strategy	   Paper,	   ed.	   European	   Centre	   for	   Energy	   and	   Resource	  Security	  (London:	  Department	  of	  War	  Studies,	  King's	  College	  London	  2011);	  Stevens,	  'Hype	  and	  reality'.	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several	  European	  countries.54	  This	  kind	  of	  coarse	  analysis,	  however,	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  rigorous	   insight	   into	   the	   bottom-­‐up	   prospects	   for	   shale	   gas	   development	   for	   a	   given	  area.	  Indeed,	  as	  one	  of	  these	  studies	  freely	  admits,	  “to	  fully	  grasp	  the	  problem	  of	  surface	  accessibility	  caused	  by	  spatial	  constraints,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  do	  an	  analysis	  at	  the	  most	  local	  level	  possible.”55	  Given	   these	   technical	   and	   logistical	   constraints	   in	  Europe,	   an	   important	   consideration	  reveals	  itself	  –	  namely	  how	  to	  manage	  multiple	  landowners	  and	  their	  varying	  claims	  to	  restrict	  and/or	  require	  compensation	  for	  accessing	  their	  property.	  This	  constitutes	  one	  of	   the	   key	   factors	   highlighted	   by	   Centrica,	   an	   energy	   firm,	   in	   its	   assessment	   of	   the	  potential	   for	  unconventional	  gas	  development	   in	  Europe.56	  It	   is	  all	   the	  more	  pertinent	  given	   the	   additional	   need	   for	   extensive	   utility	   line	   placement	   in	   the	   context	   of	   local	  opposition	   to	  any	  activities	   that	  may	  potentially	  spoil	   landscapes	  or	   require	  extensive	  excavation	  activities.	  
Legal	  issues	  The	   literature	  on	   shale	   gas	  development	  prospects	   often	  notes	   that	  European	   and	  US	  land	   ownership	   rules	   differ;	  whereas	   in	   the	   latter,	   landowners	   own	   both	   surface	   and	  mineral	  rights,	  in	  the	  former,	  sub-­‐surface	  rights	  are	  generally	  owned	  by	  the	  state.57	  The	  argument	   runs	   that	   mineral	   rights	   regimes	   in	   European	   countries	   pose	   greater	  challenges	   for	  drilling	  because	  surface	  owners	  are	  not	  entitled	   to	   royalties	  or	   ‘signing	  bonuses’	  and	  hence	  have	  little	  incentive	  to	  support	  shale	  gas	  development.58	  However,	  this	   argument	   may	   obscure	   the	   complexity	   of	   mineral	   rights	   in	   the	   USA,	   which	   are	  governed	  by	  myriad	   state	   laws	  and	  where	   “the	   leases,	   sales,	   gifts	   and	  bequests	  of	   the	  past	   have	   produced	   a	   landscape	  where	  multiple	   persons	   or	   companies	   have	   a	   partial	  ownership	  of	  or	  rights	  to	  many	  real	  estate	  parcels.”59	  Particularly	  in	  areas	  where	  there	  has	  been	  extensive	  historical	   oil	   and	  gas	  development	   (e.g.	   the	  Barnett	   and	  Marcellus	  shales)	  it	  is	  common	  for	  the	  mineral	  and	  surface	  estates	  to	  be	  owned	  by	  different	  people	  (e.g.	  a	  ‘split	  estate’).60	  This	  phenomenon	  may	  be	  under-­‐reported	  because	  “the	  extent	  of	  severed	   rights	   is	   very	   difficult	   to	   estimate	   empirically	   because	   of	   the	   lack	   of	   easily	  accessible	  records.”61	  Thus,	  the	  real	  distinction	  between	  US	  and	  European	  land	  access	  rights	  is	  not	  necessarily	  ownership	  but	   rather	   the	  degree	   to	  which	   surface	   landowners	  have	   a	   say	   in	   granting	  permission	  to	  develop	  an	  area.	  In	  the	  USA,	  state	  and	  local	  laws	  tend	  to	  favour	  the	  holder	  of	   the	  mineral	   estate.	   Indeed,	  where	   split	   estates	   exist	   in	  Texas,	   surface	  owners	  must	  allow	   the	   holder	   of	   the	  mineral	   estate	   to	   “freely	   use	   the	   surface	   estate	   to	   the	   extent	  reasonably	   necessary	   for	   the	   exploration,	   development	   and	   production	   of	   the	   oil	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Gény,	  'Unconventional	  Gas';	  House	  of	  Commons,	  'Shale	  Gas:	  Fifth	  Report	  of	  Session	  2010-­‐12';	  Roderick	  Kefferputz,	  'Shale	  Fever:	  Replicating	  the	  US	  gas	  revolution	  in	  the	  EU?	  CEPS	  Policy	  Brief	  no	  210',	  (Brussels:	  Centre	  for	  European	  Policy	  Studies,	  2010);	  Stevens,	  'Hype	  and	  reality',	  16.	  55	  Gény,	  'Unconventional	  Gas'.	  56	  Centrica	  Energy,	  'Unconventional	  Gas	  in	  Europe'.	  57	  Gény,	  'Unconventional	  Gas'.	  58	  Harvey	  and	  Gray,	  'Unconventional	  resources	  of	  Britain',	  30,	  House	  of	  Commons,	  'Shale	  Gas:	  Fifth	  Report	  of	  Session	  2010-­‐12',	  28.	  59	  geology.com,	  Mineral	  Rights	  (cited).	  60	  Anthony	   Andrews	   et	   al.,	   'Unconventional	   Gas	   Shales:	   Development,	   Technology,	   and	   Policy	   Issues',	  (Washington	  D.C.:	  Congressional	  Research	  Service,	  2009),	  27.	  61	  David	  Kay,	  'The	  Economic	  Impact	  of	  Marcellus	  Shale	  Gas	  Drilling.	  What	  Have	  We	  Learned?	  What	  are	  the	  Limitations?',	  in	  Working	  Paper	  Series	  (Ithaca,	  NY:	  Cornell	  University,	  2011).	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gas	  under	  the	  property.”62	  This	  includes	  comprehensive	  access	  to	  the	  land	  for	  carrying	  out	  seismic	  tests,	  drilling	  wells,	  building	  roads	  and	  utility	  lines	  and	  so	  on.	  Similar	  laws	  exist	  in	  other	  US	  states,	  under	  which	  surface	  owners	  must	  provide	  reasonable	  access	  to	  the	  land	  in	  exchange	  for	  the	  right	  to	  protection	  from	  “unreasonable	  encroachment	  and	  damage”	  and	  compensation	  for	  the	  use	  of	  the	  surface.	  63	  In	   Europe,	   by	   contrast,	   there	   seems	   to	   be	   some	   confusion	   as	   to	   the	   extent	   to	   which	  surface	  landowners	  can	  restrict	  the	  development	  of	  shale	  gas.	  A	  legal	  study	  on	  shale	  gas	  development	   in	  Europe	  commissioned	  by	   the	  EU	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  clear	  answer.	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  it	  is	  claims	  that	  property	  owners	  may	  not	  be	  “willing	  to	  permit	  a	  company	  on	  to	  its	  land	  if	  he	  is	  not	  being	  compensated	  by	  a	  financial	  incentive”	  yet	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  same	  report	   it	   is	  stated	  that	  such	  consent	   from	  landowners	   is	  unnecessary	  for	  the	  exploration	   and	   exploitation	   of	   state-­‐owned	   sub-­‐surface	   minerals.64	  Whereas	   some	  studies	   state	   that	   land	   owners	   can	   be	   a	   significant	   hindrance	   to	   shale	   gas	   drilling	  operations65,	   others	   argue	   that	   “hydrocarbons	   are	  mostly	   nationalized,	   so	   there	   is	   no	  need	   for	  gas	   firms	   to	  negotiate	  with	  many	  different	   landowners	  (though	   the	  owner	  of	  the	  site	  of	  the	  actual	  drilling	  pad	  will	  surely	  need	  compensation).”66	  This	  confusion	  may	  stem	  from	  the	  variable	  importance	  assigned	  to	  landowner	  consent	  in	  different	  Member	  States.	  Under	  French	  law,	  for	  example,	  the	  Mining	  Code	  stipulates	  that	  any	  holder	  of	  an	  exploration	  licence	  is	  entitled	  to	  conduct	  all	  necessary	  prospection	  activities	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  surface	  owner	  lends	  his	  consent	  to	  such	  activities.67	  In	  the	  UK,	  by	  contrast,	   it	   is	  stated	  that	   ‘the	  rights	  granted	  by	  landward	  licenses	  do	  not	  include	  any	  rights	  of	  access,	  and	  the	  onus	  is	  upon	  the	  licensee	  to	  obtain	  all	  the	  relevant	  planning	   permissions	   from	   the	   respective	   authorities	   and	   landowners’.68	  Moreover,	   a	  court	  case	  has	  laid	  a	  precedent	  for	  requiring	  permission	  from	  landowners	  under	  whose	  land	   a	  horizontal	   section	  of	   a	   gas	  well	   passes.69	  In	  particular	   the	   court	   ruled	   that	   ‘the	  owner	  of	   the	  surface	   is	   the	  owner	  of	   the	  strata	  beneath	   it,	   including	  the	  minerals	   that	  are	   to	   be	   found	   there,	   unless	   there	   has	   been	   an	   alienation	   of	   them	  by	   conveyance,	   at	  common	   law	   or	   by	   statute,	   to	   someone	   else’.70	  In	   Poland,	   the	   authorisation	   holder	  always	  needs	  to	  have	  approval	   from	  the	  concerned	   land	  owners	  as	  a	  conditio	  sine	  qua	  
non	  before	  any	  authorisation	  can	  be	  granted.71	  	  Drilling	  companies	  and	  regulators	  in	  the	  USA	  have	  addressed	  the	  problem	  of	  obtaining	  access	   from	   multiple	   landowners	   by	   initiating	   what	   is	   known	   as	   unitisation	   and	  pooling.72	  These	   processes	   both	   involve	   negotiations	   with	   multiple	   landowners	   for	  receiving	  a	  pro-­‐rated	  share	  of	  royalties	  based	  on	  their	  respective	  acreage	  overlaying	  the	  gas	  reservoir.	  While	  pooling	  refers	  to	  the	  combination	  of	  several	  small	  tracts	  of	  land	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  Texas	  Railroad	  Commission,	  'Oil	  &	  Gas	  Exploration	  and	  Surface	  Ownership',	  (Austin,	  TX).	  63	  Andrews	  et	  al.,	  'Unconventional	  Gas	  Shales'.	  64	  Philippe	  &	  Partners,	  'Unconventional	  Gas	  in	  Europe',	  8	  and	  26,	  respectively.	  65	  Gény,	  'Unconventional	  Gas';	  Kuhn	  and	  Umbach,	  'Strategic	  Perspectives';	  Stevens,	  'Hype	  and	  reality'.	  66	  Ridley,	  'Shale	  Gas	  Shock',	  17.	  67	  Philippe	  &	  Partners,	  'Unconventional	  Gas	  in	  Europe'.	  68	  Rhian	   Kendall,	   Nigel	   Smith	   and	   Andrew	   Bloodworth,	   'Alternative	   Fossil	   Fuels:	   Mineral	   Planning	  Factsheet',	  (Keyworth:	  British	  Geological	  Survey,	  2011).	  69	  Antoinette	   Harvey,	   '	   Inquiry	   concerning	   shale	   gas	   licensing',	   correspondence	   with	   Peter	   Zeniewski	  (2011).	  70	  Ibid.	  71	  Philippe	  &	  Partners,	  'Unconventional	  Gas	  in	  Europe',	  26.	  72	  See	   Krista	   Weidner,	   'Natural	   Gas	   Exploration,	   a	   landowners	   guide	   to	   leasing	   land	   in	   Pennsylvania',	  (Altoona,	  PA:	  PennState	  College	  of	  Agricultural	  Sciences,	  2008).	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meet	   the	   spacing	   requirements	   for	   a	   single	   well,	   unitisation	   refers	   to	   field-­‐wide	   or	  partial	   field-­‐wide	  operation	  of	  a	  producing	  reservoir	   involving	  multiple	  adjoining	   land	  tracts.	  With	  farm	  plots	  smaller	  and	  land	  ownership	  more	  diffuse	  in	  Europe	  than	  in	  the	  USA,	  both	  unitisation	  and	  pooling	  may	  be	  an	  option	  required	  for	  managing	  concession	  areas	  fairly	  and	  effectively.	  Moreover,	  both	  pooling	  and	  unitisation	  can	  contribute	  to	  a	  reduced	  surface	  footprint	  by	  reining	  in	  excessive	  drilling	  brought	  about	  by	  the	   ‘rule	  of	  capture’	   principle	   (whereby	   sub-­‐surface	   minerals	   can	   be	   extracted	   from	   adjacent	  property	  tracts).	  	  Since	  much	  of	  the	  sub-­‐surface	  in	  Europe	  is	  state-­‐owned,	  legal	  uncertainties	  surrounding	  the	   rule	   of	   capture	   in	  many	   cases	   are	  moot,	   but	   the	   centralised	   approach	   to	   drilling	  programmes	   implied	   by	   pooling	   and	   unitisation	   can	   be	   viewed	   as	   a	   useful	   practice	  applicable	  to	  the	  European	  context.	  Indeed,	  lessons	  from	  unitisation	  and	  pooling	  can	  be	  drawn	   not	   necessarily	   from	   the	   fair	   distribution	   of	   royalties	   but	   as	   a	   model	   for	  efficiently	  extracting	  gas	  over	  a	  given	  surface	  area.	  Gas	  fields	  in	  the	  USA	  that	  have	  been	  pooled	  or	  unitised	  have	  helped	  to	  reduce	  surface	  disturbance	  by	  avoiding	  unnecessary	  wells	   and	   infrastructure	   while	   maximising	   a	   field’s	   ultimate	   recovery	   according	   to	  shared	   technical	   or	   engineering	   information	   among	   different	   operators	   and	   licence	  holders.	  In	  this	  way,	  benefits	  are	  accrued	  by	  licensing	  authorities	  as	  well	  as	  landowners.	  Some	   industry	   experts	   also	   endorse	   this	   method;	   indeed,	   it	   is	   synonymous	   with	   the	  recommendation	   of	   E&P	   experts	   at	   Italy’s	   ENI	   that	   shale	   gas	   exploitation	   be	   pursued	  according	  to	  a	  modular	  facilities	  approach,	  whereby	  development	  and	  production	  from	  a	   ‘complex’	  of	  multiple	  wellpads	   is	  managed	  centrally	   in	  order	   to	  avoid	  duplication	  of	  infrastructure,	   goods	   and	   service	   procurement,	   and	   to	   speed	   up	   permitting	  procedures.73	  This	   top-­‐down	   low-­‐cost	   strategy	   contrasts	   with	   the	   US	   experience	   of	  factory-­‐style	  drilling	  and	  resonates	  instead	  with	  conventional	  gas	  field	  development	  in	  continental	  Europe,	  which	  has	  by	  and	  large	  been	  driven	  by	  environmentally	  conscious,	  regulated	  drilling	  programmes.	  
Socioeconomic	  issues	  Public	   acceptance	   is	   regularly	   acknowledged	   as	   a	   major	   constraint	   to	   shale	   gas	  operations	  in	  Europe.	  A	  key	  dimension	  of	  this	  issue	  relates	  to	  the	  greater	  sensitivity	  in	  Europe	  toward	  activities	  affecting	  the	  environment,	  health	  and	  safety.	  Several	  analysts	  point	  out	  that	  zoning	  restrictions	  and	  tighter	  regulations	  on	  the	  use	  of	  public	  lands	  can	  hinder	  onshore	  prospecting	  for	  hydrocarbons	  in	  much	  of	  Europe.	  In	  most	  cases,	  drilling	  activities	   encounter	   constraints	   in	   areas	   considered	   out	   of	   bounds,	   such	   as	  environmentally	  protected	  areas	  or	   those	   in	  close	  proximity	   to	  building	  or	   residential	  zones.	   This	   is	   complemented	   by	   the	   European	   Union’s	   biodiversity	   policy,	   known	   as	  Natura	   2000,	   which	   protects	   over	   25	  000	   nature	   conservation	   areas	   collectively	  covering	  around	  800	  000	  km2,	  or	  roughly	  20%	  of	  the	  total	  land	  area	  of	  the	  EU.	  74	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Poland,	  this	  policy	  has	  a	  particularly	  important	  bearing	  on	  obtaining	  rights	  since	  land	   exploitation	   occurring	   in	   proximity	   to	   such	   protected	   sites	   are	   subject	   to	   a	  mandatory	  environmental	  impact	  assessment.	  More	  generally,	  analysts	  have	  flagged	  up	  what	  is	  considered	  a	  greater	  ‘environmental	  awareness’	  in	  Europe	  than	  in	  the	  USA.75	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  Guarnone	  et	  al.,	  'Unconventional	  mindset'.	  74	  European	   Commission,	   'Guidance	   Document:	   Non-­‐energy	   mineral	   extraction	   and	   Natura	   2000',	   ed.	  Directorate-­‐General	   for	   Environment	   (Luxembourg:	   Office	   for	   Official	   Publications	   of	   the	   European	  Communities,	  2010).	  75	  Kefferputz,	  'Shale	  Fever'.	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Public	  acceptance,	  it	  is	  said,	  can	  be	  secured	  in	  large	  part	  by	  providing	  adequate	  financial	  recompense	  for	  populations	  affected	  by	  shale	  gas	  drilling.	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  commonly	  argued	  that	  local	  communities	  in	  the	  USA	  are	  more	  amenable	  to	  fossil	  fuel	  exploitation	  on	  their	  land	  given	   the	   financial	   incentives,	  and	   the	   long	  history	  of	  gas	  and	  oil	  development	   in	  areas	  containing	  shale	  gas	  resources.76	  A	  report	  on	  North	  America’s	  gas	  market	  by	  IHS	  CERA	  states	  that	  gas	  development	  provides	  landowners	  with	  royalties,	  rental	  payments	  and	  bonuses,	   at	   the	   same	   time	   as	   creating	   jobs	   from	   road	  building,	   land	   clearing	   and	  local	  service	  provisions.77	  In	  Europe,	  however,	  several	  analysts	  have	  noted	  the	   limited	  benefits	   accrued	   by	   local	   populations	   and	   the	   concomitant	   potential	   for	   considerable	  opposition	  to	  drilling.	  As	  Paul	  Stevens	  of	  Chatham	  House	  writes:	  
“Large-­‐scale	   disruptions	   caused	   by	   drilling	   and	   hydraulic	  
fracturing	   are	   likely	   to	   generate	   huge	   local	   opposition,	  
especially	  given	  concerns	  over	  environmental	  damage.	  While	  
some	   operations	   are	   beginning	   to	   face	   increased	   local	  
opposition	  in	  the	  United	  States,	   there	   is	  a	   financial	   incentive	  
for	   local	   communities	   to	   suffer	   the	   inconveniences	   because	  
the	  resource	  is	  the	  property	  of	  the	  private	  landowner	  and	  not	  
the	   state.	   In	   Europe,	   by	   contrast,	   the	   state	   will	   reap	   the	  
financial	   rewards	   of	   the	   resource	   and	   provide	   no	   financial	  
incentive	  for	  the	  local	  community.”78	  Another	   set	   of	   literature	   argues	   that	   such	   claims	  may	   amount	   to	   over-­‐simplification,	  since	   it	   is	  not	   strictly	   true	   that	   landowners	   in	  Europe	  are	  not	   entitled	   to	   any	  benefits	  from	  hydrocarbon	  production.	  According	  to	  a	  study	  by	  Phillipe	  &	  Partners,	  France	  and	  Sweden	  grant	  surface	  owners	  part	  of	  the	  royalties	  acquired	  from	  production	  licences.79	  Still,	   this	  does	  not	  preclude	  cases	  where	  opposition	  generates	  a	  political	  backlash	  that	  makes	  shale	  gas	  drilling	  untenable	  (such	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  France	  and	  Bulgaria).	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  European	  landowners	  directly	  reaping	  the	  rewards	  from	  sub-­‐surface	  resource	   extraction,	   it	   is	   all	   the	   more	   necessary	   to	   clearly	   communicate	   other,	   more	  indirect	  economic	  benefits	  that	  can	  be	  potentially	  accrued	  by	  local	  communities.	  In	  this	  context,	   studies	   observing	   the	   local	   economic	   impact	   of	   shale	   gas	   activities	   are	   an	  important	   source	   for	   considering	   the	   degree	   of	   public	   acceptance	   of	   shale	   gas	  development.	  The	  term	  economic	  impact	  refers	  to	  the	  contribution	  a	  given	  investment,	  policy	   or	   project	   (in	   this	   case,	   shale	   gas	   operations)	   may	   make	   to	   the	   existing	   local	  economy.80 	  Several	   studies	   have	   explored	   this	   impact	   in	   different	   US	   shales.	   For	  example,	  a	  three-­‐part	  study	  led	  by	  Timothy	  Considine	  at	  Pennsylvania	  State	  University	  analysed	   the	  economic	   impact	  of	  Marcellus	   shale	  gas	  development	  by	   calculating	   “the	  sum	   of	   the	   direct,	   indirect	   and	   induced	   spending,	   set	   off	   from	   the	   expenditures	   by	  natural	  gas	  producers.”81	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  infusion	  of	  money	  from	  the	  gas	  industry	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  Gény,	   'Unconventional	   Gas',	   Kefferputz,	   'Shale	   Fever',	   Ridley,	   'Shale	   Gas	   Shock',	   Stevens,	   'Hype	   and	  reality'.	  77	  Downey,	  'Fueling	  North	  America's	  future'.	  78	  Stevens,	  'Hype	  and	  reality',	  17.	  	  79	  Philippe	  &	  Partners,	  'Unconventional	  Gas	  in	  Europe',	  45.	  80	  Kay,	  'Economic	  Impact	  of	  Marcellus	  Shale'.	  81Timothy	   J.	   Considine	   et	   al.,	   'An	   Emerging	   Giant:	   Prospects	   and	   economic	   impacts	   of	   developing	   the	  Marcellus	   shale	   natural	   gas	   play',	   (Altoona,	   PA:	   Pennsylvania	   State	   University,	   2009),	   18.	   Indirect	  spending	   refers	   to	   gas	   and	   oil	   companies’	   purchase	   of	   goods	   and	   services	   from	   other	   businesses	   (e.g.	  supply	  chain	  expenditure).	   Induced	  spending	  derives	  from	  the	  resulting	   increase	   in	  household	  incomes,	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the	  local	  economy	  was	  quantified	  by	  observing	  the	  provision	  of	  goods	  and	  services,	  as	  well	   as	   the	  payment	  of	   taxes	   and	   royalties.	   These	  were	  modelled	  using	   ‘input-­‐output’	  analysis,	   a	   widely-­‐used	   method	   for	   measuring	   how	   these	   factors	   contribute	   to	   other	  sectors	   of	   the	   economy.	   The	   study	   concluded	   that,	   in	   2008,	   the	   Marcellus	   shale	   gas	  industry	  “generated	  $2.3	  billion	  in	  total	  value	  added,	  more	  than	  29,000	  jobs,	  and	  $240	  million	  in	  state	  and	  local	  taxes.”82	  Table	  4-­‐3	  below,	  summarising	  the	  work	  of	  Considine	  and	  his	   colleagues,	   shows	   the	  metrics	  used	   to	  quantify	   the	  economic	   impacts	  of	   shale	  gas	  development.	  
Table	  4-­‐3:	  Economic	  impacts	  of	  Marcellus	  Shale	  development	  in	  Pennsylvania,	  USA,	  200983	  	   Direct	   Indirect	   Induced	   Total	   Total	  (direct	  
/	  indirect	  
only)	  
Gross	   output	  
($million)	  
3	  769	   1	  557	   1	  844	   7	  170	   5	  326	  
Gross	   value	  
added	  
($million)	  
1	  982	   828	   1	  066	   3	  876	   2	  810	  
Employment	  
(FTE	  jobs)	  
21	  778	   8	  732	   13	  587	   44	  098	   30	  510	  
Tax	   impacts	  
(state/fed/local,	  
$million)	  	  
	   	   	   1	  446	   	  
	  However,	   economic	   impact	   assessments	   of	   hydrocarbon	   extraction	   often	   generate	   a	  high	  level	  of	  controversy,	  mainly	  due	  to	  the	  numerous	  assumptions	  contained	  therein.	  Indeed,	   such	   assessments	   rely	   first	   and	   foremost	   on	   the	   expected	   expenditures	   and	  revenues	  of	  oil	  and	  gas	  companies	  and,	  as	  a	  corollary,	  on	  likely	  natural	  gas	  production	  rates.	  Assumptions	  must	  therefore	  be	  made	  about	  the	  number	  of	  wells	  drilled	  in	  a	  given	  surface	   area	   annually	   over	   an	   extended	   period	   of	   time	   (as	   shown	   in	   the	   note	  accompanying	   Table	   4-­‐3	   above).	   These	   assumptions	   must	   be	   underpinned	   by	   a	  relatively	  clear	  idea	  of	  the	  amount	  of	  gas	  extracted	  by	  a	  given	  well	  (ideally	  accompanied	  by	  decline	  rate	  analysis	  and	  the	  approximate	  cost	  of	  well	  stimulation	  techniques).	  	  Moreover,	   it	   is	  also	  necessary	  to	  calculate	  production	  costs,	  which	  are	  crucially	  reliant	  on	  projections	  of	  future	  natural	  gas	  prices.	  These	  costs	  vary,	  inter	  alia,	  according	  to	  the	  type,	   location	  and	   length	  of	   the	  well	   (in	  addition	   to	  other	   important	  variables	  such	  as	  technological	   ‘learning	   curves’,	   lease	   payments,	   royalty/tax	   rates,	   price	   pressures	  resulting	   from	  heightened	   demand	   for	   products	   and	   services,	   and	   so	   on).	   Finally,	   the	  extent	   to	   which	   expenditure	   and	   revenue	   is	   divided	   between	   external	   and	   locally	  sourced	   goods	   and	   services	   has	   an	   important	   bearing	   on	  whether	   positive	   economic	  gains	   are	   felt	   by	   the	   communities	   closest	   to	   drilling	   operations.	   Related	   to	   this,	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  which	  stimulates	  spending	  on	   local	  goods	  and	  services.	  See	  also	  Wood	  Mackenzie,	   'U.S.	  Supply	  Forecast	  and	  Potential	  Jobs	  and	  Economic	  Impacts	  (2012-­‐2030)',	  (Wood	  Mackenzie,	  2011).	  82	  Considine	  et	  al.,	   'An	  Emerging	  Giant'.	  Although	  not	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  present	  section,	  there	  is	  an	  interesting	  meta-­‐analysis	  that	  critically	  engages	  with	  studies	  analysing	  the	  economic	  impact	  of	  shale	  gas	  development	  –	  see	  Kay,	  'Economic	  Impact	  of	  Marcellus	  Shale'.	  83	  Note:	   based	   on	   710	   new	  wells	   in	   a	   year	   and	   an	   average	   daily	   production	   rate	   of	   327mcf.	   Considine,	  Watson	  and	  Blumsack,	  'Economic	  Impacts	  of	  Marcellus'.	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extent	   to	   which	   landowners	   spend	   their	   royalty	   payments	   in	   the	   local	   economy	   (an	  important	   input	   for	   calculating	   induced	   effects)	   can	  only	   be	   inferred.	  Only	   by	  making	  such	   assumptions	   is	   it	   possible	   to	   estimate	   the	   gross	   output,	   value	   added	   and	  employment	   impacts	   of	   natural	   gas	   operations	   in	   different	   sectors	   of	   the	   economy	  (whether	  in	  the	  form	  of	  direct,	  indirect	  or	  induced	  impacts).	  	  With	  so	  many	  variables	  and	  an	  inherent	  range	  of	  uncertainty	  in	  each,	  it	  is	  small	  wonder	  that	   the	   results	   of	   such	   studies	   are	   so	   frequently	   contested. 84 	  On	   a	   deeper	  methodological	  level,	  the	  input-­‐output	  models	  processing	  the	  data	  are	  also	  criticised	  for	  being	   incapable	  of	   evaluating	   the	   implications	  of	   rapid	  and	  substantial	   changes	   in	   the	  economy.85	  The	  neglect	  of	  boom/bust	   cycles	  associated	  with	   resource	  extraction	   is	   an	  important	   omission,	   as	   are	   the	   supply/demand	   effects	   that	   crucially	   inform	  assumptions	  about	  both	  the	  profitability	  and	  cumulative	   impacts	  of	  additional	  wells.86	  There	   are	   also	   certain	   overlooked	   risks	   to	   longer-­‐term	   development	   that	   resource	  extraction	  may	  bring	  to	  bear	  on	  local	  economies.	  Indeed,	  as	  Kay’s	  meta-­‐analysis	  notes,	  although	   large-­‐scale	   drilling	   would	   “increase	   the	   wealth	   and	   income	   of	   various	  individuals	  and	  communities	  at	  least	  during	  parts	  of	  the	  Marcellus	  development	  cycle…	  it	  would	  also	  bring	  new	  risks	  and	  most	  unavoidably,	  significant	  change.	  Whether	  natural	  gas	  development	  would	  lead	  to	  economic	  diversification	  or	  overspecialized	  dependency	  is	  an	  important	  economic	  development	  concern.”	  	  Finally,	   there	   are	   additional	   caveats	   pertaining	   to	   the	   applicability	   of	   US-­‐based	  economic	   impact	   assessments	   to	   Europe.	   As	   noted	   by	   a	   study	   probing	   the	   possible	  impact	  of	  shale	  gas	  in	  the	  UK,	  the	  scale	  of	  reserves,	  geography,	  drilling	  costs	  and	  royalty	  payments	  are	  all	  significantly	  different	  between	  the	   two	  sides	  of	   the	  Atlantic.87	  On	  the	  last	  point	  in	  particular,	  drilling	  companies’	  payments	  to	  private	  landowners	  in	  the	  USA	  make	   up	   the	   bulk	   of	   total	   spending,	   according	   to	   Considine’s	   report. 88 	  If	   these	  expenditures	   were	   re-­‐directed	   to	   the	   national	   level	   in	   the	   form	   of	   state	   taxes	   and	  royalties,	  then	  the	  benefits	  to	  the	  local	  economy	  would	  be	  far	  less	  tangible.	  Fortunately,	  a	   recent	   study	   carried	   out	   for	   Cuadrilla	   Resources	   in	   the	   UK	   quantifies	   the	   expected	  impact	  of	  a	  single	  test	  well	  drilled	   in	  the	  region	  of	  Lancashire,	  based	  only	  on	  the	  sunk	  costs	   incurred	   by	   site	   preparation	   and	   well	   drilling/fracturing	   operations	   (and	   not	  assuming	  royalties,	  taxes,	  gas	  production	  rates	  or	  additional	  wells	  drilled).	  The	  results	  were	  presented	  accordingly:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  See	  Kay,	  'Economic	  Impact	  of	  Marcellus	  Shale',	  Thoman	  Kinnaman,	  'The	  Economic	  Impact	  of	  shale	  gas	  extraction;	   a	   review	   of	   existing	   studies',	   in	   Other	   Faculty	   Research	   and	   Publications	   (Lewisburg,	   PA:	  Bucknell	  University,	  2010).	  	  85	  European	   Commission,	   'Communication	   from	   the	   Commission	   to	   the	   Council	   and	   the	   European	  Parliament	  -­‐	  Report	  on	  progress	  in	  creating	  the	  internal	  gas	  and	  electricity	  market	  ',	  (Luxembourg:	  Office	  for	  Official	  Publications	  of	  the	  European	  Communities,	  2009).	  86	  Kay,	  'Economic	  Impact	  of	  Marcellus	  Shale',	  5-­‐6.	  87	  Cuadrilla	  Resources,	  'Economic	  Impact	  in	  Lancashire',	  11.	  88	  Considine	  et	  al.,	  'An	  Emerging	  Giant',	  22.	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Overseas	   TOTAL	  
Labour	  	   303	   1	  983	   2	  285	   547	   2	  833	  
Subsistence	   385	   77	   462	   51	   513	  
Bought	   in	   goods	   &	   services	   (incl.	  
depreciation)	  
801	   1	  793	   2	  594	   2	  102	   4	  696	  
Overheads	  	   115	   691	   806	   345	   1	  151	  
Profits	   125	   752	   877	   376	   1	  254	  
Total	   1	  729	   5	  296	   7	  024	   3	  422	   10	  446	  
	   17%	   50%	   33%	   	   	  	  As	   shown	   in	   Table	   4-­‐4,	   a	   single	   test	  well	   drilled	   over	   a	   12-­‐month	   period	   costs	  £10.5	  million,	  of	  which	  roughly	  17%	  is	  deployed	  on	  local	  workers	  and	  suppliers,	  with	  the	  rest	  split	  between	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  UK,	  and	  goods	  and	  services	  procured	  overseas.	  	  
4.2 Market	  access	  This	   section	   touches	   on	   the	   impact	   that	   infrastructure,	   and	   contractual	   and	   political	  limitations	  may	  have	  on	  market	  access	  for	  unconventional	  gas.	  It	  corresponds	  with	  the	  last	   of	   the	   factors	   determining	   the	   viability	   of	   natural	   gas	   production	   as	   presented	   in	  Figure	  1-­‐3.	  There	  are	  two	  principle	  determinants	  of	  whether	  new	  gas	  resources	  are	  able	   to	  reach	  markets:	  1)	   their	  physical	  proximity	   to	  suitable	  gas	   transportation	   infrastructure;	  and	  2)	  the	  regulatory	  structure	  of	  the	  natural	  gas	  market.	  Whilst	  the	  distance	  between	  the	  wellhead	  and	  pipelines	  drives	  up	  the	  capital	  and	  operating	  costs	  required	  to	  deliver	  gas	  to	   consumers,	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   natural	   gas	  market	   has	   important	   implications	   for	  how	  easily	  new	  supplies	  are	  able	   to	   compete	  with	  established	  supplies.	  Most	  notably,	  the	  degree	   to	  which	   the	  market	  has	  been	   liberalised90	  plays	  a	   critical	   role	   in	  ensuring	  that,	   for	   example,	   incumbent	   firms	   do	   not	   use	   control	   over	   existing	   infrastructure	   to	  stymie	  competition	  from	  market	  entrants.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  shale	  gas	  operators	   in	  the	  USA	  have,	  by	  and	  large,	  experienced	   ‘easy	  and	  low-­‐cost	  access	  to	  the	  gas	  transport	  network’	  has	  been	  singled-­‐out	  by	  many	  experts	  as	  having	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  the	  rapid	  development	  of	  that	  resource	  across	  the	  Atlantic.91	  However,	   there	   is	   uncertainty	   as	   to	   whether	   the	   US	   experience	   can	   be	   replicated	   in	  other	  regions	  of	   the	  world.	  According	   to	   the	   IEA,	  one	  of	   the	  obstacles	   to	  be	  overcome	  will	  be	  the	  proximity	  of	  a	  pipeline	  system	  to	  shale	  plays.92	  Royal	  Dutch	  Shell	  has	  echoed	  this	  belief,	  stating	  that	  a	  lack	  of	  transmission	  infrastructure	  in	  areas	  where	  there	  has	  not	  traditionally	   been	   any	   gas	   production	   could	   challenge	   the	   development	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  Cuadrilla	  Resources,	  'Economic	  Impact	  in	  Lancashire'.	  90	  Or	  deregulated,	  following	  US	  terminology.	  91	  Stevens,	  'Hype	  and	  reality',	  12.	  See	  also	  Kuhn	  and	  Umbach,	  'Strategic	  Perspectives',	  17.	  92 	  IEA,	   'Medium-­‐Term	   Oil	   and	   Gas	   Markets',	   (Paris:	   Organisation	   for	   Economic	   Co-­‐operation	   and	  Development	  2010),	  185.	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unconventional	   gas	   in	   these	   areas.93	  Regarding	   the	   scale	   of	   the	   challenge	   faced,	   the	  World	   Energy	   Council	   drew	   attention	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   only	   32	   of	   the	   142	   basins	   that	  contained	   shale	   worldwide	   had	   any	   existing	   infrastructure	   that	   could	   reduce	   initial	  capital	  expenditures	  related	  to	  the	  exploitation	  of	  shale	  gas.94	  Moving	   beyond	   the	   mere	   presence	   of	   infrastructure,	   however,	   the	   role	   played	   by	   a	  liberalised	  energy	  market	  has	  received	  even	  greater	  attention	  in	  the	  literature.	  The	  IEA,	  for	  example,	  has	  been	  quick	  to	  point	  out	  that	  even	  in	  markets	  where	  extensive	  pipeline	  systems	  are	  already	  built,	   “regulations	  about	   third	  party	  access	   to	   such	   infrastructure	  can	  be	  important	  as	  a	  means	  of	  minimising	  transport	  costs”.95	  Much	  of	  the	  discussion	  is	  driven	   by	   the	   fact	   that,	   whereas	   the	   US	   natural	   gas	  market	   is	   liberalised,	   the	  market	  liberalisation	   process	   in	   Europe	   is	   still	   ongoing.	   A	   number	   of	   notable	   reports	   thus	  contrast	   the	   “fully	  deregulated”	  US	  market	  with	   the	  European	  market	  –	  a	  market	   that	  they	   judge	   to	   be	   still	   “dominated	   by	   few	   players”.96	  These	   reports	   add	   that	   certain	  European	   countries	   still	   maintain	   restrictions	   on	   third-­‐party	   access, 97 	  and	   that	  transmission	  pipelines	   in	  Europe	   “are	   still	   not	   independent	  but	   are	   affiliates	  of	  major	  national	   producers”. 98 	  By	   this	   view,	   such	   factors	   introduce	   an	   added	   degree	   of	  uncertainty	  to	  unconventional	  gas	  production	  in	  Europe.	  
4.2.1 Market	  structure	  Also	  known	  as	  deregulation,	  market	  liberalisation	  involves	  the	  opening	  up	  of	  markets	  to	  competition	   by	   reducing	   the	   statutory	   barriers	   to	   entry	   and	   exit	   that	   exist.	   It	   is	  predicated,	   on	   the	   assumption	   that	   the	   traditional	   form	   of	   government	  monopoly	   or	  regulated	   public	   utility	   operation	   of	   gas	   is	   inefficient,	   that	   a	   system	   that	   introduces	  market	   competition	   inherently	   provides	   lower	   prices,	  more	   desirable	   service	   options	  for	   consumers	   and	   –	   on	   balance	   –	   greater	   security	   of	   public	   service	   operations.	  Structural	   and	   regulatory	   reform	   measures	   are	   introduced	   to	   facilitate	   ‘gas-­‐to-­‐gas	  competition’.99	  Since	   the	   supply	   of	   gas	   is	   usually	   geographically	   removed	   from	   its	   ultimate	  consumption,	   the	   liberalised	   model	   also	   envisions	   a	   competitive	   market	   for	  transportation	   capacity	   in	   a	   system	   that	   is	   subject	   to	   open	   access.	   A	   key	   element	   is,	  therefore,	   ensuring	   third-­‐party	   access	   to	   the	   transmission	   network.	   Neoclassical	  economic	  theory	  states	  that	  the	  ownership	  of	  physical	  transmission	  rights	  (such	  would	  be	   the	   case	   under	   vertical	   integration)	   increases	   the	   ability	   of	   energy	   suppliers	   to	  exercise	  market	   power	   through	  withholding	   transmission	   capacity.	  When	   a	   vertically	  integrated	   company	   becomes	   unbundled	   into	   different	   companies	   handling	   the	  production,	   transmission	   and	   distribution	   stages	   in	   the	   value	   chain	   separately,	   this	  facilitates	  market	   entry	   for	   new	   suppliers	   such	   as	   unconventional	   gas	   companies,	   for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  ‘Memorandum	  submitted	  by	  Shell’	  in	  House	  of	  Commons,	  'Shale	  Gas:	  Fifth	  Report	  of	  Session	  2010-­‐12',	  23.	  94	  WEC,	  'Survey	  of	  Energy	  Resources',	  3-­‐4.	  95	  IEA,	  'Golden	  age',	  47.	  96	  Stevens,	  'Hype	  and	  reality',	  17.	  97	  ‘However,	  this	  will	  be	  required	  to	  change	  as	  the	  EU	  3rd	  Package	  of	  gas	  regulations	  becomes	  law	  in	  early	  2011.’	  Gény,	  'Unconventional	  Gas',	  39.	  98 	  Kuhn	   and	   Umbach,	   'Strategic	   Perspectives',	   37.	   See	   also	   Farid	   Gasmi	   and	   Juan	   Daniel	   Oviedo,	  'Investment	   in	   transport	   infrastructure,	   regulation,	   and	   gas-­‐gas	   competition',	   Energy	   Economics	   32	  (2010).	  99	  James	  T.	  Jensen,	  'The	  LNG	  Revolution',	  Energy	  Journal	  24,	  no	  2	  (2003):	  4.	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example.	  Competition	  in	  the	  market	  is	  encouraged	  and	  the	  greater	  variety	  of	  companies	  can	  help	  the	  market	  to	  react	  to	  outside	  shocks	  more	  smoothly	  and	  flexibly.	  Additionally,	  unbundling	   results	   in	   efficiency	   gains	   and	   consumer	   savings	   by	   removing	   regulatory	  haze,	  excess	  capacity	  and	  central	  planning.100	  	  The	   neoclassical	   assumptions	   outlined	   above	   are	   often	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   structure-­‐conduct-­‐performance	  paradigm:	  The	  structure	  of	  markets	  is	  considered	  a	  crucial	  driver	  for	  the	  conduct	  of	  firms	  and	  the	  eventual	  economic	  performance.101	  After	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	   Single	   European	   Market	   objective	   in	   1985,	   this	   paradigm	   became	   the	   point	   of	  departure	   for	   the	  European	  Commission,	  which	  used	   it	  as	  an	   instrument	   to	   tackle	   the	  prevailing	  intra-­‐communal	  barriers	  to	  trade.102	  When	  applied	  to	  the	  natural	  gas	  market,	  the	  paradigm	  implies	  that	  the	  main	  objectives	  for	  the	  regulator	  are:	  	  1) full	  unbundling	  and	  maximum	  entry	   in	   the	  potentially	  competitive	  segments	  of	  the	  value	  chain;	  and	  2) market	   liquidity	  and	  effective	  access	  and	  performance	  regulation	  in	  the	  natural	  monopoly	  segments	  of	  the	  value	  chain.103	  In	   fact,	   whilst	   the	   structure-­‐conduct-­‐performance	   paradigm	   presents	   a	   parsimonious	  blueprint	  for	  regulators,	  theorists	  influenced	  by	  the	  new	  institutional	  economics	  school	  of	   thought104	  have	   questioned	   the	   assumption	   that	   integration	   in	   the	   utilities	   sector	  should	   always	   be	   prevented	   or	   removed.	   These	   theorists	   highlight	   that	   vertical	  integration	  and	  contracting	  structures	  may	  lead	  to	  greater	  economic	  efficiency	  because	  they	   help	   to	   offset	   the	   uncertainty	   and	   risk	   involved	   in	   the	   large	   up-­‐front	   payments	  necessary	   in	   natural	   gas	   infrastructure	   investment.	   Liberalised	  markets	  may	   increase	  the	   cost	   of	   capital	   and	   reduce	   investment	   if	   the	   size	   of	   firms	   in	   the	  market	   falls,	   or	   if	  regulatory	   risk	   is	   increased	   due	   to	   increased	   (and	   inefficient)	   regulatory	   oversight	   of	  investment	  decisions.105	  At	   the	  heart	  of	   the	   issue	   lies	   the	  concept	  of	   transaction	  costs,	  which	  are	  not	  explicitly	  considered	   in	   neoclassical	   economics.	   These	   include	   the	   direct	   costs	   of	   writing,	  monitoring	   and	   enforcing	   contracts,	   plus	   the	   costs	   associated	  with	   the	   risk	   of	  ex	  ante	  investments	  having	  an	  ex	  post	  performance	  that	  is	  lower	  than	  anticipated	  as	  a	  result	  of	  contractual	  hazards	  and	  other	  uncertainties.106	  When	  one	  considers	  that	  investments	  in	  gas	   markets	   along	   the	   entire	   value	   chain	   are	   often	   very	   large	   and	   predominantly	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  P.	   Joskow	   and	   J.	   Tirole,	   'Transmission	   rights	   and	  market	   power	   on	   electric	   power	   networks',	  RAND	  
Journal	  of	  Economics	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  no	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  101	  J.	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   Barriers	   to	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   Their	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   Industries	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  University	  Press,	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  Haaland	  Matláry,	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  policy	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  Union	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  Macmillan	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  Aad	  Correlje	  and	   John	  Groenewegen,	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  market,	   transaction	  costs	  and	  efficient	   regulation	   ',	   in	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  Economic	  Policy	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  York:	  The	  Free	  Press,	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  and	  Groenewegen,	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  costs	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  efficient	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irreversible	  (sunk),	  then	  it	  becomes	  easy	  to	  see	  how	  potential	  transaction	  costs	  can	  play	  a	  central	  role	  in	  deciding	  the	  economic	  viability	  of	  a	  gas	  project.107	  To	  illustrate,	  take	  the	  following	  example,	  sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘investment	  hold-­‐up	   problem’.	   Prior	   to	   investing	   in	   a	   gas	   pipeline,	   the	   investor	   has	   a	   relatively	   strong	  bargaining	   position	   because	   the	   consumer	   depends	   on	   him	   for	   undertaking	   the	  investment.	   Once	   laid,	   however,	   the	   pipeline	   has	   very	   limited,	   if	   any,	   alternative	   use.	  This	   ties	   the	   investor	   to	   the	  market	   for	   the	   foreseeable	   future,	   shifting	   the	  bargaining	  power	  to	  the	  consumer.	  The	  consumer	  can	  now	  adapt	  his	  policy	  to	  increase	  his	  own	  (or	  his	   society’s)	   rents	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   the	   investor’s.	   This	   may	   be	   done	   through	  renegotiation,	   by	   determining	   lower	   prices,	   or	   by	   freely	   permitting	   entry	   to	   the	  infrastructure.	  Investors	  therefore	  demand	  that	  future	  customers	  commit	  to	  paying	  the	  sunk	  costs	  which	  they,	  the	  investors,	  provide	  up-­‐front.	  Without	  such	  assurances	  against	  so-­‐called	  regulatory	  risk,	  the	  decision	  to	  build	  a	  pipeline	  could	  never	  be	  made.108	  Viewed	  in	  this	  light,	  the	  task	  for	  regulators	  is	  to	  establish	  a	  ‘workable’	  balance	  between	  maintaining	   the	   pressure	   for	   a	   dynamically	   competitive	  market	   (neoclassical	   theory)	  and	  providing	  a	  sufficient	  degree	  of	  stability	  and	  coordination	  to	  facilitate	  investments	  in	   the	   system	   (new	   institutional	   economics). 109 	  The	   question	   for	   potential	  unconventional	  gas	  in	  Europe	  is	  not	  just	  whether	  the	  market	  is	  sufficiently	  liberalised,	  but	   also	   whether	   regulators	   are	   able	   to	   find	   a	   form	   of	   governance	   that	   allows	   both	  traditional	   suppliers	   and	   market	   entrants	   to	   minimise	   transaction	   costs	   and	   their	  exposure	  to	  ex	  post	  risks.	  
4.2.2 Market	  access	  in	  North	  America	  This	  section	  looks	  at	  the	  regulation	  of	  the	  North	  American	  natural	  gas	  industry	  and	  the	  trends	   in	   new	   pipeline	   construction	   since	   the	   rapid	   increase	   in	   unconventional	   gas	  production	   witnessed	   in	   recent	   years.	   In	   doing	   so,	   it	   seeks	   to	   tease	   out	   some	   of	   the	  market	   access	   conditions	   that	   may	   have	   played	   a	   role	   in	   the	   sharp	   rise	   in	  unconventional	  gas	  production	  on	  that	  continent.	  US	   regulation	  of	  natural	  gas	  began	   in	   the	  1930s	  with	  an	  attempt	   to	  curb	   the	  abuse	  of	  market	   power	   in	   the	   interstate	   pipeline	   business.	   Between	   this	   period	   and	   1978,	   the	  structure	  of	  the	  North	  American	  natural	  gas	  industry	  was	  simple,	  with	  limited	  flexibility	  and	   few	  options	   for	  natural	   gas	  delivery.	  The	  Federal	  Government	   regulated	  both	   the	  price	   at	   which	   producers	   sold	   natural	   gas	   to	   transportation	   pipelines,	   as	   well	   as	   the	  price	   at	   which	   pipeline	   owners	   could	   sell	   to	   local	   distribution	   companies.	   State	  governments	  then	  regulated	  the	  price	  at	  which	   local	  distribution	  companies	  could	  sell	  natural	   gas	   to	   their	   customers.	  With	  wellhead	   prices	   of	   gas	   regulated	   too,	   there	  was	  little	   competition	   in	   the	  marketplace	   and	   incentives	   to	   improve	   service	   and	   innovate	  were	  few.	  The	  limited	  incentive	  for	  producers	  and	  consumers	  to	  adapt	  their	  behaviour	  in	  this	  rigid	  system	  led	  to	  natural	  gas	  shortages	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  surpluses	  in	  the	  1980s.	  During	  the	  1980s	  and	  early	  1990s,	  interstate	  natural	  gas	  markets	  in	  the	  USA	  made	  the	  gradual	   transition	  away	  from	  the	  regulation	  that	  had	  characterised	  the	  three	  previous	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decades.	  The	   first	  steps	   took	  place	   in	  1978	  with	   the	  passage	  of	   the	  Natural	  Gas	  Policy	  Act	  under	  the	  initiative	  of	  the	  US	  Federal	  Energy	  Regulatory	  Commission	  (FERC).	  This	  removed	   wellhead	   ceiling	   prices,	   which	   were	   later	   deregulated	   altogether	   with	   the	  Natural	   Gas	  Wellhead	   Decontrol	   Act	   (1989).	   In	   1984,	   FERC	   Order	   380	   released	   local	  distribution	   companies	   (LDCs)	   from	   long-­‐term	   take-­‐or-­‐pay	   contracts,	   marking	   the	  beginning	   of	   the	   liberalisation	   of	   the	   gas	   transportation	  market.	   Known	   as	   the	   Open	  Access	  Order,	  FERC	  Order	  436	  in	  the	  very	  next	  year	  established	  a	  voluntary	  framework	  for	  non-­‐discriminatory	  third-­‐party	  access	  to	  gas	  transmission	  pipelines	  –	  a	  scheme	  that	  all	   major	   pipeline	   systems	   eventually	   participated	   in.	   And	   in	   1992,	   FERC	   Order	   636	  made	   the	   fundamental	   vertical	   unbundling	   of	   transportation	   and	   sales	   activities	  compulsory,	  additionally	  obliging	  pipeline	  companies	  to	  publish	  information	  about	  the	  availability	  of	  services	  and	  to	  expand	  access	  to	  interstate	  storage	  capacity.110	  
Table	  4-­‐5:	  Major	  legislation	  for	  the	  US	  gas	  industry	  by	  Congress,	  FERC	  and	  court	  rulings111	  
Date	   Legislation	   Principal	  objective	  1954	   Court:	   Phillips	  decision	  	   Federal	  Power	  Commission	  must	  enforce	  wellhead	  price	  control	  and	  use	  authority	  to	  regulate	  E&P	  industry	  1978	  	   US	   Congress	   Natural	  Gas	  Policy	  Act	  	   Provide	   for	   gradual	   phase-­‐out	   of	   producer	   rate	   regulation	   and	  incremental	   pricing	   guidelines	   for	   industrial	   gas	   sales;	   led	   to	  upscaling	   of	   cogeneration	   of	   electricity	   in	   major	   industrial	   heat	  producers	  in	  conjunction	  with	  Public	  Utility	  Regulatory	  Policies	  Act	  1985	  	   FERC	  order	  436	  	   Third-­‐party	  access	  to	  gas	  transmission	  pipelines	  encouraged,	  activate	  discounts	  for	  shippers	  and	  producers	  1987	  	   FERC	  order	  500	  	   Open	  access	  to	  gas	  transmission	  pipelines	  further	  regulated	  and	  shift	  cost	  of	  long-­‐term	  obligations	  to	  producers	  and	  shippers	  in	  case	  of	  no	  take-­‐up	  of	  gas	  volumes	  1988	  	   FERC	  order	  497	  	   Separate	  operating	  employees	  of	  interstate	  natural	  gas	  pipelines	  from	  their	  marketing	  affiliates	  to	  function	  independently	  of	  each	  other	  1989	  	   US	   Congress	   Natural	  Gas	   Wellhead	  Decontrol	  Act	  	   Complete	  deregulation	  of	  wellhead	  gas	  prices	  1992	  	  	   US	   Congress	   Energy	  Policy	  Act	  	   Reduce	   US	   dependence	   on	   foreign	   oil	   (federal	   bodies	   should	   use	  natural	  gas	  engines	  and	  utilities)	  and	  provide	  funding	  for	  research	  to	  recover	   more	   natural	   gas	   from	   conventional	   and	   unconventional	  resources	  FERC	  order	  636	  	   Mandate	  full	  third-­‐party	  access	  to	  gas	  transmission	  pipelines	  1996	  	   FERC	  order	  889	  	   Enforce	   employees	   of	   the	   transmission	   providers	   engaged	   in	  transmission	   system	   operations	   to	   function	   independently	   of	  marketing	  employees	  2000	  	   FERC	  order	  637	  	   Provide	   full	   transparency	  about	   tariffs	   and	   capacity	  via	  Open	  Access	  Same-­‐time	  Online	  Information	  Platform;	  daily	  auctions	  2003	  	   FERC	  order	  2004	  	   Corporate	   separation	   of	   marketing	   and	   title	   transfer	   services	   to	  shippers	  and	  gas	  transmission	  services,	  overruled	  by	  landmark	  court	  ruling	  in	  2006	  and	  CFR	  18	  revision	  in	  2008	  2005	  	   US	   Congress	   Energy	  Policy	  Act	  	   FERC	   obtained	   Penal	   Authority	   to	   penalise	   companies	   that	   do	   not	  abide	  with	  FERC	  Code	  of	  Conduct	  and	  Regulation	  Orders	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  110	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  sector',	   Energy	   Economics	   30,	   no	   3	   (2008),	   Christian	   von	   Hirschhausen,	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  A	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  of	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  ',	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  Policy	  16,	  no	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  (2008).	  111	  Sources:	  EIA,	  Key	  FERC	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  2,	  no	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Date	   Legislation	   Principal	  objective	  2006	  	   Court	   ruling	   in	  National	   Fuel	   Gas	  Supply	   Corporation	  versus	  FERC	  	  
Court	   rejects	   the	   treatment	   of	   Energy	  Affiliates	   in	   FERC	  order	  2004,	  implying	  FERC’s	  corporate	  separation	  between	  energy	  and	  marketing	  affiliates	   is	   not	   required	   so	   long	   as	   functional	   no-­‐conduit	   rule	   is	  fulfilled	  2008	  	  	   FERC	  order	  712	  	   More	  efficient	  pipeline	  capacity	  release	  standards	  Revision	   CFR	   18	   part	  358	  	   Revision	  of	  Orders	  497,	  889	  and	  2004	  based	  on	  2006	  Court	  ruling	  to	  allow	   integrated	   planning	   and	   competitive	   solicitation	   of	   and	  transmission	   capacity;	   limited	   to	   a	   strict	   functional	   separation	   of	  transmission	  function	  employees	  and	  marketing	  function	  employees	  	  The	   restructuring	   of	   the	  US	   gas	  market	   has	   had	   a	   substantial	   impact.	   End	   users	   now	  have	  a	  number	  of	  options	  to	  source	  their	  natural	  gas.	  They	  are	  able	  to	  choose	  the	  best	  purchase	   and	   transportation	   arrangements	   from	   the	   wellhead	   to	   the	   pipeline.	  Alternatively,	  they	  may	  choose	  to	  turn	  to	  the	  LDC	  for	  a	  bundled	  product	  and	  leave	  the	  arrangements	   for	   sourcing	   and	   interstate	   transportation	   of	   the	   gas	   to	   the	   LDC.	   The	  number	  of	  gas	  marketers	   (companies	   that	  coordinate	   the	  business	  of	  bringing	  natural	  gas	  from	  the	  wellhead	  to	  end-­‐users)	  jumped	  from	  50	  in	  1986	  to	  some	  260	  in	  the	  1990s.	  The	   number	   of	   market	   centres,	   or	   ‘hubs’,	   have	   also	   increased,	   as	   has	   the	   size	   of	   the	  financial	  market,	  which	   helps	   to	   ensure	   supply	   security	   through	   contracts	   that	   hedge	  against	  price	  changes.112	  	  Not	  all	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  new	  regime	  have	  been	  positive.	  For	  example,	  price	  spikes	  in	  California	   over	   the	   summer	   of	   2000	   brought	   charges	   of	   market	   abuse	   and	   raised	  broader	  questions	  about	  both	   the	  effectiveness	  of	   competitive	  pressures	   in	   increasing	  the	  economic	  efficiency	  of	   the	  gas	  market	  as	  well	   as	  how	  successfully	   the	  US	  pipeline	  system	  can	  support	  arbitrage.113	  In	  spite	  of	  certain	  localised	  and	  transient	  occurrences	  however,	   the	   general	   consensus	   is	   that	   the	   new	   regime	   has	   been	   successful	   in	  facilitating	  competition	  in	  the	  US	  gas	  market	  and	  this	  has	  been	  a	  major	  improvement	  on	  the	  previous	  system	  of	  vertically	  integrated	  utilities.	  Comparable	  fuel	  purchases	  became	  much	  less	  expensive	  –	  halved,	  in	  some	  cases	  –	  and	  artificial	  inefficiencies	  were	  reduced	  in	  the	  gas	  supply	  chain.114	  A	   liberalised	  and	  competitive	  market	   thus	   formed	  an	   important	  part	  of	   the	  regulatory	  backdrop	   to	   the	   unconventional	   gas	   revolution	   in	   the	   USA.	   But	   the	   brief	   theoretical	  review	   presented	   earlier	   in	   this	   chapter	   then	   raises	   another	   question:	   whether	   the	  increased	   regulatory	   risk	   in	   this	   liberalised	   market	   has	   prevented	   infrastructure	  investment	  –	  a	  question	  more	  significant	  for	  unconventional	  gas	  developments	  because	  of	  their	  narrower	  profit	  margins.	  	  In	  the	  USA,	  most	  shale	  gas	   is	  either	  proximal	  to	  the	   intended	  market,	  as	   in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Marcellus,	  or	  close	  to	  major	  pipelines,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Barnett,	  Haynesville	  and	  Woodford.	  Nevertheless,	   significant	   shale	   reserves	   lie	  outside	   the	  existing	  US	  pipeline	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grid	  and	  require	  capital	   investment	  to	  build	  the	   infrastructure	  necessary	  to	  utilise	   the	  gas.	  In	  2009,	  the	  Interstate	  Natural	  Gas	  Association	  of	  America	  estimated	  that	  $133-­‐210	  billion	   would	   need	   to	   be	   invested	   during	   the	   following	   20	   years	   to	   process	   the	   gas	  coming	  from	  shale	  and	  other	  tight	  gas	  formations.115	  
Figure	  4-­‐10:	  US	  natural	  gas	  pipeline	  capacity	  additions	  versus	  marketed	  gas	  production116	  
	  Figure	   4-­‐10	   above	   presents	   new	   US	   gas	   pipeline	   additions	   and	   annual	   marketed	   gas	  production	  for	  the	  period	  1999	  to	  2010.	  It	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  whilst	  both	  measures	  appear	  either	   stagnant	   or	   in	   slight	   decline	   in	   the	   years	   between	   1999	   and	   2005,	   the	   period	  between	  2005	  and	  2010	  is	  marked	  by	  a	  significant	  increase	  in	  marketed	  gas	  production	  –	  a	  trend	  known	  to	  be	  underpinned	  by	  greater	  unconventional	  production	  –	  and	  an	  even	  more	  striking	  jump	  in	  additional	  pipeline	  capacity.	  According	  to	  the	  EIA,	  2008	  was	  the	  most	  active	  year	  for	  US	  natural	  gas	  pipeline	  construction	  in	  more	  than	  a	  decade.	  Eighty-­‐four	   projects	   and	   close	   to	   6	  500	   kilometres	   of	   pipeline	   were	   added.	   Much	   of	   the	  construction	   was	   driven	   by	   unconventional	   supply	   growth,	   particularly	   in	   northeast	  Texas,	  which	  saw	  13	  new	  pipelines	  related	  to	  the	  development	  of	  gas	  supplies	  from	  the	  Barnett,	  Woodford	  or	  Fayetteville	  shale	  formations.117	  Pipeline	   construction	   activity	   in	   2009	   was	   also	   considerable,	   albeit	   well	   below	   the	  exceptionally	  high	  pace	  of	   additions	   in	  2008.	  At	   least	  43	  natural	   gas	  pipeline	  projects	  were	   completed	   in	   2009	   in	   the	   lower	   48	   states,	   adding	   close	   to	   4	  800	   kilometres	   of	  pipeline	   to	   the	   natural	   gas	   grid	   and	   representing	   an	   investment	   of	   about	   $9.9	   billion.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  115	  INGAA	  Foundation	  and	  ICF	  International,	  'Natural	  Gas	  Pipeline	  and	  Storage	  Infrastructure	  Projections	  Through	  2030	  ',	  (Washington	  DC:	  Interstate	  Natural	  Gas	  Association	  of	  America	  Foundation	  2009).	  116	  Source:	  Energy	  Information	  Administration,	  GasTran	  Natural	  Gas	  Transportation	  Information	  System,	  Natural	  Gas	  Pipeline	  Projects	  Database.	  Cited	  in	  California	  Energy	  Commission,	  'Current	  Trends:	  Natural	  Gas	  Infrastructure',	  in	  Staff	  Workshop:	  2011	  Integrated	  Energy	  Policy	  Report	  (2011).	  117	  Andrews	  et	  al.,	  'Unconventional	  Gas	  Shales',	  6.	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Figure	   4-­‐11	   below	   shows	   three	   projects	   of	   particular	   interest	   that	   illustrate	   how	  increased	   unconventional	   gas	   production	   has	   impacted	   regional	   patterns	   in	   pipeline	  utilisation.	  
Figure	  4-­‐11:	  Significant	  pipeline	  expansions	  in	  the	  USA	  in	  2009118	  
	  Both	   the	   Midcontinent	   Express	   and	   Texas	   Independence	   pipelines	   allow	   greater	  deliverability	   from	   the	   Barnett	   Shale	   to	   regional	   markets.119	  However,	   the	   longest	  natural	   gas	   pipeline	   project	   completed	   in	   2009	   was	   the	   1	  000-­‐kilometre	   Rockies	  Express-­‐East	  pipeline.	  This	  marked	  the	  end	  of	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  2	  700-­‐kilometre,	  $5	  billion	  pipeline	  system	  stretching	  from	  Colorado	  to	  Ohio.	  Natural	  gas	  resources	  within	  the	   Rockies	   are	   found	   primarily	   in	   unconventional	   formations,120	  and	   the	   pipeline	  demonstrates	  that	  a	  combination	  of	  shale	  gas,	  CBM	  and	  tight	  gas	  development	  has	  also	  driven	  very	  significant	  infrastructure	  projects	  in	  the	  USA.	  	  For	  the	  near	  future	  at	   least,	  unconventional	  gas	   looks	  set	  to	  continue	  to	  transform	  the	  US	   transmission	   network.	   Table	   4-­‐8	   below	   shows	   a	   list	   of	   pipelines	   set	   to	   come	   into	  service	   between	   2011	   and	   2014	   with	   the	   express	   purpose	   of	   bringing	   shale	   gas	   to	  market.	  Whilst	  the	  majority	  of	  such	  pipeline	  developments	  in	  previous	  years	  centred	  on	  the	  Barnett	  Shale	  in	  northeast	  Texas,	  most	  of	  the	  projects	  in	  the	  immediate	  time-­‐horizon	  will	   service	   the	   Marcellus	   Shale	   and	   are	   located	   in	   the	   states	   of	   Pennsylvania,	   West	  Virginia	  and	  New	  York.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  118 	  Source:	   EIA,	   'Natural	   Gas	   Year-­‐In-­‐Review	   2009',	   (Washington,	   DC:	   US	   Energy	   Information	  Administration,	  2010).	  119	  Ibid.	  120	  Tight	   gas	   sands	  are	  widely	  distributed	   in	   the	  Green	  River	  Basin	  of	   south-­‐western	  Wyoming	  and	   the	  Piceance	  Basin	  of	  north-­‐western	  Colorado.	  The	  Rocky	  Mountain	  region	  is	  also	  the	  location	  of	  two	  of	  the	  most	  prolific	   coal-­‐bed	  methane	  basins	   in	   the	  world:	   the	  San	   Juan	  Basin	   in	   south-­‐western	  Colorado	  and	  north-­‐western	  New	  Mexico,	  and	  the	  Powder	  River	  Basin	  in	  eastern	  Wyoming.	  Environmental	  Protection	  Agency,	   'An	  Assessment	   of	   the	  Environmental	   Implications	   of	  Oil	   and	  Gas	   Production:	  A	  Regional	   Case	  Study	  ',	  (Washington	  DC:	  Environmental	  Protection	  Agency,	  2008),	  2-­‐5.	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Table	  4-­‐6:	  US	  shale	  gas	  pipeline	  projects	  in	  the	  near	  future121	  










Iroquois	   NYMarc	  Project	   Announced	   2014	   500	   106	   5.67	   NJ	   to	  NY	  Sunrise	  Project	   Completed	   2012	   272	   80	   8.88	   PA	   to	  WV	  Appalachian	  Gateway	  Project	   Construction	   2012	   635	   177	   13.71	   WV	   to	  PA	  Tioga	   County	  Extension	  Project	   Construction	   2011	   46.76	   26	   9.91	   PA	   to	  NY	  Barnett	   Intrastate	  Gas	   Pipeline	  Project	   Announced	   2011	   NA	   161	   28.3	   TX	   to	  TX	  	  Across	  the	  border	  in	  Canada,	  there	  is	  also	  evidence	  that	  unconventional	  gas	  production	  is	   changing	   gas	   trade	   flows	   and	  driving	   new	   infrastructure	   investment.	   The	  Canadian	  and	  US	  natural	  gas	  markets	  operate	  as	  a	  single	  integrated	  market	  and	  have	  a	  number	  of	  similarities.	   For	   example,	   the	   Canadian	   natural	   gas	   market	   has	   a	   highly	   liberalised	  structure	  as	  a	   result	  of	   far-­‐reaching	   regulatory	   reforms	   that	  began	   in	  1985.122	  Canada	  has	   relatively	   well-­‐developed	   pre-­‐existing	   pipeline	   infrastructure	   that	   has	   been	   built	  around	   historical	   conventional	   production.	   And	   finally,	   Canada	   has	   experienced	   a	  significant	  increase	  in	  unconventional	  gas	  production	  in	  the	  last	  decade.123	  	  Canadian	  tight	  and	  shale	  gas	  developments	  are	  primarily	   focused	  on	  the	  Montney	  and	  Horn	   River	   Basin	   plays	   in	   northeast	   British	   Columbia.	   Whilst	   the	   transmission	  infrastructure	   in	   British	   Columbia	   as	   a	   whole	   has	   benefitted	   from	   decades	   of	  conventional	   gas	  production,	  Canada’s	  National	  Energy	  Board	   forecasts	   that	   a	   slew	  of	  modest	   expansions	   will	   be	   necessary	   to	   connect	   new	   unconventional	   supplies	   to	   the	  substantial	  existing	   long-­‐haul	  capacity	  that	  brings	  gas	  to	  the	  major	  consuming	  regions	  of	  eastern	  Canada	  and	  beyond.124	  Projects	  in	  this	  vein	  include	  the	  Groundbirch	  (recently	  completed)	   and	  Horn	  River	  Mainline	   pipelines	   (planned)	   that	   connect	   supplies	   in	   the	  Horn	  River	  Basin	   to	   the	  Alberta	  system.	  More	  significantly,	   the	  ambitious	  Pacific	  Trail	  Pipeline	  project	  will	  move	  gas	  from	  northeast	  British	  Columbia	  to	  the	  planned	  Kitimat	  LNG	   terminal	   for	   export	   to	   premium	  markets	   in	  Asia	  when	   the	   two	   are	   completed	   in	  2014.	  	  So	  what	  does	  the	  North	  American	  experience	  tell	  us	  about	  the	  role	  that	  market	  access	  plays	   in	   unconventional	   gas	   development?	   Due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   large-­‐scale	   shale	   gas	  production	   has	   so	   far	   not	   been	   observed	   outside	   of	   liberalised	   energy	   markets,	  questions	   remain	   about	   whether	   the	   phenomenon	   can	   be	   replicated	   in	   differently	  structured	   markets	   and,	   if	   so,	   how	   this	   might	   look.	   What	   this	   section	   does	   show,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121	  Source:	  US	  Energy	  Information	  Agency.	  Information	  as	  of	  December	  2011.	  122	  A.	   Serletis	   and	   R.	   Rangel-­‐Ruiz,	   'Testing	   for	   common	   features	   in	   North	   American	   energy	   markets',	  
Energy	  Economics	  26	  (2004),	  P.	  I.	  Wilson,	  'Deregulation	  and	  natural	  gas	  trade	  relationships:	  lessons	  from	  the	  Alberta-­‐California	  experience	  ',	  Energy	  Policy	  25	  (1997).	  123	  Tight	  and	  shale	  gas	  production	  accounted	  for	  36%	  (34%	  from	  tight,	  2%	  from	  shale)	  of	  total	  domestic	  gas	  production	  in	  2010,	  up	  from	  18%	  in	  2000.	  National	  Energy	  Board,	  'Canadian	  Energy	  Overview	  2010',	  (Ottawa:	  National	  Energy	  Board,	  2011).	  124	  National	   Energy	   Board,	   'Canada’s	   Energy	   Future:	   Infrastructure	   Changes	   and	   Challenges	   to	   2020',	  (Ottawa:	  National	  Energy	  Board,	  2009).	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however,	  is	  that	  an	  institutional	  framework	  can	  be	  found	  to	  enable	  investment	  in	  major	  unconventional	  gas	  infrastructure	  projects	  in	  even	  the	  most	  highly	  liberalised	  markets.	  This	   is	   in	   spite	   of	   the	   narrower	   profit	   margins	   and	   greater	   uncertainty	   commonly	  ascribed	   to	   unconventional	   gas	   production.125	  In	   this	   regard,	   tax	   incentives	   and	   loan	  guarantees,	   such	   as	   those	   offered	   under	   the	  US	   Energy	   Policy	   Act	   (2005)	   and	  British	  Columbia’s	   Infrastructure	  Royalty	  Credit	  Program,	  may	  play	  a	  key	  role	   in	  ensuring	  an	  acceptable	  rate	  of	  return	  for	  investors	  in	  such	  projects.	  
4.2.3 Market	  access	  in	  the	  EU-­‐27	  This	   section	   takes	   a	   brief	   look	   at	   the	   existing	   pipeline	   system	   and	   structure	   of	   the	  natural	   gas	   market	   in	   Europe	   to	   suggest	   how	   much	   the	   North	   American	   experience	  might	   be	   able	   to	   inform	   expectations	   regarding	   possible	   indigenous	   shale	   gas	  production.	   A	   note	   of	   caution,	   however:	   simple	   infrastructural	   indicators,	   such	   as	   the	  combined	   length	   of	   various	   types	   of	   pipelines	   for	   example,	   cannot	   give	   a	   reliable	  indication	   of	   the	   amount	   of	   additional	   investment	   necessary	   to	   bring	   new	  unconventional	  gas	  supplies	  to	  market	  due	  to	  a	  host	  of	  additional	  factors	  that	  must	  also	  be	   taken	   into	   consideration.	   Similarly,	   the	   coincident	   timing	  of	   several	  market	   reform	  steps	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  find	  econometric	  evidence	  capable	  of	  directly	  testing	  the	  effect	  of	   liberalisation	  measures,	  such	  as	  ownership	  unbundling.	  There	  may	  also	  be	  country-­‐to-­‐country	   differences	   in	   the	   pace	   at	   which	   binding	   EU	   legal	   measures	   become	  practically	   effective.126	  For	   the	   abovementioned	   reasons,	   this	   section	   cannot	   offer	   a	  methodologically	   empirical	   assessment	   of	   the	   factors	   in	   question,	   although	   it	   aims	   to	  provide	   a	   rigorous	   treatment	   of	   some	   of	   the	   most	   notable	   and	   relevant	   available	  evidence. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  125	  This	   echoes	   the	   empirical	   analysis	   of	   investment	   trends	   in	   US	   LNG	   revealing	   that	   infrastructure	  investment	   is	   forthcoming	   during	   favourable	   economic	   conditions,	   and	   that	   after	   the	   1992	  implementation	   of	   Order	   636,	   the	   natural	   gas	   pipeline	   system	   underwent	   an	   investment	   boom.	  Hirschhausen,	  'Infrastructure,	  regulation,	  investment	  and	  security	  of	  supply'.	  126 	  Michael	   Pollitt,	   'The	   arguments	   for	   and	   against	   ownership	   unbundling	   of	   energy	   transmission	  networks',	  Energy	  Policy	  36,	  no	  2	  (2008	  ).	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Figure	  4-­‐12:	  The	  US	  natural	  gas	  transmission	  network127	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  127	  Source:	  EIA,	  Office	  of	  Oil	  and	  Gas,	  Natural	  Gas	  Division,	  Gas	  Transportation	  Information	  System.	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Figure	  4-­‐13:	  The	  EU’s	  natural	  gas	  transmission	  network128	  
	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  128	  Source:	  European	  Commission,	  Platts,	  IHS.	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Figure	  4-­‐12	  and	  Figure	  4-­‐13	  show	  the	  transmission	  pipeline	   infrastructure	   in	  the	  USA	  and	   Europe	   respectively.	   The	   USA	   was	   the	   first	   country	   to	   develop	   its	   natural	   gas	  resources	   and	   has	   what	   can	   be	   considered	   a	   well-­‐developed	   transmission	   network.	  According	   to	   the	   EIA,	   there	   were	   an	   estimated	   490	  000	   kilometres	   of	   interstate	   and	  intrastate	   transmission	   pipeline	   in	   the	   USA	   at	   the	   close	   of	   2008	   –	   over	   53	   km	   of	  transmission	   pipeline	   for	   every	   1	  000	   km2	   of	   land.129	  Although	   there	   are	   significant	  differences	  between	   individual	  Member	  States	  (see	  Table	  4-­‐7),	   the	  equivalent	  statistic	  for	  the	  EU	  is	  comparable	  –	  roughly	  29	  km	  of	  transmission	  pipeline	  per	  1	  000km2.130	  
Table	  4-­‐7:	  Gas	  transmission	  grid	  density	  by	  country131	  	   United	  States	   Italy	   Sweden	   United	  
Kingdom	  
Total	  EU	  
aggregated	  Gas	   grid	   (km)	  /area	  (1	  000km2)	   53	   110	   1	   45	   29	  	  Although	   these	   figures	   suggest	   that	   the	   US	   and	   EU	   gas	   transportation	   systems	   are	  analogous,132	  readers	   should	   be	   aware	   of	   several	   factors	   that	   complicate	   the	   direct	  comparison	  of	  the	  two	  markets	  on	  simple	  pipeline	  density	  terms.	  First,	  whilst	  pipeline	  age	   and	   efficiency	   can	   be	   considered	   to	   be	   alike,	   differences	   in	   both	   the	   geographical	  distribution	  of	  pipelines	  in	  relation	  to	  unconventional	  plays	  and	  their	  current	  levels	  of	  utilisation	  need	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account.133	  Secondly,	  differences	  in	  patterns	  of	  pipeline	  development	  also	  need	  to	  be	  factored	  in.	  For	  example,	  the	  USA	  is	  both	  a	  major	  producer	  and	  consumer	  of	  gas	  and	  the	  dense	  transmission	  infrastructure	  in	  states	  such	  as	  Texas	  and	   offshore	   in	   the	   Gulf	   of	   Mexico	   are	   a	   legacy	   of	   many	   years	   of	   hydrocarbon	  development.	  Being	  primarily	  a	  consumer	  of	  natural	  gas,	  Europe	  does	  not	  have	  regions	  that	  are	  as	   tightly	  networked	  and	   this	  may	  have	   the	  effect	  of	   lowering	   the	  aggregated	  length	  of	  pipelines	  per	  km2.	  	  Finally,	   the	   possibility	   that	   unconventional	   gas	   supplies	   can	   be	   produced	   close	   to	  markets	   may	   lessen	   reliance	   on	   transmission	   pipelines	   altogether.	   In	   government	  testimony,	  Shell	  has	  stated	  that	  successful	  shale	  gas	  development	  in	  Europe	  is	  likely	  to	  first	   meet	   local	   market	   demand,	   thus	   potentially	   freeing	   up	   supply	   to	   other	   parts	   of	  Europe.134	  In	  the	  USA,	  Pennsylvania-­‐based	  UGI	  Utilities	  is	  investigating	  the	  possibility	  of	  adding	  consumer	  value	  by	  selling	  locally	  produced	  Marcellus	  shale	  gas	  directly	  through	  their	  distribution	  system	  –	  a	  sort	  of	  shale	  gas	  micro-­‐grid.135	  Whilst	  this	  is	  an	  exceptional	  case,	  it	   illustrates	  how	  widely	  distributed	  unconventional	  gas	  resources	  may	  challenge	  traditional	  assumptions	  about	  the	  role	  infrastructure	  plays	  in	  resource	  development.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  129	  EIA,	   About	   U.S.	   Natural	   Gas	   Pipelines	   -­‐	   Transporting	   Natural	   Gas	   (2011,	   cited	   12	   December	   2011);	  available	   from	  http://205.254.135.7/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications/ngpipeline/index.html	  130	  Source:	  European	  Commission,	  Platts,	  IHS.	  131	  Sources:	  EIA,	  Natural	  Gas	  Pipelines	  (cited),	  IEA,	  'Oil	  and	  Gas	  Markets',	  187.	  132	  Gény,	  'Unconventional	  Gas',	  46.	  133	  ‘In	   the	  US,	  a	  huge	  number	  of	  pipeline	  debottlenecking	  projects	  have	  been	  necessary	   to	  sustain	  shale	  gas	  production	  growth,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  main	  producing	  regions	  (e.g.	  Texas,	  Rockies,	  Oklahoma)	  are	  in	  the	  vicinity	  of	  dense	  pipeline	  networks.’	  Ibid.,	  98.	  134	  Memorandum	  submitted	  by	  Shell,	  in	  House	  of	  Commons,	  'Shale	  Gas:	  Fifth	  Report	  of	  Session	  2010-­‐12'.	  135	  David	  Falcheck,	   'UGI	  links	  shale	  gas	  to	  system:	  Utility	  celebrates	  first	  Marcellus	  connection',	  Scranton	  
Times-­‐Tribune	  2011.	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If	  the	  EU	  shares	  certain	  broad	  similarities	  with	  the	  USA	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  development	  of	  its	   energy	   infrastructure,	   then	   energy	  market	   structure	   similarities	   are	   less	   apparent.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  USA	  has	  a	  fully	  liberalised	  market	  for	  natural	  gas	  but	  reforms	  to	  the	  EU’s	  internal	  gas	  market	  are	  still	  ongoing.	  The	  liberalisation	  of	  gas	  markets	  in	  Europe	  began	  in	  the	  UK	  with	  the	  1982	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  Act,	  designed	  to	  bring	  competition	  to	  the	  transmission	  and	  distribution	  of	  natural	  gas.	  In	  1986,	   the	   UK	  market	   was	   opened	   for	   non-­‐domestic	   customers	   and	   British	   Gas	   –	   the	  largest	   integrated	   gas	   utility	   company	   in	   the	   world	   at	   the	   time	   –	   was	   privatised.	  Dramatic	  changes	  continued	  with	  the	  1995	  Gas	  Act,	  which	  laid	  the	  groundwork	  for	  the	  introduction	  of	   full	   retail	   competition	  by	   creating	   licensing	   schemes	   for	   companies	   to	  engage	   in	   the	   transport	   and	   supply	   of	   gas.	   Then	   in	   1996	   the	   Network	   Code	   was	  introduced	   –	   a	   legal	   document	   that	   set	   the	   rules	   for	   system	   balancing,	   capacity	  acquisition	   and	   trading,	   and	   gas	   transportation	   and	   trading	   in	   the	   pipeline	   system.136	  The	  UK	   experience	   demonstrated	   that	   it	  was	   possible	   to	  move	   from	  a	  monopoly	   to	   a	  competitive	   environment	   in	   natural	   gas	  without	   structural	   reforms	   in	   an	  EU	  Member	  State.137	  The	  EU	  began	  the	  liberalisation	  of	  the	  European	  natural	  gas	  sector	  at	  the	  supra-­‐national	  level	  in	  1998	  with	  the	  adoption	  of	  what	  has	  become	  known	  as	  the	  First	  Gas	  Directive.138	  This	   sought	   to	   break	   monopolies	   and	   create	   an	   open	   and	   competitive	   market	   by	  requiring	   that	   integrated	   companies	   unbundle	   their	   internal	   accounts	   and	   not	   abuse	  commercially	   sensitive	   information.	   It	   also	  mandated	   that	   network	  operators	   provide	  third-­‐party	   access	   to	   their	   infrastructure	   and	   that	  Member	   States	   gradually	   introduce	  market	  opening.	  The	   legislation	  aspired	  to	  bring	  choice	  to	  consumers,	  accessibility	   for	  all	   suppliers	   and	   improvement	   to	   security	   of	   supply	   through	   diversity.	   Several	  subsequent	   legal	   acts	   –	   introduced	   in	   Table	   4-­‐8	   below	   and	   covered	   in	  more	   detail	   in	  Annex	  G	  –	  have	  progressively	  built	  upon	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  First	  Gas	  Directive,	  albeit	  with	  varied	  success.	  The	  most	  recent	  Third	   Internal	  Market	  Package	  took	  direct	  effect	  on	  3	  March	  2011.139	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  Álvaro	  Carteaa	  and	  Thomas	  Williams,	   'UK	  Gas	  Markets:	   the	  Market	  Price	  of	  Risk	  and	  Applications	   to	  Multiple	  Interruptible	  Supply	  Contracts',	  Energy	  Economics	  30,	  no	  3	  (2008).	  137	  Andrej	   Juris,	   'Market	  Development	   in	   the	  United	  Kingdom's	  Natural	   Gas	   Industry',	   (Washington	  DC:	  World	  Bank,	  1998).	  138	  European	  Union,	  'Directive	  98/30/EC	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  22	  June	  1998	  concerning	   common	   rules	   for	   the	   internal	   market	   in	   natural	   gas	   ',	   (Luxembourg:	   Office	   for	   Official	  Publications	  of	  the	  European	  Communities,	  1998).	  139	  European	  Union,	  'Directive	  2009/73/EC	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  13	  July	  2009	  concerning	   common	   rules	   for	   the	   internal	   market	   in	   natural	   gas	   and	   repealing	   Directive	   2003/55/EC	  (Text	  with	  EEA	  relevance)',	   (Luxembourg:	  Office	   for	  Official	  Publications	  of	   the	  European	  Communities,	  2009);	  European	  Union,	  'Regulation	  (EC)	  No	  713/2009	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  13	  July	  2009	  establishing	  an	  Agency	  for	  the	  Cooperation	  of	  Energy	  Regulators	  (Text	  with	  EEA	  relevance)',	  (Luxembourg:	   Office	   for	   Official	   Publications	   of	   the	   European	   Communities,	   2009);	   European	   Union,	  'Regulation	   (EC)	   No	   715/2009	   of	   the	   European	   Parliament	   and	   of	   the	   Council	   of	   13	   July	   2009	   on	  conditions	   for	   access	   to	   the	   natural	   gas	   transmission	   networks	   and	   repealing	   Regulation	   (EC)	   No	  1775/2005	   (Text	   with	   EEA	   relevance)',	   (Luxembourg:	   Office	   for	   Official	   Publications	   of	   the	   European	  Communities,	  2009).	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Table	  4-­‐8:	  Major	  regulations	  for	  the	  EU	  internal	  gas	  market140	  
Date	   EU	  Directives	  and	  Acts	   Principal	  objective	  August	  1998	  	   98/30/EC	   First	   Gas	  Directive	   ‘Regulation	  for	  an	  internal	  natural	  gas	  market’	  	   Guarantee	   TPA	   to	   improve	   competitiveness	   and	   improve	  security	  of	  supply.	  June	  2003	  	   2003/55/EC	   Second	  Amended	   Gas	   Directive	  ‘acceleration	  directive’	  	   Encourage	   legal	   unbundling	   of	   transmission	   system	   operators	  from	  gas	  trading	  companies	  on	  a	  voluntary	  basis.	  Deregulate	  gas	  markets	  by	  July	  2004	  and	  have	  full	  TPA	  by	  July	  2007,	  including	  TPA	  for	  storage	  systems.	  2004	  	   First	   Strategic	   Energy	  Review	  	   Directions	  on	  security	  of	  supply.	  March	  2005	  	   European	   Gas	   Regulatory	  Forum	  	   Guidelines	  on	  services	  and	  rules	  for	  TPA	  compiled	  by	  the	  Forum	  Oct	  2007	  	   EU	   Commission	   Report	   ‘An	  Energy	  Policy	  for	  Europe’	  	   Diverging	   views	   within	   EU;	   France	   and	   Germany	   favour	  independent	  TSOs	  as	  in	  the	  Netherlands	  since	  July	  2005.	  Nov	  2008	  	   Second	   Strategic	   Energy	  Review	  	   Securing	  an	  energy	  future.	  April	  2009	  	   Third	   Legislative	   Energy	  and	  Gas	  Package	  	   Creation	   of	   ACER	   (Agency	   for	   the	   Cooperation	   of	   Energy	  Regulators)	   and	   ENTSO	   (European	   Network	   of	   Transmission	  System	  Operators).	  	  It	  is	  too	  early	  to	  tell	  what	  the	  long-­‐term	  effects	  of	  the	  Third	  Package	  will	  be.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  there	  have	  been	  encouraging	  recent	  developments	  indicating	  that	  liberalisation	  is	  gathering	   pace.	   A	   wave	   of	   corporate	   mergers	   and	   demergers	   was	   occasioned	   by	   the	  reforms,	  heralding	  a	  change	  in	  the	  industrial	  organisation	  model	  in	  the	  European	  utility	  sector	   from	   single	   product	   national/regional	   companies	   towards	   a	  multi-­‐energy	   pan-­‐European	   model.141	  On	   the	   regulatory	   front,	   signs	   of	   market	   integration	   have	   been	  observed,	   along	   with	   price	   decreases	   in	   Member	   States	   that	   have	   diversified	   supply.	  Traded	  volumes	  on	  the	  three	  most	  liquid	  gas	  spot	  markets	  rose	  by	  4.45%	  to	  reach	  1	  455	  terawatt	   hours	   (TWh)	   in	  2009.142	  And,	   in	   combination	  with	   the	   arbitrage	  possibilities	  created	   by	   the	   increasingly	   dense	   pipeline	   structure143 ,	   the	   market	   liberalisation	  process	  in	  Europe	  is	  being	  credited	  by	  some	  observers	  for	  the	  growth	  in	  pressure	  from	  EU	   consumers	   to	   revise	   long-­‐term	   oil-­‐indexed	   gas	   contracts	   towards	   market-­‐based	  pricing	   (see	   Section	   5.2.4). 144 	  With	   any	   substantial	   European	   unconventional	   gas	  production	  not	  expected	  before	  the	  end	  of	  this	  decade,	  some	  analysts	  are	  hopeful	  that	  the	  liberalisation	  process	  will	  have	  made	  significant	  progress	  by	  then.145	  	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   market	   concentration	   remains	   high,	   changes	   observed	   in	  interregional	   connectivity	  have	  only	  been	  modest	  and	   the	   switching	   rate	   continues	   to	  remain	  low	  in	  most	  Member	  States.	  For	  these	  reasons,	  the	  latest	  Commission	  report	  on	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  Weijermars,	  'Value	  chain	  analysis'.	  141	  Jonathan	  Stern	  and	  Howard	  Rogers,	  'The	  Transition	  to	  Hub-­‐Based	  Gas	  Pricing	  in	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  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  Institute	  for	  Energy	  Studies,	  2011),	  20.	  142	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  143	  By	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   pipeline	   interconnections	  will	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   LNG	   arriving	   in	   Greece	   to	   be	   delivered	   to	   a	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   of	  south	  and	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  as	  far	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  as	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  or	  vice-­‐versa	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  to	  be	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  European	  Gas	  Hub	  to	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  Stern	  and	  Rogers,	  'Transition	  to	  Hub-­‐Based	  Pricing',	  16.	  144	  Miharu	   Kanai,	   'Decoupling	   the	   Oil	   and	   Gas	   Prices:	   Natural	   Gas	   Pricing	   in	   the	   Post-­‐Financial	   Crisis	  Market	  ',	  (Paris,	  Brussels:	  Institut	  français	  des	  relations	  internationales	  2011).	  145	  Gény,	  'Unconventional	  Gas',	  84,	  98.	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market	   progress	   concedes:	   “a	   truly	   single	   energy	   market	   is	   far	   from	   complete.”146	  Questions	  thus	  remain	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  EU’s	   internal	  market	  rules	  can	  be	  practically	  applied	   in	   the	   context	   of	   possible	   unconventional	   gas	   sources	   to	   be	   clear;	   non-­‐discriminatory,	  timely	  and	  repeatable	  across	  large	  operations.	  Moreover,	  there	  is	  an	  important	  factor	  which	  may	  make	  the	  European	  transition	  more	  complicated	   than	   historical	   precedents	   suggest.	   In	   the	   words	   of	   one	   notable	  commentator:	   “in	   both	   North	   America	   and	   the	   UK,	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	   the	   parties	  involved	   in	   the	   market	   reform	   process	   were	   under	   the	   same	   political	   and	   legal	  jurisdiction	  (or	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Canada,	  similar	  jurisdictions).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Continental	  Europe,	  not	  only	  are	  there	  a	  large	  number	  of	  importing	  companies	  with	  differing	   legal	  systems,	  but	   their	  suppliers	  –	   in	  particular	  Russia	  and	  Algeria,	  but	  not	   forgetting	   a	   large	   number	   of	   LNG	   exporting	   countries	   –	   operate	   under	  fundamentally	  different	  legal/regulatory	  frameworks.”147	  Turning	  the	  question	  on	  its	  head,	  at	  least	  two	  observers	  have	  suggested	  that	  indigenous	  unconventional	  gas	  production	  may	  facilitate	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  genuine	  single	  market	  for	  gas	   across	   the	   EU	   by	   allowing	   new	   players	   to	   challenge	   incumbent	   firms	   in	   regions	  where	  gas-­‐to-­‐gas	  competition	  may	  not	  otherwise	  be	  observed.148	  The	  economic	  theory	  of	  contestable	  markets	  states	  that	  market	  power,	  such	  as	  monopoly,	  can	  be	  controlled	  if	  there	   is	   a	   genuine	   possibility	   of	   entry	   by	   new	   suppliers.	   Actual	   entry	   of	   competing	  suppliers	   is	   not	   necessary,	   simply	   the	   threat	   that	   the	  market	  might	   be	   contestable	   is	  sufficient	  to	  stimulate	  behaviour	  associated	  with	  a	  competitive	  market.149	  In	  this	  light,	  if	  there	   are	   real	   prospects	   of	   significant	   gas	   supplies	   from	   domestic	   shale	   sources,	   this	  could	  have	  a	  very	  powerful	  influence	  on	  the	  behaviour	  of	  Europe’s	  current	  external	  gas	  suppliers	   forcing	   them	   to	   lower	   prices	   in	   order	   to	   maintain	   market	   share.150	  For	   a	  continuation	  of	  this	  point,	  see	  Sections	  5.2.3	  and	  5.2.4.	  
4.3 Indigenous	  production	  and	  energy	  security	  The	   energy	   security	   benefits	   of	   unconventional	   gas	   are	   overwhelmingly	   portrayed	   as	  being	  associated	  with	  increased	  indigenous	  production	  and	  energy	  independence.	  This	  section	  will	  show	  that	  while	  energy	   independence	  brings	  a	  host	  of	   important	  benefits,	  directly	  equating	  energy	  independence	  with	  energy	  security	  is	  too	  simplistic.	  Increasing	  reliance	   on	   energy	   imports	   is	   not	   necessarily	   incompatible	   with	   increasing	   energy	  security,	  and	  many	  of	  the	  potential	  security	  of	  supply	  benefits	  of	  unconventional	  gas	  to	  the	   EU	   may	   come	   by	   way	   of	   more	   reliable	   and	   affordable	   imports	   because	   of	   the	  liberalisation	  of	  the	  EU	  energy	  markets	  and	  growing	  global	  energy	  trade.	  Energy	   plays	   an	   essential	   role	   in	   satisfying	   basic	   human	   needs,	   providing	   for	   social	  welfare	  and	  as	  fuel	  to	  power	  the	  economic	  engine.	  It	  is	  what	  classical	  economists	  once	  called	   a	   ‘basic	   good’:	   directly	   or	   indirectly,	   it	   enters	   the	   production	   of	   every	   other	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  146	  European	   Commission,	   'Commission	   Staff	   Working	   Document:	   2009-­‐2010	   Report	   on	   progress	   in	  creating	  the	  internal	  gas	  and	  electricity	  market'.	  147	  Stern	  and	  Rogers,	  'Transition	  to	  Hub-­‐Based	  Pricing',	  34-­‐35.	  148	  Alan	  Riley,	   'The	  Importance	  of	   ‘shale	  gas’	   its	  global	   implications',	   in	  Presentation	  at	  Konrad	  Adenauer	  
Stiftung	  (Berlin:	  2010).	  149	  In	   a	   contestable	   market,	   with	   very	   low	   barriers	   to	   entry	   and	   exit,	   potential	   as	   well	   as	   actual	  competition	   is	  a	  constraint	  on	  what	   the	   incumbent	  producers	  can	  charge,	  so	   that	  a	  competitive	  price	   is	  observed	  even	  when	  there	  is	  only	  one	  seller.	  150	  Testimony	  of	  Prof.	  Paul	  Stevens	  in	  House	  of	  Commons,	  'Shale	  Gas:	  Fifth	  Report	  of	  Session	  2010-­‐12',	  Ev	  w27.	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produced	   commodity	   or	   service.151	  As	   such,	   reliable	   access	   to	   affordable	   energy	   is	   an	  important	  national	  security	  concern.	  In	  spite	  of	  its	  crucial	  importance,	  energy	  security	  lacks	  both	  a	  common	  definition	  and	  a	  methodology	  for	  its	  evaluation.	  Although	  its	  meaning	  varies	  between	  different	  countries	  and	  organisations,	  in	  general	  it	  may	  be	  used	  to	  signify	  some	  of	  the	  following:	  
• Reliability	  of	  supply;	  	  
• Self-­‐sufficiency;	  	  
• Security	  of	  infrastructure;	  	  
• Stability	  and	  diversity	  of	  suppliers;	  	  
• Reduced	  consumption	  through	  energy	  efficiency;	  
• Diversity	  of	  energy	  carriers;	  and	  increasingly…	  
• Environmental	  sustainability.152	  In	   the	  UN’s	  World	  Energy	  Assessment,	   energy	   security	   is	   described	   as	   ‘the	   continuous	  availability	   of	   energy	   in	   varied	   forms,	   in	   sufficient	   quantities,	   and	   at	   reasonable	  prices’.153	  	  In	  2003,	  the	  UK	  Department	  of	  Trade	  and	  Industry	  (now	  the	  Department	  for	  Business,	  Innovation	   and	   Skills)	   reduced	   the	   problem	   of	   ensuring	   energy	   security	   to	   one	   of	  ensuring	   reliable	   supplies	   of	   energy	   at	   predictable	   prices	   delivered	   through	   the	  market.154	  The	  International	  Energy	  Agency	  described	  it	  as	  “the	  uninterrupted	  physical	  availability	  at	  a	  price	  which	  is	  affordable,	  while	  respecting	  environmental	  concerns”.155	  And,	  finally,	  the	  European	  Commission	  refers	  to	  ‘the	  uninterrupted	  physical	  availability	  of	   energy	   products	   on	   the	   market	   at	   an	   affordable	   price	   for	   all	   consumers,	   whilst	  respecting	  environmental	  concerns	  and	  looking	  towards	  sustainable	  development”.156	  Each	   of	   the	   aforementioned	   definitions	   of	   energy	   security	   carries	   a	   good	  measure	   of	  commonsense	  value.	  However,	  energy	  security	  is	  a	  multi-­‐faceted	  concept.	  The	  following	  pages	  will	  further	  unpack	  the	  concept	  with	  specific	  reference	  to	  certain	  key	  elements	  of	  the	  European	  Commission’s	  definition,	  provided	  above.	  In	  particular,	  the	  phrases	  “for	  all	  consumers”;	   “uninterrupted	   physical	   availability”;	   “on	   the	   market	   at	   an	   affordable	  price”;	   and	   “respecting	  environmental	   concerns”	  will	  be	  explored	   in	  order	   to	   clarify	   a	  handful	  of	  important,	  but	  problematic,	  issues	  surrounding	  energy	  security.	  As	  one	  notable	  commentator	  remarks:	  “scholarly	  understanding	  of	  the	  challenges	  at	  the	  intersection	  of	  energy	  and	  national	  security,	  and	  of	  the	  various	  policy	  tools	  available	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  151	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   Prospects	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   Priorities',	  Foreign	  Affairs	   March/April	  (2010).	  152	  Adapted	   from	   Estonian	   Ministry	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs,	   Energy	   Security	   (2011,	   cited	   4	   January	   2011);	  available	  from	  http://www.vm.ee/?q=en/node/4116	  153	  United	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  Development	  Programme,	  'World	  Energy	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  (New	  York:	  UNDP,	  2000),	  113.	  154	  UK	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  of	  Trade	  and	  Industry,	  'Our	  energy	  future	  -­‐	  creating	  a	  low	  carbon	  economy',	  (London:	  2003),	  73.	  155	  IEA,	  Energy	  Security	  (2012,	  cited	  4	  January	  2011).	  156	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  'Towards	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  strategy	  for	  the	  security	  of	  energy	  supply'.	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address	  them,	  is	  surprisingly	  weak.”157	  One	  of	  the	  reasons	  for	  this	  is	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  energy	  security	  is	  inherently	  value-­‐laden.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  energy	  security	  means	  different	  things	  to	  different	  people.	  As	  Daniel	  Yergin	  writes:	  
“Energy-­‐exporting	   countries	   focus	   on	   maintaining	   the	  
‘security	   of	   demand’	   for	   their	   exports,	   which	   after	   all	  
generate	   the	   overwhelming	   share	   of	   their	   government	  
revenues.	  For	  Russia,	  the	  aim	  is	  to	  reassert	  state	  control	  over	  
‘strategic	   resources’	   and	   gain	   primacy	   over	   the	   main	  
pipelines	   and	   market	   channels	   through	   which	   it	   ships	   its	  
hydrocarbons	   to	   international	   markets.	   The	   concern	   for	  
developing	   countries	   is	   how	   changes	   in	   energy	   prices	   affect	  
their	   balance	   of	   payments.	   For	   China	   and	   India,	   energy	  
security	  now	  lies	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  rapidly	  adjust	  to	  their	  new	  
dependence	   on	   global	   markets,	   which	   represents	   a	   major	  
shift	  away	  from	  their	  former	  commitments	  to	  self-­‐sufficiency.	  
For	   Japan,	   it	  means	   offsetting	   its	   stark	   scarcity	   of	   domestic	  
resources	  through	  diversification,	  trade,	  and	  investment.”158	  The	  European	  Commission’s	  definition	  of	  energy	  security	  speaks	  of	  providing	  a	  supply	  of	  energy	  products	  “for	  all	  consumers”.	  This	  highlights	  the	  fact	  that	  energy	  security	  in	  a	  European	   context	   usually	   refers	   to	   the	   consumer-­‐centric	   notion	   of	   security	   of	   supply.	  But	  even	  security	  of	  supply	  is	  itself	  context	  dependent.	  The	  level	  of	  risk	  to	  a	  country	  is	  a	  function	  of	  the	  flexibility	  of	  its	  energy	  system	  and	  its	  economy	  to	  accommodate	  supply	  shocks,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  tightness	  of	  the	  energy	  market	  concerned.159	  Key	  analytical	  factors	  to	  consider	  include:	  1) The	  security	  of	  the	  network	  infrastructure	  essential	  to	  delivering	  energy	  supplies	  to	  customers	  (electricity	  grids,	  gas	  and	  oil	  pipelines,	  etc);	  	  2) The	  degree	  to	  which	  a	  country	  is	  dependent	  on	  imports;	  3) Diversity	   in	   the	   types	   of	   primary	   energy	   an	   economy	   relies	   on	   (the	   so-­‐called	  energy	  mix),	   in	  the	  sources	  of	  this	  energy	  and	  in	  the	  means	  through	  which	  this	  energy	  is	  delivered;	  4) The	  extent	  to	  which	  various	  types	  of	  energy	  and	  fuels	  can	  be	  substituted	  for	  each	  other	  in	  the	  economy;	  5) Environmental	  constraints	  on	  the	  type	  and	  amount	  of	  energy	  used;	  6) Fundamental	  market	  conditions;	  7) The	   political	   circumstances	   of	   countries	   and	   regions	   influencing	   the	   supply	  chain.	  Energy	  independence	  is,	  therefore,	  just	  one	  of	  a	  series	  of	  factors	  that	  determine	  security	  of	  supply	  and	  not	  a	  sufficient	  condition	  of	  security	  of	  supply.	  Countries	  that	  are	  energy	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self-­‐sufficient	   may	   also	   suffer	   from	   energy	   insecurity	   due	   to	   market	   failures,	   force	  majeure	  or	  technical	  stoppages.	  Equally,	  increasing	  reliance	  on	  energy	  imports	  may	  not	  necessarily	  be	  incompatible	  with	  increasing	  energy	  security	  if	  suppliers	  are	  reliable	  or	  if	  undelivered	   supplies	   can	   be	   easily	   substituted	   in	   the	   energy	   system.	   In	   this	   context,	  even	   imported	   unconventional	   gas	   supplies	   could	   mitigate	   the	   high	   costs	   and	   risks	  associated	  with	   long-­‐distance	  gas	   transportation	  by	  offering	  an	  alternative	   to	  supplies	  sourced	   from	   further	   afield	   and	   an	   additional	   source	   of	   gas	   in	   times	   of	   shortage.	   Put	  simply,	  unconventional	  gas	  could	  introduce	  new	  ‘supply	  shock	  absorbers’	  to	  respond	  to	  disruptions	  and	  market	  imbalances.160	  As	  a	  result	  of	  its	  conceptual	  elasticity,	  energy	  security	  has	  been	  used	  to	  justify	  a	  variety	  of	   policies.	   Recently,	   one	   major	   debate	   in	   Europe	   has	   centred	   on	   how	   to	   manage	  declining	   indigenous	   natural	   gas	   production	   and	   increasing	   import	   dependence.	   The	  terms	   ‘energy	   security’	   and	   ‘energy	   independence’	   are	   often	   used	   interchangeably;	  however,	  they	  are	  distinct	  concepts.	  Energy	  imports	  may	  exacerbate	  trade	  deficits:	  the	  development	   of	   indigenous	   energy	   sources	   can	   boost	   national	   economies;	   and	   tax	  revenues	  from	  energy	  production	  can	  bolster	  governmental	  budgets.	  However,	  strictly	  speaking	  these	  are	  not	  energy	  security	  issues	  per	  se.	  Moreover,	  energy	  independence	  as	  a	   policy	   goal	   in	   and	   of	   itself	   could	   be	   considered	   misleading	   and	   costly	   as	   most	   EU	  Member	  States	  do	  not	  have	  the	  resources	  to	  be	  self-­‐sufficient.161	  By	   referring	   to	   the	   “uninterrupted	   physical	   availability	   of	   energy”,	   the	   European	  Commission	   Green	   Paper	   correctly	   highlights	   the	   most	   basic	   aspect	   of	   security	   of	  supply.	   Energy	   resources	   like	  natural	   gas	   are	  private	   commodities	   that	   are	   subject	   to	  the	  same	  market	   forces	  as	  other	  commodities,	   such	  as	  steel,	  wheat,	  or	  pork	  bellies.162	  Large,	   flexible	   and	   well-­‐functioning	   energy	   markets	   are	   capable	   of	   providing	   a	  considerable	  source	  of	  physical	  security	  by	  absorbing	  shocks	  and	  allowing	  supply	  and	  demand	   to	   reallocate	  physical	   supply	  more	  quickly	   and	  with	  greater	   ingenuity	   than	  a	  controlled	  system	  could.163	  Only	   in	  extreme	  circumstances,	  such	  as	  embargoes,	  strikes	  or	  wars,	  is	  energy	  physically	  unobtainable	  in	  developed	  countries.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  one	  notable	   economist	   in	   the	   field,	   “Supply	   can	  almost	   always	   be	  made	   equal	   to	   demand,	  
provided	  the	  price	  is	  allowed	  to	  adjust.”164	  This	   brings	   us	   to	   the	   issue	   of	   the	   price	   of	   energy	   products	   –	   another	   fundamental	  component	   of	   security	   of	   supply.	   The	   European	   Commission’s	   reference	   to	   the	  availability	  of	  energy	  “on	  the	  market	  at	  an	  affordable	  price”	  raises	  the	  tricky	  question	  of	  how	   to	  define	   affordability.	   It	  must	  be	   recognised	   that	   a	   consumer’s	  point	   of	   view	  on	  this	  issue	  will	  clash	  fundamentally	  with	  a	  producer’s.	  In	  fact,	  the	  only	  way	  that	  energy	  prices	  can	  enhance	  energy	  security	  is	  when	  they	  are	  high	  enough	  to	  guarantee	  adequate	  return	  on	   investment	   for	  producers	  and	   low	  enough	   to	   stimulate	  economic	  growth	   in	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the	  consuming	  countries.165	  Put	  simply,	  low	  prices	  are	  as	  dangerous	  to	  energy	  security	  as	  high	  prices.166	  	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  market	  plays	  an	  essential	  role	  in	  security	  of	  supply	  by	  deciding	  the	  most	  suitable	  and	  sustainable	  price	  for	  energy	  products	  based	  on	  supply	  and	  demand.	  (This	   is	  provided,	  of	   course,	   that	   the	  market	   is	   functioning	  well!)	  Viewed	   in	   this	   light,	  unconventional	  gas	  could	  play	  a	  significant	  role	  by	  reducing	  the	  scarcity	  of	  natural	  gas	  and	   fundamentally	   rebalancing	   supply	   and	   demand.	   As	   the	   natural	   gas	   supply	   curve	  becomes	  more	   elastic,	   as	   is	   the	   case	  with	   an	   increasing	   abundance	   of	   unconventional	  gas	  resources,	   it	  will	  become	  increasingly	  difficult	   to	  price	  natural	  gas	  above	  marginal	  cost.167	  This	  could	  lower	  the	  market	  price	  of	  gas,	  improve	  the	  EU’s	  bargaining	  position	  as	  a	  gas	  consumer	  and	  make	  it	  easier	  for	  the	  EU	  to	  meet	  its	  future	  energy	  needs.	  Although	   the	   market	   plays	   an	   important	   role	   in	   ensuring	   energy	   security,	   energy	   is	  generally	  considered	  by	  policy-­‐makers	  to	  be	  too	  important	  to	  be	  solely	  entrusted	  to	  the	  market	  alone.	  Moreover,	  energy	  markets	  suffer	  from	  multiple	  market	  failures.	  Amongst	  other	   things,	   they	   are	   strongly	  distorted	  by	   the	   ‘rent-­‐seeking’	   behaviour	  of	   states	   and	  large	  businesses	  attempting	  to	  capture	  special	  monopoly	  privileges	  rather	  than	  earning	  profits	  through	  competitive	  trade.	  	  One	  notable	  source	  of	  market	  failure	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  energy	  can	  be	  considered	  both	  an	  economic	  and	  a	  political	  good.168	  In	  recent	  years,	  analysts	  have	  often	  commented	  on	  the	  manner	   in	   which	   natural	   gas	   is	   used	   as	   a	   political	   lever	   in	   the	   Russian-­‐Ukrainian	  relationship	  –	  a	  practice	  that	  has	  greatly	  distorted	  both	  the	  price	  and	  reliability	  of	   the	  natural	  gas	  delivered	  to	  Ukraine.169	  However,	  in	  the	  broader	  historical	  context,	  the	  most	  noteworthy	  example	  of	  the	  use	  of	  energy	  for	  political	  ends	  is	  the	  deployment	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  oil	  weapon.	  The	  switch	   from	   international-­‐private	   to	  national-­‐public	  ownership	  of	   the	   international	   oil	   market	   from	   1973	   onwards	   paved	   the	   way	   for	   a	   number	   of	  noteworthy,	  politically	  motivated	  interventions	  in	  crude	  oil	  reserves	  and	  production	  by	  OPEC	  governments.170	  Short-­‐term	  domestic	   concerns	   continue	   to	   influence	   the	  energy	  agendas	  of	  many	  producer	  countries	  today,	  a	  fact	  that	  some	  claim	  has	  contributed	  to	  the	  recent	  volatility	  of	  energy	  markets.171	  It	   is	   therefore	  seen	  that	  national	  and	   international	  political	  and	  strategic	   issues	  play	  a	  very	  important	  role	  in	  security	  of	  supply.	  There	  is	  a	  clear	  economic	  case	  for	  government	  intervention	   in	  markets	  where	  some	   form	  of	  market	   failure	   is	   taking	  place.	   In	   light	  of	  the	   indispensable	   importance	   of	   the	   markets,	   the	   goal	   for	   policy-­‐makers	   is	   “to	   set	   a	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framework	  which	  will	  ensure	  that	  the	  market	  operates…	  with	  a	  minimum	  of	  distortion	  and	   energy	   is	   produced	   and	   consumed	   efficiently”.172	  To	   this	   end,	   factoring	   in	   the	  political	   dimension	   of	   energy	   is	   essential	   to	   both	   understanding	   and	   mitigating	   the	  effects	  of	  events	  such	  as	  those	  mentioned	  above.	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  security	  of	  supply	  is	  not	  an	  end	  in	  itself.	  It	  is	  one	  of	  many	  means	  of	  providing	  for	  basic	  human	  needs	  and	  social	  welfare.	  When	  put	  into	  this	  broader	  human	  context,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  the	  production	  and	  use	  of	  energy	  should	  neither	  endanger	  the	  quality	  of	  life	  of	  current	  and	  future	  generations	  nor	  exceed	  the	  carrying	  capacity	  of	  ecosystems.173	  Climate	  change	  as	  a	  result	  of	  rising	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions	  represents	  a	  threat	  to	  international	  peace,	  security	  and	  development.	  More	  than	  two	  thirds	  of	  the	  world’s	   carbon	  dioxide	   emissions	   come	   from	   the	  way	  we	  produce	   and	  use	   energy,	   so	  energy	  policy	  has	  to	  play	  a	  major	  part	  in	  meeting	  this	  challenge.174	  It	  is	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  the	  European	  Commission	  makes	  “respecting	  environmental	  concerns”	  one	  of	   the	  fundamental	   components	   of	   its	   definition	   of	   energy	   security.	   By	   doing	   so	   it	  acknowledges	   that	   the	   short-­‐term	   benefits	   of	   securing	   energy	   supplies	   without	   due	  respect	   for	   the	   environment	   will	   be	   outweighed	   by	   the	   long-­‐term	   costs,	   both	   in	  monetary	  terms	  as	  well	  as	  in	  social	  welfare.	  
4.4 Summary	  The	   challenges	   facing	   shale	   gas	   drilling	   and	   development	   in	   Europe	   are	   not	  insurmountable.	   However,	   should	   the	   size	   and	   commercial	   viability	   of	   technically	  recoverable	  resources	  translate	  into	  large-­‐scale	  production,	  there	  will	  be	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  issues	  in	  need	  of	  attention.	  	  Clearly	   there	   can	   be	   no	   neat	   separation	   between	   the	   regulatory,	   environmental,	  technical,	   social	   and	   economic	   challenges	   associated	   with	   land	   access	   for	   shale	   gas	  development.	  As	  the	  analysis	  has	  revealed,	  these	  issues	  are	  intimately	  related	  and	  affect	  one	  another	   in	   inextricable	  ways.	  Nonetheless,	   the	   table	  below	  provides	  an	   indicative	  summary	  of	   the	  main	  obstacles	   to	  accessing	   land	  for	  unconventional	  gas	  development	  that	  have	  been	  revealed	  by	  the	  literature	  review.	  Surveying	  these,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  land	   access	   is,	   above	   all,	   a	   local	   issue.	   Studies	   that	   analyse	   land	   access	   issues	   at	   the	  regional	   or	   country	   level	  will	   inevitably	   yield	   generalisations	   that	   abstract	   from	   local	  specificities.	   While	   it	   is	   important	   to	   highlight	   national	   regulations	   governing	   the	  exploitation	   of	   conventional	   and	   unconventional	   hydrocarbons,	   in	   practice	   the	   first	  mover	   that	   crucially	   determines	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   development	   activities	   will	  encounter	  significant	  obstacles	  are	   local	  authorities.	  Therefore,	  a	  top-­‐down	  analysis	  of	  national	   regulations	   and	   centralised	   infrastructure	   planning	   for	   large-­‐scale	  development	   and	   production	   of	   shale	   gas	   should	   be	   complemented	   by	   a	   bottom-­‐up	  analysis	   of	   the	   surface-­‐level	   constraints	   and	   opportunities	   present	   in	   each	   shale	   gas	  play.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  172	  Lawson,	  quoted	  in	  Helm,	  'Energy	  policy':	  175.	  173	  United	  Nations	  Development	  Programme,	  'World	  Energy	  Assessment',	  31.	  	  174	  UK	   Department	   of	   Trade	   and	   Industry,	   'Meeting	   the	   Energy	   Challenge:	   A	   White	   Paper	   on	   Energy',	  (London:	  2007),	  7,	  30.	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-­‐	   Water	   management	  [Stevens175,	  Tyndall176]	  -­‐	   Natural/protected	   sites	  [Gény177]	  
	   	   	  
Social	   -­‐	   No	   sub-­‐surface	   property	  rights	  [Kuhn	  &	  Umbach178,	  Stevens,	  Gény]	  -­‐	   Duration/intensity	   of	  drilling	  [Tyndall]	  	  -­‐	   Proximity	   to	   residential	  areas	   [Centrica 179 ,	  Tyndall]	  -­‐	   Noise/visual	   impacts	  [Tyndall;	  IHS	  CERA]	  	  	  
-­‐	   NIMBYism	  [Stevens,	   Kuhn	   &	  Umbach]	  -­‐	   Community	  impacts	  [Kornfeld 180 ,	  House	   of	  Commons181]	  
	   	  
Technical/	  
logistical	  
-­‐	   Well	   size,	   spacing	   and	  density	  -­‐	   Zoning	   restrictions	  (Gény)	  -­‐	   Multi-­‐well	   pad	  permitting	   (e.g.	   adjacent	  plots)	  	  -­‐	   Smaller	   land	   parcels	  [Kuhn	   &	   Umbach,	   Gény,	  Centrica]	  
-­‐	   Inaccessible	  terrain	  -­‐	   Force	   majeure	  [Cuadrilla182]	  -­‐	   Obligation	   to	  conduct	  environmental	  impact	  assessment	  	  




-­‐	   Royalties	   for	   the	   state	  [CRS,	   Gény,	   Stevens,	  Phillipe	  and	  Partners184]	  -­‐	  Permitting	  costs	  	  -­‐Licensing/con-­‐cessions	  
-­‐	  Waste	  disposal	  -­‐	   Site	   protection	  (Kornfeld)	  	  
-­‐	   Lack	   of	  financial	  incentives	   for	  landowners/local	   communities	  [Gény,	   Kuhn	   &	  Umbach,	  Stevens]	  	  -­‐	   Higher	   labour	  costs	  (Kefferputz185)	  
-­‐	   Equipment/rig	  transport	  -­‐	   Access	   to	  distribution/transmission	   system	  [Stevens,	  Gény]	  	  -­‐	  service	  availability	  [House	   of	  Commons]	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  175	  Stevens,	  'Hype	  and	  reality'.	  176	  Wood	  et	  al.,	  'Shale	  gas	  provisional	  assessment'.	  177	  Gény,	  'Unconventional	  Gas'.	  178	  Kuhn	  and	  Umbach,	  'Strategic	  Perspectives'.	  179	  Centrica	  Energy,	  'Unconventional	  Gas	  in	  Europe'.	  180	  Kornfeld,	  'Socio-­‐Economic	  Considerations'.	  181	  House	  of	  Commons,	  'Shale	  Gas:	  Fifth	  Report	  of	  Session	  2010-­‐12',	  48.	  182	  Cuadrilla	  Resources,	  'Economic	  Impact	  in	  Lancashire'.	  183	  Korn,	  'Prospects	  in	  Europe'.	  184	  Philippe	  &	  Partners,	  'Unconventional	  Gas	  in	  Europe'.	  185	  Kefferputz,	  'Shale	  Fever'.	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5 The	  impact	  of	  unconventional	  gas	  on	  the	  European	  energy	  
system	  	  
I.	  Pearson,	  P.	  Zeniewski	  and	  P.	  Zastera	  (European	  Commission,	  JRC	  F.3)	  	  This	  chapter	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  unconventional	  gas	  boom	  in	  the	  USA	  and	  its	  knock-­‐on	  effects	  globally.	  As	  with	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  the	  wide	  range	  of	  ways	  in	  which	  unconventional	   gas	   may	   potentially	   impact	   the	   European	   energy	   system	   makes	   it	  infeasible	  to	  define	  a	  strict	  scope	  for	  the	  review	  of	  the	  evidence	  on	  this	  topic	  that	  would	  be	   both	   rigorous	   and	   comprehensive.	   As	   such,	   this	   chapter	   does	   not	   attempt	   a	  systematic	   review,	  as	  Chapter	  2	  does	   for	   reserve	  estimates.	  Although	  steps	  have	  been	  taken	   to	   locate	   the	   most	   relevant	   studies,	   to	   limit	   selection	   bias	   and	   to	   assess	   the	  methodological	  quality	  of	  sources	  used,	  the	  application	  of	  protocols	  and	  explicit	  criteria	  to	  these	  ends	  is	  unviable.	  Readers	  should	  therefore	  regard	  the	  chapter	  as	  an	  exploratory	  survey	   of	   the	   econometric,	   modelling	   and	   qualitative	   evidence	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	  identifying	   areas	   of	   further	   research	   or	   contextually	   informing	   the	   interpretation	   of	  future	  developments	  on	  these	  key	  topics.	  
5.1 The	  impact	  of	  shale	  gas	  in	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  Since	  unconventional	   gas	  production	  has	  occurred	  predominately	   in	   the	  USA,	  most	  of	  the	  data	  presented	  here	  will	  refer	  to	  the	  US	  case.	  This	  section	  highlights	  how	  respected	  industry	  references	  have	  revised	   their	   forward-­‐looking	  energy	  outlooks	   in	   light	  of	   the	  shale	  gas	  boom	  in	  the	  USA.	  A	  secondary	  objective	  is	  to	  review	  shifts	  and	  major	  trends	  attributable	   to	   growing	   shale	   gas	   production	  which,	   in	   turn,	  will	   guide	   the	  modelling	  effort	  in	  the	  subsequent	  chapter.	  	  
5.1.1 Projections	  of	  supply	  and	  production	  As	  late	  as	  2008,	  the	  EIA’s	  Annual	  Energy	  Outlook	  (AEO),	  an	  authoritative	  source	  on	  US	  energy	  industry	  data,	  predicted	  an	  overall	  decrease	  in	  US	  natural	  gas	  production,	  from	  568	  bcm	  in	  2008	  to	  544	  bcm	  in	  2030.	  These	  projections	  were	  made	  just	  as	  the	  surge	  in	  production	  from	  the	  Barnett	  Shale	  in	  Texas	  was	  occurring,	  causing	  the	  USA	  to	  surpass	  Russia	  as	   the	   largest	  gas	  producer	   in	   the	  world	   in	  2009.	  Unconventional	  gas	  made	  up	  56%	  of	   total	  US	  gas	  production	   that	  same	  year.	  Since	   then,	  estimates	  of	   future	  US	  gas	  production	  have	  undergone	  significant	  revisions	  as	  new	  reserves	  have	  been	  continually	  added	   from	   exploration	   and	   development	   of	   the	   Barnett,	   Marcellus,	   Haynesville,	  Fayetteville	  and	  Horn	  River	  shale	  plays	  (among	  others).	  	  Each	  AEO	  has	  provided	  diverging	  production	  estimates,	  but	   there	   is	  a	  visible	   trend	  of	  upward	   adjustment.	   The	   2011	   edition	   published	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   the	   shale	   gas	   boom	  forecast	  a	  steady	  increase	  in	  gas	  production	  to	  656	  bcm	  in	  2020	  and	  737	  bcm	  in	  2035.	  This	   represents	   an	   annual	   growth	   rate	   of	   0.9%	   over	   the	   2009-­‐2035	   period.	   This	  significant	   revision,	   shown	   in	   Figure	   5-­‐1,	   is	   largely	   thanks	   to	   indigenous	   shale	   gas	  production.	  Now,	   predictions	   envision	   shale	   gas	   production	   alone,	   disregarding	   other	  unconventionals,	   to	   reach	  230	  bcm	  by	  2020	  (and	  343bcm	  by	  2035).	  This	   latter	   figure	  would	  equal	  roughly	  half	  of	  the	  total	  US	  natural	  gas	  production.	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Figure	  5-­‐1:	  Projections	  of	  US	  natural	  gas	  production1	  
	  Other	   well-­‐regarded	   sources	   for	   energy	   data	   have	   also	   significantly	   revised	   their	  estimates	   of	   future	   US	   gas	   production.	   The	   IEA’s	   2010	  World	   Energy	  Outlook	   (WEO)	  baseline	  ‘new	  policies’	  scenario	  initially	  expected	  production	  to	  grow	  to	  a	  moderate	  578	  bcm	  in	  2020	  and	  606	  bcm	  by	  2035,	  equivalent	  to	  an	  annual	  average	  growth	  rate	  of	  0.2%	  over	  the	  2008-­‐2035	  period.2	  By	  contrast,	  the	  more	  recent	  2011	  report	  has	  predicted	  US	  gas	  production	  in	  2020	  to	  be	  685	  bcm	  and	  710	  bcm	  in	  2035.3	  While	   the	  EIA’s	  AEO	   is	  predominately	   focused	  on	   the	  USA,	   the	   IEA’s	   analysis	  has	  also	  reflected	   on	   the	   impact	   of	  US	   shale	   gas	   production	   on	   the	  OECD	   and	  wider	  world.	   In	  general,	   the	   IEA	   predicts	   that	   natural	   gas,	   boosted	   by	   the	   prospects	   for	   commercial	  exploitation	   of	   unconventional	   deposits	   in	   different	   parts	   of	   the	   world,	   will	   play	   an	  increasingly	   important	   role	   in	   the	   global	   energy	   mix.	   In	   the	   2011	   WEO,	   the	   IEA	  emphasises	  the	  chief	  attractions	  of	  gas:	  its	  softer	  environmental	  impact	  relative	  to	  other	  fossil	   fuels;	   its	   ability	   to	   act	   as	   a	   backup	   fuel	   for	   intermittent	   renewable	   power	  generation;	  and,	  more	  recently,	  the	  growing	  interregional	  trade	  of	  natural	  gas	  brought	  on	   by	   LNG	   markets	   (which	   will	   be	   discussed	   in	   another	   section).	   Key	   drivers	   for	  increased	  natural	  gas	  consumption	  include	  the	  recent	  turn	  away	  from	  nuclear	  energy	  in	  the	  wake	   of	   the	   Fukushima	   plant	   disaster	   in	   2011,	   China’s	   announcement	   of	   a	  major	  push	  to	  expand	  domestic	  natural	  gas	  use	  and	  the	  growing	  competitiveness	  of	  gas-­‐fired	  power	   generation	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   other	   fuels	   such	   as	   coal.	   Other	   research	   highlighted	   the	  potential	  for	  gas	  to	  serve	  as	  an	  “effective	  bridge	  to	  a	  lower	  CO2	  emissions	  future”.4	  This	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  EIA,	  'Various	  AEOs'.	  2	  IEA,	   'World	   Energy	   Outlook	   2010',	   in	  World	   Energy	   Outlook	   (Paris:	   Organisation	   for	   Economic	   Co-­‐operation	  and	  Development	  2010).	  3	  IEA,	  'Golden	  age'.	  4	  Downey,	  'Fueling	  North	  America's	  future',	  E.J.	  Moniz,	  H.D.	  Jacoby	  and	  A.J.M.	  Meggs,	  'The	  future	  of	  natural	  gas:	  Interim	  report',	  (Cambridge,	  Massachusetts:	  Massachusetts	  Institute	  of	  Technology,	  2010),	  36.	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portended	   a	   debate	   about	  whether	   gas	   is	   a	   competitor	   to,	   or	   facilitator	   of,	   renewable	  energy	   goals	   (both	   in	   an	   environmental	   as	  well	   as	   economic	   sense).	   This	   section	  will	  address	   these	   issues	   in	   terms	  of	   their	   reciprocal	   impact	  on	   the	   future	  development	  of	  unconventional	  gas,	  principally	  in	  the	  USA	  but	  also	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world.	  	  Despite	   optimistic	   forecasts	   for	   future	   natural	   gas	   production,	   the	   wide	   range	   of	  scenarios	  offered	  by	  the	  IEA’s	  WEO	  reinforces	  the	  degree	  of	  uncertainty	  concerning	  the	  future	  development	  of	   the	  global	  energy	  mix.	  The	   ‘new	  policies’	  scenario	   incorporates	  the	  policy	  commitments	  and	  plans	  that	  have	  been	  announced	  by	  countries	  around	  the	  world	   to	   address	   all	   energy-­‐related	   policy	   priorities	   (e.g.	   climate	   change,	   energy	  security,	   efficiency,	   competitiveness	   and	   so	   on).	   The	   ‘current	   policies’	   scenario,	   by	  contrast,	   presents	   projections	   under	   the	   assumption	   that	   government	   policies	   will	  remain	  unchanged	   from	  what	   has	   already	  been	   agreed.	   The	   ‘450’	   scenario	   assumes	   a	  policy	  agenda	  of	   limiting	  an	  increase	  in	  average	  global	  temperature	  to	  2˚C.	  Finally,	  the	  ‘Gas’	  scenario	  considers	  a	  positive	  future	  outlook	  for	  natural	  gas	  due	  to	  high	  demand	  in	  non-­‐OECD	   countries,	   increased	   production	   from	   unconventional	   sources	   and	  competitive	  prices	  in	  relation	  to	  other	  fuels.	  The	  variation	  in	  assumptions	  given	  by	  each	  of	  these	  scenarios	  leads	  to	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  possible	  outcomes	  in	  the	  supply	  and	  demand	  of	  various	  forms	  of	  energy	  over	  the	  next	  two	  decades.	  However,	  as	  repeatedly	  stressed	  by	   these	   reports,	   natural	   gas	   is	   the	  only	   fossil	   fuel	   for	  which	  demand	   rises	   in	   all	   four	  scenarios.5	  Therefore,	   the	   IEA	   notes	   that	   “there	   is	   much	   less	   uncertainty	   over	   the	  outlook	  for	  natural	  gas:	  factors	  both	  on	  the	  supply	  and	  demand	  sides	  point	  to	  a	  bright	  future,	  even	  a	  golden	  age,	  for	  natural	  gas.”6	  One	   of	   the	   primary	   drivers	   of	   this	   gas-­‐friendly	   outlook	   is	   the	   estimates	   of	   global	  unconventional	   gas	   reserves	   and	   production.	   Both	   the	   IEA	   and	   EIA	   have	   estimated	   a	  significant	  global	  presence	  of	  shale	  gas,	  in	  the	  USA	  in	  particular	  but	  also	  in	  Asia	  Pacific,	  Latin	  America,	  Africa	  and	  Europe.	  Many	  analyses	  now	  ponder	  whether	  unconventional	  gas	  is	  an	  appropriate	  term	  for	  shale	  gas,	  when	  its	  resource	  base	  is	  estimated	  at	  200	  Tcm,	  or	  a	  quarter	  of	  total	  global	  gas	  reserves.7	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  IEA,	   'World	   Energy	   Outlook	   2011',	   in	  World	   Energy	   Outlook	   (Paris:	   Organisation	   for	   Economic	   Co-­‐operation	  and	  Development	  2011),	  156.	  6	  Ibid.,	  42.	  7	  Ibid.,	  163.	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Figure	  5-­‐2:	  Forecasts	  of	  US	  natural	  gas	  production	  by	  type8	  
	  Given	   these	   impressive	   figures,	   it	   is	   small	  wonder	   that	   energy	  analysts,	   gas	   firms	  and	  political	   bodies	   have	   sought	   to	   understand	   the	   factors	   enabling	   the	   US	   shale	   gas	  phenomenon	   and	   test	   their	   application	   in	   other	   regions	   of	   the	   world.	   The	   caveat,	   of	  course,	  is	  that	  in	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  this	  technological	  breakthrough	  the	  one	  certainty	  is	  that	  much	  remains	  uncertain.	  Projections	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  shale	  gas	  development	  in	  the	  USA	  and	  elsewhere	   in	   the	  world	  crucially	   rely	  on	  estimates	  of	   technically	   recoverable	  resources	   and	   assumptions	   about	   the	   economic	   viability	   of	   their	   extraction.	   Although	  this	   has	   been	   taken	   up	   in	   greater	   depth	   in	   Chapter	   2,	   it	   is	   useful	   to	   note	   that	   even	  reserve	   estimates	   for	   established	   shale	   gas	   plays	   are	   subject	   to	   contestation	   and	  perennial	  revision.	  A	  recent	  analysis	  by	  the	  EIA	  helped	  underscore	  this	  phenomenon	  by	  making	  a	  significant	  downward	  adjustment	  to	  the	  technically	  recoverable	  resource	  base	  for	  Marcellus	  shale.	  This	  contributed	  to	  a	  wider	  revision	  of	  total	  US	  shale	  gas	  reserves,	  from	  an	  earlier	  estimate	  of	  827	  tcf	   in	  the	  AEO20109	  to	  482	  tcf	  one	  year	   later	  (a	   figure	  that	  is	  60%	  less	  than	  the	  one	  originally	  put	  forward).	  	  Such	  stark	  revisions	  to	  the	  US	  gas	  reserve	  base	  as	  a	  result	  of	  shale	  gas	  exploration	  have	  had	  knock-­‐on	  effects	  on	  estimates	  of	  other	  gas	  supply	  data	  in	  the	  USA.	  The	  most	  obvious	  change	  has	  occurred	   in	  predictions	  concerning	  US	  natural	  gas	   imports.	   It	  was	   initially	  expected	   that	   the	   USA	   would	   begin	   importing	   substantial	   quantities	   of	   LNG.	   These	  expectations	   led	   to	   massive	   investments	   in	   the	   infrastructure	   needed	   to	   import	   and	  process	   liquefied	   natural	   gas,	   while	   stimulating	   investments	   in	   producer	   states	  anticipating	  a	  surge	  in	  demand	  for	  LNG.	  The	  reality,	  however,	  was	  that	  the	  USA	  ended	  up	   importing	  only	  around	  13	  bcm	  of	  LNG	   in	  2009	  (out	  of	  a	   re-­‐gasification	  capacity	  of	  nearly	   150	   bcm).	   Now	   there	   are	   serious	   proposals	   to	   add	   export	   capabilities	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  EIA,	  'AEO	  2011'.	  9	  EIA,	  'AEO	  2010'.	  
	  149	  
(liquefaction	  plants)	  to	  underused	  LNG	  import	  terminals.	  As	  noted	  by	  Howard	  Rogers,	  a	  price	  differential	  between	  US	  and	  destination	  markets	  of	  between	  $3-­‐4/MBtu	  would	  be	  required	   to	  ensure	  a	   reasonable	   return	  on	   investment	   for	   this	  export	  market.10	  Under	  present	  circumstances,	  however,	  North	  America	  will	   remain	   largely	   self-­‐sufficient	  and	  therefore	  will	  essentially	  remain	  isolated	  from	  interregional	  trade.11	  	  
Figure	  5-­‐3:	  Historical	  and	  projected	  net	  US	  LNG	  imports12	  
	  The	  issues	  of	  resource	  size	  and	  LNG	  development	  deserve	  their	  own	  treatment	  and	  are	  therefore	  explored	  in	  greater	  depth	  in	  Chapter	  2	  and	  Section	  5.2.	  For	  now,	  it	  suffices	  to	  draw	  attention	  to	  the	  great	  deal	  of	  uncertainty	  surrounding	  shale	  gas	  development	  and	  the	  concomitant	  divergence	  in	  the	  predictions	  of	  its	  size	  and	  impact.	  These	  uncertainties	  aside,	   there	  have	  been	  tangible	   impacts	  on	  US	  natural	  gas	   infrastructure	  as	  a	  result	  of	  unconventional	   gas	   production.	   Substantial	   investments	   have	   been	   witnessed	   in	   mid	  and	  down-­‐stream	  processing,	   transport	  and	  storage	  capacities.	  The	  latter	   in	  particular	  has	   seen	   impressive	   growth	  as	   the	  North	  American	  markets	  have	  been	   ‘warehousing’	  gas	   to	   accommodate	   surplus	   supply,	   whilst	   the	  minimum	  working	   gas	   inventory	   has	  been	  rising	  to	  levels	  considerably	  above	  the	  volumes	  required	  for	  winter	  demand.13	  
5.1.2 Projections	  of	  demand	  and	  future	  energy	  mix	  
The impact of shale gas production has been made apparent by the growing role of gas used 
as a fuel for electricity generation. Indeed, most of the growth in demand for gas in the USA 
is expected to occur in the power generation sector, since industrial, residential and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Rogers,	  'Shale	  gas':	  136.	  11	  IEA,	  'Golden	  age'.	  12	  EIA,	  'Various	  AEOs'.	  13	  Howard	  Rogers,	   'The	   impact	   of	   a	   globalising	  market	   on	   future	   European	   gas	   supply	   and	  pricing:	   the	  importance	  of	  Asian	  demand	  and	  North	  American	  supply',	  (Oxford	  Institute	  for	  Energy	  Studies,	  2012),	  27.	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commercial sectors are considered mature markets with little growth prospects.14 Since 2005, 
incremental increases in gas-fired electricity generation have been observed (as shown in 
Figure 5-4 below). Although coal retains its position as the fuel of choice for most power-
generating units (a legacy of US policy advocating coal as a generating source in the 1970s), 
this role has recently been challenged by a notable rise in natural gas consumption in the 
power generation sector. According to IHS CERA, natural gas-fired power plants have cost, 
timing and emissions advantages compared to coal-fired plants.15 Whether these advantages 
are capitalised upon partly depends on the extent to which US producers decide to export 
natural gas via LNG liquefaction terminals, which would increase the price of natural gas 
domestically and possibly deter investments in gas-fired electricity generation (at least 
according to recent EIA analysis16). 
Figure	  5-­‐4:	  US	  electricity	  generation	  by	  fuel17	  
	  Nonetheless,	   in	   the	   nearer	   term	   it	   is	   already	   apparent	   that	   gas-­‐fired	   electricity	  generation	  is	  gaining	  ground.	  As	  shown	  in	  Figure	  5-­‐5	  below,	  data	  on	  generating	  capacity	  reveals	  a	  sizeable	  difference	  in	  coal	  and	  gas-­‐fired	  investments	  in	  the	  USA	  over	  the	  next	  four	   years.	   Moreover,	   as	   large	   numbers	   of	   coal-­‐fired	   generators	   are	   scheduled	   for	  retirement,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  investments	  in	  combined	  cycle	  gas	  turbines	  (CCGTs)	  will	  gain	  ground,	  boosted	  by	  the	  recently	  narrowed	  gap	  between	  the	  costs	  of	  gas	  versus	  coal	  for	  electricity	   generation	   (Figure	  5-­‐6).	  However,	   a	   caveat	   is	   that	   the	   incremental	   costs	   of	  coal	   remain	   lower	   than	   for	   natural	   gas,	   even	   despite	   the	   recent	   surge	   in	   shale	   gas	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Downey,	  'Fueling	  North	  America's	  future'.	  15	  Ibid.	  16	  EIA,	  'Effect	  of	  Increased	  Natural	  Gas	  Exports	  on	  Domestic	  Energy	  Markets	  as	  requested	  by	  the	  Office	  of	  Fossil	  Energy',	  (Washington,	  DC:	  US	  Energy	  Information	  Administration,	  2012).	  17	  EIA,	  'Electric	  Power	  Monthly:	  January	  2012',	  (Washington,	  DC:	  US	  Energy	  Information	  Administration,	  2012).	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production	   and	   the	   corresponding	   decline	   in	   natural	   gas	   prices.	   This	  means	   that	   the	  capacity	   utilisation	   rate	   for	   gas-­‐fired	   plants	   is,	   on	   average,	  much	   lower	   than	   for	   coal	  (although	  the	  higher	  efficiencies	  of	  CCGTs	  relative	  to	  coal-­‐fired	  power	  plants	  should	  be	  taken	   into	  account).	  Moreover,	   the	   fuel	  costs	  of	  combined-­‐cycle	  plants	  account	   for	  60-­‐75%	  of	  total	  generation	  costs	  (compared	  with	  0-­‐40%	  for	  renewables,	  nuclear	  or	  coal),	  meaning	   that	   these	   gas-­‐fired	  plants	   are	   far	  more	   sensitive	   to	   changes	   in	   fuel	   prices.18	  Still,	  according	  to	  ConocoPhillips,	  the	  full-­‐cycle	  costs	  of	  building	  new	  power	  plants	  are	  currently	  more	  favourable	  for	  combined	  cycle	  gas	  plants	  than	  alternatives	  run	  on	  coal	  (despite	   lower	   fuel	   prices),	   nuclear,	   renewables	   and	   fossil	   fuels	   accompanied	   by	   CCS	  technology.	   This	   is	   largely	   due	   to	   the	   relatively	   low	   capital	   expenditures	   of	   CCGTs	   in	  relation	  to	  these	  alternatives.19	  
Figure	   5-­‐5:	   Planned	   additions	   to	   coal	   and	   gas-­‐fired	   electricity	   capacity	   in	   the	   United	   States	   of	  
America	  (aggregate	  2011-­‐2015)20	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18 	  IEA,	   'Energy	   Technology	   Perspectives:	   Scenarios	   &	   Strategies	   to	   2050',	   (Paris:	   Organisation	   for	  Economic	  Co-­‐operation	  and	  Development	  2006).	  19	  This	   is	   assuming	   a	   price	   of	   $7/mcf.	  Marianne	   Kah,	   'The	   future	   role	   of	   natural	   gas	   in	   the	   US'	   (paper	  presented	  at	  the	  UT	  Energy	  Symposium,	  Austin,	  TX,	  2011).	  20	  EIA,	  'Electric	  Power	  Monthly:	  January	  2012'.	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Figure	  5-­‐6:	  Average	  cost	  of	  coal	  and	  gas	  for	  electricity	  generation	  in	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America,	  
January	  2007	  -­‐	  October	  201121	  
	  Besides	  its	  growing	  role	  in	  electricity	  generation,	  natural	  gas	  may	  very	  well	  become	  an	  important	   component	   of	   the	   transportation	   sector,	   whether	   directly	   in	   natural	   gas-­‐powered	   vehicles	   (NGVs)	   or	   via	   the	   generation	   of	   electric	   power	   to	   recharge	   the	  batteries	  of	  an	  electric	  vehicle.22	  An	  MIT	  interdisciplinary	  study	  also	  concludes	  that	  the	  two	  most	  significant	  opportunities	  for	  addition	  market	  share	  for	  natural	  gas	  are	  power	  generation	   and	   transportation.23 	  This	   has	   been	   confirmed	   by	   IEA	   analysis,	   which	  modelled	  a	  significant	  penetration	  of	  NGVs	  as	  a	  result	  of	   favourable	  price	  differentials	  between	   natural	   gas	   and	   oil.	   The	   introduction	   of	   such	   vehicles	   leads	   to	   a	   predicted	  expansion	   of	   gas	   in	   the	   road	   transportation	   sector’s	   global	   energy	   mix,	   from	   1%	   to	  between	  3-­‐5%	  in	  2035.24	  In	  addition	  to	  fostering	  investment	   in	  gas-­‐fired	  electricity	  generation	  and	  boosting	  the	  prospects	  for	  gas-­‐powered	  transport,	  the	  surge	  in	  US	  shale	  gas	  production	  has	  also	  had	  impacts	  on	  the	  transformation	  sector,	  particularly	  the	  US	  petrochemicals	  industry.	  As	  a	  result	   of	   this	   energy-­‐intensive	   industry	   requiring	   a	   substantial	   amount	   of	   ethane	   and	  other	  natural	  gas	  liquids,	  its	  competitiveness	  is	  heavily	  dependent	  on	  the	  price	  of	  these	  liquids,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  price	  of	  competitive	  feedstocks	  more	  generally	  (such	  as	  propane,	  butane	  and	  naphtha).	  In	  this	  context,	  increases	  in	  the	  ratio	  of	  the	  price	  of	  oil	  to	  the	  price	  of	  natural	  gas	  (from	  a	  low	  of	  5.5:1	  in	  2003	  to	  15.9:1	  in	  2009)	  have	  been	  favourable	  for	  US	  exports	  of	  petrochemicals,	  plastics	  and	  other	  derivatives.	  The	  American	  Chemistry	  Council	   has	   therefore	   been	   upbeat	   about	   its	   future	   prospects,	   noting	   that	   ‘with	   the	  development	  of	  new	  shale	  gas	  resources,	  the	  US	  petrochemical	  industry	  is	  announcing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Ibid.	  22	  Downey,	  'Fueling	  North	  America's	  future'.	  23	  Moniz,	  Jacoby	  and	  Meggs,	  'Future	  of	  natural	  gas'.	  24	  IEA,	  'WEO	  2011',	  171.	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significant	   expansions	   of	   petrochemical	   capacity,	   reversing	   a	   decade-­‐long	   decline’.25	  However,	   it	   must	   not	   be	   assumed	   from	   this	   trend	   that	   shale	   gas	   has	   reinvigorated	  demand	  in	  the	  US	  industrial	  sector	  as	  a	  whole;	  dramatic	  efficiency	  gains,	  coupled	  with	  drops	   in	   productivity	   due	   to	   the	   global	   recession	   and	   anticipated	   regulation	   of	  greenhouse	  gas	  (GHG)	  emissions,	  have	  offset	  increases	  in	  demand.26	  
5.1.3 Natural	  gas	  and	  renewable	  energy	  Natural	   gas	   is	   often	   promoted	   as	   the	   optimal	   backup	   for	   intermittent	   renewable	  electricity	  generation.	  Indeed,	  annual	  utilisation	  rates	  for	  wind	  turbines	  (the	  renewable	  energy	  source	  with	  the	  greatest	  potential	  for	  growth	  in	  the	  USA)	  stand	  at	  around	  30%.	  With	   load	   factors	   (ratio	   of	   average/peak	   demand)	   in	   the	   USA	   nearing	   57%,	   the	  integration	  of	  wind	  power	   into	   the	  electricity	  generation	  sector	   requires	   considerable	  backup	   capacity.	   Gas-­‐fired	   CCGTs,	   combustion	   turbines	   and	   steam	   boilers	   are	   well	  suited	   to	   ‘cycling’	   and	   ‘peaking’	   capacity	   requirements,	   in	   that	  utilisation	   rates	   can	  be	  changed	   in	   response	   to	   load	   variations,	  while	   fuel	   injection	   can	   commence	   rapidly	   to	  meet	  high	  but	   infrequent	   levels	  of	  electricity	  demand.	  This	  makes	  natural	  gas	  an	   ideal	  accompaniment	  to	  intermittent	  renewable	  electricity	  generation,	  ensuring	  grid	  stability	  during	  times	  of	  peak	  demand	  in	  a	  way	  that	  coal	  or	  nuclear	  plants	  cannot.	  Thus,	   there	   are	   visible	   prospects	   of	   natural	   gas	   gaining	   market	   share	   as	   renewable	  electricity	   generation	   rises.	   Indeed,	   a	   recent	   analysis	   carried	   out	   by	   the	   EIA	   has	  predicted	   strong	   growth	   in	   the	   renewables	   sector.	   Sources	   that	   generate	   variable	  amounts	  of	  electricity	  (e.g.	  non-­‐hydro)	  are	  set	  for	  a	  growth	  spurt	  in	  the	  coming	  decades	  such	  that,	  by	  2035,	  the	  share	  of	  these	  energy	  sources	  in	  the	  total	  generation	  of	  the	  USA	  is	   predicted	   to	   increase	   to	   9%	   (up	   from	   4%	   in	   2010).27	  The	   expansion	   of	   renewable	  energy	  in	  the	  USA	  is	  contingent	  on	  a	  number	  of	   factors,	  but	  the	  necessity	  for	  ensuring	  grid	  stability	   through	  backup	  capabilities	   is	  a	  key	  consideration	   for	   investment	   in	   this	  sector.	  Natural	  gas	  is	  an	  attractive	  option	  in	  this	  context	  but	  it	  is	  by	  no	  means	  the	  only	  one;	   reservoir	   hydro	   or	   pumped	   storage	   could	   also	   serve	   to	   stabilise	   solar	   or	   wind-­‐powered	  electricity	  generation	  through	  storage	  capabilities	  (although	  these	  sources	  of	  flexibility	  are	  often	  not	  available	  close	  to	  centres	  of	  demand).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  American	  Chemistry	  Council,	  'Shale	  Gas	  and	  New	  Petrochemicals	  Investment:	  Benefits	  for	  the	  Economy,	  Jobs,	  and	  US	  Manufacturing	  ',	  (Washington,	  DC:	  American	  Chemistry	  Council,	  2011).	  26	  Downey,	  'Fueling	  North	  America's	  future'.	  27	  EIA,	   'EIA	   projects	   U.S.	   non-­‐hydro	   renewable	   power	   generation	   increases,	   led	   by	  wind	   and	   biomass',	  (Washington,	  DC:	  US	  Energy	  Information	  Administration,	  2012).	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Figure	   5-­‐7:	   Projected	   non-­‐hydropower	   renewable	   electricity	   generation	   in	   the	   United	   States	   of	  
America,	  2010-­‐203528	  
	  Much	   debate	   has	   centred	   around	   the	   impact	   of	   shale	   gas	   development	   on	   renewable	  energy	  and	  climate	  change	  goals.	  Whereas	  proponents	  invoke	  the	  argument	  that	  gas	  is	  the	   cleanest	   fossil	   fuel	   and	   can	   displace	   coal	   while	   serving	   as	   a	   backup	   fuel	   for	  intermittent	  renewable	  power,	  opponents	  claim	  that	  cheap	  and	  reliable	  gas-­‐fired	  power	  generation	  will	  divert	  investment	  away	  from	  renewable	  energy	  projects,	  and	  that	  even	  the	  comparatively	  low	  carbon	  footprint	  of	  natural	  gas	  will	  nonetheless	  equal	  increases	  in	  overall	  GHG	  emissions	  as	  global	  demand	  for	  energy	  continues	  to	  grow.	  Evidence	  can	  be	   presented	   in	   favour	   of	   both	   sides,	   as	   there	   is	   still	   much	   uncertainty	   over	   climate	  change	   policies	   and	   the	   longer-­‐term	   incentives	   for	   market	   players	   to	   invest	   in	  renewable	   and/or	   gas-­‐based	   power	   generation.	   After	   all,	   the	   planning	   horizons	   for	  energy	   infrastructure	   investments,	   as	  well	   as	  GHG	   emission	   reduction	   goals,	   are	   both	  measured	  in	  decades;	  should	  countries	  such	  as	  the	  USA	  –	  where	  fossil	   fuels	  constitute	  over	   80%	   of	   total	   primary	   energy	   supply	   –	   decide	   on	   carbon	   reduction	   regulations	  (such	  as	  cap-­‐and-­‐trade	  or	  an	  emissions	  ceiling),	  this	  will	  affect	  the	  operating	  margins	  of	  a	  substantial	  portion	  of	  the	  energy	  industry,	  particularly	  those	  players	  that	  have	  chosen	  the	   ‘wrong	   fuel’.	   Compounding	   this	   longer-­‐term	  uncertainty	   is	   the	  outlook	   for	  natural	  gas	   prices,	   which	   historically	   have	   been	   far	   more	   variable	   than	   coal	   (see	   Figure	   5-­‐6	  above),	   as	  well	   as	   the	  need	   to	  quantify	   the	  opportunity	   cost	   involved	   in	   choosing	   gas	  over	  renewables	  (and,	  indeed,	  vice	  versa).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Ibid.	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Figure	  5-­‐8:	  Projected	  CO2	  emissions	  in	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America29	  
	  As	   an	   unconventional	   fossil	   fuel,	   shale	   gas	   has	   sparked	   a	   related	   debate	   on	   whether	  additional	  carbon	  emissions	  are	  emitted	  from	  its	  relatively	  unique	  method	  of	  extraction.	  It	  is	  not	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  section	  to	  unpack	  in	  any	  detail	  the	  arguments	  put	  forward	  in	  this	   context,	   but	   merely	   to	   draw	   attention	   to	   the	   differences	   in	   life-­‐cycle	   emissions	  analyses	   related	   to	   shale	   gas.30	  Robert	   Howarth	   and	   fellow	   researchers	   at	   Cornell	  University	  have	  put	  forward	  a	  controversial	  claim	  that	  fugitive	  methane	  emissions	  from	  shale	  gas	  development	  contribute	  to	  an	  overall	  GHG	  footprint	  equal	  to	  coal	  over	  a	  100-­‐year	  time	  scale.31	  However,	  others	  have	  countered	  that	   life-­‐cycle	  analysis	  of	  emissions	  from	  natural	  gas	  need	  to	  account	  for	  the	  relative	  efficiencies	  of	  different	  fossil	  fuels	  used	  for	  power	  generation.	  For	  example,	  it	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  the	  numbers	  in	  the	  Cornell	  study	   “are	   based	   on	   the	   high	   heating	   values	   (HHV)	   of	   shale	   gas	   and	   coal	   for	   CO2	  emissions,	   without	   taking	   into	   account	   the	   higher	   efficiency	   of	   shale	   gas	   in	   power	  generation,	   which	   would	   result	   in	   less	   CO2	   per	   unit	   power	   output.”32	  One	   study	   has	  noted	   a	   caveat	   in	   this	   respect,	   highlighting	   the	   variability	   of	   emissions	   due	   to	   site-­‐specific	   factors,	   such	   as	   the	   pressure	   of	   the	   fluids	   brought	   to	   the	   surface;	   the	  effectiveness	   of	   on-­‐site	   gas	   capturing	   equipment;	   the	   control	   efficiency	   of	   any	   flaring	  that	   is	  done;	   the	  chemical	   composition	  of	   the	  gas	  and	  hydrocarbon	   liquids	  at	   the	  drill	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  EIA,	  'AEO	  2011'.	  30	  See	  EIA,	  'Emissions	  of	  Greenhouse	  Gases	  in	  the	  United	  States	  2008',	  (Washington,	  DC:	  2009),	  Jinsheng	  Wang,	  David	  Ryan	  and	  Edward	   J.	  Anthony,	   'Reducing	  the	  greenhouse	  gas	   footprint	  of	  shale	  gas',	  Energy	  
Policy	  39,	  no	  12	  (2011).	  31	  Robert	  W.	  Howarth,	  Renee	  Santoro	  and	  Anthony	  Ingraffea,	  'Methane	  and	  the	  greenhouse-­‐gas	  footprint	  of	  natural	  gas	  from	  shale	  formations',	  Climatic	  Change	  106	  (2011):	  679–90.	  32	  Wang,	  Ryan	  and	  Anthony,	  'Greenhouse	  gas	  footprint	  of	  shale	  gas'.	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site;	   and	   the	   duration	   of	   drilling	   and	   completion	   work	   before	   the	   start	   of	   regular	  production.33	  	  More	  generally,	  the	  debate	  on	  the	  role	  of	  gas	  in	  the	  transition	  to	  renewables	  has	  evoked	  ideological	  arguments	  concerning	  the	  use	  of	  fossil	  fuels.	  A	  provisional	  assessment	  of	  the	  impact	   of	   shale	   gas	   on	   the	   environment	   and	   climate	   change	   carried	   out	   by	   UK	  researchers	   argues	   that	   ‘whilst	   world	   demand	   for	   fossil	   fuels	   remains	   high,	   any	   new	  sources	   of	   fossil	   fuel	   (even	   if	   relatively	   low	   carbon	   per	   unit	   of	   useful	   energy)	  will	   be	  purchased,	  combusted	  and	  consequently	  added	   to	   the	  global	  emissions	  burden.	   It	  will	  not	  substitute	  for	  other	  fossil	  fuels	  and	  in	  this	  regard	  claiming	  shale	  gas	  as	  a	  viable	  low	  carbon	  option	   for	   the	  UK	  cannot	  be	   reconciled	  with	   the	   spirit	   of	  UK	   commitments	  on	  climate	   change.’34	  This	   statement	  makes	   it	   clear	   that	   natural	   gas	  may	   be	   a	   burden	   or	  boon	   to	   the	   carbon	   agenda	   depending	   on	   one’s	   criteria	   and	   expectations.	   Given	   the	  complexity	  of	  the	  issues	  and	  the	  changing	  incentives	  of	  state,	  market	  and	  societal	  actors	  under	  various	  political,	  economic	  and	  social	  conditions,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  gas/renewables	  relationship	  will	  be	   far	  more	  nuanced	   than	   the	  stark	  positions	  on	  either	   side	   of	   the	   debate.	   In	   other	   words,	   natural	   gas	   will	   at	   times	   constrain	   and	   at	  others	  enable	   investments	   in	  renewable	  energy.	  Possible	   technological	  and	  regulatory	  breakthroughs	  may	  yet	  alter	  the	  supply	  balance	  in	  the	  USA	  and	  elsewhere,	  contributing	  to	  a	   substantially	   revised	  outlook	   for	   longer-­‐term	   investments	   in	  both	   renewable	  and	  non-­‐renewable	  energy	  infrastructure.	  	  
5.1.4 Shale	  gas	  production	  costs	  and	  natural	  gas	  prices	  Production	   costs	   of	   shale	   wells,	   particularly	   their	   level	   in	   relation	   to	   general	   market	  prices,	   form	   a	   crucial	   determinant	   of	   the	   degree	   of	   future	   unconventional	   gas	  development	  in	  the	  USA	  and	  elsewhere.	  However,	  there	  is	  a	  notable	  absence	  of	  concrete	  per-­‐well	   production	   costs	   available	   in	   the	   public	   domain.	   From	  what	   can	   be	   gleaned	  from	  various	  corporate	  presentations	  and	  private	  consulting	  firms,	  per-­‐well	  production	  costs	   for	   shale	   gas	  wells	   in	   the	  USA	   tend	   to	   range	   from	   $2-­‐9	  million.	   Given	   the	   early	  stages	   at	   which	   Europe	   is	   assessing	   its	   shale	   gas	   potential,	   figures	   for	   per-­‐well	  production	  costs	  are	  even	  more	  tentative,	  with	  estimates	  ranging	  from	  $5m	  up	  to	  $20m	  (see	  Figure	  5-­‐9).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Al	  Armendariz,	  'Emissions	  from	  Natural	  Gas	  Production	  in	  the	  Barnett	  Shale	  Area	  and	  Opportunities	  for	  Cost-­‐Effective	  Improvements',	  (Dallas,	  TX:	  Southern	  Methodist	  University,	  2009),	  33.	  34	  Wood	  et	  al.,	  'Shale	  gas	  provisional	  assessment',	  51.	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Figure	  5-­‐9:	  Total	  per-­‐well	  production	  costs	  for	  shale	  gas35	  
	  As	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	   3,	   the	   range	   of	   shale	   gas	   production	   costs	   is	   influenced	   by	   a	  number	   of	   physical	   and	   commercial	   factors.	   The	   former	   includes	   factors	   such	   as	   the	  geological	  characteristics	  of	  the	  play	  in	  question	  (e.g.	  depth,	  permeability,	  total	  organic	  carbon	  content,	  etc.),	  the	  number	  of	  frac	  stages,	  the	  length	  of	  the	  horizontal	  sections	  of	  the	  wellbore	  and	  the	  number	  of	  drilling	  days.	  Decisions	  on	  drilling	  programmes	  rely	  on	  evaluations	   of	   the	   possible,	   probable	   and	   proved	   reserves	   following	   test	   drilling	   and	  seismic	   monitoring	   results	   (which	   commonly	   yield	   a	   chance	   of	   success	   expressed	   in	  percentage	   terms).	  Commercial	   factors,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	   include	  taxes,	   royalty	  rates	  and	   the	   cost	   of	   services	   and	   materials	   for	   drilling,	   completion	   and	   building	   the	  supporting	   infrastructure	   for	   gathering,	   processing	   and	   compressing	   produced	   gas.	  Once	   in	   the	  production	  stage,	  well	  performance	   indicators	   such	  as	   IP	   rate,	   the	  EUR	  of	  gas	   from	  the	  well,	   the	  reserves-­‐to-­‐production	  ratio	  and	  the	  decline	  curve	  all	  affect	   the	  net	   present	   value	   of	   the	  well	   (as	  well	   as	   the	   rate	   of	   return	   for	   the	   drilling	   company).	  Examples	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  shale	  gas	  drilling	  companies	  evaluate	  potential	  wells	  and	  quantify	  finding	  and	  developing	  costs	  are	  presented	  in	  Annex	  H. There	  are	  several	  indirect	  factors	  that	  have	  been	  known	  to	  significantly	  affect	  the	  cost-­‐competitiveness	  of	  shale	  gas	  wells	  in	  the	  USA,	  either	  positively	  or	  negatively.	  One	  such	  factor,	   for	   example,	   is	   the	   cost	   of	  water.	   A	   consulting	   report	   notes	   that	   an	   individual	  shale	  gas	  well	  commonly	  requires	  the	  acquisition	  and	  treatment	  of	  between	  2-­‐6	  million	  gallons	   of	   water.	   Currently,	   the	   costs	   of	   this	   water	   are	   estimated	   to	   range	   between	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Mohsen	  Bonakdarpour	  et	  al.,	   'The	  economic	  and	  employment	  contributions	  of	  shale	  gas	   in	  the	  United	  States',	   in	   IHS	  Global	  Insight	   (Washington	  DC:	   IHS	  Cera,	  2011);	  Centrica	  Energy,	   'Unconventional	  Gas	   in	  Europe';	  Cleantech,	  'Investment	  Guide';	  Cuadrilla	  Resources,	  'Economic	  Impact	  in	  Lancashire';	  FX	  Energy,	  'Poland;	  A	  unique	  play	  on	   the	  strong	  European	  gas	  market',	   (FX	  Energy,	  2012);	  Hefley	  et	  al.,	   'Economic	  Impact';	  IEA,	  'Oil	  and	  Gas	  Markets';	  Mark	  Kaiser,	  'Profitability	  assessment	  of	  Haynesville	  shale	  gas	  wells',	  
Energy	  38,	  no	  1	  (2011).	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$0.25/Mcf	  to	  as	  high	  as	  $1.38/Mcf.36	  This	  range	  reflects	  uncertainties	  concerning	  water	  quantities	  as	  well	  as	  the	  appropriate	  treatment	  strategy	  (which,	  in	  turn,	  are	  importantly	  affected	   by	   sub-­‐surface	   interactions	   between	   fracturing	   fluids	   and	   shale	   rocks).	   The	  World	  Energy	  Council,	  moreover,	  believes	  that	  steadily	  increasing	  costs	  related	  to	  water	  reclamation	  and	  chemical	  cleanup	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  drive	  up	  production	  costs	  to	  $6-­‐8/Mcf.37	  Other	  such	   issues	  bearing	  on	  production	  costs	   include:	  changes	   to	   tax	  credits	  for	   unconventional	   fuels;	   environmental	   considerations	   limiting	   both	   sub-­‐surface	  drilling	  practices	  and	  land	  access	  for	  well	  drilling	  and	  completion	  activities	  (see	  Section	  4.1	  for	  a	  more	  detailed	  treatment	  of	  this	  issue);	  and	  revised	  fiscal	  regimes	  in	  US	  states	  situated	  atop	  unexplored	  shale	  gas	  deposits.	  Analysts	  often	  note	  a	  number	  of	  potential	  service	   sector	   bottlenecks,	   such	   as	   the	   availability	   of	   land-­‐based	   rigs	   equipped	   to	  horizontal	   drilling	   specifications	   and	   the	   sufficiency	   of	   skilled	   human	   resources.	   An	  absence	  of	   these	  may	   increase	   the	  cost	  base	  and	  challenge	   the	  commercial	  viability	  of	  well-­‐drilling	  projects.38	  	  It	  is,	  therefore,	  not	  surprising	  that	  the	  range	  of	  production	  costs	  is	  so	  great.	  Nonetheless,	  analysts	   have	   attempted	   to	   provide	   ‘rules	   of	   thumb’	   that	   extrapolate	   from	   drilling	  experience.	   It	   is	   commonly	   argued,	   for	   example,	   that	   most	   of	   the	   life-­‐cycle	   costs	   of	  developing	   a	   single	   shale	   gas	   well	   are	   expended	   under	   the	   categories	   of	   finding	   and	  development	   (F&D)	   and	   lease	   operating	   expenditures	   (LOE). 39 	  These	   broader	  categories	   can	   be	   further	   sub-­‐divided	   into	   constituent	   cost	   components.	   According	   to	  IHS	  CERA,	  the	  well	  capital	  expenditures	  that	  form	  part	  of	  F&D	  costs	  can	  be	  divided	  into	  three	   main	   categories	   –	   drilling	   (40%),	   completions	   (including	   fracking,	   50%)	   and	  facilities	  (10%).40	  However,	  for	  Europe	  these	  cost	  ratios	  may	  not	  reflect	  the	  absence	  of	  upstream	   infrastructure	   in	   several	   countries	   with	   shale	   gas	   prospects.	   There	   is	   also	  some	   scope	   for	   debate	   as	   to	   the	   largest	   cost	   components	   for	   developing	   a	   shale	   play.	  Some	   studies	   have	  noted	   that	   F&D	   costs	   represent	   the	  most	   significant	   proportion	   of	  total	  well	   costs	  and	  as	  such	  are	  pivotal	   for	  determining	  break-­‐even	  prices.41	  However,	  other	  analysts	  have	  pointed	  out	   that	  F&D	  costs	  make	  up	  a	  considerable	  proportion	  of	  total	   expenditure	   only	   in	   the	   first	   three	   years,	   but	   subsequently	   the	   costs	   are	   more	  evenly	  dispersed	  when	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  full	  life	  cycle	  of	  a	  well.42	  This	  bias	  may	  be	  due	  to	  the	  observation	  that	  gas	  drilling	  firms	  typically	  require	  a	  pay-­‐out	  within	  the	  first	  three	  years	  of	  their	  initial	  investment.43	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  Black	  &	  Veatch,	   'Growing	  shale	  resources;	  understanding	  implications	  for	  North	  American	  natural	  gas	  prices',	  (prepared	  for	  the	  state	  of	  Alaska	  by	  Black	  &	  Veatch	  Management	  Consulting,	  2010).	  37	  WEC,	  'Survey	  of	  Energy	  Resources',	  14.	  38	  Rogers,	  'Shale	  gas':	  134.	  39	  Gény,	  'Unconventional	  Gas',	  80.	  40	  Bonakdarpour	  et	  al.,	  'Economic	  and	  employment	  contributions',	  15.	  The	  cost	  of	  land	  acquisition	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  considered	  separately.	  41	  Michelle	  Foss,	   'The	  Outlook	  for	  US	  Gas	  Prices	   in	  2020:	  Henry	  hub	  at	  $3	  or	  $10?',	  (Oxford	  Institute	  for	  Energy	  Studies,	  2011).	  42	  Guarnone	  et	  al.,	  'Unconventional	  mindset'.	  43	  A.E.	   Berman,	   'Shale	   gas	   -­‐	   the	   eye	   of	   the	   storm'	   (paper	   presented	   at	   the	   Middlefield	   Investment	  Conference,	  Calgary,	  Canada,	  14	  July	  2011,	  2011).	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Figure	  5-­‐10:	  Indicative	  cost	  breakdown	  of	  a	  shale	  gas	  project,	  first	  three	  years44	  
	  
Figure	  5-­‐11:	  Indicative	  cost	  breakdown	  of	  a	  shale	  gas	  project,	  full	  life	  cycle45	  
	  The	  production	  costs	  of	  natural	  gas	  need	  to	  be	  assessed	  in	  relation	  to	  gas	  prices	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  resource	  is	  economically	  viable.	  However,	  estimates	  of	  the	  so-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Guarnone	  et	  al.,	  'Unconventional	  mindset'.	  45	  Ibid.	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called	   ‘break-­‐even’	   price	   of	   natural	   gas,	   which	   is	   necessary	   to	   recoup	   per-­‐well	  expenditures,	   vary	   and	   are	   subject	   to	   much	   contestation.	   As	   noted	   by	   the	   IEA,	  conventional	  wisdom	  in	  2008	  converged	  around	  a	  price	  range	  of	  $6-­‐8/MBtu	   for	  shale	  gas	  to	  be	  economic.	  Since	  then,	  this	  range	  has	  been	  progressively	  lowered	  and,	  writing	  in	   2010,	   the	   IEA	   estimated	   a	   price	   between	   $3-­‐6/MBtu	   for	   North	   America.46	  Early	  estimates	   for	   break-­‐even	   costs	   in	   Europe	   (specifically	   Poland	   and	   Germany)	   were	  provided	  by	  an	  analysis	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  Oxford	  Institute	  for	  Energy	  Studies	  and	  range	  from	   $8-­‐12/MBtu.47	  The	   IEA’s	   assumptions	   regarding	   costs	   were	   estimated	   on	   a	   life-­‐cycle	   production	   basis	   only	   and	   were	   hence	   limited	   to	   finding/developing	   costs,	  operating	   expenditures	   and	   decommissioning	   costs	   (all	   of	  which	  were	   discounted	   by	  the	   cost	   of	   capital).48	  However,	   neither	   transportation	   costs	   nor	   the	   cost	   of	   liquids	  production	  were	  taken	  into	  account,	  despite	  the	  latter	  having	  been	  noted	  as	  a	  significant	  factor	  positively	  affecting	  shale	  well	  economics	  in	  the	  USA	  (see	  Chapter	  3).	  	  
Figure	  5-­‐12:	  Break-­‐even	  prices	  for	  unconventional	  gas	  production49	  
	  The	  effect	  of	  shale	  gas	  development	  on	  prices	  has	  already	  been	  felt	  in	  the	  USA.	  As	  shown	  in	   Figure	   5-­‐13	   and	   Figure	   5-­‐25,	   US	  Henry	  Hub	   prices	   began	   a	   sharp	   decline	   in	   2008,	  which	   corresponded	   with,	   amongst	   other	   factors,	   the	   steady	   increase	   in	   natural	   gas	  production	   in	   the	  USA.	  Of	   course,	  US	  market	   conditions	  are	  quite	  variable,	   as	  average	  Henry	  Hub	  spot	  prices	  have	  ranged	  from	  under	  $3	  to	  over	  $12	  per	  MBtu	  in	  the	  past	  five	  years.	  Much	  of	  this	  impact	  has	  been	  due	  to	  the	  global	  recession	  in	  2008,	  contributing	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  IEA,	  'Oil	  and	  Gas	  Markets',	  183.	  47	  Gény,	  'Unconventional	  Gas',	  87.	  48	  IEA,	  'Golden	  age',	  49.	  49	  Centrica	  Energy,	  'Unconventional	  Gas	  in	  Europe';	  Economist	  Intelligence	  Unit,	  'Breaking	  new	  ground:	  A	  special	   report	   on	   global	   shale	   gas	   developments',	   (London:	   Economist	   Intelligence	   Unit,	   2011);	   Gény,	  'Unconventional	  Gas';	  Korn,	   'Prospects	   in	  Europe';	  Wood	  Mackenzie,	   'Global	  unconventional	  gas	  trends',	  (Wood	  Mackenzie,	  2009);	  Medlock,	  Jaffe	  and	  Hartley,	  'Shale	  Gas	  and	  National	  Security';	  Moniz,	  Jacoby	  and	  Meggs,	  'Future	  of	  natural	  gas'.	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a	  pronounced	  fall	   in	  the	  US	  gas	  price	  and	  a	  corresponding	  reduction	   in	  the	  number	  of	  rigs	  actively	  drilling	  for	  gas.50	  It	  was	  therefore	  initially	  anticipated	  that	  depressed	  prices	  in	  the	  USA	  would	  ease	  indigenous	  production	  of	  gas,	  as	  the	  break-­‐even	  extraction	  costs	  would	   no	   longer	   be	   covered	   by	  wellhead	   prices.	  However,	   contrary	   to	   this	   belief,	   the	  margins	  have	   improved	  as	   the	   technological	   learning	   curve	  has	  driven	  down	  per-­‐well	  development	  costs.51	  Moreover,	  gas	  producers	  ‘sold	  production	  forward’	  on	  gas	  futures	  and	   the	   expectation	   of	   higher	   prices.	   This	   hedging	   strategy,	   propped	   up	   by	   a	   bullish	  forward	   price	   curve,	   helped	   to	   cushion	   producers	   from	   depressed	   gas	   prices	   in	   the	  second	  half	  of	  2008.	  However,	   some	   research	  has	   recently	   concluded	   that	   the	  production	   costs	   claimed	  by	  various	  shale	  gas-­‐producing	  companies	  are	  optimistically	   low	  and	  that	   in	  reality	  these	  independent	  producers	  have	  actually	  been	  selling	  their	  gas	  at	   large	  negative	  economic	  margins.52	  A	  study	  undertaken	  by	  Weijermars	  et	  al.	  in	  2011	  compared	  conventional	  vs.	  unconventional	  gas	  producers	  according	  to	  earnings,	  capital,	  shareholder	  return,	  value	  driver	   inventory	   and	  margin	   analysis;	   it	  was	   revealed	   that	   unconventional	   producers	  regularly	  underperformed	  in	  relation	  to	  their	  conventional	  gas-­‐producing	  counterparts.	  A	   key	   conclusion	   of	   the	   study	   was	   that	   sustained	   shale	   gas	   production	   and	   the	  avoidance	  of	  a	  liquidity	  crisis	  crucially	  relies	  on	  better	  well-­‐flow	  rates,	  lower	  production	  costs	  and	  significant	  research	  and	  development	  (R&D)	  in	  order	  to	  enable	  a	  lower	  F&D	  cost	   base.53 	  Another	   study	   that	   modelled	   and	   simulated	   shale	   play	   economics	   in	  Haynesville,	   USA	   similarly	   concluded	   that,	   given	   high	   initial	   capital	   expenditures	   for	  developing	  shale	  gas	  resources,	   ‘the	  majority	  of	  wells	   fail	   to	  break-­‐even	  on	  a	  full-­‐cycle	  basis	  at	  prevailing	  gas	  prices	  [~$4/MBtu]’.54	  Compounding	  these	  challenging	  economics	  is	   the	   relatively	   steep	   decline	   curves	   for	   shale	   gas	   wells,	   implying	   that	   continuous	  drilling	  is	  required	  to	  maintain	  a	  flat	  production	  profile.	  One	  element	   that	  must	  be	   factored	   in	   to	  any	  examination	  of	   the	   strong	  and	  sustained	  growth	  in	  US	  shale	  gas	  production	  is	  NGL	  production	  –	  a	  topic	  already	  touched	  upon	  in	  Chapter	  3	  (see	  Table	  3-­‐11,	  Table	  3-­‐21and	  Table	  3-­‐22,	  for	  example).	  For	  decades,	  natural	  gas	  traded	  at	  a	  relative	  price	  to	  oil	  of	  between	  6:1	  and	  10:1.	  Crude	  oil	  prices	  have	  since	  risen	  and	  North	  American	  gas	  prices	  have	  dropped	  to	  yield	  ratios	  of	  almost	  20:1	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing.	  High	  oil	  prices	  mean	  that	  US	  drilling	  rigs	  are	  migrating	  from	  dry	  shale	  plays,	  such	  as	  the	  Marcellus,	  to	  liquids-­‐rich	  plays	  in	  the	  Mid	  West,	  such	  as	  the	  Anadarko,	  Bakken	  and	  Permian.	  As	  the	  price	  of	  NGLs	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  price	  of	  oil,	  such	  plays	  are	   much	   more	   commercially	   attractive,	   but	   the	   significant	   amounts	   of	   dry	   gas	  incidentally	   produced	   from	   such	   plays	   are	   sold	   on	   the	   gas	   market	   regardless	   of	   the	  already-­‐low	  market	  prices.	  If	  this	  trend	  continues,	  the	  US	  market	  for	  natural	  gas	  could	  be	   in	   for	   an	   extended	   period	   of	   very	   competitive	   prices.55	  See	   Box	   6-­‐2	   for	   additional	  elaboration	  of	  this	  point.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Rogers,	  'Shale	  gas':	  125.	  51	  EIA,	  'AEO	  2011'.	  52	  Weijermars	  et	  al.,	  'Unconventional	  gas	  research	  initiative'.	  See	  also	  Berman,	  'Eye	  of	  the	  storm',	  Foss,	  'US	  Gas	  Prices	  in	  2020'.	  53	  Weijermars	  et	  al.,	  'Unconventional	  gas	  research	  initiative'.	  54	  Kaiser,	  'Profitability	  assessment'.	  55	  Bentek	  Energy	  LLC,	   'US	  Energy	  Markets	  In	  Transition:	  Nat	  Gas,	  Oil	  &	  NGLs	  Rewrite	  The	  Script'	  (paper	  presented	  at	   the	  European	  Commission,	  Brussels,	  2012);	  Guy	  Chazan,	   'Statoil	   to	  switch	   focus	   to	   ‘liquid-­‐rich	  shales’',	  Financial	  Times,	  8	  February	  2012,	  2012.	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Furthermore,	   it	   remains	   to	   be	   seen	   whether	   the	   margins	   underpinning	   shale	   play	  economics	   can	   be	   improved	   by	   the	   technological	   learning	   curve.	   Analysts	   at	   ARI	  International,	  a	  consulting	  firm,	  have	  provided	  evidence	  on	  improved	  well	  performance	  in	  the	  form	  of	  reduced	  drilling	  days,	  increases	  in	  the	  average	  IP	  rates	  of	  producing	  wells	  and	   ever-­‐longer	   lengths	   of	   horizontal	   sections	   of	   wellbores. 56 	  These	   factors	   have	  contributed	  to	  a	  reduction	  by	  half	   in	  total	  drilling	  and	  completion	  costs	  in	  the	  last	  five	  years	   of	   shale	   gas	   drilling,	   and	   portend	   future	   efficiency	   gains	   that	   may	   offset	   the	  precipitous	  fall	  in	  US	  wellhead/spot	  prices.	  
Figure	  5-­‐13:	  US	  natural	  gas	  production	  and	  average	  annual	  Henry	  Hub	  prices57	  
	  Disregarding	  the	  numerous	  debates	  revolving	  around	  shale	  gas	  well	  economics	  and	  the	  extent	  of	  cost	  optimisation,	  it	  is	  already	  apparent	  that	  shale	  gas	  development	  in	  the	  USA	  has	   had	   a	   significant	   effect	   on	   the	   outlook	   for	   future	   gas	   prices.	   Indeed,	  whereas	   the	  AEO2011	  reference	  case	  projects	  gas	  prices	  to	  reach	  $7.07/MBtu	  in	  2035,	  a	  scenario	  of	  high	  EUR	  of	   shale	  gas	  yields	  a	  price	  of	  $5.35/MBtu.	  Conversely,	   a	   low	  shale	  EUR	  case	  predicts	   prices	   as	   high	   as	   $9.26/MBtu.58	  That	   the	   estimated	   range	   of	   prices	   varies	   so	  significantly	  as	  a	  result	  of	  different	  production	  rates	  for	  shale	  gas	  bears	  testament	  to	  its	  importance	  for	  the	  future	  of	  the	  US	  energy	  balance.	  However,	  it	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  what	  impact	   the	  progressive	  decline	   in	  prices	  –	   from	  an	  average	  of	  $4.50/Mbtu	   in	  2010,	   to	  $4.00/Mbtu	  in	  2011,	  to	  the	  recent	  ten-­‐year	  lows	  of	  around	  $2/Mbtu	  –	  will	  have	  on	  the	  margins	  of	  independent	  unconventional	  gas	  producers	  over	  the	  coming	  years.	  	  Setting	   the	   US	   case	   in	   a	   wider	   global	   context,	   the	   IEA’s	   World	   Energy	   Outlook	   has	  revised	   its	   natural	   gas	   price	   assumptions	   in	   all	   three	   of	   its	   scenarios	   due	   to	   what	   it	  considers	   to	  be	   improved	  prospects	   for	   the	  commercial	  production	  of	  unconventional	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  Kuuskraa,	  'Economic	  and	  market	  impacts',	  9.	  57	  BP,	  'Statistical	  review	  2011'.	  58	  EIA,	  'Effect	  of	  Increased	  Natural	  Gas	  Exports'.	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gas.	  In	  particular,	  the	  report	  notes	  that	  “higher	  projected	  output	  of	  unconventional	  gas	  acts	   to	   keep	   increases	   in	   the	   price	   of	   natural	   gas	   below	   the	   level	   envisaged	   in	  WEO-­‐2010,	  increasing	  its	  competitiveness	  against	  other	  fuels.”	  Indeed,	  although	  average	  gas	  import	   prices	   in	   Europe	   have	   since	   recovered	   from	   an	   earlier	   five-­‐year	   low	   of	  $6.34/Mbtu	  in	  August	  2009	  (or	  €4.51/Mbtu),	  each	  IEA	  WEO	  since	  2008	  has	  nonetheless	  revised	  its	  projections	  of	  gas	  import	  costs	  for	  Europe	  into	  the	  coming	  decades.	  As	  shown	  in	   Figure	   5-­‐14,	   the	   average	   import	   prices	   under	   the	   IEA	   reference	   and	   ‘new	   policies’	  scenarios,	   although	   steadily	   rising,	   have	   nonetheless	   been	   repeatedly	   revised	  downwards	  in	  recent	  years	  (the	  WEO	  2011	  ‘Golden	  Age	  of	  Gas’	  scenario	  is	  added	  for	  a	  reference	  ‘lower	  bound’	  price	  estimate).	  	  
Figure	  5-­‐14:	  IEA	  estimates	  of	  import	  price	  for	  Europe	  under	  reference	  scenario59	  
	  
5.2 The	  impact	  in	  Europe	  to	  date	  Unlike	   the	   oil	  market,	   natural	   gas	  markets	   are	   current	   not	   globally	   integrated.	   At	   the	  time	  of	  writing,	  natural	  gas	  prices	  span	  a	  range	   from	  around	  $0.75	  per	  million	  British	  thermal	  units	  (MBtu)	  in	  Saudi	  Arabia	  to	  just	  over	  $2/MBtu	  in	  the	  USA	  and	  $16/MBtu	  in	  the	  LNG-­‐dependent	  Asian	  markets.	  EU	  prices	  fall	  between	  US	  and	  Asian	  prices,	  with	  the	  price	   of	   gas	   traded	   at	   the	   UK	   National	   Balancing	   Point	   (NBP)	   averaging	   $9.21/MBtu	  during	   November	   2011.	   But	   even	   within	   the	   EU	   itself,	   there	   can	   be	   significant	  differences	  between	   the	   ‘spot’	  prices	   in	  North	  West	  European	  Member	  States	   like	   the	  UK	  and	  long-­‐term	  oil-­‐indexed	  prices	  in	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  European	  Member	  States.60	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  fragmentation	  in	  the	  global	  gas	  system,	  the	  last	  decade	  has	  seen	  gradual,	  but	   unmistakable,	   change	   that	   has	   led	   to	   the	   ripple	   effects	   of	   the	   unconventional	   gas	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  IEA,	   'Golden	   age';	   IEA,	   'World	   Energy	   Outlook',	   in	   World	   Energy	   Outlook	   (Paris:	   Organisation	   for	  Economic	  Co-­‐operation	  and	  Development,	  various).	  60	  EIA,	  'Effect	  of	  Increased	  Natural	  Gas	  Exports',	  3.	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revolution	  in	  the	  USA	  being	  felt	  worldwide.	  The	  natural	  gas	  system	  has	  gone	  from	  being	  comprised	   of	   distinct	   regional	   or	   national	   markets	   to	   one	   where	   interregional	   trade	  flows	   have	   a	   noticeable	   impact	   on	   physical	   supply-­‐demand	   dynamics	   and	   in	   some	  circumstances	   even	   large	   shifts	   in	   prices.	   Global	   growth	   in	   the	   trade	   of	   LNG	   has	  underpinned	   this	   transformation.	   Whereas	   the	   concept	   of	   a	   ‘world	   gas	   market’	   was	  almost	  unthinkable	  ten	  years	  ago,	  a	  surge	  of	  new	  global	  LNG	  liquefaction	  capacity,	  much	  of	  which	   is	   inherently	  destination	   flexible	  or	   ‘self-­‐contracted’,	  has	   introduced	   the	   first	  elements	  of	  interregional	  gas	  price	  competition.61	  In	   early	   2010,	   the	   development	   of	   the	   increasingly	   globalised	   LNG	  market	   coincided	  with	  two	  other	  key	  factors	  to	  create	  a	   ‘perfect	  storm’62	  that	  resulted	  in	  a	  glut	  of	  global	  gas	  supply:	  a)	   the	  boom	  in	  unconventional	  gas	  production	   in	  the	  USA;	  and	  b)	  demand	  levels	   below	   those	   anticipated	   due	   to	   the	   economic	   recession.63	  This	   section	   explains	  how	  these	  issues	  came	  together,	  heralding	  significant	  changes	  in	  the	  natural	  gas	  system	  that	  allowed	  unconventional	  gas	  to	  significantly	  impact	  European	  markets	  years	  before	  any	   prospective	   indigenous	   production	   within	   Europe	   itself.	   It	   also	   looks	   at	   the	  implications	   on	   investment	   in	   infrastructure,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   implications	   on	   the	   way	  natural	  gas	  is	  priced	  in	  the	  EU.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  Jensen,	  'LNG	  Revolution':	  8.	  62	  Howard	  V.	  Rogers,	  'LNG	  Trade-­‐flows	  in	  the	  Atlantic	  Basin:	  Trends	  and	  Discontinuities	  ',	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  Institute	  for	  Energy	  Studies,	  2010),	  41.	  63	  For	  an	  overview,	  see	  IEA,	  'WEO	  2010'.	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5.2.1 Increasing	  LNG	  liquefaction	  and	  regasification	  capacity	  Global	  LNG	  trade	  volumes	  have	  been	  steadily	  growing	  in	  the	  last	  decade	  and	  increasing	  LNG	  liquefaction	  and	  regasification	  capacity	  looks	  set	  to	  continue	  to	  drive	  this	  trend	  for	  the	  foreseeable	  future.	  	  
Figure	  5-­‐15:	  Global	  LNG	  trade	  volumes	  and	  LNG	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  global	  gas	  consumption64	  
	  Figure	  5-­‐15	  above	  shows	  a	  two-­‐fold	  increase	  in	  global	  LNG	  trade	  volumes	  in	  the	  period	  2000-­‐2010.	   In	  proportional	   terms,	   this	  growth	  rate	   far	  exceeds	   incremental	  growth	   in	  global	   gas	   consumption,	   resulting	   in	   an	   ever	   greater	   percentage	   of	   the	   gas	   consumed	  globally	   –	   currently	   around	   10%	   –	   being	   transported	   by	   LNG.	   It	   is	   expected	   that	  interregional	  gas	   trading	  will	   increase	   from	  590	  bcm	   in	  2009	   to	  around	  1	  150	  bcm	   in	  2035.	  More	  than	  half	  of	  this	  growth	  will	  come	  from	  LNG,	  increasing	  the	  share	  of	  LNG	  in	  interregionally	  traded	  gas	  from	  31%	  in	  2008	  to	  42%	  in	  2035.65	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  BP,	  'Statistical	  review	  2011'.	  65	  IEA,	  'WEO	  2011',	  93.	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Figure	  5-­‐16:	  EU	  LNG	  imports	  by	  Member	  State66	  
	  As	  a	  major	  consumer	  of	  natural	  gas,	  Europe	  is	  robustly	  contributing	  to	  this	  trend.	  Figure	  5-­‐16,	  above,	  shows	  a	  strong	  growth	  in	  LNG	  imports	  into	  Europe	  from	  2008	  to	  2010.	  In	  this	  period,	  North	  West	  Europe	  saw	  the	  commissioning	  and	  start-­‐up	  of	  substantial	  new	  LNG	  terminal	  import	  capacity.	  The	  Zeebrugge	  expansion	  in	  Belgium,	  together	  with	  three	  new	  UK	   terminals	   (Isle	  of	  Grain	  Phase	   II,	   South	  Hook	  LNG	  and	  Dragon	  LNG),	  added	  a	  total	   LNG	   import	   capacity	   equivalent	   to	   43.5	  bcm	  a	   year	   –	   a	   volume	  greater	   than	   the	  total	   gas	   demand	   in	   the	   Netherlands	   alone.67	  As	   Figure	   5-­‐17	   below	   shows,	   the	   EU	  currently	  has	  a	  regasification	  capacity	  of	  over	  150	  bcm,	  which	  looks	  set	  to	  double	  in	  the	  period	  to	  2020.68	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  Source:	   Eurostat.	   NB:	   There	   are	   differences	   in	   the	   way	   different	   Member	   States	   have	   reported	   LNG	  import	  volumes	  must	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  when	  considering	  this	  chart.	  67	  Morten	  Frisch,	  'Current	  European	  Gas	  Pricing	  Problems:	  Solutions	  Based	  on	  Price	  Review	  and	  Price	  Re-­‐Opener	   Provisions',	   in	   International	   Energy	   Law	   and	   Policy	   Research	   Paper	   Series	   (Dundee:	   Centre	   for	  Energy,	  Petroleum	  &	  Mineral	  Law	  &	  Policy,	  University	  of	  Dundee,	  2010),	  9.	  68	  Kuhn	  and	  Umbach,	  'Strategic	  Perspectives',	  44.	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Figure	  5-­‐17:	  Current	  and	  planned	  EU-­‐27	  LNG	  regasification	  capacity	  (as	  of	  September	  2011)69	  
	  In	   2010,	   Europe	   accounted	   for	   22%	   of	   the	  world’s	   regasification	   capacity,	   Korea	   and	  Japan	   44%	   and	   North	   America	   25%.70	  Given	   the	   steep	   decline	   in	   actual	   and	   forecast	  natural	  gas	  imports	  to	  the	  USA	  (examined	  further	  later	  in	  this	  section),	   it	   is	   likely	  that	  these	  ratios	  will	  change	  in	  the	  coming	  years.	  The	  sharp	  increase	  in	  US	  gas	  prices	  in	  the	  winter	   of	   2001/02	  had	   given	   rise	   to	   a	   rash	   of	   regasification	   terminal	   proposals,71	  but	  given	  that	  the	  latest	  EIA	  energy	  outlook	  sees	  the	  USA	  becoming	  a	  net	  exporter	  of	  LNG	  in	  2016	  and	  an	  overall	  net	  exporter	  of	  natural	  gas	  in	  2021,72	  most	  of	  the	  projects	  awaiting	  final	  investment	  decisions	  are	  unlikely	  to	  move	  forward.	  With	  a	  number	  of	  planned	  LNG	  regasification	  projects	  in	  the	  USA	  on	  hold,	  Europe	  looks	  set	  to	  become	  the	  region	  with	  the	  fastest	  growing	  regasification	  capacity	  globally,	  soon	  overtaking	  the	  USA	  to	  become	  the	  second	  largest	  regional	  market	  for	  LNG	  after	  Asia	  in	  terms	  of	  regasification	  potential	  (see	  Table	  5-­‐1).	  
Table	  5-­‐1:	  LNG	  regasification	  terminals	  by	  region	  (as	  of	  June	  2010)73	  
Region	   Operation	   Construction	   Planned	  Asia	  	   418	   59	   131	  Europe	  	   173	   24	   244	  Middle	  East	  and	  Africa	  	   3	   4	   11	  North	  America	  	   165	   49	   282	  Latin	  America	  	   14	   2	   8	  
Total	  	   772	   137	   674	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  Source:	  Gas	  Infrastructure	  Europe,	  'GIE	  LNG	  Investment	  Database',	  (2011).	  70	  IEA,	  'Golden	  age',	  71.	  71	  As	   of	   June	   2010,	   49	   bcm	   of	   regasification	   capacity	  was	   under	   construction	   in	   the	   USA,	   bringing	   the	  forecast	   for	   total	   US	   capacity	   to	   214	   bcm	   by	   2013.	   Fifteen	   projects	   were	   awaiting	   final	   investment	  decisions.	  IEA,	  'Oil	  and	  Gas	  Markets',	  262.	  72	  EIA,	   'Annual	  Energy	  Outlook	  2012:	  Early	  Release	  Overview',	  (Washington,	  DC:	  US	  Energy	  Information	  Administration,	  2012).	  73	  IEA,	  'Oil	  and	  Gas	  Markets',	  254.	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The	  large	  increase	  in	  LNG	  import	  capacity	  in	  North	  West	  Europe	  has	  coincided	  with	  the	  start-­‐up	   of	   a	   number	   of	   large	   LNG	   liquefaction	   plants	   around	   the	   world.	   In	   a	   much-­‐anticipated	  development,	  Qatar	  launched	  six	  7.8	  million-­‐tonne-­‐per-­‐annum	  (mtpa)	  LNG	  trains	   between	  April	   2009	   and	  December	   2010,	   adding	   80	   bcm	   to	   global	   liquefaction	  capacity	  (Table	  5-­‐3).	  The	  sudden	  rise	  in	  Qatari	  output	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  profile	  of	  EU-­‐27	  LNG	  imports	  as	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  5-­‐18,	  below.	  Along	  with	  new	  LNG	  developments	  in	  Russia,	   Yemen	   and	   Peru,	   the	   Qatari	   projects	   helped	   to	   bring	   total	   global	   liquefaction	  capacity	  to	  around	  370	  bcm	  in	  mid-­‐2011.74	  
Table	  5-­‐2:	  Qatar’s	  new	  liquefaction	  trains75	  
Project	   Partners	   Capacity	   No,	  of	  trains	   Start	  date	  Qatargas	  2	  	   Qatar	   Petroleum,	  ExxonMobil,	  Total	  	   7.8	  mtpa	   2	   Apr.	  2009	  Qatargas	  3	  	   Qatar	   Petroleum,	  ConocoPhillips,	  Mitsui	  	   7.8	  mtpa	   1	   Sep.	  2010	  Qatargas	  4	  	   Qatar	   Petroleum,	  Shell	  	   7.8	  mtpa	   1	   Dec.	  2010	  RasGas	  3	  	   Qatar	   Petroleum,	  ExxonMobil	  	   7.8	  mtpa	   2	   Sep.	  2009	  Feb.	  2010	  	  
Figure	  5-­‐18:	  EU	  LNG	  imports	  by	  origin76	  
	  At	  this	  point,	  it	  is	  worth	  touching	  on	  the	  apparent	  mismatch	  between	  global	  liquefaction	  and	  regasification	  capacity.	  As	  of	  June	  2010,	  the	  world’s	  regasification	  capacity	  stood	  at	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  IEA,	  'Golden	  age',	  167.	  75	  Kanai,	  'Decoupling	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  Prices',	  26.	  76	  Source:	  Eurostat.	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roughly	  770	  bcm	  –	  roughly	  2.5	  times	  its	  liquefaction	  capacity.77	  While	  this	  means	  there	  will	  be	  global	  competition	  for	  LNG	  shipments	  when	  world	  gas	  supply	  tightens,78	  surplus	  regasification	  capacity	  provides	  a	  very	  important	  flexibility	  for	  seasonal	  load-­‐balancing	  purposes	  and	  may	  improve	  security	  of	  supply.	  For	  example,	  the	  value	  of	  Japan’s	  excess	  regasification	   capacity	  was	   clearly	   demonstrated	   following	   the	  2011	   earthquakes	   and	  tsunami,	  because	  it	  allowed	  extra	  spot	  supplies	  to	  reach	  gas-­‐fired	  power	  plants	  in	  order	  to	   bridge	   the	   shortfall	   in	   electricity	   generation	   caused	   by	   the	   loss	   of	   the	   Fukushima	  reactors.79	  With	  the	  expected	  completion	  of	  projects	  in	  Australia,	  Angola	  and	  Algeria,	  the	  trend	  in	  liquefaction	  growth	  looks	  set	  to	  continue	  into	  the	  immediate	  future,	   increasing	  overall	  capacity	   by	   an	   expected	   50%	   in	   the	   five-­‐year	   period	   from	   2008	   to	   2013.80	  Looking	  further	   ahead,	   the	   Papua	   New	   Guinea	   and	   Gorgon	   projects	   will	   add	   significant	   LNG	  supplies	  to	  Asian	  markets.	  Final	  investment	  decisions	  were	  taken	  in	  2009	  and	  they	  are	  scheduled	   to	   start	  by	  2014.81	  Also	  of	   interest	   are	   three	  projects	   in	  Queensland,	  which	  are	   the	   first	   in	   the	   world	   to	   be	   based	   on	   CBM.	   Based	   on	   currently	   operating	   and	  sanctioned	   projects,	   Australian	   LNG	   export	   capacity	   could	   exceed	   70	   bcm	   by	   2015,	  making	  it	  the	  second-­‐largest	  global	  LNG	  exporter	  after	  Qatar.82	  
Table	  5-­‐3:	  LNG	  liquifaction	  plants	  under	  construction	  by	  country83	  
	   	   Capacity	   	  
	   Plant	   (bcm)	   (mtpa)	   Start	  date	  Algeria	   Skikda	  (rebuild)	   6.1	   4.5	   2013	  	   Gassi	  Touil	   6.4	   4.7	   2013	  Angola	   Angola	   7.1	   5.2	   2012	  Australia	   Pluto	   6.5	   4.8	   2012	  	   Gorgon	   20.4	   15.0	   2014	  	   Gladstone	  LNG	   10.6	   7.8	   2014	  	   Queensland	  Curtis	   11.6	   8.5	   2015	  Indonesia	   Donggi	  Senoro	   2.7	   2.0	   2014	  Papua	  New	  Guinea	   PNG	  LNG	   9.0	   6.6	   2014	  	  Yet	   further	   down	   the	   line,	   projects	   totalling	   over	   500	   bcm	   of	   additional	   liquefaction	  capacity	   are	   being	   evaluated	   to	   come	   online	   in	   the	   period	   2015-­‐2020.	   Liquefaction	  projects	  typically	  take	  four	  or	  more	  years	  to	  permit	  and	  build,	  and	  are	  planned	  to	  run	  for	  at	  least	  20	  years.	  These	  long	  lead	  times	  mean	  the	  maximum	  amount	  of	  supply	  that	  can	  be	  attained	  within	  the	  next	  five	  years	  is	  fairly	  well	  known,	  although	  project	  delays	  often	   result	   in	   lower	   capacity	   than	   anticipated.84	  Forecasts	   ahead	   of	   this	   five-­‐year	  window	  are	  subject	  to	  greater	  uncertainty	  and	  it	  can	  be	  expected	  that	  many	  more	  LNG	  projects	  are	  reported	  in	  the	  trade	  press	  than	  are	  ever	  actually	  built.	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  IEA,	  'Oil	  and	  Gas	  Markets',	  253.	  78	  Weijermars	  et	  al.,	  'Unconventional	  gas	  research	  initiative':	  404.	  79	  IEA,	  'Golden	  age',	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  80	  IEA,	  'Oil	  and	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  Markets',	  14,	  168,	  71;	  IEA,	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  81	  IEA,	  'Oil	  and	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  Markets',	  171.	  82	  IEA,	  'WEO	  2011',	  168.	  83	  Source:	  IEA,	  'Golden	  age',	  68.	  European	  Commission	  analysis.	  84	  Ibid.,	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With	   Henry	   Hub	   gas	   trading	   below	   $3/Mbtu	   during	   the	   mild	   winter	   of	   2012,85	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  applications	  for	  liquefaction	  projects	  were	  submitted	  in	  the	  USA.	  These	   would	   allow	   applicants	   to	   export	   domestic	   supplies	   of	   natural	   gas	   to	   higher	  priced	  overseas	  markets	  as	  LNG.	  As	  well	   as	   the	   recent	   successful	   request	   to	  build	   the	  Sabine	  Pass	  liquefaction	  terminal	  in	  Louisiana,	  seven	  more	  applications	  for	  liquefaction	  projects	   have	   been	   submitted.	   If	   approved	   by	   the	   regulator,	   these	   projects	  would	   see	  roughly	  18%	  of	  current	  US	  gas	  production	  shipped	   to	  markets	  worldwide.86	  However,	  the	  debate	  on	  whether	  to	  allow	  such	  exports	   is	  ongoing.	  Proponents	  have	  emphasised	  job	  creation	  at	  the	  LNG	  plants,	  while	  opponents,	  such	  as	  industrial	  consumers,	  stress	  the	  impact	  on	  US	  business	  in	  light	  of	  findings	  that	  more	  natural	  gas	  exports	  would	  lead	  to	  higher	  gas	  prices.87	  Notwithstanding	  this	  debate,	   the	   long-­‐term	  effectiveness	  of	  any	  effort	  to	  resist	  market	  forces	   that	   naturally	   incentivise	   greater	   US	   LNG	   exports	   may	   be	   undermined	   by	   the	  possibility	  of	  gas	  re-­‐exports	  from	  Canada.	  Canada	  has	  an	  existing	  free	  trade	  agreement	  with	   the	   USA	   and	   therefore	   US	   law	   requires	   the	   Department	   of	   Energy	   to	   grant	   gas	  export	   applications	   to	   Canada	   without	   modification	   or	   delay.88	  Without	   a	   destination	  clause,	  cheap	  US	  pipeline	  imports	  could	  either	  be	  directly	  shipped	  on	  to	  Asian	  markets	  via	  Canadian	  terminals,	  or	  be	  used	  to	  meet	  domestic	  Canadian	  demand,	  thereby	  freeing	  greater	  volumes	  of	  Canadian-­‐produced	  gas	  for	  export.	  Moreover,	   any	   effort	   to	   keep	   natural	   gas	   prices	   in	   the	  USA	   artificially	   low	  may	  prove	  self-­‐defeating	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  As	  Section	  4.3	  shows,	  low	  gas	  prices	  are	  as	  dangerous	  to	  energy	   security	   as	   high	   prices	   because	   they	   undermine	   investment	   in	   extraction	   and	  production.	  This	  means	  that,	  should	  gas	  exports	  from	  the	  USA	  be	  constrained,	   low	  gas	  prices	  would	  only	  be	  a	   transitory	  phenomenon	  until	   the	  price	  mechanism	  reduced	  US	  gas	  production	  to	  sustainable	  levels	  for	  domestic	  demand.	  Prices	  would	  then	  rise	  again.	  The	   dramatic	   rise	   in	   investment	   in	   global	   regasification	   and	   liquefaction	   capacity	  outlined	   so	   far	   in	   this	   section	   stands	   in	   contrast	   to	   seemingly	   slow	  progress	   in	   other	  major	   natural	   gas	   infrastructure	   projects.	   The	   period	   2010-­‐2013	   will	   see	   European	  regasification	   capacity	   increase	   by	   roughly	   25%.	   Meanwhile,	   only	   two	   major	   new	  interregional	   pipeline	  projects	   –	  Medgaz	   and	   the	  much-­‐awaited	  Nord	  Stream	  pipeline	  between	  Russia	  and	  Germany	  –	  will	  have	  come	  online	  in	  the	  same	  period.	  In	  the	  words	  of	   the	   IEA:	   “Across	   regions,	   LNG	   regasification	   terminals	   seem	   to	   be	   making	   more	  progress	  than	  pipelines.”89	  One	   explanation	   for	   this	   disparity	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   an	   increasing	   proportion	   of	  undeveloped	   gas	   reserves	   are	   located	   further	   away	   from	  major	  markets.	   LNG	  plays	   a	  vital	  role	   in	  bringing	  this	  gas	  to	  the	  consumer	  when	  distance,	  geographical	  or	  political	  obstacles	   make	   pipeline	   transport	   impossible.	   Looking	   to	   the	   future,	   technological	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  Gregory	  Meyer,	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  winter	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  to	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  Financial	  Times,	  10	  January	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  86Ed	   Crooks,	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  for	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  of	  Energy	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  United	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  (Washington	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  Natural	  Gas	  Act.	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  Congress,	  'Exportation	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  importation	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progress	  will	   continue	   to	   drive	   this	   trend.	   The	  world’s	   first	   floating	   LNG	   liquefaction	  project90	  was	   commissioned	   by	   Shell	   in	   May	   2011.91	  Floating	   LNG	   provides	   a	   way	   of	  developing	  stranded	  gas	  reserves	  far	  out	  at	  sea,	  which	  would	  otherwise	  be	  too	  difficult	  to	  pipe	  to	  land-­‐based	  liquefaction	  plants.	  Another	  explanation	  for	  the	  difference	  in	  growth	  between	  pipeline	  and	  LNG	  projects	  lies	  in	  their	  distinct	  investment	  risk	  profiles.	  Section	  4.2.1	  describes	  the	  ‘investment	  hold-­‐up	  problem’	   faced	   by	   companies	   looking	   to	   invest	   large	   amounts	   in	   relatively	   inflexible	  energy	  infrastructure	  projects,	  such	  as	  pipelines.	  Such	  assets	  are	  subject	  to	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  locational	  specificity,	  meaning	  that	  they	  are	  dependent	  on	  the	  availability	  and	  price	  of	  resources	  from	  a	  limited	  geographical	  area.	  They	  are	  also	  usually	  ‘dedicated	  assets’	  that	  are	   particular	   to	   a	   certain	   customer.	   Dedicated	   assets	   sink	   investments	   into	   a	   pre-­‐defined	  market	  and	  create	  a	  bilateral	  relationship	  between	  the	  supplier	  and	  buyer	  that	  incentivises	  bargaining	  over	  rents	  ex	  post.	  The	  anticipation	  of	  this	  dilemma	  complicates	  the	  decision	   to	   invest	  ex	  ante.	   Seen	   in	   this	   light,	   the	   reduced	   locational	   specificity	  and	  dedication	  of	  an	  LNG	  terminal	  may	  sometimes	  make	   it	  a	   less	  risky	   investment	  option,	  even	   though	   operating	   costs	   may	   be	   marginally	   higher	   when	   compared	   with	   a	  pipeline.92	  
5.2.2 The	  LNG	  trade	  and	  global	  gas	  markets	  LNG	  markets	  are	  difficult	  to	  monitor	  because	  there	  is	  no	  single	  supply	  point	  whose	  price	  fluctuations	  act	  as	  a	  reference	  for	  markets	  worldwide	  and	  no	  prominent	  hubs	  at	  which	  physical	  supplies	  from	  a	  number	  of	  sources	  are	  commingled	  and	  traded.93	  Nevertheless	  the	   past	   years	   have	   seen	   ample	   evidence	   that	   LNG	   is	   changing	   the	   characteristics	   of	  global	  gas	  markets.	  Whereas	  the	  high	  cost	  of	  transporting	  gas	  had	  previously	  restricted	  trade	   to	   specific	   regions,	   fluctuations	   in	   supply,	   demand	   and	   prices	   are	   increasingly	  being	  transmitted	  throughout	  the	  globe.	  The	  words	  of	  one	  analyst	  capture	  the	  essence	  of	   this	   transformation	   in	   the	  simplest	   terms	  (although	  a	  number	  of	   important	  caveats	  will	  be	  discussed):	  	  
“…natural	   gas	   is	   evolving	   from	   a	   local,	   stationary,	   non-­‐
residential	   commodity,	   into	  a	  mobile,	   international,	  primary	  
product	  similar	  to	  crude	  oil.”94	  The	   vast	   majority	   of	   LNG	   is	   still	   sold	   via	   a	   ‘traditional’	   model:	   under	   long-­‐term,	   oil-­‐indexed,	  take-­‐or-­‐pay	  contracts,	  where	  the	  buyers	  of	  the	  gas	  have	  the	  market	  power	  to	  lay	  off	  some	  of	  the	  market	  risk	  to	  their	  end-­‐use	  customers	  (i.e.	  where	  the	  buyers	  are	  a	  form	  of	  government	  monopoly	  or	  regulated	  public	  utility	  in	  the	  retail	  market).	  In	  order	  to	   spread	   exploration	   risks,	   project	   developers	   are	   normally	   joint	   ventures	   of	  companies	   that	   operate	   as	   if	   they	  were	   shareholders	   in	   a	   corporation,	   rather	   than	   as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  Floating	  LNG	  sees	   liquefaction	   facilities	   installed	  on	   large	  ocean-­‐going	  vessels	   that	  are	  moored	  above	  offshore	  gas	  fields.	  LNG	  and	  other	  products	  are	  then	  loaded	  directly	  on	  to	  carriers	  for	  delivery	  to	  market,	  eliminating	  the	  need	  for	  pipelines	  to	  shore	  or	  land-­‐based	  plants.	  91	  The	  Shell	  floating	  LNG	  vessel	  will	  be	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  at	  the	  Prelude	  field,	  off	  the	  coast	  of	  Western	  Australia,	  for	  an	   anticipated	   deployment	   period	   of	   25	   years	   before	   potentially	   being	   moved	   to	   other	   assets	   in	   the	  region.	  IEA,	  'Golden	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  69,	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  intervention':	  3252.	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  of	  floating	  LNG	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   are	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   expensive	   investments,	   they	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   be	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   an	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   sunken	  infrastructure	  cost	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  a	  pipeline	  or	  onshore	  liquefaction	  plant	  might	  be.	  93	  Jensen,	  'LNG	  Revolution':	  21.	  94	  Kuhn	  and	  Umbach,	  'Strategic	  Perspectives',	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independent	   and	   competitive	   corporate	   entities.	   Competition	   does	   exist	   between	  projects,	  but	  not	  among	  the	  individual	  participants	  in	  the	  project	  itself.95	  This	  traditional	  model,	  however,	   is	  being	  challenged.	  Contract	  terms	  have	  loosened	  on	  both	  price	   and	  volume,	   and	   can	  be	  negotiated	   for	   shorter	  periods	  of	   time	   (see	  Figure	  5-­‐19).96 	  And	   increasingly,	   one	   or	   more	   joint	   venture	   partners	   are	   contracting	   for	  destination-­‐flexible	  volumes	   that	   they	   can	  market	   independently.	  The	  development	  of	  LNG	  projects	  with	  de-­‐integrated	  and	  competitive	  ‘links’	  in	  the	  chain	  over	  the	  last	  decade	  has	   meant	   that	   cross	   shipping	   –	   with	   its	   inherent	   inefficiencies	   –	   has	   become	  increasingly	  common.	  This	  is	  supported	  by	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  uncommitted	  LNG	  carriers	   that	   are	   free	   to	   operate	   in	   the	   short	   term	   market.	   In	   some	   respects,	   the	  transformation	  resembles	  the	  onshore	  gas	  market	  liberalisation	  process	  covered	  earlier	  in	  Sections	  4.2.2	  and	  4.2.3.97	  
Figure	  5-­‐19:	  Short-­‐term	  trading	  in	  LNG98	  
	  The	  Nigerian	  LNG	  project	  at	  Bonny	  Island,	  which	  began	  commercial	  operation	  in	  1999,	  is	  a	  good	  example	  of	  the	  new	  model.	  Although	  the	  first	  three	  trains	  of	  the	  project	  were	  originally	  contracted	  under	  traditional	  terms,	  trains	  4	  and	  5	  were	  contracted	  with	  Shell	  and	  Total	  to	  be	  destination-­‐flexible.	  The	  shift	  towards	  increased	  destination	  flexibility	  is	  also	  reflected	  in	  Atlantic’s	  LNG	  venture	  in	  Trinidad	  and	  the	  Egyptian	  LNG	  development	  east	  of	  Alexandria.	  These	   facilities	   liquefy	  volumes	  of	  gas	   for	  sellers	  at	  a	   fixed	   fee	  (so-­‐called	  LNG	  tolling)	  allowing	  sellers	  to	  then	  market	  this	  LNG	  directly	  to	  buyers.99	  The	   inherent	   physical	   possibility	   of	   flexible	   transport	   with	   LNG	   coupled	   with	   the	  changes	  within	  the	  LNG	  industry	  just	  described	  have	  resulted	  in	  increased	  numbers	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  For	  an	  excellent	  overview,	  see	  Jensen,	  'LNG	  Revolution':	  5.	  96	  EIA,	   'The	   Global	   Liquefied	   Natural	   Gas	   Market:	   Status	   &	   Outlook',	   (Washington,	   DC:	   US	   Energy	  Information	  Administration,	  2003).	  97	  Jensen,	  'LNG	  Revolution':	  5,	  29.	  98	  Including	  contracts	  of	  three	  years	  or	  less.	  Source:	  James	  T.	  Jensen,	  'Fostering	  LNG	  Trade:	  Developments	  in	  LNG	  Trade	  and	  Pricing	  ',	  (Brussels:	  Energy	  Charter	  Secretariat,	  2009).	  	  99	  Ibid.,	  23.	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varying	   and	   more	   complex	   LNG	   trading	   routes.	   Underpinning	   and	   driving	   this	  diversification	   is	   the	   price	   incentive	   to	   move	   natural	   gas	   from	   low	   to	   high-­‐value	  markets.	  High	  prices	  in	  Asia	  and	  Europe	  thus	  represent	  a	  potential	  opportunity	  for	  LNG	  sellers	  who	  are	  able	  to	  undercut	  traditional	  suppliers	  in	  these	  markets.	  This	  process,	  in	  turn,	  contributes	  towards	  gas	  price	  convergence	  across	  the	  various	  regions	  in	  a	  global	  market	  that	  is	  growing	  less	  fragmented.100	  LNG	  cargo	   ‘arbitrage’101	  in	  the	  Atlantic	  Basin	  between	  the	  USA	  and	  continental	  Europe	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  the	  early	  to	  mid-­‐2000s	  following	  the	  start-­‐up	  of	  the	  Trinidad	  and	  Nigerian	   projects. 102 	  The	   Atlantic	   Basin	   currently	   has	   the	   greatest	   proportion	   of	  destination-­‐flexible	  volumes	  –	  a	  full	  41%	  of	  capacity	  in	  2008	  –	  meaning	  that	  supplies	  to	  the	  basin	  (i.e.	  between	  the	  North	  American	  and	  European	  gas	  markets)	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  the	  most	  reactive	  to	  demand	  fluctuations.103	  As	  the	  Middle	  East	  is	  capable	  of	  acting	  as	   a	   swing	   supplier	   to	   both	   the	   Atlantic	   and	   Pacific	   Basins,	   Asian	   LNG	  markets	   have	  become	   increasingly	   involved	   in	   inter-­‐basin	   arbitrage	   following	   the	   addition	   of	   new	  capacity	  in	  the	  region	  from	  2005.	  As	  liquefaction	  capacity	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  grows	  and	  the	   industry	   liberalises,	   Europe	   has	   found	   itself	   in	   an	   interesting	   competitive	   buying	  position	   as	   the	   closest	   major	   LNG	   market	   to	   major	   Middle	   Eastern	   supplies	   i.e.	   the	  market	   with	   the	   lowest	   transportation	   costs	   compared	   with	   competing	   Asian	   or	   US	  destinations.	  104	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  M.	  J.	  Oudeman,	  'Advisory	  letter	  on	  the	  emergence	  of	  unconventional	  gas',	  Letter	  to	  Mr	  M.J.M.	  Verhagen,	  The	  Minister	  for	  Economic	  Affairs,	  Agriculture	  and	  Innovation,	  2011.	  101	  The	  term	  is	  in	  inverted	  commas	  because	  true	  arbitrage	  involves	  the	  simultaneous	  buying	  and	  selling	  of	  the	   same	   product	   in	   different	   markets	   at	   different	   prices.	   In	   spite	   of	   this,	   the	   general	   idea	   of	   taking	  advantage	  of	  a	  price	  difference	  between	  two	  or	  more	  markets	   to	  achieve	  a	  near	  risk-­‐free	  profit	  at	  near	  zero	  cost	  holds.	  102	  Boriss	  Siliverstovs	  et	  al.,	  'International	  Market	  Integration	  for	  Natural	  Gas?	  A	  Cointegration	  Analysis	  of	  Gas	  Prices	   in	  Europe,	  North	  America	  and	  Japan',	   in	  Globalization	  of	  Natural	  Gas	  Markets	  Working	  Papers	  (Berlin:	  Deutsches	  Institut	  für	  Wirtschaftsforschung,	  2004),	  16.	  103	  Jensen,	  'Fostering	  LNG	  Trade',	  23.	  104	  Jensen,	  'LNG	  Revolution':	  16-­‐17,	  21,	  23,	  33;	  Rogers,	  'LNG	  Trade-­‐flows',	  1.	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Figure	  5-­‐20:	  2010	  export	  destinations	  of	  global	  LNG	  swing	  suppliers105	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see	  the	  interregional	  trade	  in	  gas	  growing	  in	  the	  years	  ahead,	  it	  believes	  this	  growth	  will	  only	  be	  gradual	  –	   from	  19%	  of	  all	  gas	  consumed	  in	  2009	  to	  25%	  in	  2035.	  Similarly,	   it	  expects	   considerable	   price	   differences	   between	   the	   US,	   European	   and	   Japanese	   gas	  markets	   to	   persist	   into	   2035,	   despite	   a	   gradual	   trend	   towards	   price	   convergence.109	  Claims	   of	   a	   global	   market	   for	   natural	   gas	   have	   therefore	   been	   downplayed	   as	   “over	  simplistic”	   and	   “at	   best	   premature”	   by	   notable	   observers	   who	   highlight	   that	   the	  inherent	  physical	  characteristics	  of	  the	  commodity	  will	  always	  put	  it	  at	  a	  transportation	  disadvantage	  when	  compared	  with	  oil	  and	  oil	  products,	  dampening	  momentum	  towards	  the	  realisation	  of	  a	  truly	  global	  market.110	  
5.2.3 EU	  Member	  States	  and	  the	  recent	  ‘gas	  glut’	  Although	   the	   three	   major	   regional	   gas	   markets	   are	   increasingly	   connected,	   the	  especially	   strong	   connection	   between	   North	   American	   and	   European	   markets	   in	   the	  Atlantic	   Basin	   was	   clearly	   evident	   in	   the	   coupling	   of	   UK	   and	   US	   hub	   prices	   between	  2009	   and	   2010.111 	  This	   connection	   –	   a	   direct	   product	   of	   rapidly	   increasing	   LNG-­‐receiving	  terminal	  capacity	  in	  North	  West	  Europe	  –	  enabled	  many	  EU	  Member	  States	  to	  benefit	   from	   the	   recent	   natural	   gas	   glut	   resulting	   from	   the	   financial	   crisis	   and	   the	  increased	  unconventional	  gas	  production	  in	  the	  USA.	  
Figure	  5-­‐21:	  Euro	  area	  and	  EU-­‐27	  industrial	  production,	  total	  industry	  excluding	  construction112	  
	  The	  general	  backdrop	  to	  the	  price	  coupling	  seen	  in	  2009-­‐2010	  was	  the	  global	  economic	  crisis,	  which	  caused	  both	  pipeline	  gas	  and	  LNG	  demand	  to	  be	  reduced	  in	  most	  countries	  of	   the	   world.	   Seasonally	   adjusted	   gas	   demand	   data	   for	   OECD	   Europe	   showed	   that	  consumption	   in	  winter	  2009-­‐10	   fell	  back	   to	  2003-­‐2004	   levels	  before	  being	  buoyed	  by	  the	   especially	   cold	   winter	   in	   the	   following	   year.113	  The	   dramatic	   fall	   in	   EU	   industrial	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  109	  IEA,	  'WEO	  2011',	  63,	  93.	  110	  Rogers,	  'LNG	  Trade-­‐flows',	  77;	  Stevens,	  'Hype	  and	  reality',	  6.	  111	  IEA,	  'Oil	  and	  Gas	  Markets',	  158.	  112	  Source:	  Eurostat.	  	  113	  Anouk	   Honoré,	   'Economic	   recession	   and	   natural	   gas	   demand	   in	   Europe:	   what	   happened	   in	   2008-­‐2010?',	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  Institute	  for	  Energy	  Studies,	  2011),	  3.	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production	   that	  was	   the	   source	   of	   this	   sharp	   drop	   in	   demand	   is	   illustrated	   in	   Figure	  5-­‐21.	  The	   slump	   in	   global	   gas	   demand	   coincided	   with	   an	   increasing	   and	   unexpected	  withdrawal	   of	  North	  America	   from	   the	  LNG	  market.	   Figure	  5-­‐22	  below	   shows	   that	   in	  2006	  the	  EIA	  –	  like	  most	  analysts	  –	  was	  expecting	  the	  USA	  to	  import	  increasingly	  larger	  volumes	   of	   LNG	   to	   offset	   falling	   local	   production	   and	   increasing	   consumption.	   As	  recently	  as	  2008,	  the	  administration	  was	  reporting	  in	  its	  Annual	  Energy	  Outlook	  that	  it	  expected	  US	  gas	  markets	  ‘to	  be	  tight	  throughout	  the	  projection	  because	  of	  competition	  for	   LNG	   supplies	   across	   the	   world’.114	  Significant	   investments	   were	   being	   made	   in	  regasification	   facilities	   and	   major	   importers	   of	   gas	   were	   bracing	   themselves	   for	   a	  seller’s	   market	   in	   the	   foreseeable	   future	   in	   spite	   of	   the	   imminent	   large	   increase	   in	  Middle	  Eastern	  liquefaction	  capacity.115	  
Figure	  5-­‐22:	  Forecast	  US	  natural	  gas	  imports116	  
	  Instead,	  total	  year-­‐on-­‐year	  US	  gas	  production	  increased	  by	  4.5%	  in	  2008,	  2.5%	  in	  2009	  and	   then	   again	   by	   3.5%	   in	   2010	   as	   a	   result	   of	   increased	   unconventional	   gas	  production.117	  This	   reduced	  LNG	   import	   requirements	   to	  a	  meagre	   ca.10%	  of	   total	  US	  regasification	  capacity	  during	  that	  period.118	  As	  a	  result	  of	  a	  significant	  proportion	  of	  US	  LNG	   import	   volumes	   being	   flexibly	   sold	   under	   short-­‐term	   contracts, 119 	  the	   USA	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  114	  EIA,	  'AEO	  2008',	  78.	  115	  Oudeman,	  'Advisory	  letter'.	  116	  Source:	   Reference	   scenario	   figures	   from	   successive	   US	   Energy	   Information	   Administration	   Annual	  Energy	  Outlook	  reports,	  2004-­‐2011.	  117	  Source:	  EIA.	  118	  IEA,	  'Oil	  and	  Gas	  Markets',	  14.	  119	  They	   represented	   80%	   of	   US	   trade	   in	   LNG	   in	   2003	   and	   70%	   in	   2004.	   Don	  Maxwell	   and	   Zhen	   Zhu,	  'Natural	   gas	  prices,	  LNG	   transport	   costs,	   and	   the	  dynamics	  of	  LNG	   imports',	  Energy	  Economics	   33,	  no	  2	  (2011):	  220.	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effectively	  became	  “a	   large	  virtual	  gas	  exporter”,	  with	  LNG	  cargoes	  originally	  destined	  for	  US	  shores	  diverted	  to	  other	  customers.120	  
Figure	  5-­‐23:	  US	  natural	  gas	  imports	  and	  exports121	  
	  In	  fact,	  not	  only	  was	  the	  USA	  a	  large	  virtual	  exporter	  of	  natural	  gas,	  but	  its	  actual	  natural	  gas	  exports	  were	  also	  growing	  (see	  Figure	  5-­‐23	  above).	  The	  overwhelming	  majority	  of	  these	   exports	   were	   dispatched	   via	   trunk	   pipelines	   to	   Canada	   and	   Mexico.	   However,	  recently	  released	  data	  also	  reveals	  a	  startling	  two-­‐fold	  jump	  in	  LNG	  exports	  in	  the	  year	  2010	  (Figure	  5-­‐24).	  The	  figures	  are	  made	  even	  more	  surprising	  when	  considering	  some	  of	   the	   new	   export	   destinations	   for	   US	   LNG.	   The	   USA	   had	   only	   one	   operational	   LNG	  liquefaction	  plant	  in	  2010,122	  and	  its	  location	  in	  Alaska	  made	  it	  unsuitable	  for	  supplying	  the	  UK	  and	  Spanish	  markets.	  In	  fact,	  the	  growth	  in	  LNG	  exports	  in	  2010	  was	  driven	  by	  re-­‐exports:	  shipments	  that	  were	  previously	  imported,	  offloaded	  into	  above-­‐ground	  LNG	  storage	   tanks	   at	   regasification	   terminals	   and	   then	   subsequently	   reloaded	   on	   to	   new	  tankers	  for	  delivery	  to	  other	  countries.123	  This	  highly	  irregular	  practice	  is	  a	  testament	  to	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  disruption	  to	  the	  established	  global	  supply	  and	  demand	  equilibrium	  for	  natural	  gas	  during	  the	  period.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  120	  IEA,	  'Oil	  and	  Gas	  Markets',	  181.	  121	  Source:	   EIA,	   'U.S.	   Natural	   Gas	   Imports	   &	   Exports:	   2010',	   (Washington,	   DC:	   US	   Energy	   Information	  Administration,	  2011).	  122	  ConocoPhilips’	  Kenai	  LNG	  plant.	  123	  EIA,	  'Natural	  Gas	  Imports	  &	  Exports'.	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Figure	  5-­‐24:	  US	  LNG	  exports	  and	  gas	  prices124	  
	  On	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  Atlantic,	  newly	  completed	  receiving	  terminals	  in	  Wales,	  France	  and	  Italy	  enabled	  a	  number	  of	  EU	  Member	  States	  to	  absorb	  some	  of	  the	  LNG	  originally	  earmarked	   for	   the	   US	   market	   from	   swing	   suppliers	   such	   as	   Trinidad	   and	   Tobago.	  However,	   combined	  with	   the	   large	   increase	   in	   liquefaction	   capacity	   from	  Qatar,125	  the	  displaced	  US	   supplies	   still	   occasioned	   a	   fall	   in	   European	   spot	   prices	   that	   started	  mid	  2008	   and	   continued	   well	   into	   2009.	   Figure	   5-­‐25	   below	   shows	   that	   the	   world’s	   two	  major	  spot	  markets	  both	  saw	  extremely	  low	  prices	  in	  2009	  ($4/MBtu	  at	  the	  US	  Henry	  Hub	  and	  $5/MBtu	  at	   the	  UK	  National	  Balancing	  Point).126	  It	  also	  reveals	  a	   remarkably	  close	  correlation	  between	   those	   two	  markets	   from	  early	  2009	   to	  early	  2010	  –	  a	  price	  coupling	  that	  was	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  both	  saturated	  supply	  and	  a	  largely	  shared	  pool	  of	  LNG	  suppliers	  that	  were	  able	  to	  feed	  these	  two	  markets.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  124	  Source:	  Ibid.	  125	  105	  bcm	  of	  global	  liquefaction	  capacity	  came	  online	  over	  the	  2009-­‐2010	  timeframe.	  IEA,	  'Oil	  and	  Gas	  Markets',	  170-­‐1.	  126	  Ibid.,	  196.	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Figure	  5-­‐25:	  Henry	  Hub	  and	  National	  Balancing	  Point	  gas	  prices127	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Figure	  5-­‐26:	  Global	  natural	  gas	  prices131	  
	  Looking	  at	  the	  broader	  context,	  Figure	  5-­‐26	  shows	  how	  the	  relationship	  between	  North	  American,	   European	   and	   Japanese	   spot	   prices	   appears	   to	   have	   changed	   since	   2009.	  Before	   that	   time,	   they	   predominantly	   traded	   in	   a	   narrow	  band,	  with	   temporary	   price	  differences	  reflecting	  local	  conditions,	  such	  as	  storage.	  However,	  in	  2009	  and	  2010,	  the	  differences	  have	  grown	  and	  appear	  to	  be	  more	  lasting,	  with	  European	  prices	  hovering	  somewhere	  between	  the	  low	  US	  prices	  and	  higher	  predominantly	  oil-­‐indexed	  Japanese	  LNG	  prices.	  James	  Jensen	  calls	  this	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  bipolar	  gas-­‐pricing	  world,	  where	  Atlantic	  basin	  arbitrage	  puts	  downward	  pressure	  on	  European	  prices.132	  By	   this	  view,	  regional	  gas	  prices	  reflect	  relative	  market	  exposures	  to:	  a)	  the	  unit	  price	  of	  oil	  at	  the	  top	  end:	  and	  b)	  low	  Henry	  Hub	  prices.	  As	  for	  Europe,	  a	  modest	  but	  persistent	  difference	  between	  lower	  NBP	  prices	  and	  higher	  German	   border	   prices	   reflects	   both	   the	   effects	   of	   oil-­‐indexation	   and	   deep	   systemic	  factors	  that	  continue	  to	  hinder	  the	  liberalisation	  of	  the	  EU	  gas	  market.133	  It	  is	  a	  reminder	  that,	  although	  many	  Member	  States	  in	  North	  West	  Europe	  were	  able	  to	  profit	  from	  the	  availability	   of	   cheap	   LNG	   in	   2009	   and	   2010,	   the	   remainder	   of	   the	   continent	   received	  only	   small	   amounts	  of	   that	   additional	   supply	   as	   the	  EU	  gas	   system	  remains	   relatively	  fragmented.	  Buyers	   in	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  paid	  on	  average	  €0.55/MWh	  more	  for	   their	  gas	   than	   their	  Western	  European	  counterparts	   in	  2008,	  a	   figure	   that	   sharply	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  131	  Source:	  BP,	  'Statistical	  review	  2011'.	  Note:	  cif	  =	  cost	  +	  insurance	  +	  freight	  (average	  prices).	  132	  James	  T.	  Jensen,	  'LNG	  -­‐	  Creating	  a	  “World	  Gas	  Market”?'	  (paper	  presented	  at	  the	  MIT	  Energy	  Initiative	  Fall	  Research	  Conference,	  Cambridge,	  Massachusetts,	  2011).	  133	  The	  situation	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing	  is	  foretold	  in	  Frisch,	  'European	  Gas	  Pricing	  Problems',	  14.	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increased	  to	  €	  4.86/MWh	  in	  2009.134	  This	  “two-­‐tier	  price	  system”	  for	  natural	  gas	  in	  the	  EU135	  is	  the	  topic	  of	  the	  next	  section	  of	  this	  report.	  
5.2.4 The	  oil-­‐gas	  price	  link	  With	  the	  physical	  rationale	  for	  oil-­‐indexation	  diminishing,	  the	  increased	  accessibility	  of	  low-­‐priced	  LNG	  imports	  has	  pressured	  gas	  buyers	  into	  renegotiating	  the	  terms	  of	  their	  existing	  oil-­‐indexed	  gas	  purchase	  contracts.	  Progress	   in	   liberalising	  the	  EU	  gas	  market	  has	   been	   a	   key	   enabler	   of	   this	   development	   and	   the	   continual	   removal	   of	   barriers	   to	  accessing	   spot-­‐indexed	   supplies	   in	   Europe	   has	   prompted	   a	   number	   of	   experts	   to	  question	  the	  future	  of	  oil-­‐linked	  gas	  pricing.	  As	  mentioned,	  natural	  gas	  prices	  are	   set	  via	   two	  principal	  mechanisms	   in	   the	  EU.	  Oil-­‐product	  linkage	  was	  established	  in	  the	  1970s	  on	  the	  principle	  that the price of gas should 
generally be competitive with the prices of alternative (non-gas) fuels. The	  economic	  logic	  of	  this	   ‘market	  value	  principle’	  or	   ‘netback’	  pricing	  mechanism	  was	   that	  end-­‐users	  had	  a	  real	  choice	  between	  burning	  gas	  and	  oil	  products,	  and	  would	  switch	  to	  the	  latter	  if	  given	  a	  price	  incentive	  to	  do	  so.136	   To	  this	  day,	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  EU’s	  pipeline-­‐imported	  gas	  remains	  indexed	  to	  the	  price	  of	   oil	   or	   oil	   products	   through	   long-­‐term	   take-­‐or-­‐pay	   contracts	   whose	   terms	   are	  confidential	   to	   the	   buyers	   and	   sellers	   of	   that	   gas.137	  The	   continuing	   rationale	   of	   oil-­‐indexation,	  however,	  is	  being	  increasingly	  questioned	  because	  of	  the	  virtual	  elimination	  of	   oil	   products	   from	  modern	   stationary	   energy	   sectors.	  Whereas	  oil	   is	   still	   the	   fuel	   of	  choice	   in	   the	   transportation	   sector,	   less	   than	  3%	  of	   the	   electricity	   generated	   in	  OECD	  Europe	  comes	  from	  oil,	  a	  figure	  that	  has	  halved	  over	  the	  period	  2000	  to	  2009.138	  A	  number	  of	  factors	  are	  driving	  this	  trend,	  including:	  1)	  rising	  oil	  prices;	  2)	  the	  spread	  of	  more	  efficient	  turbines	  that	  are	  poorly	  suited	  to	  oil	  products;	  3)	  the	  cost	  of	  maintaining	  oil-­‐burning	  equipment	  and	  oil	   stocks;	  and	  4)	   tightening	  environmental	   standards	   that	  penalise	   the	   use	   of	   oil	   as	   a	   fuel.139	  Taken	   together,	   these	   factors	   mean	   that	   there	   is	  almost	  “no	  commercial	  scenario	  in	  which	  users	   installing	  new	  fuel-­‐burning	  equipment	  will	  choose	  to	  use	  oil	  products	  rather	  than	  gas	  in	  stationary	  uses.”140	  With	  gas	  demand	  growth	  in	  Europe	  forecast	  to	  become	  increasingly	  concentrated	  in	  the	  power	  sector,	  the	  logic	   of	   oil-­‐indexation	   seems	   ever	   more	   tenuous	   (although	   see	   Section	   6.3.2	   for	   the	  possibility	  of	  oil-­‐gas	  ‘re-­‐coupling’	  in	  the	  future).141	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  134	  European	  Commission,	  'Non	  paper:	  The	  internal	  energy	  market	  –	  time	  to	  switch	  into	  higher	  gear',	  ed.	  Directorate-­‐General	  for	  Energy	  (2011).	  135	  Frisch,	  'European	  Gas	  Pricing	  Problems',	  1.	  136	  Kanai,	   'Decoupling	   Oil	   and	   Gas	   Prices',	   2;	   Jonathan	   Stern,	   'Continental	   European	   Long-­‐Term	   Gas	  Contracts:	  is	  a	  transition	  away	  from	  oil	  product-­‐linked	  pricing	  inevitable	  and	  imminent?',	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  Institute	   for	   Energy	   Studies,	   2009);	   Jonathan	   Stern,	   'Is	   there	   a	   rationale	   for	   the	   continuing	   link	   to	   oil	  product	  prices	   in	  Continental	  European	   long-­‐term	  gas	  contracts?	   ',	   (Oxford:	  Oxford	   Institute	   for	  Energy	  Studies,	  2007);	  Stern	  and	  Rogers,	  'Transition	  to	  Hub-­‐Based	  Pricing',	  2.	  137	  In	   spite	   of	   this	   confidentiality,	   publicly	   available	   border	   price	   data	   has	   allowed	   the	   key	   variables	   of	  these	  contracts	  to	  be	  inferred	  over	  time.	  138	  IEA,	  'WEO	  2011',	  345.	  139	  Kanai,	   'Decoupling	   Oil	   and	   Gas	   Prices',	   2;	   Stern,	   'European	   Long-­‐Term	   Gas	   Contracts';	   Stern	   and	  Rogers,	  'Transition	  to	  Hub-­‐Based	  Pricing',	  2.	  140	  Stern	  and	  Rogers,	  'Transition	  to	  Hub-­‐Based	  Pricing',	  2.	  141	  See,	  for	  example,	  IEA,	  'Golden	  age',	  22.	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Alternatively,	   gas	   prices	   may	   be	   set	   freely	   by	   the	   forces	   of	   supply	   and	   demand	   for	  natural	   gas	   itself	   –	   not	   oil	   –	   in	   a	   paradigm	   known	   as	   spot	   trading	   or	   gas-­‐to-­‐gas	  competition.	   Spot	   trading	   has	   the	   theoretical	   advantage	   of	   allocating	   resources	   and	  setting	  prices	  more	  efficiently	  than	  oil-­‐indexation.	  This	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  consumer	   prices	   will	   always	   be	   cheaper,142	  but	   by	   allowing	   the	   price	   mechanism	   to	  more	  directly	  incentivise	  gas	  production,	  dampen	  consumption	  and	  reallocate	  physical	  supplies	  when	  supplies	  get	  tighter,	  spot	  pricing	  helps	  to	  ensure	  stable	  and	  sustainable	  prices	  for	  both	  consumers	  and	  producers	  of	  natural	  gas	  (see	  Section	  4.3).	  Spot	  pricing	  has	  become	  prevalent	   in	  an	   increasing	  number	  of	   liberalised	  markets	   the	  world	   over,	   including	   North	   America,	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   and	   Australia.	   The	   IEA	  estimates	  that	  one-­‐third	  of	  the	  world’s	  gas	  may	  be	  priced	  in	  gas-­‐to-­‐gas	  competition.	  In	  spite	   of	   recent	   efforts	   to	   liberalise	   the	   EU	   gas	   market,	   however,	   just	   one	   quarter	   of	  continental	  European	  gas	  is	  spot	  traded.	  Hold-­‐out	  advocates	  of	  oil-­‐indexation	  maintain	  that	  a	  continuing	  lack	  of	  liquidity	  and	  depth	  on	  certain	  EU	  gas	  trading	  hubs	  may	  lead	  to	  excessive	   volatility	   and	   the	   risk	   of	   price	   manipulation.	   Oil-­‐indexation,	   by	   this	   view,	  constrains	  volatility	  through	  averaging	  provisions	  and	  by	  providing	  a	   link	  to	  the	  deep,	  liquid	  and	  global	  market	  for	  oil.143	  	  Until	  recently,	  discussion	  of	  the	  merits	  and	  demerits	  of	  oil-­‐indexation	  in	  Europe	  was,	  to	  some	   extent,	   an	   academic	   exercise.	   The	   market	   power	   of	   many	   sellers	   of	   pipeline-­‐imported	  gas	  meant	  that	  they	  were	  largely	  able	  to	  decide	  the	  terms	  of	  its	  sale	  and	  these	  sellers	  preferred	  oil-­‐indexation.	  However,	  this	  situation	  changed	  as	  the	  gradual	  process	  of	  liberalisation	  impacted	  on	  gas	  market	  structures	  in	  continental	  Europe.	  The	  advent	  of	  competition	   and	   third-­‐party	   access	   means	   that	   customers	   have	   increasing	   access	   to	  alternatives	  to	  the	  oil-­‐linked	  supplies	  once	  forced	  upon	  them	  by	  their	  traditional	  utility	  providers.	   This	   may	   explain	   International	   Gas	   Union	   data	   showing	   that	   the	   relative	  share	  of	  spot	  pricing	  in	  European	  wholesale	  gas	  price	  formation	  increased	  from	  15.5%	  to	   more	   than	   28%	   between	   2005	   and	   2009,	   whereas	   oil	   indexation	   decreased	   from	  79.1%	  to	  67%	  in	  the	  same	  period.144	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  ‘If	  a	  general	  and	  durable	  transition	  to	  more	  spot	  indexed	  prices	  were	  to	  occur,	  the	  result	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  lower	  gas	  prices	  on	  average	  in	  Europe	  in	  the	  near	  to	  medium	  term,	  (at	  least	  for	  some	  types	  of	  consumers)	  while	  spare	  supply	  capacity	  exists	  in	  the	  European	  market.	  But	  in	  the	  long	  term,	  gas	  prices	  could	  actually	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  higher	  at	  certain	  times	  than	  they	  would	  otherwise	  have	  been;	  for	  example,	  strong	  demand	  during	  cold	  winters	  or	  through	  a	  surge	  in	  gas-­‐fired	  power	  demand	  could	  see	  prices	  rise	  steeply.’	  Ibid.,	  76.	  143	  Ibid.,	  72-­‐75.	  144	  Mike	  Fulwood,	  'Trends	  in	  Wholesale	  Gas	  Price	  Formation	  Mechanisms:	  results	  on	  the	  2009	  IGU	  Survey	  ',	   International	   Gas	  Union	  Magazine	   2011,	   International	   Gas	   Union,	   'Wholesale	   Gas	   Price	   Formation:	   A	  global	  review	  of	  drivers	  and	  regional	  trends	  ',	  (Oslo:	  International	  Gas	  Union,	  2011).	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Table	  5-­‐4:	  European	  spot	  gas	  prices	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  oil-­‐indexed	  gas	  prices	  in	  €/MWh145	  	   TTF	  average	   NWE	  GCI	   TTF/GCI	  January	  2011	   22.24	   25.84	   86%	  December	  2010	   24.15	   26.13	   92%	  November	  2010	   19.50	   25.98	   75%	  October	  2010	   18.56	   25.54	   73%	  September	  2010	   18.95	   25.07	   76%	  August	  2010	   18.12	   24.21	   75%	  July	  2010	   19.52	   23.55	   83%	  June	  2010	   19.28	   22.62	   85%	  May	  2010	   16.78	   21.80	   77%	  April	  2010	   13.53	   21.56	   63%	  March	  2010	   11.99	   21.00	   57%	  February	  2010	   13.72	   20.74	   66%	  January	  2010	   14.48	   20.02	   72%	  
Average	  2010	   17.38	   23.19	   75%	  	  With	   legal	   and	   technical	   barriers	   to	   growing	   volumes	   of	   spot-­‐traded	   gas	  disappearing,146	  the	   sharp	   fall	   in	   spot	   prices	  witnessed	   in	   2009	   and	   2010	   occasioned	  widespread	  dissatisfaction	  amongst	   the	  utilities	   locked	   into	  buying	  gas	  on	  oil-­‐indexed	  terms	  as	   they	  were	  gradually	  priced	  out	  of	   the	  market.147	  Table	  5-­‐4	  above	  shows	   that	  spot	  gas	  prices	  on	  the	  Dutch	  TTF	  trading	  hub	  were	  an	  average	  of	  25%	  lower	  than	  oil-­‐indexed	   gas	   prices	   for	  North	  West	   Europe	   over	   2010	   and	   January	   2011.148	  With	   spot	  prices	   so	   low,	   midstream	   gas	   players	   sought	   to	   replace	   as	   much	   of	   their	   oil-­‐indexed	  wholesale	   volumes	   with	   spot	   gas	   as	   was	   possible	   within	   the	   limits	   imposed	   by	  infrastructure	   and	   their	   existing	   take-­‐or-­‐pay	   contracts.	   As	   a	   result	   of	   the	   abundant	  supplies	   on	   the	   spot	  market,	   even	   after	   buyers	   had	   reduced	   their	   nominations	   of	   oil-­‐indexed	   gas	   to	   the	   minimum	   off-­‐take	   limits	   and	   replaced	   the	   difference	   with	   spot	  volumes,	  a	  large	  disparity	  between	  spot	  and	  oil-­‐indexed	  prices	  still	  existed.	  This	  forced	  utilities	  into	  either	  selling	  gas	  to	  consumers	  at	  a	  loss	  or	  being	  undercut	  by	  competitors	  able	  to	  source	  cheaper	  gas	  from	  LNG	  terminals	  or	  the	  UK	  market.149	  Some	  estimates	  put	  pipeline	   imports	   in	   Contract	   Year	   2008/2009	   at	   92%	   of	   take-­‐or-­‐pay	   levels,	   implying	  that	   some	  midstream	   players	  may	   have	   been	   compelled	   to	   risk	   contractual	   penalties	  because	  of	  these	  testing	  market	  conditions.150	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  145	  Note:	   the	   Table	   shows	   TTF	   day-­‐ahead	   prices	   compared	   with	   the	   Platts	   North	   West	   Europe	   Gas	  Contract	  indicator	  (NWE	  GCI),	  which	  indicates	  a	  typical	  price	  for	  long-­‐term	  oil-­‐indexed	  supplies.	  The	  final	  column	   shows	   TTF	   as	   a	   percentage	   of	   NWE	   GCI.	   Source:	   Stern	   and	   Rogers,	   'Transition	   to	   Hub-­‐Based	  Pricing',	  5.	  146	  Physically	   traded	   volumes	   on	   the	   seven	   continental	   spot	  markets	   –	   Zeebrugge	   (Belgium),	   TTF	   (the	  Netherlands),	   NCG	   (Germany),	   Gaspool	   (Germany),	   PEG	   (France),	   PSV	   (Italy)	   and	   CEGH	   (Austria)	   –	  increased	  from	  just	  over	  100	  bcm	  in	  2007	  to	  almost	  300	  bcm	  in	  2009.	  IEA,	  'WEO	  2010',	  207.	  147	  Rogers,	  'LNG	  Trade-­‐flows',	  1;	  Stern	  and	  Rogers,	  'Transition	  to	  Hub-­‐Based	  Pricing',	  33.	  ‘The	  advances	  in	  gas	  market	   liberalisation	  currently	  being	   implemented	   in	  Europe	  at	   large,	  but	   in	  Germany	   in	  particular	  are	  playing	  an	  important	  part	  in	  creating	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  European	  gas	  market	  environment	  which	  can	  now	  be	  observed.’	  Frisch,	  'European	  Gas	  Pricing	  Problems'.	  148	  For	  an	  in-­‐depth	  overview,	  see	  also	  European	  Commission,	  '2009-­‐2010	  Report	  on	  progress	  in	  creating	  the	   internal	   gas	   and	   electricity	   market',	   ed.	   Directorate-­‐General	   for	   Energy	   (Luxembourg:	   Office	   for	  Official	  Publications	  of	  the	  European	  Communities,	  2011).	  149	  For	  a	  more	  complete	  explanation	  of	  this	  process,	  see	  Rogers,	  'LNG	  Trade-­‐flows',	  24.	  150	  Stern	  and	  Rogers,	  'Transition	  to	  Hub-­‐Based	  Pricing',	  23.	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Understandably,	   the	   situation	   placed	   enormous	   pressure	   on	   utilities	   facing	   the	   rapid	  erosion	  of	   their	  market	  share.	  Caught	  between	  their	   long-­‐term	  contractual	  obligations	  and	  pressure	  from	  their	  (principally	  industrial)	  customers	  to	  supply	  cheaper	  gas,	  these	  utilities	   have	   in	   turn	   pressed	   their	   suppliers	   for	   contract	   renegotiations	   on	   price	   and	  volumes.151	  As	  Howard	  Rogers	  writes,	  Europe’s	  newfound	  ability	  to	  substitute	  pipeline	  imports	   with	   cheaper	   LNG	   had	   partially	   undermined	   the	   ‘national	   incumbent’	   gas	  purchaser	  in	  Europe.152	  Exemplifying	  this	  point,	  Dr	  Bernhard	  Reutersberg,	  the	  chairman	  of	   E.ON	   Ruhrgas,	   made	   a	   strong	   and	   public	   plea	   to	   adapt	   long-­‐term	   contracts	   to	   the	  changed	  circumstances	  in	  October	  2009.153	  In	  response,	  suppliers	  such	  as	  GasTerra,	  Statoil	  and,	  in	  the	  end,	  Gazprom	  made	  several	  concessions	  to	  their	  customers.	  Sources	  suggest	  that	  several	  companies	  were	  allowed	  to	  ‘roll	   over’	   volumes	  not	   taken	  below	  minimum	   take-­‐or-­‐pay	   levels	   to	   future	   years.	   GDF	  Suez,	  Distrigas	  and	  Swissgas	  were	  granted	  a	  partial	  decoupling	   from	  oil-­‐based	  pricing	  by	  GasTerra	  during	  their	  2009	  contract	  extension	  negotiations,	  and	  Statoil’s	  customers	  were	  allowed	  to	  link	  up	  to	  25%	  of	  their	  volumes	  to	  spot	  prices	  in	  early	  2010.	  It	  was	  only	  in	  February	  2010	  that	  Gazprom	  and	  E.ON	  Ruhrgas	  announced	  that	  they	  had	  agreed	  on	  linking	  15%	  of	  their	  volumes	  to	  spot	  prices	  for	  the	  following	  three	  years.154	  Rebounding	  crude	   prices	   in	   2010	  will	   have	   buoyed	  Gazprom’s	   revenues,	   but	   figures	   from	   the	   IEA	  reveal	   that	   its	  hard-­‐line	   strategy	  on	  oil-­‐indexation	  may	  have	  cost	   it	   in	   the	   longer	   run:	  Gazprom’s	  share	  of	  EU	  gas	  imports	  declined	  a	  substantial	  4%	  in	  2010	  as	  it	  gradually	  lost	  market	  share	  to	  competitors	  more	  willing	  to	  spot-­‐index	  their	  pricing	  formulas.155	  	  The	  steady	  recovery	  of	  European	  hub	  prices	  since	  then	  has	  made	  the	  benefits	  of	  spot-­‐indexation	   less	   apparent,	   blunting	   the	   immediate	   competitive	   challenge	   to	   oil-­‐indexation.	  In	  spite	  of	  this	  “near-­‐term	  illusion	  of	  stability”,	  however,	  the	  current	  balance	  of	   expert	   opinion	   suggests	   that	   the	   EU	   will	   move	   slowly	   away	   from	   oil-­‐indexation	  because	   of	   the	   persisting	   risk	   of	   future	   exposure	   to	   discount	   hub	   prices.156	  Jonathan	  Stern	   has	   been	   one	   of	   the	   most	   prominent	   advocates	   of	   this	   view.	   In	   2007,	   he	  questioned	  the	  rationale	  of	  the	  continuing	  linkage	  of	  prices	  in	  long-­‐term	  gas	  contracts	  to	  those	   of	   oil	   products.157	  Then,	   in	   2009,	   he	   argued	   that	   a	   transition	   away	   from	   oil	  product-­‐related	   pricing	   was	   inevitable	   and	   imminent,	   and	   that	   the	   endpoint	   of	   the	  transition	  would	  be	  hub-­‐based	  prices.158	  Commenting	  on	  poll	  results	  showing	  that	  only	  16%	   of	   respondents	   at	   the	   2010	   European	   Autumn	   Gas	   Conference	   agreed	   to	   the	  proposition	  that	  recent	  pricing	  and	  contractual	  changes	  towards	  spot-­‐indexation	  were	  temporary,	  Stern	  wrote:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  151	  IEA,	  'Oil	  and	  Gas	  Markets',	  195.	  152	  Rogers,	  'LNG	  Trade-­‐flows',	  1.	  153	  Bernhard	  Reutersberg,	  'Key	  issues	  to	  Address	  Sustainabie	  Supply	  and	  Demand	  of	  Natural	  Gas'	  (paper	  presented	   at	   the	   24th	  World	  Gas	   Conference,	   Buenos	  Aires	   2009).	   See	   also	  Klaus	   Schäfer,	   'Natural	   gas	  markets	   in	  Europe	   -­‐	  Challenges	  and	  developments'	   (paper	  presented	  at	   the	  ONS	  2010	   -­‐	   Secure	  Sustain	  Supply	  Stavanger,	  2010).	  154IEA,	  'Oil	  and	  Gas	  Markets',	  200,	  Kanai,	  'Decoupling	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  Prices',	  3;	  Stern	  and	  Rogers,	  'Transition	  to	  Hub-­‐Based	  Pricing',	  26.	  155	  IEA,	  'WEO	  2011',	  345.	  156	  Jensen,	   'Creating	  a	   “World	  Gas	  Market”?'.	   See	  also	  Frisch,	   'European	  Gas	  Pricing	  Problems',	  1;	  Kanai,	  'Decoupling	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  Prices',	  39;	  Oudeman,	  'Advisory	  letter'.	  157	  Stern,	  'Continuing	  link	  to	  oil	  product	  prices'.	  158	  Stern,	  'European	  Long-­‐Term	  Gas	  Contracts'.	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“What	   we	   are	   observing	   here	   is	   a	   fundamental	   mindset	  
change	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  traditional	  buyers	  from	  one	  which	  
was	   appropriate	   for	   those	   in	   a	   dominant	   position	   with	   a	  
relatively	   captive	  market,	   to	   one	  which	   increasingly	   reflects	  
the	  competitive	  environment	  of	  access	  to	  liquid	  gas	  hubs	  and	  
the	  trading	  culture	  of	  European	  utilities.”159	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  159	  Stern	  and	  Rogers,	  'Transition	  to	  Hub-­‐Based	  Pricing',	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6 The	   potential	   impact	   of	   shale	   gas	   on	   the	   global	   energy	  
system	  	  
F.	  Gracceva	  and	  P.	  Zeniewski	  (European	  Commission,	  JRC	  F.3)	  The	  relative	  strengths	  of	  natural	  gas	  in	  comparison	  with	  other	  fossil	  fuels	  have	  recently	  been	   emphasised	   by	   a	   number	   of	   notable	   studies.1	  In	   fact,	   many	   of	   the	   uncertainties	  facing	   the	   energy	   system	   as	   a	   whole	   can	   potentially	   be	   considered	   opportunities	   for	  natural	  gas,	   i.e.	   climate	  change	  policies,	   the	  need	   for	  back-­‐up	   fossil	   fuel	   for	   renewable	  energy	  and	  so	  on.	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  use	  an	  energy	  system	  analysis	  approach	  to	   explore	   the	   uncertainties	   surrounding	   the	   future	   of	   natural	   gas,	   with	   a	   particular	  focus	  on	  the	  role	  shale	  gas	  can	  play	  in	  this	  wider	  perspective.	  It	  will	  attempt	  to	  answer	  the	  following	  questions:	  	  
• How	   much	   does	   the	   purported	   golden	   age	   of	   natural	   gas	   depend	   on	   the	  development	  of	  unconventional	  gas,	  and	  shale	  gas	  in	  particular?	  	  
• In	  what	  ways	  will	   the	  energy	  system	  be	  affected	  with	  or	  without	  significant	  shale	  gas	  production?	  	  
• What	  conditions	  would	  permit	  shale	  gas	  to	  gain	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  the	  future	  energy	  system,	  up	  to	  the	  point	  of	  becoming	  a	  ‘game	  changer’?	  To	   answer	   these	   questions,	   the	   authors	   present	   not	   a	   forecast	   or	   projection	   but	   an	  
exploration	   of	   uncertainty	   around	   the	   future	   of	   shale	   gas.	   Indeed,	   the	   potential	   for	  development	  and	  production	  of	  this	  resource	  cannot	  be	  considered	  in	  isolation	  from	  the	  existing	   fuels,	   trade	   flows,	   technologies	   and	   infrastructures	   that	   make	   up	   the	   global	  energy	  system.	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  shale	  gas	  can	  meaningfully	  penetrate	  this	  system	  is	  contingent	   on	   the	   dynamic	   interactions	   of	   a	   considerable	   number	   of	   supply-­‐	   and	  demand-­‐side	  drivers	  and	  techno-­‐economic	  developments.	  	  The	  methodological	  approach	  followed	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  a	  two-­‐step	  analysis	  carried	  out	  from	  an	  energy	  system	  perspective.	  First,	  we	  select	  the	  key	  factors	  affecting	  future	  gas	  supply	   and	   demand	   and,	   as	   a	   corollary,	   the	   pace	   and	   scale	   of	   unconventional	   gas	  development.	   A	   discussion	   of	   these	   factors	   will	   be	   rendered	   into	   a	   set	   of	   workable	  assumptions	  on	  what	  can	  be	  considered	   the	  primary	  determinants	  of	   future	  shale	  gas	  development.	   In	   particular,	   we	   focus	   on	   the	   size	   and	   production	   costs	   of	   shale	   gas	  resources,	  as	  well	  as	  global	  economic	  growth	  as	  a	  driver	  of	  energy	  demand.	  A	  similar	  analysis	  was	   recently	   carried	   out	   by	   the	   IEA2;	  the	   key	   similarities	   and	  differences	   are	  elaborated	  in	  Annex	  I.	  A	   model	   is	   then	   used	   to	   construct	   a	   set	   of	   possible	   scenarios	   for	   future	   shale	   gas	  development.	  The	  different	   trajectories	  borne	  out	  by	   these	   scenarios	  will	   be	  analysed	  and	  compared,	  with	  a	  particular	  focus	  on	  three	  main	  outputs	  –	  production,	  interregional	  trade	   and	   final	   use.	   In	   doing	   so,	   it	   is	   hoped	   that	   light	  will	   be	   shed	   on	   the	   conditions	  under	  which	  shale	  gas	  can	  be	  integrated	  into	  the	  global	  energy	  system.3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  For	  example,	  see	  IEA,	  'Golden	  age'.	  2	  IEA,	  'Golden	  Rules	  for	  a	  Golden	  Age	  of	  Gas',	  in	  World	  Energy	  Outlook	  (Paris:	  OECD	  2012).	  3	  Despite	  striving	  for	  a	  systemic	  treatment	  of	  factors	  affecting	  shale	  gas	  development,	  it	  is	  invariably	  the	  case	   that	   not	   all	   of	   them	   can	   be	   considered.	   Aspects	   such	   as	   environmental	   impacts	   or	   legal	   and	  regulatory	  issues	  are	  not	  considered	  in	  the	  present	  analysis.	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As	  the	  model	  used	  in	  the	  analysis	  divides	  Europe	  into	  Eastern	  and	  Western	  parts	  (EEU	  and	  WEU),	  any	  reference	  to	  ‘Europe’	  as	  a	  whole	  in	  the	  subsequent	  text	  will	  be	  taken	  to	  mean	  the	  sum	  of	  all	  of	  the	  countries	  in	  these	  two	  groupings	  (see	  Box	  6-­‐1	  below).	  	  
Box	  6-­‐1:	  ETSAP-­‐TIAM	  and	  its	  main	  characteristics	  The	  ETSAP-­‐TIMES	  Integrated	  Assessment	  (ETSAP-­‐TIAM)	  model	  is	  a	  multi-­‐region	  partial	  equilibrium	  model	  of	  the	  energy	  systems	  of	  the	  entire	  world	  divided	  in	  several	  regions,	  linked	  by	  trade	  variables	  of	  the	  main	  energy	  forms	  (coal,	  oil,	  gas)	  and	  of	  emission	  permits.	  It	  has	  been	  initially	  developed	  and	  is	   maintained	   by	   the	   Energy	   Technology	   Systems	   Analysis	   Programme	   (ETSAP),	   a	   consortium	   of	  member	  country	  teams	  that	  maintain	  and	  expand	  the	  analytical	  capabilities	  of	  the	  MARKAL/TIMES	  family	  of	  models.3	  These	  models	  are	  used	  by	  diverse	  institutions,	  such	  as	  the	  IEA	  and	  EIA,	  to	  generate	  in-­‐depth	  national	  and	  multi-­‐country	  analyses	  of	  energy	  systems	  several	  decades	  into	  the	  future.	  The	  ETSAP-­‐TIAM	  model	  used	  in	  this	  assessment	  is	  the	  version	  distributed	  to	  the	  ETSAP	  partners	  (such	  as	  DG	   JRC)	   in	   April	   2011,	   then	   further	   developed	   by	   JRC	   towards	   a	   more	   detailed	   and	   updated	  representation	  of	  the	  global	  gas	  market.	  The	  ETSAP-­‐TIAM	  model	  used	   in	  this	  assessment	  contains	  detailed	  descriptions	  of	   technologies	  and	  energy	   flows	   used	   in	   all	   the	   different	   sectors	   of	   the	   energy	   system	   –	   e.g.	   residential,	   industrial,	  agricultural,	   etc..	   The	   interaction	   of	   these	   variables,	  which	   number	   in	   the	  millions,	   is	   driven	   by	   an	  underlying	   mathematical	   structure;	   in	   a	   process	   of	   linear	   optimisation	   an	   intertemporal	   dynamic	  partial	   equilibrium	   on	   energy	  markets	   is	   computed.	   The	  model	   chooses	   energy	   supply	   services	   at	  minimum	   global	   cost	   by	   simultaneously	   making	   decisions	   on	   equipment	   investment,	   equipment	  operation,	  primary	  energy	  supply	  and	  energy	  trade.4	  By	  incorporating	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  energy	  supply	  chain,	  TIMES	  is	  a	  vertically-­‐integrated	  model	  of	  the	  entire	  energy	  system.	  	  The	   ETSAP-­‐TIAM	   model	   is	   particularly	   amenable	   to	   exploring	   possible	   long-­‐term	   energy	   futures	  based	  on	  different	  sets	  of	  assumptions	  –	  or	  scenarios	  –	  about	  the	  future	  drivers	  of	  the	  energy	  system.	  This	   makes	   it	   particularly	   amenable	   to	   exploring	   possible	   long-­‐term	   energy	   futures	   based	   on	  different	   sets	   of	   assumptions	   –	   or	   scenarios	   –	   about	   the	   future	   drivers	   of	   the	   energy	   system.	  Beginning	  with	  a	  base	  year,	  in	  this	  case	  2005,	  the	  model	  is	  furnished	  with	  real	  data	  on	  the	  processes,	  commodities	  and	  flows	  making	  up	  the	  energy	  economy.	  Countries	  are	  grouped	  into	  15	  regions.	  For	  each	   region	   ETSAP-­‐TIAM	   contains	   explicit	   descriptions	   of	   more	   than	   1	  000	   technologies	   and	   100	  commodities	   (energy	   forms,	   materials,	   emissions),	   logically	   interrelated	   in	   a	   Reference	   Energy	  System	  covering	  extraction,	  processing,	  conversion,	  trading	  and	  end-­‐uses	  of	  all	  energy	  forms.	  Logical	  inter-­‐relationships	  exist	  between:	  
• Technologies	   (or	  processes):	   these	   represent	  physical	  devices	   that	   transform	  commodities	  into	   other	   commodities.	   There	   are	   primary	   processes	   that	   come	   directly	   from	   the	   source	  (e.g.	   upstream	   or	   imports	   of	   gas)	   or	   processes	   that	   transform	   these	   commodities	   (e.g.	  refineries	  that	  produce	  oil	  products);	  
• Commodities:	   these	   are	   energy	   carriers,	   energy	   services,	   materials,	   monetary	   flows	   and	  emissions.	   A	   commodity	   is	   generally	   produced	   by	   some	   process(es)	   and/or	   consumed	   by	  other	  process(es);	  
• Flows:	  this	   is	  the	  amount	  of	  a	  given	  commodity	  produced	  or	  consumed	  by	  a	  given	  process.	  For	  example,	  natural	  gas	  is	  a	  commodity,	  whereas	  natural	  gas	  for	  combined	  cycle	  turbine	  is	  a	  commodity	  flow.5	  Trade	  variables	  of	  energy	  commodities	  (and	  of	  emission	  permits)	  link	  the	  regions,	  permitting	  energy	  forms	  such	  as	  coal,	  crude	  oil,	  petroleum	  products	  and	  gas/LNG	  to	  be	  endogenously	  traded.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  www.iea-­‐etsap.org	  4Loulou	  and	  Labriet,	  'ETSAP	  TIAM'.	  5Ibid.:	  14.	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AFR	   Algeria,	   Angola,	   Benin,	   Botswana,	   Cameroon,	   Congo,	  Democratic	  Republic	   of	   Congo,	   Egypt,	  Eritrea,	  Ethiopia,	  Gabon,	  Ghana,	  Ivory	  Coast,	  Kenya,	  Libya,	  Morocco,	  Mozambique,	  Namibia,	  Nigeria,	  Senegal,	   South	   Africa,	   Sudan,	   United	   Republic	   of	   Tanzania,	   Togo,	   Tunisia,	   Zambia,	   Zimbabwe	   and	  Other	  Africa.	  
AUS	   Australia,	  New	  Zealand,	  Oceania	  
CAN	   Canada	  
CHI	   China	  
CSA	   Argentina,	  Bolivia,	  Brazil,	  Chile,	  Colombia,	  Costa	  Rica,	  Cuba,	  Dominican	  Republic,	  Ecuador,	  El	  Salvador,	   Guatemala,	  Haiti,	   Honduras,	   Jamaica,	  Netherlands	  Antilles,	  Nicaragua,	   Panama,	   Paraguay,	  Peru,	  Trinidad	  and	  Tobago,	  Uruguay,	  Venezuela	  and	  Other	  Latin	  America	  
EEU	   Albania,	   Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina,	   Bulgaria,	   Croatia,	   Czech	   Republic,	   Hungary,	   Macedonia,	  Montenegro,	  Poland,	  Romania,	  Serbia	  (Kosovo),	  Slovenia,	  Slovakia	  
FSU	   Armenia,	  Azerbaidjian,	  Belarus,	  Estonia,	  Georgia,	  Kazakhstan,	  Kyrgyzstan,	  Latvia,	  Lithuania,	  Moldova,	  Tajikistan,	  Turkmenistan,	  Ukraine,	  Uzbekistan,	  Russian	  Federation	  
IND	   India	  
JPN	   Japan	  
MEA	   Bahrain,	   Islamic	  Republic	  of	   Iran,	   Iraq,	   Israel,	   Jordan,	  Kuwait,	  Lebanon,	  Oman,	  Qatar,	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  Syria,	  United	  Arab	  Emirates,	  Yemen	  and	  Turkey,	  Cyprus	  
MEX	   Mexico	  
ODA	   Bangladesh,	  Brunei	  Darussalam,	  Cambodia,	  Chinese	  Taipei,	   Indonesia,	  Democratic	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  Korea,	  Malaysia,	  Mongolia,	  Myanmar,	  Nepal,	  Pakistan,	  Philippines,	  Singapore,	  Sri	  Lanka,	  Thailand,	  Vietnam	  and	  Other	  Asia	  
SKO	   South	  Korea	  
USA	   United	  States	  of	  America	  
WEU	   Austria,	  Belgium,	  Cyprus,	  Denmark,	  Finland,	  France,	  Germany,	  Greece,	  Iceland,	  Ireland,	  Italy,	  Luxembourg,	  Malta,	  Netherlands,	  Norway,	  Portugal,	  Spain,	  Sweden,	  Switzerland,	  United	  Kingdom	  As	   a	   partial	   equilibrium	   model,	   ETSAP-­‐TIAM	   is	   vulnerable	   to	   the	   standard	   criticisms	   of	   the	  simplifying	  assumptions	  made	  in	  economics.	  For	  example,	  linear	  optimisation	  means	  that	  the	  system	  chooses	   technologies	   that	   are	   most	   cost-­‐effective,	   unencumbered	   by	   endogenous	   political	   or	  socioeconomic	   constraints.	   However,	   even	   if	   the	  model	   assumes	   competitive	   energy	  markets	  with	  perfect	  foresight,	  its	  choice	  of	  fuels,	  technologies,	  investments	  and	  trade	  patterns	  is,	  in	  fact,	  subject	  to	  many	  constraints,	  such	  as	  supply	  bounds	  (in	  the	   form	  of	  supply	  curves)	   for	   the	  primary	  resources;	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technical	   constraints	   governing	   the	   creation;	   operation	   and	   abandonment	   of	   each	   technology;	  balance	   constraints	   for	   all	   energy	   forms	   and	   emissions;	   timing	   of	   investment	   payments	   and	   other	  cash	  flows;	  and	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  a	  set	  of	  demands	  for	  energy	  services	  in	  all	  sectors	  of	  the	  economy.	  (Energy	   demand	   is	   endogenous,	   whereas	   energy	   service	   demand	   is	   exogenous	   –	   aspects	   such	   as	  passenger	  kilometres	  or	  residential	  space	  heat,	  which	  are	  projected	  by	  a	  set	  of	  drivers	  such	  as	  GDP	  growth	  and	  population,	  number	  of	  households	  and	  sectoral	  outputs.)	  It	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  no	  modelling	  effort	  can	  lay	  claim	  to	  a	  completely	  accurate	  or	  even	  comprehensive	   account	   of	   the	   energy	   system,	   let	   alone	   provide	   a	   fully	   defensible	   prediction	   of	   its	  future.	   Thus,	   the	   main	   goal	   of	   using	   the	   ETSAP-­‐TIAM	   model	   is	   not	   to	   forecast	   the	   future	   but	   to	  explore	   the	  possibilities	  presented	  by	  shale	  gas	   in	  ways	   that	   can	  support	  decision-­‐making.	  Used	   in	  this	  way,	  the	  ETSAP-­‐TIAM	  model	  is	  an	  appropriate	  and	  powerful	  tool	  of	  analysis	  for	  considering	  the	  broader	  trends	  affecting	  the	  future	  global	  energy	  mix.	  	  
6.1 Key	  factors	  for	  shale	  gas	  development	  Energy	  markets	  are	  subject	   to	  much	  uncertainty,	  as	  many	  of	   the	  events	  shaping	   them	  cannot	  be	  anticipated	  and	  future	  developments	  in	  technologies	  and	  resources	  cannot	  be	  foreseen	  with	   certainty.	  To	  understand	   the	  potential	   impact	  of	  unconventional	  gas	  on	  energy	  markets	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  take	  into	  consideration	  the	  key	  uncertainties	  that	  can	  be	   considered	   pivotal	   for	   determining	   upper	   and	   lower	   bounds	   of	   future	   shale	   gas	  development.	  These	  factors	  can	  be	  categorised	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  natural	  gas	  supply	  chain	  –	  i.e.	   upstream	   exploration	   and	   production,	   mid	   and	   downstream	   processing	   and	  transport,	  and,	  finally,	  end	  use.	  In	  the	  following,	  a	  set	  of	  key	  factors	  are	  briefly	  discussed.	  For	  each	  of	  them	  a	  reasonable	  area	  of	  uncertainty	  is	  defined	  in	  a	  quantitative	  manner,	  by	   setting	   in	   a	   transparent	   way	   reference	   figures	   and	   lower	   and	   upper	   bounds.	   The	  ways	   in	   which	   these	   different	   figures	   can	   impact	   on	   the	   energy	   system	   have	   been	  explored	  through	  the	  ETSAP-­‐TIAM	  model.	  
6.1.1 Upstream	  natural	  gas	  resources	  and	  cost	  
Conventional	  and	  unconventional	  gas	  resources	  Unconventional	  gas	   includes	  tight	  gas,	  coal-­‐bed	  methane	  and	  shale	  gas.	  The	  prevailing	  literature	   suggests	   that	   the	   latter	   currently	  has	   the	  most	   significant	   growth	  prospects	  because	   new	   technologies	   have	   enabled	   economically	   viable	   extraction	   of	   gas	   from	  permeable	   shale	   reservoirs.	   This	   report	   has	   provided	   a	   range	   of	   estimates	   on	   the	  technically	   recoverable	   resource	   base	   of	   shale	   gas.	   This	   is	   one	   of	   the	   key	   input	  assumptions	   used	   in	   the	   scenario	   analysis.	   The	   figure	   below	   summarises	   the	   data	  collected	  in	  Chapter	  2.	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Figure	  6-­‐1:	  Assumptions	  on	  the	  global,	  technically	  recoverable	  reserves	  of	  shale	  gas	  
	  It	  is	  useful	  to	  consider	  these	  unconventional	  gas	  resource	  estimates	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  world’s	   existing	   conventional	   gas	   reserves.	   Figure	   6-­‐2	   below	   reveals	   that	   the	   Former	  Soviet	  Union	  (FSU)	  and	   the	  Middle	  East	  region	  retain	   the	   largest	  conventional	  natural	  gas	   reserves.	   Russia	   in	   particular	   possesses	   a	   vast	   potential	   for	   expanding	   and	  developing	   its	  conventional	  reserves,	  which	  are	  remotely	   located	  and	  underdeveloped	  (such	  as	  in	  the	  Yamal	  Peninsula	  or	  other	  parts	  of	  eastern	  Siberia).	  Hence,	  the	  projected	  increase	  in	  exports	  from	  these	  two	  regions	  is	  a	  significant	  consideration	  when	  gauging	  the	   future	   penetration	   of	   indigenous	   unconventional	   gas,	   particularly	   in	   import-­‐dependent	  regions	  such	  as	  Europe.	  The	  increase	  in	  exports	  from	  the	  FSU	  and	  the	  Middle	  East,	   in	   turn,	   relies	  on	  capacity	  constraints	  and	  the	  price	  differential	  between	   imports	  and	  potential	  indigenous	  production.	  In	  Europe	  it	  is	  down	  to	  developments	  in	  regional	  gas	   pricing,	   competition	   from	   other	   markets	   and	   the	   corresponding	   expansion	   of	  flexible	  LNG	  cargoes,	  which	  will	  crucially	  affect	  the	  quantities	  of	  gas	  bought	  under	  long-­‐term	  piped	  gas	  contracts.	  	  Finally,	   other	   unconventional	   fuels	   may	   look	   set	   to	   add	   to	   the	   global	   reserve	   base;	  unconventional	   oil	   resources,	   including	   extra-­‐heavy	   oil	   and	   kerogen	   oil,	   have	   a	   large	  potential;	   however,	   many	   technical,	   commercial	   and	   political	   obstacles	   need	   to	   be	  overcome	  before	  they	  can	  be	  fully	  developed.6	  The	  systemic	  approach	  adopted	  here	  for	  the	   scenario	   analysis	   means	   that,	   even	   if	   the	   specific	   uncertainty	   surrounding	  unconventional	   oil	   is	   not	   explored	   here,	   any	   of	   the	   following	   scenarios	   takes	   into	  account	  the	  potential	  competition	  between	  unconventional	  oil	  and	  unconventional	  gas.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  IEA,	  'WEO	  2011'.	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Figure	  6-­‐2:	  Global	  conventional	  gas	  reserves	  (recoverable,	  enhanced	  recovery	  and	  new	  discovery)	  
	  
Conventional	  and	  unconventional	  gas	  production	  costs	  The	  assumptions	  about	  the	  costs	  of	  producing	  conventional	  gas	  resources	  by	  2020	  are	  noted	   in	   Figure	   6-­‐3,	   taking	   into	   account	   the	   variable	   costs	   of	   exploiting	   existing	  reserves,	  as	  well	  as	  developing	  new	  fields.	  	  Shale	  gas	  production	  costs	  have	  been	  discussed	  in	  Section	  5.1,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  Clearly	   there	   is	   much	   variation	   in	   the	   costs	   of	   finding,	   developing	   and	   producing	  unconventional	  gas,	  which	  depend	  on	  prevailing	  market	  conditions,	  the	  characteristics	  of	   the	  well,	   the	   regulatory	   context	   and	   the	   profile	   of	   the	   operating	   company.	   For	   the	  scenario	  analysis,	  the	  cost	  estimations	  have	  been	  based	  partly	  on	  the	  analysis	  of	  other	  sources	  provided	   in	   Section	  5.1.4	   and	  partly	   from	   the	   final	   cost	   assumptions	  made	   in	  Section	  3.3.	  The	  caveats	  and	  assumptions	  made	  for	  these	  figures	  have	  been	  discussed	  in	  the	   relevant	   section	   and	   need	   not	   be	   elaborated	   upon	   here.	   The	   conservative,	   most	  likely	  and	  optimistic	  estimates	  were	  respectively	  employed	  in	  ten-­‐year	  intervals	  (2010-­‐2030)	  to	  capture	  the	  reduction	  in	  costs	  attributed	  to	  technological	  development.	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Figure	  6-­‐3:	  Conventional	  gas	  production	  cost	  estimates	  in	  20207	  
	  
Table	  6-­‐1:	  Total	  unit	  production	  cost	  per	  shale	  gas	  well	  in	  Europe	  without	  liquids	  
€/GJ	   Optimistic	   Most	  likely	   Conservative	  
2010	   4.56	   7.22	   20.78	  
2020	   3.23	   5.24	   15.40	  
2030	   2.68	   4.42	   13.17	  	  To	  better	  capture	  regional	  differences	  in	  production	  costs,	  the	  authors	  have	  constructed	  a	   modifying	   factor	   based	   on	   the	   EIA’s	   Financial	   Reporting	   System	   (FRS),	   which	   is	   a	  statistical	   database	   on	   the	   functional	   and	   financial	   performance	   of	   major	   US	   energy-­‐producing	  companies,	  including	  their	  operations	  abroad.8	  Data	  on	  the	  upstream	  cost	  of	  finding,	  developing	  and	  producing	  gas	  and	  oil	  wells	  were	  used	  to	  derive	  a	  total	  per-­‐unit	  production	   cost	   for	   the	   six	   regions	   for	  which	   data	   is	   available	   (see	   Table	   6-­‐2).	   These	  were	   compared	   against	   a	   European	   base	   case	   to	   construct	   multipliers	   for	   these	  respective	  regions.	  The	  rationale	  for	  using	  this	  dataset	  is	  that	  the	  expertise	  of	  US	  drilling	  and	   service	   companies	   is	   currently	   a	   key	   ingredient	   for	   initially	   exploring	   shale	   gas	  resources	  in	  regions	  of	  interest.	  Most	  of	  the	  companies	  reporting	  through	  the	  FRS	  have	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  The	   average	   is	   the	  mean	   value	   of	   the	  minimum	   and	  maximum	   costs	   of	   exploiting	   three	   categories	   of	  reserves:	   recoverable,	   enhanced	   recover,	   and	   undiscovered/new	   discovery	   For	   each	   category,	   a	   three-­‐step	  supply	  curve	  is	  assumed,	  where	  the	  minimum	  cost	  is	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  lowest	  step	  of	  the	  supply	  curve	  for	  recoverable	  reserves,	  while	  maximum	  costs	  are	  for	  the	  highest	  step	  of	  enhanced	  recovery.	  8	  EIA,	   'Database:	  The	  Financial	  Reporting	  System	  Public	  Data',	   (Washington,	  DC:	  US	  Energy	   Information	  Administration,	  2012).Bear	  in	  mind	  that	  FRS	  companies	  have	  represented	  40-­‐60%	  of	  the	  total	  US	  energy-­‐producing	  industry	  over	  the	  last	  30	  years;	  therefore,	  aggregate	  production	  statistics	  of	  FRS	  companies	  are	  only	  a	  representative	  sample	  of	  the	  total	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portfolios	  that	  include	  shale	  gas	  exploration	  activities	  in	  different	  countries	  (alongside	  their	  conventional	  oil	  and	  gas	  assets).	  
Table	  6-­‐2:	  Upstream	  costs	  for	  FRS	  companies,	  2006-­‐2008	  and	  2007-­‐20099	  
$/boe	   2006-­‐8	   2007-­‐9	   Modifying	  factor	  
United	  States	  of	  America	   41.49	   33.76	   0.63	  
Canada	   38.75	   24.76	   0.46	  
Europe	   72.32	   53.37	   1.00	  
Former	  Soviet	  Union	   16.7	   20.96	   0.39	  
Africa	   42.24	   45.32	   0.85	  
Middle	  East	   17.09	   16.88	   0.32	  
Other	  Eastern	  Hemisphere	   21.18	   16.56	   0.31	  
Other	  Western	  Hemisphere	   33.88	   26.64	   0.50	  	  Resource	   and	   data	   availability	   issues	   preclude	   a	   more	   accurate	   representation	   of	  regional	   differences	   in	   shale	   gas	   production	   costs,	   so	   the	   interpretation	   of	   this	   data	  should	   be	   approached	   with	   the	   usual	   level	   of	   caution. 10 	  Even	   so,	   the	   upstream	  production	   costs	   incurred	   by	   major	   US	   energy	   firms	   represent	   a	   proxy,	   albeit	   an	  imperfect	  one,	  for	  the	  relative	  level	  of	  investment	  needed	  in	  each	  respective	  region.	  As	  the	  upstream	  costs	  noted	  above	  are	  for	  conventional	  oil	  and	  gas	  wells,	  extrapolating	  these	  to	  shale	  gas	  requires	  a	  differentiation	  of	  the	  key	  cost	  components	  of	  conventional	  gas	   versus	   unconventional	   shale	   gas	   production.11	  In	   technological	   terms,	   the	   key	  difference	   between	   conventional	   and	   shale	   gas	   extraction	   lies	   in	   the	   latter’s	   use	   of	  horizontal	   drilling	   and	   hydraulic	   fracturing	   techniques	   for	   targeting	   gas	   trapped	   in	  continuous	   rock	   formations.	   Compared	  with	   conventional	   gas,	   this	   requires	   lengthier	  wellbores,	  a	  greater	  amount	  of	  land,	  more	  water	  (or	  drilling	  mud),	  more	  frequent	  truck	  trips	   and	   expenses	   unique	   to	   fracturing	   and	   directional	   drilling.	   To	   provide	   a	  conservative	   representation	   of	   these	   costs,	   the	  modifying	   factor	   above	   has	   only	   been	  applied	   to	   the	   proportion	   of	   expenses	   in	   Chapter	   2	   that	   represent	   additional	   costs	  required	   to	   drill	   and	   develop	   a	   horizontal,	   hydro-­‐fracked	   shale	   gas	   well.	   These	   are	  essentially	   the	   day	   rate	   costs	   discussed	   in	   Table	   3-­‐16,	   which	   cover	   the	   rig	   rental,	  directional	   drilling	   cost,	  mud	   servicing,	   and	  bit	   and	   evaluation	   expenditure.	   Together,	  these	  components	  are	  estimated	  to	  make	  up	  around	  25%	  of	   total	  per-­‐well	  production	  costs	  of	  shale	  gas	   in	  2015	  (followed	  by	  18%	  and	  14%	  in	  2025	  and	  2030	  respectively,	  reflecting	   technological	   learning	   curves	   and	   greater	   economies	   of	   scale).	   The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  EIA,	   'Performance	  Profiles	  of	  Major	  Energy	  Producers',	   (Washington,	  DC:	  2009).	  Note:	  Upstream	  costs	  are	  finding	  costs	  plus	  lifting	  costs.	  Natural	  gas	  was	  converted	  to	  equivalent	  barrels	  of	  oil	  at	  0.178	  barrels	  per	  thousand	  cubic	  feet.	  Sum	  of	  elements	  may	  not	  add	  to	  total	  due	  to	  independent	  rounding.	  Source:	  U.S.	  Energy	  Information	  Administration,	  Form	  EIA-­‐28	  (Financial	  Reporting	  System).	  10	  Indeed,	   upstream	   costs	   for	   US	   energy	   firms	   operating	   abroad	   may	   not	   reflect	   average	   costs	   for	   all	  market	  players	  in	  a	  given	  region.	  Moreover,	  there	  is	  considerable	  variation	  in	  cost	  components	  within	  the	  different	   regions	   that	  may	   influence	   total	  production	  expenditure.	  Notably,	   operating	  expenditures	  and	  production	   taxes	   vary	   due	   to	   different	   labour,	   service,	   regulatory	   and	   infrastructural	   constraints	   in	  different	  countries.	  11	  One	  caveat	  underpinning	  this	  approach	  is	  that	  the	  productivity	  of	  shale	  gas	  wells	  in	  the	  USA	  are	  higher	  than	  for	  conventional	  wells,	  meaning	  a	  potentially	  lower	  per-­‐unit	  production	  cost	  over	  the	  entire	  life	  of	  a	  shale	  well	  despite	  more	  substantial	  capital	  expenditures.	  Bonakdarpour	  et	  al.,	  'Economic	  and	  employment	  contributions',	  8.	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calculations	   have	   yielded	   the	   following	   costs	   of	   shale	   gas	   for	   the	  15	  world	   regions	   in	  2020.	  
Figure	  6-­‐4:	  Shale	  gas	  production	  cost	  estimates	  for	  2020	  
	  As	  shown,	  conservative	  cost	  estimates	  drive	  up	  the	  range	  of	  uncertainty.	  For	  the	  energy	  model	   used	   to	   carry	   out	   the	   scenario	   analysis,	   supply	   curves	   have	   been	   defined	   by	  assuming	   that	   a	   proportion	   of	   the	   estimated	   reserves	   provided	   in	   Chapter	   2	   can	   be	  developed	   at	   a	   certain	   cost.	   In	   an	   optimistic	   case	   of	   high	   proven	   reserves	   and	   low	  production	  costs	  for	  example,	  45%	  of	  potential	  shale	  gas	  reserves	  in	  any	  region	  are	  set	  to	  be	  extractable	  at	  the	   ‘optimistic’	  production	  cost	  described	  in	  Table	  6-­‐1,	  while	  50%	  are	   set	   to	   be	   extractable	   at	   the	   ‘most	   likely’	   production	   cost	   and	   5%	   are	   set	   to	   be	  extractable	  at	  the	  ‘conservative’	  production	  cost.	  Conversely,	  a	  conservative	  scenario	  of	  low	   proven	   reserves	   and	   high	   production	   cost	   will	   make	   only	   5%	   of	   reserves	  extractable	   at	   the	   ‘optimistic’	   cost,	  with	   50%	   extractable	   at	   the	   ‘most	   likely’	   cost	   and	  45%	   at	   the	   ‘conservative’	   production	   cost.12 	  Figure	   6-­‐5	   below	   shows	   how,	   in	   an	  optimistic	   case,	   the	   USA	   can	   produce	   around	   30	  000	   bcm	   of	   shale	   gas	   resources	   at	  around	  $5.00	  per	  gigajoule	  (GJ),	  followed	  by	  an	  additional	  30	  000	  bcm	  at	  a	  production	  cost	  of	  around	  $9.00/GJ.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  in	  the	  conservative	  case,	  the	  USA	  can	  produce	  around	  1	  000	  bcm	  of	  shale	  gas	  resources	  at	  around	  $5.00/GJ,	  followed	  by	  an	  additional	  9,000	  bcm	  at	  a	  production	  cost	  of	  around	  $9.00/GJ.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  As	   the	   ETSAP-­‐TIAM	   model	   optimises	   the	   balance	   of	   fuels	   and	   technologies	   based	   on	   cost,	   just	  considering	   scenarios	  of	  highest	  or	   lowest	   figures	  would	  either	  preclude	   commercially	  viable	   shale	  gas	  production	   in	   any	   region	   (including	   the	  USA	   and	  Canada)	   or	   on	   the	   contrary,	   assume	   that	   shale	   gas	   is	  strongly	   competitive	   in	   any	   region.	   The	   supply	   curve	   approach	   leads	   to	   a	   more	   realistic	   assumption,	  where	  even	  a	  conservative	  scenario	  can	  yield	  some	  level	  of	  production.	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It	   is	   informative	   to	   compare	   the	   two	   shale	  gas	   supply	   curves	  below	  with	   that	  used	   in	  another	  notable	  modelling	  study	  by	  MIT.13	  The	  curves	  used	  in	  the	  aforementioned	  study	  lie	  clearly	  between	  the	  two	  curves	  used	  in	  the	  present	  analysis;	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  curves	  used	   here	   cover	   a	  wider	   range.	   In	   particular,	   the	   optimistic	   case	   used	   in	   the	   present	  study	  assumes	  three	  times	  more	  low-­‐cost	  shale	  gas	  than	  the	  MIT	  study	  does.	  The	  supply	  curves	   in	   the	   present	   study	   therefore	   represent	   more	   extreme	   cases	   on	   both	   sides,	  reflecting	   the	  great	  uncertainty	   in	   the	  data	   that	  has	  been	   identified	  and	  addressed	  by	  earlier	  chapters.	  This	  is	  important	  to	  bear	  in	  mind	  when	  considering	  the	  results.	  
Figure	  6-­‐5:	  Shale	  gas	  supply	  curves	  for	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  in	  2015	  
	  Together	  with	  its	  own	  production	  cost,	  a	  further	  factor	  affecting	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  shale	  gas	   is	   the	  production	  cost	  of	   the	  other	   types	  of	  unconventional	  gas,	   i.e.	   coal-­‐bed	  methane	   and	   tight	   gas.	   The	   supply	   curves	   for	   both	   types	   of	   unconventional	   gas	   have	  been	   built	   in	   line	   with	   IEA	   (2011):	   the	   production	   cost	   of	   coal-­‐bed	   methane	   ranges	  between	  $3	   and	  $8/GJ,	  while	   the	  production	   cost	   of	   tight	   gas	   ranges	  between	  $4	   and	  $8/GJ.	  
The	  role	  of	  natural	  gas	  in	  a	  carbon-­‐constrained	  world	  	  At	   the	   international	   level,	   reliance	   upon	   a	   system	   of	   voluntary	   national	   pledges	   of	  emission	   reductions	   by	   2020,	   as	   set	   out	   initially	   in	   the	   Copenhagen	   Accord,	   leaves	  uncertainty	  concerning	  the	  likely	  structure	  of	  any	  future	  agreements	  that	  may	  emerge	  to	  replace	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol.	  The	  absence	  of	  a	  clear	  international	  regime	  for	  mitigating	  GHG	  emissions	  in	  turn	  raises	  questions	  about	  the	  likely	  stringency	  of	  national	  policies	  in	  both	  industrialised	  countries	  and	  major	  emerging	  economies	  over	  the	  coming	  decades.	  Particularly	   in	   the	   power	   sector,	   the	   relative	   costs	   of	   different	   technologies	  may	   shift	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Moniz,	  Jacoby	  and	  Meggs,	  'Future	  of	  natural	  gas',	  31.	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significantly	   in	   response	   to	   research,	   development	   and	  demonstration,	   as	  well	   as	   CO2	  emissions	  prices.	  	  A	  carbon	  tax	  would	  increases	  the	  absolute	  cost	  of	  energy	  from	  fossil	  fuels.	  These	  costs	  would	   be	   passed	   on	   to	   the	   final	   consumer	   in	   the	   form	   of	   higher	   prices	   that,	   in	   turn,	  would	   lower	   overall	   demand.	   Given	   the	   relative	   efficiencies	   and	   carbon	   emissions	   of	  different	  energy	   technologies	  or	   fuels,	   the	   technology	  mix	  of	   the	  whole	  energy	  system	  would	  be	  affected.	  However,	  much	  depends	  on	  how	  substantial	  the	  carbon	  tax	  or	  other	  climate	  change	  policies	  will	  be.	  In	  power	  generation,	  gas-­‐fired	  electricity	  generation	  will	  be	   less	  affected	  by	  a	  carbon	   tax	   than	  coal.	  But	   there	   is,	   after	  all,	   a	  point	  at	  which	  gas-­‐fired	   power	   generation	   loses	   its	   competitiveness	   to	   non-­‐emission	   generating	   sources,	  such	  as	  nuclear	  or	  renewables.	  	  As	  the	  extent	  and	  nature	  of	  the	  GHG	  mitigation	  measures	  that	  will	  be	  adopted	  is	  one	  of	  the	  key	  uncertainties	  surrounding	  the	  future	  development	  of	  the	  global	  gas	  market,	  the	  scenario	   analysis	   includes	   a	   specific	   sensitivity	   analysis	   exploring	   the	   impact	   on	   the	  global	  energy	  system,	  particularly	  on	  gas,	  of	  a	   future	   ‘carbon	  constrained’	  world,	   i.e.	  a	  world	  committed	  to	  halve	  CO2	  emissions	  by	  2050.	  
Box	  6-­‐2:	  The	  impact	  of	  liquids	  on	  shale	  gas	  production	  costs	  An	  important	  issue	  to	  highlight	  when	  discussing	  shale	  gas	  production	  costs	  is	  the	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  associated	  liquid	  hydrocarbons,	   in	  the	  form	  of	  natural	  gas	  liquids	  (NGLs)	  that	  need	  to	  be	  separated	  in	  a	  processing	  plant,	  such	  as	  butane,	  propane	  or	  ethane.	  Production	  and	  processing	  of	  such	  liquids	  can	  serve	  to	   lower	   per-­‐unit	   production	   costs	   and	   raise	   the	   economic	   profitability	   of	   wells.	   Thus,	   even	   if	   the	  proportion	   of	   total	   ‘dry’	   gas	   production	   dwarfs	   total	   liquids	   production	   from	   a	   given	   shale	   well,	   the	  energy	  content	  and	  market	  price	  of	  the	  latter	  makes	  for	  a	  compelling	  business	  case	  to	  target	  liquid-­‐rich	  shale	  plays.	  Moreover,	  there	  have	  been	  substantial	  recent	  additions	  to	  proved	  US	  ‘wet’	  gas	  reserves	  –	  e.g.	  gas	  that	  includes	  lease	  condensates	  and	  natural	  gas	  plant	  liquids;	  the	  EIA	  has	  reported	  a	  9%	  increase	  in	  proved	   reserves	   of	   natural	   gas	   plant	   liquids	   and	   a	   14%	   increase	   in	   lease	   condensates	   from	   2008	   to	  2009.14	  However,	  despite	  its	  growing	  role	  in	  shale	  gas	  economics,	  the	  figures	  on	  unit	  costs	  of	  production	  per	  well	  that	   are	   used	   in	   the	  model	   do	   not	   include	   liquid	   production.	   This	   omission	  was	  made	   to	   better	   reflect	  existing	  estimates	  of	  break-­‐even	  costs	  of	  shale	  gas	  wells,	  such	  as	  those	  found	  in	  the	  IEA’s	  recent	  Golden	  
Age	  of	  Gas	  report,	  which	  explicitly	  do	  not	  account	  for	  the	  value	  or	  cost	  of	  liquid	  production.15	  
6.1.2 	  Midstream	  
Gas	  transportation	  costs	  and	  capacities	  Despite	   the	   recent	   surge	   in	   interest	   in	   Europe’s	   unconventional	   gas,	   many	   analyses	  nevertheless	  continue	  to	  project	  significant	  growth	  in	  imports	  of	  conventional	  pipeline	  gas	   and	   LNG	   for	   the	   European	   gas	   market.16	  This	   serves	   as	   a	   reminder	   that	   the	  prospects	   of	   unconventional	   gas	   gaining	   market	   share	   depends	   not	   only	   on	   its	  competitiveness	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  other	  fuels	  such	  as	  coal	  or	  nuclear,	  but	  also	  on	  its	  relationship	  to	   conventional	   gas,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   various	   ways	   in	   which	   gas	   is	   transported.	   In	   this	  respect,	  the	  cost	  competitiveness	  of	  different	  modes	  of	  gas	  transport	  (LNG	  and	  pipeline)	  is	  a	  factor	  of	  interest	  for	  considering	  future	  gas-­‐supply	  market	  dynamics	  and	  the	  degree	  of	  market	  penetration	  of	  unconventional	  gas	  reserves.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14 	  EIA,	   'Summary:	   U.S.	   Crude	   Oil,	   Natural	   Gas,	   and	   Natural	   Gas	   Liquids	   Proved	   Reserves	   2009	   ',	  (Washington,	  DC:	  US	  Energy	  Information	  Administration,	  2010).	  15	  IEA,	  'Golden	  age',	  49.	  16	  EIA,	  'Various	  AEOs';	  IEA,	  'WEO	  Various'.	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Significant	  growth	  in	  LNG	  infrastructure	  and	  trade	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  either	  foster	  or	  deter	   investments	   in	   unconventional	   gas	   production;	   just	   as	   LNG	   can	   encourage	   gas-­‐producing	   countries	   to	   export	   their	   indigenous	   production,	   so	   too	   can	   regasification	  terminals	  for	  importing	  countries	  –	  given	  favourable	  costs	  relative	  to	  domestic	  shale	  gas	  production	  –	  serve	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  latter.	  Analysts	  have	  already	  begun	  to	  ponder	  a	   future	   scenario	   in	   which	   significant	   and	   ongoing	   US	   and	   Canadian	   shale	   gas	  production	  leads	  to	  LNG	  flows	  from	  North	  America	  to	  European	  and	  Asian	  markets.17	  If	  interregional	  LNG	  trade	  sees	  such	  exponential	  growth,	  this	  may	  reduce	  the	  incentive	  to	  invest	   in	   shale	   gas	   production	   outside	   of	   North	   America	   (particularly	   given	   the	  regulatory	   and	   service-­‐sector	   bottlenecks	   that	   could	   moderate	   its	   degree	   of	  development	  in	  Europe).	  Conversely,	  if	  high	  reserves	  and	  low	  production	  cost	  stimulate	  considerable	  shale	  gas	  production	  in	  all	  regions,	  this	  may	  dilute	  the	  importance	  of	  LNG	  by	  challenging	  the	  profitability	  of	  long-­‐distance	  interregional	  trade.	  	  Given	   these	  uncertainties,	   the	   scenario	   analysis	  must	   take	   into	   account	   the	   important	  role	  played	  by	  gas	  transportation	  costs,	  which	  will	  crucially	  inform	  the	  price	  differential	  between	  competing	  sources	  of	  natural	  gas	  supply	  as	  interregional	  gas	  trade	  develops	  (a	  differential	   which	   must,	   of	   course,	   remain	   bound	   by	   contractual	   and	   capacity	  constraints).	  	  In	  Figure	  6-­‐6	  below,	  James	  Jensen	  has	  provided	  a	  rough	  approximation	  of	  the	  difference	  in	  costs	  of	  gas	   (and	  oil)	   transport	   in	   terms	  of	  distance,	   type,	  diameter	  and	  capacity	  of	  supply	   line.	  Natural	  gas	  must	  be	  cooled	   to	  minus	  162°C	   in	  order	   to	  condense	   it	   into	  a	  liquid	  form.	  This	  reduces	  its	  volume	  by	  approximately	  600	  times,	  thereby	  allowing	  it	  to	  be	  cost-­‐effectively	  shipped	  by	  tanker.	  Building	  and	  running	  the	  liquefaction	  plants	  that	  cool	   and	   condense	   the	   gas	   into	   a	   liquid	   is	   expensive	   and	   energy-­‐intensive;	   however,	  shipping	  LNG	   is	   less	  costly	   than	  pipeline	   transport	  on	  a	  per-­‐MBtu	  basis.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this,	   LNG	  usually	   costs	  more	   to	   ship	   than	   pipeline	   gas	   over	   distances	   less	   than	  1	  500	  miles.	  Over	  distances	  of	  more	   than	  2	  500	  miles,	  however,	  LNG	   is	  generally	  cheaper	   to	  transport	  than	  even	  the	  most	  efficiently	  piped	  gas.18	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Rogers,	  'Impact	  of	  a	  globalising	  market'.	  18	  James	  T.	  Jensen,	  'The	  Future	  of	  Gas	  Transportation	  in	  the	  Middle	  East:	  LNG,	  GTL	  and	  Pipelines'	  (paper	  presented	   at	   the	   The	   Annual	   Conference	   of	   the	   Emirates	   Center	   for	   Strategic	   Studies	   &	   Research,	   Abu	  Dhabi,	  2004).	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Figure	  6-­‐6:	  Illustrative	  costs	  of	  gas,	  oil	  and	  coal	  transportation19	  
	  The	   traditional	   LNG	  project	   has	  been	  described	   as	   a	   ‘chain’	  with	   four,	   or	   occasionally	  five,	   links:	   1)	   field	   development;	   2)	   in	   some	   cases,	   a	   pipeline	   to	   the	   coast;	   3)	   the	  liquefaction	  facility;	  4)	  tanker	  transportation;	  and	  5)	  the	  regasification	  terminal.20	  For	  a	  typical	  LNG	  value	  chain,	  exploration	  and	  production	  of	  feedstock	  supplies	  represent	  15-­‐20%	  of	  total	  capital	  costs,	  liquefaction	  comprises	  30-­‐45%	  of	  costs,	  shipping	  accounts	  for	  another	  10-­‐30%	  and	  gasification	  and	  storage	  account	  for	  the	  remaining	  15-­‐25%.21	  Each	  link	   in	   the	   chain	   is	   capital-­‐intensive,	   with	   most	   LNG	   projects	   costing	   several	   billion	  dollars.	  There	  is	  some	  debate	  as	  to	  the	  direction	  in	  which	  LNG	  production	  costs	  are	  heading.	  Up	  until	   the	   early	   2000s,	   technological	   progress	  had	   led	   to	   a	   sharp	  decrease	   in	   the	   large	  initial	   capital	   cost,	   and	   hence	   life-­‐cycle	   operating	   cost,	   of	   liquefaction	   plants	   –	   the	  principal	   cost	   component	   in	   the	  LNG	  chain.	  The	  average	   investment	   for	  a	   liquefaction	  plant	   dropped	   from	   some	   $550	   a	   tonne	   per	   year	   of	   capacity	   in	   the	   1960s,	   to	  approximately	  $200	  in	  the	  early	  2000s.	  Several	  factors	  accounted	  for	  this	  trend.	  Studies	  highlighted	  economies	  of	  scale	  in	  the	  construction	  phase	  that	  reduced	  the	  marginal	  cost	  of	  each	  additional	   liquefaction	  train	  built	  at	  the	  same	  greenfield	  site	  by	  20-­‐30%.22	  In	  a	  similar	   vein,	   larger	   LNG	   train	   sizes	   resulting	   from	   the	   shift	   from	   steam-­‐driven	   to	   gas	  turbine-­‐driven	  compressors	  drove	  down	  liquefaction	  costs	  as	  well.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  James	  T.	  Jensen,	   'The	  Development	  of	  a	  Global	  LNG	  Market:	  Is	  it	  Likely?	  If	  so,	  when?',	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  Institute	  for	  Energy	  Studies,	  2004),	  7.	  20	  Jensen,	  'LNG	  Revolution':	  26.	  21	  Maxwell	  and	  Zhu,	  'Dynamics	  of	  LNG	  imports':	  219.	  22	  Sylvie	   Cornot-­‐Gandolphe,	   'LNG	   Cost	   Reductions	   and	   Flexibility	   in	   LNG	   Trade	   add	   to	   Security	   of	   Gas	  Supply',	   in	   Energy	   Prices	   and	   Taxes,	   1st	   Quarter	   2005,	   ed.	   IEA	   (Paris:	   Organisation	   for	   Economic	   Co-­‐operation	  and	  Development	  2005),	  xxix.	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More	  recent	  analyses,	  however,	  contend	  that	  investment	  costs	  for	  liquefaction	  terminals	  have	   increased	   by	   about	   20%	   over	   the	   last	   five	   years.23	  Writing	   in	   2009,	   the	   IEA	  estimated	   that	   LNG	   liquefaction	   plants	   commissioned	   in	   the	   period	   from	   2009-­‐2013	  would	   cost	   about	   $830/tonne	   compared	  with	   $430/tonne	   for	   those	   commissioned	   in	  2005-­‐2008	   (see	   Figure	   6-­‐7	   below). 24 	  Another	   study	   provided	   a	   similar	   range	   of	  liquefaction	   costs	   over	   the	   decade	   to	   2009,	   capturing	   their	   rise	   from	   $300/tonne	   to	  between	  $600-­‐1400/tonne	  per	  annum.25	  	  
Figure	  6-­‐7:	  LNG	  liquefaction	  plant	  capital	  costs26	  
	  As	  for	  other	  links	  in	  the	  LNG	  chain,	  shipping	  costs	  have	  fallen	  markedly,	  as	  competition	  between	   shipyards	   reduced	   the	   construction	   cost	   of	   LNG	   tankers	   from	   about	   $280	  million	   for	  a	  138,000	  cu.	  metre	  ship	   in	  1995	   to	  $150-­‐160	  million	  by	   the	  mid-­‐2000s.27	  Larger	   tankers,	   enjoying	   greater	   economies	   of	   scale	   also	   reduced	   operating	   costs.	  Tanker	  sizes	  have	  increased	  from	  some	  40	  000	  cubic	  metres	  for	  the	  first	  generation	  to	  135	  000-­‐140	  000	   cubic	   metres.28	  In	   addition,	   the	   EIA	   found	   in	   a	   2003	   report	   that	  regasification	   terminal	   costs	   seemed	   to	   have	   fallen,	   although	   this	   trend	   was	   more	  difficult	  to	  verify	  as	  the	  costs	  varied	  more	  by	  location.29	  All	  of	  the	  abovementioned	  cost	  components	  of	  the	  various	  stages	  of	  the	  LNG	  chain	  hinge	  on	   supply-­‐and-­‐demand	   dynamics,	   thus	   implying	   a	   considerable	   degree	   of	   uncertainty	  for	   the	   future.	   Moreover,	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   cost	   of	   LNG	   production	   witnesses	  substantial	   change	   also	   depends	   on	   the	   cost	   of	   raw	   materials	   (steel,	   nickel	   and	  aluminium),	   labour	   and	   services	   (which	   come	   at	   a	   premium	   during	   periods	   of	  significant	  global	  investments	  in	  capacity),	  as	  well	  as	  a	  range	  of	  project-­‐specific	  factors	  such	  as	  plant	  location	  and	  construction	  times.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23Stefan	   Lochner	   and	   Jan	   Richter,	   'The	   impact	   of	   recent	   gas	   market	   developments	   on	   long-­‐term	  projections	  for	  global	  gas	  supply',	  Energiewirtschaft	  34	  (2010).	  24IEA,	  'WEO	  2009',	  451.	  25Andrew	  Morris	  and	  Keith	  Messenger,	  'Global	  gas	  &	  LNG	  markets	  &	  GB's	  Security	  of	  Supply;	  a	  report	  to	  Department	  of	  Energy	  and	  Climate	  Change',	  (Poyry	  Consulting,	  2010).	  26	  IEA,	  'WEO	  2009',	  451.	  27	  Maxwell	  and	  Zhu,	  'Dynamics	  of	  LNG	  imports':	  221.	  28	  Cornot-­‐Gandolphe,	  'LNG	  Cost	  Reductions',	  xxx.	  29	  EIA,	  'Global	  LNG	  Market',	  42.	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For	   the	   scenario	   analysis,	   the	   costs	   of	   regasification	   and	   liquefaction	   terminals	   are	  calculated	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   initial	   investment	   costs,	   fixed	   operating	   and	   maintenance	  costs,	  the	  plant	  availability	  and	  any	  losses	  incurred,	  which	  are	  annualised	  according	  to	  the	   lifetime	   of	   the	   plant	   and	   subjected	   to	   a	   discount	   rate	   (in	   this	   case	   5%).	   More	  specifically,	   the	   cost	   of	   liquefaction	   plants	   is	   in	   line	   with	   the	   more	   recent	   estimates,	  which,	   as	  mentioned,	   are	   higher	   than	   those	   given	   for	   the	   first	   half	   of	   the	   2000s.	   The	  main	   set	   of	   scenarios	   assume	  a	   capex	  of	   about	   $6	  billion	   for	   an	  LNG	   chain	  producing	  10.6	  bcm/a	  (i.e.	  8	  mtpa).	  For	   pipelines,	   the	   primary	   determinants	   of	   construction	   costs	   are	   the	   length	   and	  diameter	  of	  the	  pipeline,	  the	  operating	  pressure	  (and	  the	  corresponding	  need	  for	  higher	  grade	  steel)	  and	  the	  terrain.30	  Operating	  costs,	  in	  turn,	  vary	  depending	  on	  the	  number	  of	  compressor	  stations	  and	  the	  price	  of	   their	  generating	   fuel.	  The	   total	  per-­‐unit	  cost	  will	  depend	  on	  average	  capacity	  utilisation	  and	  load	  factors.	  According	  to	  analysts	  at	  the	  IEA	  and	  Cedigaz,	  the	  investment	  required	  to	  lay	  a	  long	  distance,	  large	  diameter	  line	  amounts	  to	  $1-­‐1.5	  billion	  per	  1	  000km.31	  Since	  this	  figure	  was	  presented	  in	  2004,	  some	  analysts	  have	  found	  that	  pipeline	  costs	  have	  increased	  by	  30%	  for	  onshore	  and	  as	  high	  as	  70%	  for	   offshore	   projects.32 	  Recent	   analysis	   carried	   out	   within	   the	   ETSAP	   community	  concludes	   that	   an	   onshore	   pipeline	   carrying	   20bcm	   per	   annum	   over	   a	   distance	   of	  1	  000km	   costs	   between	   $0.47-­‐0.80/Mbtu.33	  For	   sub-­‐sea	  pipelines,	   earlier	   IEA	   analysis	  set	  the	  capex	  on	  a	  baseline	  500km,	  12	  bcm/pa	  offshore	  pipeline	  at	  $2	  billion,	  implying	  a	  total	  gas	  transportation	  cost	  of	  $0.70	  to	  $0.80/MBtu	  for	  this	  distance.34	  As	  with	  for	  LNG	  transport	  costs,	  the	  most	  recent	  estimates	  have	  been	  used	  for	  pipelines	  in	  the	  scenario	  analysis.	  However,	  in	  order	  to	  explore	  the	  uncertainty	  surrounding	  gas	  transportation	  costs	  and	  its	  potential	  impact	  on	  the	  development	  of	  indigenous	  production	  in	  the	  different	  world	  regions,	  a	  sensitivity	  analysis	  has	  been	  carried	  out,	  by	  assuming	  LNG	  costs	  decreasing	  to	  the	  levels	  of	  the	  early	  2000s.	  As	   for	   capacity,	   Table	   6-­‐3	   and	   Table	   6-­‐4	   also	   show	   assumptions	   about	  medium-­‐term	  capacity	   forecasts	   for	   both	   interregional	   LNG	   and	   piped	   gas,	   which	   are	   derived	   from	  recent	   IEA	   data.	   The	   figures	   for	   2020	   are	   then	   progressively	   increased	   until	   they	   are	  doubled	  in	  2040	  to	  provide	  a	  rough	  approximation	  of	  the	  maximum	  capacity	  available	  in	  at	  this	  time.	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  There	  are,	  of	   course,	  other	   factors	   to	  consider	   that	  vary	  according	   to	   local	   conditions,	   such	  as	   labour	  costs,	  service	  costs,	  securing	  rights	  of	  passage,	  honouring	  safety	  regulations,	  and	  so	  on.	  31Sylvie	   Cornot-­‐Gandolphe	   et	   al.,	   'The	   challenges	   of	   further	   cost	   reductions	   for	   new	   supply	   options	  (pipeline,	  LNG,	  GTL)	  ',	  in	  22nd	  World	  Gas	  Conference	  (Tokyo,	  Japan:	  Cedigaz,	  2003).	  32Lochner	  and	  Richter,	  'Impact	  of	  gas	  market	  developments'.	  33Pernille	  Seljom,	  'Oil	  and	  Natural	  Gas	  Logistics',	  in	  IEA	  ETSAP	  Technology	  Brief	  P03	  (ETSAP,	  2011).	  34IEA,	  'WEO	  2009',	  451.	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Table	  6-­‐3:	  Major	  interregional	  natural	  gas	  pipeline	  projects35	  
	  Origin	   Destination	  	   Major	  pipelines	   bcm/a	  
FSU	  
CHI	   Altai	   30.0	  SKO	   Russia	  -­‐	  Asia	  Pacific	   10.0	  
WEU	   Nord	  Stream	   27.5	  Nord	  Stream	  2	   27.5	  South	  Stream	   63.0	  Nabucco	   31	  
MEA	   WEU	   ITGI	  (Interc.	  Turkey	  Greece	  Italy)	   12	  TAP	  (Trans	  Adriatic	  Pipeline)	   20	  IGAT	  9	  (Iranian	  Gas	  Trunkline)	   37	  
FSU	   CHI	   CAGP	   35	  CAGP	  expansion	   25	  ODA	   TAPI	   30	  MEA	   IND	   IPI	   8	  MEA	   Arab	  Gas	  Pipeline	   10	  ODA	   CHI	   Myanmar	  -­‐	  China	   12	  AFR	   WEU	   GALSI	  (Gasdotto	  Algeria	  Sardegna	  Italia)	   8	  	  	   	   Total	   386	  	  
Table	  6-­‐4:	  Assumed	  maximum	  liquefaction	  capacity	  2020	  	   AFR	   AUS	   CAN	   CHI	   CSA	   EEU	   FSU	   IND	   JPN	   MEA	   MEX	   ODA	   SKO	   USA	   WEU	  bcm/a	   547	   138	   0	   0	   195	   0	   59	   0	   0	   618	   0	   196	   0	   57	   8	  
6.1.3 Natural	  gas	  in	  power	  generation	  and	  other	  end	  uses	  
Economic	  growth	  and	  natural	  gas	  demand	  For	  any	  given	  region,	  the	  intensity	  of	  unconventional	  gas	  exploration	  and	  development	  depends	  on	  total	  gas	  demand.	  Historically,	  this	  demand	  has	  been	  linked	  to	  the	  level	  of	  GDP	  growth.	  The	  scenario	  analysis	  will	  base	  its	  GDP	  assumptions	  on	  those	  found	  in	  the	  EIA’s	  International	  Energy	  Outlook	  2010,	  which	  provides	  forecasts	  to	  2035	  of	  regional	  GDP	  levels.	  Of	  course,	  GDP	  and	  total	  energy	  demand	  are	  not	  perfectly	  correlated.	  As	  discussed	  in	  the	  IEA’s	  WEO	  2011,	  the	  degree	  of	  increase	  in	  energy	  demand	  relative	  to	  GDP	  depends	  on	  a	  given	  country’s	   stage	  of	  economic	  development.	  For	  developed	  countries,	   increases	   in	  energy	   demand	   are	   tempered	   by	   efficiency	   improvements	   and	   saturation	   effects.36	  In	  developing	   countries,	   however,	   there	   is	   a	   higher	   ‘elasticity’	   of	   energy	   consumption	  relative	  to	  GDP,	  implying	  more	  substantial	  per	  capita	  growth	  in	  energy	  demand	  as	  these	  countries’	   living	   standards	   improve.	   The	   graph	   below	   demonstrates	   the	   relationship	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  IEA,	  'WEO	  2011'.	  36	  Ibid.	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between	   GDP	   and	   natural	   gas	   consumption	   in	   a	   set	   of	   mainly	   developing	   regions	   by	  showing	  their	  respective	  values	  for	  the	  regions	  over	  the	  period	  from	  2005-­‐2010.	  
Figure	  6-­‐8:	  GDP	  and	  gas	  consumption	  by	  region,	  2005-­‐201037	  
	  At	   the	   time	   of	   writing,	   the	   global	   economic	   climate	   is	   gloomy,	   particularly	   for	   the	  world’s	   advanced	   economies	   as	   complex	   financial	   and	   fiscal	   challenges	   continue	   to	  threaten	   overall	   recovery	   from	   recession.	   Current	   projections	   of	   global	   GDP	  development,	   therefore,	   assign	  most	   of	   the	   growth	   to	   developing	   countries,	   implying	  more	  substantial	   increases	   in	  global	  energy	  demand	  as	  these	  countries	   ‘catch	  up’	  with	  the	   advanced	   industrialised	   economies.	   In	   the	   longer	   term,	   as	   well,	   most	   forecasts	  assume	   that	   non-­‐OECD	   countries	   –	   in	   particular	   China	   –	  will	   account	   for	  most	   of	   the	  economic	  growth	   in	   the	  coming	  decades	  and,	  as	  a	  corollary,	   the	  majority	  of	  growth	   in	  energy	   demand	   (see	   Table	   6-­‐5	   below).	   Any	   output	   from	   the	   model	   will	   be	   highly	  sensitive	   to	   these	   assumptions	   about	   global	   growth.	   To	   capture	   the	   consequent	  uncertainty,	   the	  scenario	  analysis	  will	  distinguish	  between	   low	  and	  high	  growth	  cases	  as	   shown	   in	   Table	   6-­‐5.	   However,	   both	   cases	   do	   not	   deviate	   from	   the	   assumption	   of	  relative	  economic	  convergence,	  i.e.	  low	  income	  regions	  growing	  faster	  than	  high	  income	  regions.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  EIA,	   'International	   Energy	   Outlook	   2010',	   (Washington,	   DC:	   US	   Energy	   Information	   Administration,	  2010).	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Table	  6-­‐5:	  GDP	  assumptions	  in	  the	  model	  	  Average	  growth	  in	  %,	  PPP	   Low	  growth	   High	  growth	  	  	   2010-­‐2020	   2020-­‐2040	   2010-­‐2020	   2020-­‐2040	  
	  	  OECD	  North	  America	   2	   2	   3.4	   3.2	  	  	  	  	  United	  States	  of	  America	   2	   1.8	   3.6	   3	  	  	  	  	  Canada	   2.1	   1.6	   3.2	   2.6	  	  	  	  	  Mexico	   1.4	   3.7	   2.4	   4.7	  
	  	  OECD	  Europe	   1.5	   1.4	   2.6	   2.4	  
	  	  OECD	  Asia	   1.4	   0.7	   2.5	   1.7	  	  	  	  	  Japan	   0.8	   -­‐0.2	   1.9	   0.8	  	  	  	  	  South	  Korea	   2.8	   2.1	   3.9	   3.1	  	  	  	  	  Australia/New	  Zealand	   1.9	   2	   3	   3	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  Total	  OECD	   1.7	   1.6	   3	   2.7	  	  	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  Non-­‐OECD	  Europe	  and	  Eurasia	   3	   2.3	   4.1	   3.3	  	  	  	  	  Russia	   2.6	   2.4	   3.7	   3.4	  	  	  	  	  Other	   3.5	   2.1	   4.6	   3.1	  
	  	  Non-­‐OECD	  Asia	   5.2	   3.7	   6.3	   4.7	  	  	  	  	  China	   6	   3.8	   7.1	   4.8	  	  	  	  	  India	   5.1	   3.5	   6.2	   4.5	  	  	  	  	  Other	  non-­‐OECD	  Asia	   3.7	   3.6	   4.8	   4.6	  
	  	  Middle	  East	   3.4	   3.1	   4.5	   4.1	  
	  	  Africa	   3	   2.7	   4.1	   3.7	  
	  	  Central	  and	  South	  America	   3.5	   2.8	   4.6	   3.8	  	  	  	  	  Brazil	   3.7	   3.4	   4.7	   4.4	  	  	  	  	  Other	  Central	  and	  South	  America	   3.3	   2.2	   4.4	   3.2	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  Total	  Non-­‐OECD	   4.4	   3.3	   5.5	   4.3	  	  	   	   	   	   	  
Total	  World	   3	   2.6	   4.2	   3.6	  
Gas-­‐fired,	  nuclear	  and	  renewable	  power	  generation	  Natural	  gas	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  capture	  a	  greater	  share	  of	  the	  global	  mix	  of	  electricity-­‐generating	   fuels	   (largely	  by	  muscling	   in	  on	  coal’s	   current	  dominance).	  This,	  of	   course,	  depends	  on	  the	  natural	  gas	  price,	  which	  represents	  the	  majority	  of	  operating	  costs	  for	  relatively	   efficient	   combined	   cycle	   plants	   and	   the	   concomitant	   investment	   decisions	  within	  the	  industry.	  The	  penetration	  of	  natural	  gas	  in	  the	  electricity	  generation	  mix	  also	  depends	  on	  the	  policies	  enacted	  by	  governments	  to	  regulate	  and	  tax	  carbon	  emissions.	  Indeed,	   the	   IEA’s	   WEO	   for	   2011	   has	   identified	   carbon	   pricing	   and	   subsidies	   to	  renewables	  as	  the	  two	  government	  policies	  that	  will	  have	  the	  most	  significant	  impact	  on	  the	  electricity	  generation	  mix	  over	  time.38	  To	  explore	  these	  issues	  a	  specific	  sensitivity	  analysis	  has	  been	  carried	  out	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  the	  robustness	  of	  the	  results	  (see	  Figure	  6-­‐9).	  
Gas	  use	  in	  transport	  and	  the	  gas/oil	  price	  link	  A	  central	  question	  that	  has	  arisen	  in	  the	  analysis	  is	  whether	  to	  assume	  a	  coupling	  or	  de-­‐coupling	   of	   oil	   and	   gas	   prices.	  Much	   has	   been	  written	   recently	   about	   the	   logic	   of	   the	  price	  linkage	  of	  gas	  to	  oil.	  As	  discussed	  in	  Section	  5.2.4,	  commentators	  have	  questioned	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  IEA	  WEO	  2011	  p.	  178	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the	   long-­‐term	   viability	   of	   oil	   indexation	   given	   the	   gradual	   devolution	   of	   substitution	  possibilities	   between	   gas	   and	   oil	   products.	   Analysts	   have	   also	   noted	   that	   abundant	  unconventional	  gas	  production	  in	  the	  USA	  has	  served	  to	  weaken	  the	  linkage	  between	  oil	  and	  gas	  prices,	  leading	  to	  a	  NYMEX	  crude-­‐to-­‐gas	  futures	  contract	  ratio	  of	  43:1	  in	  January	  2012,	   the	   highest	   in	   the	   last	   two	   decades.39	  Thus,	   contemporary	   wisdom	   holds	   that	  global	  unconventional	  gas	  development	  will	  play	  a	  key	  role	  in	  enabling	  a	  gradual	  break	  from	   gas-­‐oil	   price	   linkages	   as	   the	   two	   fuels	   and	   their	  markets	   develop	   their	   separate	  ways.	  	  However,	  uncertainties	  regarding	  future	  technological	  developments	  may	  turn	  this	  logic	  on	  its	  head.	  A	  persistently	  high	  oil-­‐to-­‐gas	  ratio	  would	  create	  incentives	  to	  invest	  in	  gas-­‐based	  transport	  technologies	  that	  are	  currently	  deemed	  uncompetitive	  against	  a	  sector	  dominated	   by	   oil.	   Indeed,	   in	   addition	   to	   stimulating	   growth	   in	   natural	   gas-­‐powered	  vehicles	   (NGVs),	   significant	  shale	  gas	  production	  could	  also	  make	  gas-­‐to-­‐liquids	   (GTL)	  technology	   attractive.	   Although	   Shell’s	   recently	   completed	   Pearl	   GTL	   plant	   in	   Qatar	  represents	  a	  significant	  step	  forward	  for	  industry,	  the	  process	  that	  converts	  dry	  gas	  to	  distillates	   such	   as	   diesel,	   heating	   oil	   and	   jet	   fuel	   had	   long	   been	   regarded	   as	   a	  prohibitively	  costly	  investment,	  justified	  only	  in	  areas	  where	  gas	  reserves	  are	  ‘stranded’	  and	  could	  not	  access	  markets.40	  However,	  with	  a	  high	  enough	  oil-­‐to-­‐gas	  price	  ratio	  and	  a	  large	   enough	   resource	   base,	   GTL	   plants	   become	   increasingly	   commercially	   viable,	  serving	   as	   competitors	   to	   gasoline	   and	   diesel	   from	   conventional	   oil	   refineries.	  Paradoxically,	  then,	  some	  of	  the	  same	  forces	  that	  are	  currently	  driving	  a	  wedge	  between	  oil	   and	   gas	   prices	   can,	   in	   the	   longer	   term,	   enable	   their	   re-­‐coupling,	   by	   stimulating	  investments	  in	  technologies	  such	  as	  GTL	  that	  once	  again	  make	  gas	  and	  oil	  substitutable	  fuels.	   Of	   course,	   much	   hinges	   on	   the	   natural	   gas	   and	   oil	   price	   link	   over	   a	   period	   of	  decades:	   in	   its	   discussion	   of	   the	   potential	   of	   future	   gas-­‐to-­‐liquids	   production,	   the	   EIA	  Annual	  Energy	  Outlook	  states	   that	   “only	  with	   the	  highest	   [oil]	  prices	   in	   the	  Reference	  case	   and	   the	   low	   end	   of	   GTL	   plant	   costs	   do	   the	   break-­‐even	   economics	   favour	   [such]	  project[s].”41	  Significant	  shale	  gas	  development	  may	  very	  well	  enable	  such	  a	  scenario.	  	  In	  the	  scenario	  analysis,	  a	  basic	  assumption	  has	  been	  used	  across	  all	  the	  main	  scenarios:	  that	   natural	   gas	   can	   be	   priced	   according	   to	   its	   own	   specific	   market	   economics,	   i.e.	  independently	   from	   the	   conditions	  prevailing	   in	   the	  oil	  market.	  However,	   as	   this	   is	   in	  fact	   a	   strong	   assumption,	   in	   order	   to	   explore	   this	   factor	   of	   uncertainty	   a	   specific	  sensitivity	  analysis	  has	  been	  carried	  out,	  to	  assess	  how	  the	  results	  of	  the	  analysis	  change	  if	  the	  assumption	  of	  decoupling	  is	  removed.	  
6.1.4 Summary	  of	  key	  assumptions	  The	  table	  below	  is	  by	  no	  means	  an	  exhaustive	  account	  of	  all	  the	  factors	  that	  will	  affect	  unconventional	   gas	  development.	  Rather,	   for	   each	  broader	   category	   some	  key	  drivers	  have	   been	   selected	   that	   are	   appropriate	   for	   the	   scenario	   analysis	   and	   in	  many	   cases	  these	   drivers	   reflect	   assumptions	   about	   other	   factors	   affecting	   unconventional	   gas	  production	   (e.g.	   the	   costs	   of	   shale	   gas	   are	   a	   function	   of	   capital	   and	   operating	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Samantha	  Santa	  Maria,	  Crude	  oil	  to	  gas	  ratio	  near	  all-­‐time	  highs...	  who	  cares?	  (Platts,	  2012,	  cited	  24	  April	  2012);	  available	  from	  http://www.platts.com/weblog/oilblog/2012/01/26/crude-­‐gas_ratio.html	  40	  IEA,	  'Energy	  Technology	  Perspectives',	  267.	  Moreover,	  in	  this	  context	  the	  comparatively	  lower	  costs	  of	  LNG	  technology,	  which	  enhances	  the	  mobility	  of	  gas,	  also	  reduces	  the	  incentive	  to	  invest	  in	  GTL	  processes.	  41	  EIA	  AEO	  2010,	  p.	  40	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expenditures	   as	   diverse	   as	   the	   cost	   of	   water	   or	   the	   price	   of	   materials	   for	   building	  gathering	  systems).	  	  
Table	  6-­‐6:	  Summary	  of	  modelling	  assumptions	  
Category	   Variables	   Notes/assumptions	   Uncertainty	   Criticality	  
Upstream	   Unconventional	  gas	  resource	  size	   Technically	   recoverable	   reserves	   of	  shale	  gas	   High	   High	  Unconventional	  gas	   production	  costs	   Costs	   per	   GJ	   for	   F&D	   and	   producing	  shale	   gas,	   including	   cost	   reductions	  over	  time	   High	   High	  
Downstream	  
Gas	   transport	  costs	   Cost-­‐competitiveness	   of	   imported	   LNG	  and	   piped	   gas	   versus	   indigenous	   shale	  gas	  production	   Medium	   Medium	  Oil/gas	   price	   link	  	   The	   difference	   between	   oil	   and	   gas	  prices	   expressed	   as	   a	   ratio	   (in	   energy	  equivalent	  terms)	   High	   High	  
Final	  use	  
Total	   global	  energy	  demand	   Global	  GDP	  growth	  is	  the	  main	  driver	  of	  future	  demand	  for	  energy	  services	   High	   High	  Gas-­‐fired	   power	  generation	   The	   cost-­‐competitiveness	   of	   CCGT	   in	  relation	   to	   other	   power	   generation	  technologies	   Medium	   Medium	  Gas	   use	   in	  transportation	  sector	   Depends	   on	   competing	  fuels/technology	   like	   biofuels,	   hybrids,	  EVs,	   etc.	   Also	   relies	   on	   favourable	  gas/oil	  price	  differential	   Low	   Medium	  
Regulation	   Carbon	  tax	   A	  carbon	  tax	  crucially	  alters	  the	  energy	  supply	   mix	   by	   incentivising	  investments	   in	   renewable	   carbon-­‐neutral	  energy	   Medium	   High	  	  Three	   of	   these	   factors	   have	   been	   chosen	   as	   pivotal,	   both	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   future	  uncertainty	   as	   well	   as	   how	   critical	   they	   are	   for	   the	   eventual	   penetration	   of	  unconventional	   gas	   in	   the	   global	   energy	   system.	   These	   are	   the	   resource	   size	   and	  production	   cost	   of	   shale	   gas	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   and	   global	   GDP	   growth	   on	   the	   other.	  Therefore,	   the	   four	   main	   scenarios	   –	   ConLG,	   ConHG,	   OptLG	   and	   OptHG	   –	   reflect	   the	  combination	   of	   assumptions	   regarding	   these	   factors.	   Accordingly,	   there	   are	   two	  scenarios	   with	   either	   optimistic	   or	   conservative	   assumptions	   about	   shale	   gas	  production	   cost	   and	   reserve	   size	   (Opt/Con),	   and	   another	   two	   scenarios	   with	   either	  optimistic	   or	   conservative	   assumptions	   about	   global	   growth	   (HG/LG).	   To	   explore	   the	  impact	   of	   a	   lower	   oil-­‐gas	   price	   ratio,	   an	   additional	   differentiation	  was	   applied	   to	   the	  conservative-­‐low	  growth	  scenario	  (as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  6-­‐9).	  Combined,	  these	  yield	  five	  scenarios	  covering	  a	  range	  of	  possible	  outcomes	  over	  the	  period	  until	  2040.	  A	  primary	  advantage	   of	   employing	   this	   framework	   is	   that	   either	   set	   of	   assumptions	   about	  high/low	   demand	   and	   optimistic/conservative	   supply	   can	   be	   held	   constant	   while	  probing	  the	  effects	  of	  each.	  Interpreting	  the	  respective	  results	  of	  these	  scenarios,	  along	  with	   some	   key	   sensitivities,	   will	   hence	   reveal	   the	   range	   of	   uncertainty	   underpinning	  future	  global	  shale	  gas	  development.	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global	  energy	  system	   X	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Social	  of	  acceptance	  of	  
nuclear	  power	   X	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Oil/gas	  price	  linkage	   	   	   X	   	   	   	   	   	  
LNG	  transportation	  




























Scenario	   Description	   Variation	  for	  sensitivity	  analysis	  
Optimistic-­‐
low	   growth	  
(Opt-­‐LG)	  
Shale	   gas	   resources	   corresponding	  to	  the	  upper-­‐level	  estimates,	  most	  of	  which	   are	   deployable	   at	   low	  production	   costs.	   Low	   GDP	   growth	  at	  regional	  level	  
• OPT-­‐LG+LCO2:	   Optimistic	   low	   growth	   with	  the	  additional	  assumption	  of	  CO2	  reduction	  	  
• Opt-­‐LG+HNUC:	   Optimistic	   low	   growth	   with	  the	  additional	  assumption	  of	  possible	  higher	  nuclear	  penetration	  	  
• Opt-­‐LG+LCLNG:	  Optimistic	   low	  growth	  with	  the	   additional	   assumption	   of	   lower	   LNG	  transport	  costs	  
Conservative-­‐
Low	   Growth	  
(Con-­‐LG)	  
Shale	   gas	   resources	   corresponding	  to	  the	  lower-­‐level	  estimates,	  most	  of	  which	   are	   deployable	   at	   high	  production	   costs.	   Low	   GDP	   growth	  at	  regional	  level	  
• Con-­‐LG+CP:	   Conservative	   low	   growth	   with	  the	   additional	   assumption	   of	   oil	   and	   gas	  prices	  still	  coupled	  in	  the	  long	  term	  
• Con-­‐LG+LCLNG:	   Conservative	   high	   growth	  with	   the	   additional	   assumption	   of	   lower	  LNG	  transport	  costs	  
Optimistic-­‐
High	   Growth	  
(Opt-­‐HG)	  
Shale	   gas	   resources	   corresponding	  to	  the	  upper	  level	  estimates,	  most	  of	  which	   are	   deployable	   at	   low	  production	   costs.	   High	   GDP	   growth	  at	  regional	  level	  
• Opt-­‐HG+CP:	  Optimistic	  high	  growth	  with	  the	  additional	   assumption	   of	   oil	   and	   gas	   prices	  still	  coupled	  in	  the	  long	  term	  
Conservative-­‐
High	   Growth	  
(Con-­‐HG)	  
Shale	   gas	   resources	   corresponding	  to	  the	  lower	  level	  estimates,	  most	  of	  which	  deployable	  at	  high	  production	  cost.	   High	   GDP	   growth	   at	   regional	  level.	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6.2 Scenario	  analysis	  results	  In	  the	  following	  section,	  the	  authors	  explore	  the	  various	  conditions	  under	  which	  shale	  gas	  gains	  importance	  in	  the	  global	  energy	  mix,	  based	  on	  the	  key	  factors	  identified	  and	  discussed	  above.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  scenario	  analysis	  shed	  light	  on	  some	  of	  the	  primary	  issues	  shaping	  the	  debate	  about	  unconventional	  gas:	  for	  example,	  the	  role	  of	  gas	  in	  the	  global	   energy	  mix;	  whether	   shale	   gas	  will	   constrain	  or	   enable	   the	  globalisation	  of	   the	  gas	   market	   (and	   its	   impact	   on	   traditional	   buyer-­‐seller	   relationships);	   the	   impact	   of	  significant	   global	   gas	   production	   on	   energy	   services	   such	   as	   electricity	   and	  transportation;	  and,	  as	  a	  corollary,	  the	  role	  of	  natural	  gas	  as	  a	  bridging	  fuel	  to	  a	  carbon-­‐free	  energy	  future.	  	  Overall,	  the	  results	  convey	  an	  impression	  of	  uncertainty,	  which	  is	  driven	  by	  the	  different	  assumptions	  made	   about	   the	   gas	   supply	   curve	   and	   overall	   demand	   for	   energy.	   These	  two	   factors	   are	   shown	   to	   have	   significant	   effects	   on	   total	   primary	   energy	   supply,	  transport	  and	  trade.	  The	  key	  task	  is	  to	  explore	  the	  variability	  of	  these	  impacts	  and	  relate	  them	   to	   shale	   gas	   development.	   Thus,	   it	   will	   be	   shown	   that	   the	   impact	   of	   demand	  growth	   is	  particularly	   important	   for	  explaining	  gas	  market	  dynamics,	  but	   its	   impact	   is	  less	  pronounced	  when	  probing	  changes	   in	   the	  role	  of	  gas	   in	   the	  wider	  energy	  system.	  Here,	   different	   supply	   curves	   assume	   relatively	   greater	   importance,	   yielding	   different	  trade	  and	  consumption	  patterns	  as	   they	  adjust	   to	   the	  cost	  of	  energy.	  A	  crucial	  area	  of	  assessment	   in	   this	  context	   is,	   first	  of	  all,	  whether	  and	  to	  what	  extent	   the	   future	  of	   the	  energy	  system	  will	  be	  carbon-­‐constrained.	  A	  second	  factor	  of	  importance	  is	  the	  natural	  gas	  pricing	  environment	  –	  i.e.	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  prices	  are	  determined	  by	  gas	  market	  dynamics	   rather	   than	   linked	   to	  oil	  prices.	  The	  effect	  of	   shale	  gas	  development	  on	   this	  issue	  will	  also	  be	  explored.	  	  
6.2.1 Context	  and	  global	  trends	  At	  the	  outset	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  note	  the	  key	  differences	  in	  the	  main	  scenario	  results.	  Figure	  6-­‐10,	  Figure	  6-­‐11	  and	  Figure	  6-­‐12	  show	  some	  useful	  parameters	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  when	  interpreting	   the	   trends	   and	   patterns	   revealed	   in	   the	   subsequent	   analysis.	   Indeed,	   the	  global	   energy	   demand	   and	   supply	   balance	   is	   subject	   to	   considerable	   variation	  depending	   on	   a	   countless	   number	   of	   variables.	   Here,	   we	   explore	   the	   range	   of	  uncertainty	  around	  economic	  growth	  and	  shale	  gas	  economics.	  Figure	  6-­‐10	  shows	  the	  impact	  of	  different	  economic	  growth	  trajectories	  on	  primary	  energy	  demand.	  In	  the	  long	  term,	  an	  optimistic	  growth	  scenario	  implies	  a	  17%	  higher	  level	  of	  total	  energy	  demand	  in	  2030	  (rising	  to	  30%	  in	  2040).	  As	  for	  gas	  economics,	  optimistic	  assumptions	  about	  the	  shale	  gas	  supply	  curve	  reveal,	  as	  can	  be	  expected,	  a	  more	  substantial	  role	  for	  this	  fuel	  in	  the	   global	  primary	  energy	   supply,	   as	   shown	   in	  Figure	  6-­‐11.	  But	  what	   is	   interesting	   is	  that	  gas	  increases	  in	  importance,	  even	  in	  the	  most	  conservative	  case	  of	  low	  growth	  and	  unfavourable	   conditions	   for	   shale	   gas	   development;	   indeed,	   from	   2010	   to	   2040	   the	  share	   of	   gas	   in	   the	   global	   energy	   supply	   increases	   from	  20%	   to	   just	   over	   30%	  of	   the	  total.	  	  The	   picture	   is	   somewhat	   different	   when	   considering	   the	   impact	   of	   shale	   gas	   on	   the	  global	  distribution	  of	  energy	  demand.	  Indeed,	  even	  under	  different	  growth	  trajectories,	  the	   presence	   or	   absence	   of	   shale	   gas	   development	   does	   not	   significantly	   change	   the	  relative	   shares	   of	   different	   sources	   of	   primary	   energy	   –	   oil,	   gas,	   nuclear	   and	   so	   on	   –	  among	  the	  different	  regions.	  In	  both	  cases,	  China	  remains	  the	  primary	  engine	  of	  growth	  as	  it	  increases	  its	  share	  of	  global	  energy	  demand	  from	  18%	  to	  25%.	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Figure	  6-­‐10:	  Total	  energy	  demand	  under	  different	  scenario	  assumptions	  
	  




Figure	  6-­‐12:	  Total	  energy	  demand	  by	  region	  
	  
6.2.2 Upstream	  gas	  production	  Observing	  changes	  in	  the	  upstream	  sector,	  two	  key	  questions	  come	  to	  the	  fore.	  Firstly,	  what	  role	  can	  unconventional	  gas	  play	  in	  the	  future	  primary	  energy	  mix?	  In	  particular,	  how	  does	  an	  optimistic	  perspective	  for	  shale	  gas	  development	  affect	  global	  and	  regional	  gas	  production?	  Under	   conditions	   of	   slow	   growth	   and	   conservative	   assumptions	   about	   the	   resource	  base,	  shale	  gas	  production	  is	  projected	  to	  rise	  at	  a	  slow	  but	  steady	  pace	  to	  reach	  a	  rate	  of	  just	  over	  100	  Mtoe/year	  in	  2030	  and	  300	  Mtoe/year,	  or	  10%	  of	  total	  global	  gas	  demand,	  by	  2040.	  The	  optimistic	  and	  high-­‐growth	  scenario,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  shows	  how,	  under	  assumptions	   of	   extremely	   competitive	   extraction	   costs,	   plentiful	   resources	   and	   high	  GDP	   growth,	   shale	   gas	   has	   the	   potential	   to	   make	   up	   a	   quarter	   of	   total	   global	   gas	  production	  by	  2030	  and	  be	  close	  to	  40%	  by	  2040.	  Figure	   6-­‐13	   also	   shows	   how	   total	   gas	   production	   becomes	   higher	   in	   the	   high-­‐growth	  scenario.	   But	   the	   impact	   of	   higher	   growth	   on	   shale	   gas	   production	   only	   becomes	  apparent	  at	  the	  very	  end	  of	  the	  time	  horizon	  Other	  unconventional	   sources	   of	   gas	   remain	   relatively	  unaffected	  by	  different	   growth	  trajectories.	   In	   all	   cases,	   both	   coal-­‐bed	  methane	  and	   tight	   gas	  progressively	   lose	   their	  market	  shares	  such	  that,	  even	  in	  the	  conservative	  scenario,	  shale	  is	  globally	  competitive	  after	  2020	  and,	  by	  2025,	  becomes	  the	  dominant	  source	  of	  unconventional	  natural	  gas.42	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  This	   result	   is,	  of	   course,	   related	   to	   the	  assumptions	  made	   for	   the	  economics	  of	  CBM	  and	   tight	  gas,	  as	  referred	   in	   the	   previous	   section’s	   discussion	   on	   gas	   production	   costs.	   No	   exploration	   of	   the	   potential	  impact	  of	  different	  assumptions	  around	  CBM	  and	  tight	  gas	  has	  been	  carried	  out	  here.	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Figure	  6-­‐13:	  Global	  gas	  production	  
	  In	   the	   scenario	   most	   favourable	   to	   shale	   gas	   development,	   there	   are	   a	   number	   of	  regional	  trends	  worth	  highlighting.	  As	  shown	  in	  Figure	  6-­‐14,	  the	  USA	  captures	  the	  lion’s	  share	  of	  unconventional	  gas	  production	  in	  2020	  by	  producing	  70%	  of	  the	  world’s	  total.	  However,	   over	   time	   the	   US	   share	   declines	   to	   30%	   as	   new	   entrants	   slowly	   enter	   the	  unconventional	  gas-­‐producing	  market.	   In	  particular,	  East	  Asian	  markets	  see	  a	  surge	  in	  shale	  gas	  production	  after	  2020	  such	  that	  within	  20	  years	  these	  countries	  provide	  28%	  of	  the	  global	  unconventional	  gas	  supply	  (with	  China	  alone	  producing	  three	  quarters	  of	  this	   figure).	   Other	   regions	   witness	   more	   moderate	   but	   steady	   growth;	   significant	  production	  takes	  place	  in	  Central/South	  America	  (9%),	  in	  Europe	  (8%),	  in	  Africa	  (7%)	  and	  in	  Canada	  (6%)	  in	  2040.	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Figure	  6-­‐14:	  Unconventional	  gas	  production	  in	  the	  optimistic	  high-­‐growth	  scenario	  
	  Traditional	  conventional	  gas	  suppliers,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  do	  not	  exploit	  their	  potential	  for	  shale	  gas	  development.	  Thus,	  even	  in	  the	  optimistic	  case,	  neither	  the	  Former	  Soviet	  Union	  (which	  includes	  the	  Russian	  Federation	  and	  Caspian	  region)	  nor	  the	  Middle	  East	  significantly	  produces	  reserves	  during	  the	  period	  under	  scrutiny.	  Some	  significant	  shale	  gas	   production	   starts	   in	   FSU	   at	   the	   very	   end	   of	   the	   time	   horizon,	   but	   a	  more	   careful	  analysis	  of	  the	  results	  shows	  how,	  despite	  having	  potentially	  vast	  shale	  gas	  reserves,	  the	  margins	   between	   conventional	   and	   unconventional	   gas	   remain	   tilted	   in	   favour	   of	   the	  former.	   This	   trend	   is	  more	   strongly	   visible	   in	   the	  Middle	   East.	   This	  means	   that	   both	  regions’	   relative	   share	   in	   total	   global	   gas	   production	   declines	   proportionately	   to	   the	  increase	  in	  shale	  gas	  production	  in	  other	  regions	  (yielding	  an	  average	  of	  3-­‐4%	  less	  gas	  over	   the	  period	   from	  2010-­‐2040	   in	   a	   case	   of	   significant	   shale	   gas	   production).	   In	   the	  case	   of	   the	  Middle	  East,	   shale	   gas	  production	   checks	   the	   rise	   in	   this	   region’s	   share	  of	  total	   global	   gas	  production,	   such	   that	   a	  peak	   share	  of	  17%	  reached	   in	  2025	  begins	   to	  decline	   despite	   increases	   in	   production	   from	   1	  000bcm	   to	   over	   1	  500	   bcm	   in	   2040.	  Much	  of	   this	   lost	  market	   share	   is	  picked	  up	  by	  production	   in	   the	  USA	  and	   to	   a	   lesser	  extent	  by	  Asia	  and	  Europe.	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Figure	  6-­‐15:	  Changes	  in	  relative	  share	  of	  total	  gas	  production	  in	  2040	  (conservative/optimistic)	  
	  In	   terms	  of	   cumulative	  production,	   traditional	   gas-­‐producing	   regions	   also	   see	   a	   slight	  reduction	   in	   their	   output	   volumes	   compared	   with	   a	   situation	   of	   cheap	   and	   plentiful	  shale	   gas.	   Indeed,	   a	   look	  at	   the	  optimistic	   and	   conservative	   scenarios	   reveals	   that	   the	  Former	   Soviet	   Union	   (FSU)	   produces	   an	   average	   of	   20%	   less	   conventional	   gas	   than	  would	  be	  the	  case	  in	  a	  situation	  where	  shale	  gas	  reserves	  are	  less	  abundant	  and	  more	  expensive	   to	  develop.	  The	  difference	   is	  greater	   for	   the	  Middle	  East,	  where	   there	   is	   an	  average	   reduction	   of	   15%	   in	   total	   conventional	   gas	   production	   between	   the	   two	  scenarios	   over	   the	   period	   2010-­‐2040.	   These	   figures	   imply	   that	   in	   an	   optimistic	   case	  there	  is	  enough	  room	  for	  new	  sources	  of	  unconventional	  gas	  to	  be	  developed	  alongside	  conventional	  production,	  but	  there	  is	  also	  some	  level	  of	  competitive	  substitution.	  	  Overall,	   it	  seems	  that	  shale	  gas	  will	  be	  developed	  under	  any	  combination	  of	  scenarios.	  However,	  this	  statement	  belies	  the	  vast	  differences	  in	  total	  volume	  produced.	  As	  shown	  in	  Figure	  6-­‐16,	  shale	  gas	  production	  is	  subject	  to	  high	  levels	  of	  variation	  depending	  on	  which	  assumptions	  eventually	  bear	  fruit.	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Figure	  6-­‐16:	  Shale	  gas	  production	  by	  region	  in	  2040:	  Optimistic-­‐HG	  and	  Conservative-­‐LG	  scenarios	  
	  
Box	  6-­‐3:	  Number	  of	  European	  shale	  gas	  wells	  How	   many	   wells	   would	   need	   to	   be	   drilled	   to	   sustain	   the	   most	   optimistic	   scenario	   of	   shale	   gas	  development	   in	  Europe?	  There	   is	  no	  easy	  way	  of	   calculating	   such	  a	   figure	  and	  any	  general	   estimations	  must	  either	  make	  several	  simplifying	  assumptions	  or	  ‘explain	  away’	  crucial	  factors	  such	  as	  success	  rates,	  decline	   curves,	   well	   types	   (e.g.	   ‘dry’,	   exploratory,	   development),	   ramp-­‐up	   periods	   and	   a	  whole	   host	   of	  project	  and	  play-­‐specific	  circumstances.	  	  Nonetheless,	  an	  attempt	  to	  provide	  an	  indicative	  estimate	  is	  presented	  here.	  The	  cumulative	  production	  of	  shale	  gas	  in	  Europe	  in	  an	  optimistic	  case	  of	  high	  demand,	  low	  costs	  and	  plentiful	  reserves	  would	  total	  close	   to	  3	  trillion	  cubic	  metres	  over	   the	  period	  2025-­‐2040,	  an	  average	  withdrawal	   rate	  of	  200	  bcm	  per	  annum.	  Two	  independent	  assessments	  made	  within	  this	  report	  have	  estimated	  the	  ultimate	  recovery	  of	  gas	   from	   a	   single	   well	   to	   stand	   at	   approximately	   57	   mcm	   over	   an	   assumed	   lifetime	   of	   30	   years.43	  Extrapolating	   from	   the	   US	   experience	   over	   the	   last	   ten	   years,	   the	   authors	   assume	   the	   need	   for	   ten	  exploratory	  wells	   and	   the	   presence	   of	   ten	   dry	   holes	   for	   every	   100	   shale	   gas-­‐producing	  wells	   drilled.44	  Cumulatively,	  in	  this	  case	  63	  000	  wells	  would	  need	  to	  be	  drilled	  during	  the	  period	  2025-­‐2040	  to	  maintain	  this	  rate	  of	  production,	  or	  roughly	  4	  200	  wells	  drilled	  on	  an	  annual	  basis.	  However,	  it	  must	  be	  stressed	  that	  the	  range	  of	  uncertainty	  is	  wide.	  Indeed,	  in	  a	  conservative	  case	  of	  low	  growth,	   costly	  production	  and	  scarce	  resources,	   the	   total	  number	  of	  wells	  drilled	  over	   the	  same	  period	  could	  be	  as	  low	  as	  7	  900	  (yielding	  a	  cumulative	  production	  of	  374	  bcm).	  Thus,	  these	  estimates	  should	  be	  seen	   as	   purely	   indicative,	   even	   though	   they	   roughly	   correspond	   to	   similar	   ratios	   identified	   in	   other	  sources.45	  
6.2.3 The	  role	  of	  gas	  in	  a	  carbon-­‐constrained	  world	  It	  is	  normally	  assumed	  that	  in	  a	  carbon-­‐constrained	  economy	  the	  relative	  importance	  of	  natural	  gas	  is	  likely	  to	  increase,	  as	  it	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  cost-­‐effective	  means	  by	  which	  to	  maintain	   energy	   supplies	   while	   reducing	   CO2	   emissions.	   But	   what	   if	   the	   carbon-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  See	  Sections	  2.3	  and	  3.3.6.	  44	  EIA,	  Crude	  Oil	  and	  Natural	  Gas	  Exploratory	  and	  Development	  Wells	  (2012,	  cited	  27	  April	  2012);	  available	  from	  http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_enr_wellend_s1_a.htm	  45	  Gény,	  'Unconventional	  Gas';	  Rogers,	  'Shale	  gas'.	  Both	  studies	  assume	  the	  need	  for	  800	  wells	  drilled	  per	  annum	  to	  sustain	  a	  production	  plateau	  of	  around	  30	  bcm.	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constrained	  scenario	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  objective	  of	  halving	  CO2	  emissions	  by	  2050?	  Are	   the	  most	   optimistic	   projections	   about	   the	   future	   role	   of	   natural	   gas	   in	   the	   global	  energy	   mix	   consistent	   with	   a	   carbon	   emissions	   path	   towards	   an	   average	   global	  temperature	   rise	  of	  no	  more	   than	  2˚C?	  Will	  natural	  gas	  be	  a	   cost-­‐effective	  bridge	   to	  a	  low-­‐carbon	  future?	  	  To	  assess	  these	  key	  issues,	  a	  specific	  sensitivity	  analysis	  was	  carried	  out,	  adding	  to	  one	  of	  the	  two	  optimistic	  shale	  gas	  scenarios	  described	  so	  far	  (the	  Opt-­‐LG	  scenario)	  to	  take	  a	  path	  consistent	  with	  the	  target.	  Figure	   6-­‐17	   shows	   how	   the	   global	   energy	   mix	   can	   change	   in	   a	   strongly	   carbon-­‐constrained	  scenario,	  with	  a	  reduction	   in	  overall	  CO2	  emissions	  of	  about	  40%	  in	  2040	  compared	  with	  2010	   emissions	   levels.	  What	   is	   interesting	   is	   that	   a	   higher	   carbon	   tax	  does	  not	  necessarily	  prevent	  natural	  gas	  –	  a	  subset	  of	  which	  includes	  shale	  gas	  –	  from	  being	   developed	   in	   an	   optimistic	   scenario.46	  Rather,	   the	   amount	   of	   all	   natural	   gas	  produced	  is	  lower	  as	  the	  carbon	  tax	  progressively	  rises.	  The	  significant	  change	  comes	  in	  2040,	  when	  the	  amount	  of	  gas	  produced	  in	  a	  carbon-­‐constrained	  world	  is	  30%	  less	  than	  one	  in	  which	  a	  lower	  carbon	  tax	  is	  in	  place.	  	  In	   other	   words,	   the	   strict	   emission	   targets	   modelled	   do	   not	   preclude	   a	   significant	  growth	  in	  natural	  gas	  use.	  Therefore	  the	  modelling	  results	  support	  the	  potential	  role	  of	  natural	  gas	  as	  a	  ‘bridging’	  fuel.	  However,	  there	  is	  one	  qualification	  the	  reader	  should	  bear	  in	  mind	  in	  interpreting	  these	  results.	  Although	  the	  model	  used	  here	   factors	   in	  emissions	  of	   the	  different	   fuels	  when	  burned,	   it	   does	   not	   consider	   GHG	   emissions	   during	  mining	   or	   transportation.	   Only	   a	  complete	   life-­‐cycle	   comparison	   of	   all	   the	   major	   fuels	   in	   the	   energy	   system	   can	  comprehensively	  address	  the	  controversy	  surrounding	  the	  life-­‐cycle	  emissions	  of	  shale	  gas.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  The	  reader	  should	  bear	  in	  mind	  that	  the	  carbon	  content	  of	  conventional	  and	  unconventional	  gas	  are	  the	  same	   in	   the	  model,	   and	   that	   the	   analysis	   does	   not	   incorporate	   life-­‐cycle	   emissions	   analysis	   from	   their	  differing	  methods	  of	  extraction.	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Figure	  6-­‐17:	  Total	  primary	  energy	  supply	  and	  CO2	  emissions	  in	  the	  optimistic	  low-­‐growth	  scenario	  




6.2.4 Gas	  trade	  One	  of	   the	  most	   significant	   effects	   of	   the	  US	   shale	   gas	   ‘revolution’	   so	   far	   has	   been	   its	  impact	  on	  the	  current	  and	  perspective	  US	  gas	  trade.	  Therefore,	  one	  of	  the	  main	  insights	  to	   be	   analysed	   through	   a	   global	   energy	   system	   approach	   is	   the	   potential	   for	   a	   global	  shale	  gas	  development	  to	  change	  global	  gas	  trade.	  This	  means	  answering	  questions	  like	  the	  followings:	  	  
• What	  kind	  of	  correlation,	   if	  any,	  exists	  between	  shale	  gas	  development	  and	  gas	  trading?	  Are	  shale	  gas	  and	  LNG	   trading	  complementary	  or	  competitive?	  Would	  shale	   gas	   development	   reduce	   or	   increase	   gas	   trading?	   Would	   favourable	  conditions	  for	  gas	  trading	  help	  the	  development	  of	  shale	  gas?	  Or	  in	  other	  words,	  to	  what	  extent	  do	   the	  answers	   to	   the	  previous	  question	  depend	  on	   future	  LNG	  transportation	  costs?	  
• How	  does	  shale	  gas	  development	  impact	  the	  structure	  of	  gas	  trading?	  Are	  there	  significant	   changes	   in	   the	   flows	   between	   regions,	   with	   currently	   exporting	  regions	   penalised	   from	   the	   development	   of	   shale	   gas?	   Are	   there	   regions	  developing	  shale	  gas	  for	  export?	  Also,	  is	  there	  a	  difference	  between	  the	  impact	  of	  shale	   gas	   on	   LNG	   trading	   versus	   its	   impact	   on	   pipeline	   gas	   traded	   between	  regions?	  Global	  gas	  trading	  is	  likely	  to	  increase	  in	  any	  scenario,	  independent	  of	  high	  or	  low	  GDP	  growth	   or	   optimistic/conservative	   conditions	   for	   shale	   gas.	   This	   is	   true	   for	   both	  liquefied	  natural	  gas,	  which	  increases	  two	  to	  threefold	  depending	  on	  which	  scenario	  is	  considered	   and	   also	   for	   pipeline	   trading,	  which	  witnesses	   around	   a	   doubling	   in	   total	  volumes	  traded	  between	  regions	  during	  the	  same	  period	  (2010-­‐2040).	  The	  main	  cause	  behind	   this	   increase	   is	   the	  massive	   growth	   in	   demand	   expected	   in	   Asia,	   primarily	   in	  China,	  a	  country	  which	  is	  set	  to	  import	  between	  570-­‐730	  bcm	  of	  LNG	  alone	  by	  2040.	  	  Despite	  these	  general	  trends,	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  scenarios	  reveals	  that	  shale	  gas	  does	  indeed	  affect	  the	  total	  volume	  of	  trade,	  particularly	  for	  LNG.	  As	  demonstrated	  in	  Figure	  6-­‐18	  and	  Figure	  6-­‐19,	  when	  comparing	  all	  scenarios,	  it	  appears	  that	  conditions	  of	  high	  growth	  and	  low	  shale	  gas	  development	  are	  most	  amenable	  to	  interregional	  trade.	  This	  implies	  that	  shale	  gas	  production	  is	  predominately	  reserved	  for	  internal	  use	  only;	  there	  are	  no	   cases	  where	   significant	   additions	   to	   a	   region’s	   gas	   exports	  occur	   as	   a	   result	   of	  shale	  production.	  Shale	   gas	   production	   and	   the	   global	   LNG	   trade	   show	   a	   particularly	   strong	  interrelationship.	  With	   all	   other	   factors	   held	   constant,	   the	   scenario	  with	   cheaper	   and	  more	   plentiful	   shale	   gas	   leads	   to	   a	   corresponding	   reduction	   in	   interregionally	   traded	  LNG	  volumes	  compared	  with	  the	  scenario	  of	  more	  costly	  and	  limited	  shale	  gas.	  This	  is	  a	  result	   of	   the	   relatively	   cheaper	   cost	   of	   indigenous	   production	   and	   transport	   of	   gas	  
within	  regions.	  In	  China,	  for	  example,	  LNG	  imports	  will	  see	  a	  12%	  drop	  in	  a	  situation	  of	  considerable	   shale	  gas	  production,	   correspondingly	   reducing	   the	  exports	  of	  LNG	   from	  other	  developing	  Asian	  countries,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	  
	  217	  
Figure	  6-­‐18:	  LNG	  exports	  under	  optimistic	  and	  conservative	  shale	  gas	  development	  
	  
Figure	  6-­‐19:	  LNG	  exports	  under	  conservative	  and	  optimistic	  shale	  gas	  development	  with	  low	  LNG	  
cost	  
	  But	  would	  more	  favourable	  conditions	  for	  gas	  trading	  make	  a	  difference	  to	  this	  result?	  In	  other	  words,	  would	  a	   lower	  transport	  cost	   for	  LNG	  favour	   imports	  over	   indigenous	  shale	   gas	   production?	   Figure	   6-­‐19	   shows	   that	   the	   above	   holds	   if	   a	   lower	   LNG	   cost	   is	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assumed	  for	  both	  scenarios,	  even	  if	  total	  LNG	  trade	  would	  be	  much	  higher	  in	  this	  case:	  Again	  the	  impact	  of	  an	  optimistic	  shale	  gas	  scenario	  is	  that	  it	  reduces	  total	  trade.	  However,	  a	  second	  insight	  comes	  from	  the	  comparison	  between	  total	  LNG	  trade	  in	  the	  conservative-­‐HG	  scenario	  (Figure	  6-­‐18)	  and	  the	  optimistic	  scenario	  plus	   low	  LNG	  cost	  (Figure	  6-­‐19).	  This	  suggests	  that	  a	  shale	  gas	  development	  would	  only	  reduce	  LNG	  trade	  volumes	  under	  conditions	  of	  the	  currently	  high	  LNG	  transportation	  costs.	  The	  MEA	  region	  exports	  the	  most	   in	  any	  of	   the	  scenarios,	   followed	  by	  the	  Africa,	  ODA	  and	   AUS	   regions.	   Low	   LNG	   transportation	   costs	   increase	   exports	   from	   each	   of	   these	  regions,	  but	  particularly	   from	  Australia.	  LNG	  exports	   from	  Australia	  are	  also	   the	  most	  reduced	  in	  the	  optimistic	  shale	  gas	  scenario.	  For	  pipeline	  trading	  (Figure	  6-­‐20),	  the	  trend	  is	  somewhat	  different	  as	  piped	  gas	  records	  increases	  in	  all	  scenarios,	  independent	  of	  growth	  or	  shale	  gas	  production	  assumptions.	  Looking	   east,	   in	   the	   conservative	   case,	   the	   FSU	   begins	   to	   export	   piped	   natural	   gas	   to	  non-­‐Chinese	  eastern	  markets	  in	  2020	  and	  volumes	  eventually	  triple	  to	  reach	  90bcm	  by	  2040.	   But	   in	   a	   case	   of	   significant	   shale	   gas	   production,	   this	   trade	   link	   remains	  undeveloped.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  overall	  loss	  in	  FSU	  exports	  is	  negligible	  as	  this	  market	  is	  comparatively	   small	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   link	   between	   the	   FSU	   and	   China,	   which	   is	  unaffected	  by	  significant	  shale	  gas	  production	  and	  grows	  threefold	  to	  270bcm	  over	  the	  same	   period.	   As	   for	  North	  America,	   similar	   reductions	   in	   interregional	   pipeline	   trade	  occur	   depending	   on	   the	   amount	   of	   shale	   gas	   output;	   comparing	   the	   optimistic	   with	  conservative	  cases,	   the	  USA	  reduces	   the	  need	   for	  pipeline	   imports	   from	  Canada	  by	  an	  average	  of	  27%	  over	  the	  30-­‐year	  period.	  
Figure	  6-­‐20:	  Pipeline	  exports	  by	  region	  under	  optimistic	  and	  conservative	  shale	  gas	  development	  
	  
	  219	  
Looking	  at	  imports,	  Figure	  6-­‐21	  shows	  the	  two	  ‘extreme’	  scenarios	  for	  LNG	  trade,	  i.e.	  the	  conservative	   shale	  gas	  with	   low	  LNG	  cost	  and	   the	  equivalent	   scenario	  with	  optimistic	  shale	  gas	  assumptions.	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  main	  importing	  region	  is	  China,	  which	  is	  also	  the	  region	  where	  LNG	  imports	  decrease	  the	  most,	  assuming	  high	  shale	  gas	  development.	  LNG	  imports	  also	  decrease	  in	  the	  Western	  Europe	  and	  Other	  Developing	  Asia	  regions.	  Figure	  6-­‐22	  shows	  how	  the	  impact	  of	  optimistic	  shale	  gas	  assumptions	  is	  less	  significant	  in	   pipeline	   trading	   than	   in	   LNG.	   In	   fact,	   pipeline	   imports	   seem	   more	   robust	   to	   the	  development	  of	  shale	  gas	   than	  LNG,	  as	  can	  be	  seen	  by	  the	  small	  difference	   in	  pipeline	  imports	   to	   China	   in	   the	   figure	   below.	   There	   are	   only	  marginal	   reductions	   in	   all	   other	  regions.	  Now	  turning	  to	  Europe	  in	  more	  detail	  (see	  Figure	  6-­‐23	  below),	  piped	  gas	  from	  the	  FSU	  and	   Africa	   record	   steady	   increases	   in	   both	   the	   conservative	   and	   optimistic	   cases.	  However,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  shale	  gas	  does	  not	  affect	  interregional	  pipeline	  trade.	  Assuming	   that	   high-­‐capacity/long-­‐distance	   lines	   such	   as	   South	   Stream,	   Nabucco	   and	  Nord	   Stream	   II	   are	   constructed,	   their	   competitiveness	   and	   full	   capacity	   use	   is	   only	  assured	  in	  a	  situation	  where	  shale	  gas	  reserves	  are	  costly	  to	  develop.	  Otherwise,	  shale	  gas	   and	   pipeline	   imports	   compete	   for	   European	   market	   share	   and,	   in	   a	   scenario	   of	  optimistic	  shale	  gas	  resources	  and	  low	  growth,	  Europe’s	  pipeline	  imports	  from	  the	  FSU	  become	  less	  competitive	  over	  time.	  	  This	   trend	   is	   more	   pronounced	   in	   Western	   Europe	   than	   in	   Eastern	   Europe.	   Indeed,	  whereas	   the	   former	   reduces	   total	   imports	   by	   about	   30%	   with	   significant	   shale	   gas	  production,	  the	  latter	  can	  only	  claim	  a	  net	  reduction	  of	  10%	  in	  the	  same	  scenario.	  This	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  due	  to	  the	  comparatively	  low	  transport	  costs	  for	  piped	  gas	  relative	  to	  new	  production	   from	   shale	   gas	   resources.	   This	   means	   that	   Eastern	   Europe’s	   imports	   of	  pipeline	   gas	   from	   the	   FSU	   record	   steady	   increases	   over	   the	   period	   from	   2010-­‐2040.	  Even	   in	  an	  optimistic	  case	  of	  cheap	  and	  plentiful	  shale	  gas,	   import	  dependence	   in	   this	  region	  remains	  flat	  at	  around	  75%.	  However,	  this	  trend	  also	  depends	  on	  the	  degree	  of	  growth	   in	  energy	  demand.	  Where	   there	   is	  a	  relatively	  high	   level	  of	  GDP	  growth,	  shale	  gas	  takes	  a	  proportionally	  smaller	  share	  of	  Europe’s	  total	  gas	  supply	  from	  FSU	  imports	  –	  around	  10%	  –	  over	  the	  period	  until	  2040.	  	  As	  a	  final	  comment,	  the	  scenario	  analysis	  shows	  the	  low	  robustness	  of	  the	  results	  with	  respect	   to	   LNG	   cost.	   Figure	   6-­‐23	   shows	   how	   the	   structure	   of	   EU	   gas	   imports	   is	   very	  sensitive	  to	  LNG	  cost	  assumptions.	  If	  LNG	  costs	  remain	  at	  the	  current	  high	  levels	  then	  an	  optimistic	   shale	   gas	   scenario	   mainly	   decreases	   LNG	   imports;	   in	   the	   low	   LNG	   cost	  scenario,	  it	  is	  the	  pipeline	  routes	  that	  are	  mainly	  affected.	  Assuming	   a	   conservative	   level	   of	   shale	   gas	   development	   under	   conditions	   of	   high	  growth,	  Europe’s	  LNG	  imports	  until	  2025	  are	  set	   to	  rise	  by	  an	  average	  of	  3.6	  bcm	  per	  annum	  (with	  most	  of	  the	  volumes	  sourced	  from	  the	  Middle	  East	  region).	  Only	  after	  this	  period	  does	   the	  slow	  expansion	  of	  shale	  gas	  production	  stop	  this	  upward	  climb.	   In	  an	  optimistic	  case	  of	  shale	  gas	  development,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	  LNG	   imports	  see	  a	  much	  sharper	  decrease.	  In	  this	  case,	  LNG	  imports	  fall	  to	  zero	  by	  2040	  as	  significant	  indigenous	  shale	  gas	  reduces	  the	  need	  for	  relatively	  costly	  LNG.	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Figure	  6-­‐21:	  LNG	  imports	  by	  region	  in	  the	  conservative	  shale	  gas	  development	  scenario	  with	  low	  
LNG	  cost	  versus	  optimistic	  low	  growth	  
	  
Figure	  6-­‐22:	  Pipeline	  imports	  by	  region	  in	  the	  conservative	  shale	  gas	  development	  scenario	  versus	  
optimistic	  low	  growth	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Figure	  6-­‐23:	  European	  gas	  imports	  in	  conservative/optimistic	  shale	  gas	  scenarios	  
	  
6.2.5 The	  impact	  of	  shale	  gas	  production	  on	  imports	  For	  the	  net	  gas-­‐importing	  regions,	  the	  impact	  of	  shale	  gas	  on	  energy	  dependence	  largely	  depends	  on	  the	  degree	  of	  production	  and	  the	  increase	  in	  gas	  demand.	  For	  Europe,	  the	  results	   suggest	   that	   shale	   gas	   production	   will	   not	   make	   the	   region	   self-­‐sufficient	   in	  natural	  gas.	  Even	  in	  the	  most	  optimistic	  case	  of	  high	  GDP	  growth,	  large	  reserve	  size	  and	  low	   production	   cost,	   European	   shale	   gas	   development	   can	   only	   compensate	   for	   the	  decline	   in	   conventional	   gas	   production	   (as	   shown	   in	   Figure	   6-­‐24).	   Under	   such	  circumstances,	  this	  implies	  that	  Europe’s	  import	  dependence	  will	  remain	  relatively	  flat	  over	   the	   period	   to	   2040	   as	   shale	   gas	   reserves	   serve	   the	   twin	   purpose	   of	   shoring	   up	  indigenous	  production	  and	  keeping	  pace	  with	  rising	  gas	  demand.	  In	  this	  way,	  shale	  gas	  manages	  to	  reverse	  what	  would	  otherwise	  be	  an	  increase	  in	  overall	  gas	  demand;	  in	  the	  best	  case,	   shale	  gas	  development	  has	   the	  potential	   to	   reduce	  Europe’s	  dependence	  on	  gas	  imports	  by	  an	  average	  of	  6%	  in	  2020	  to	  more	  than	  20%	  in	  2040.	  In	  other	  words,	  by	  2040,	  import	  dependence	  decreases	  from	  79%	  (in	  the	  conservative	  scenario)	  to	  57%	  in	  case	  of	  significant	  shale	  gas	  production.	  In	  some	  regions	  where	  demand	  growth	  is	  strong,	  even	  a	  surge	  in	  shale	  gas	  production	  cannot	  prevent	  an	  increase	  in	  imports.	  This	  is	  the	  case	  in	  India	  where	  the	  gas	  demand	  increases	   six-­‐fold,	  more	   than	   offsetting	   indigenous	   shale	   gas	   production.	   But	   in	   other	  cases,	   such	  as	  China,	   significant	   shale	  gas	  production	  can	   indeed	  strengthen	  a	  general	  decrease	   in	   import	   dependence	   despite	   rising	   energy	   demand.	   Assuming	   cheap	   and	  abundant	  shale	  gas	  reserves,	  China	  will	  lower	  its	  imports	  from	  three	  quarters	  to	  half	  of	  the	  total	  gas	  demand	  by	  2040.	  However,	  if	  shale	  gas	  proves	  more	  costly	  and	  difficult	  to	  find,	  China’s	  import	  dependence	  will	  reach	  60%	  in	  the	  same	  year.	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In	   the	  USA,	   the	   total	  volume	  of	  net	   imports	   is	   relatively	  unaffected	  by	  unconventional	  gas	  development.	  The	  higher	  deployment	  of	  shale	  gas	  in	  the	  optimistic	  cases	  is	  mainly	  absorbed	   by	   the	   US	   gas	  market,	   as	   natural	   gas	   serves	   as	   a	   substitute	   for	   coal	   in	   the	  power	  generation	  sector.	  Indeed,	  if	  shale	  gas	  is	  cheap	  and	  abundant	  under	  lower	  growth	  assumptions,	  coal	  will	  generate	  only	  400TWh	  of	  electricity	  in	  2040,	  instead	  of	  the	  1	  800	  TWh	  resulting	  from	  a	  case	  of	  limited	  shale	  gas	  production.	  This	  substantial	  gap	  of	  75%	  is	   filled	   by	   gas-­‐fired	   power	   generators,	   explaining	   not	   only	   the	   threefold	   rise	   in	   the	  share	  of	  gas	  used	  for	  electricity	  generation	  over	  the	  period	  from	  2010-­‐2040	  but	  also	  the	  lack	  of	  significant	  export	  of	  natural	  gas.	  	  
6.3 Natural	  gas	  in	  power	  generation	  and	  end	  uses	  Primarily,	  shale	  gas	  can	  affect	  the	  energy	  system	  and	  its	  evolution	  through	  its	  impact	  on	  the	   cost	   of	   energy	   and	   eventually,	   provided	   the	   energy	   markets	   are	   competitive,	   on	  energy	   prices.	   Significant	   growth	   in	   shale	   gas	   production	   can	   reduce	   the	   gas	   price,	  provided	  that	  the	  gas	  market	  can	  decouple	  from	  the	  oil	  market.	  Figure	   6-­‐25	   and	   Figure	   6-­‐26	   show	   the	   relationship	   between	  demand,	   production	   and	  price	  in	  a	  case	  of	  low	  growth	  and	  either	  high	  or	  low	  shale	  gas	  production.	  As	  shown,	  the	  greater	  the	  difference	  in	  price	  between	  a	  conservative	  and	  optimistic	  scenario,	  the	  more	  there	  is	  an	  observable	  effect	  on	  gas	  demand.	  In	  Europe,	  an	  optimistic	  case	  of	  shale	  gas	  production	  does	  less	  to	  change	  prices	  than	  equivalent	  scenarios	  in	  the	  USA	  and	  China,	  where	  the	  price	  differential	  between	  conservative	  and	  optimistic	  production	  is	  around	  $2/GJ.	  The	  subsequent	  differences	  in	  the	  effect	  of	  shale	  gas	  development	  on	  demand	  are	  shown	  in	  Figure	  6-­‐26.	  	  
Figure	   6-­‐25:	   Gas	   prices	   in	   China,	   Western	   Europe	   and	   the	   United	   States	   of	   America	   in	   the	  
optimistic	  and	  conservative	  shale	  gas	  scenarios	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Figure	  6-­‐26:	  Increase	  in	  gas	  demand	  between	  conservative	  and	  optimistic	  shale	  gas	  scenarios	  
	  As	   discussed	  on	   the	   following	  pages,	   in	   terms	  of	   final	   energy	  use,	   the	  main	   impact	   of	  favourable	   shale	   gas	   development	   can	   be	   expected	   in	   the	   power	   generation	   and	  transportation	   sectors.	   As	   a	   matter	   of	   fact,	   the	   scenario	   analysis	   shows	   how	  unconventional	   sources	   help	   natural	   gas	   to	   challenge	   the	   dominance	   of	   coal	   in	  electricity	  generation	  and	  of	  oil	  in	  the	  transport	  sector.	  	  
6.3.1 Power	  generation	  With	   regard	   to	   the	   power	   sector,	   the	   first	   and	   most	   immediate	   effect	   of	   cheap	   and	  plentiful	  shale	  gas	  is	  a	  strong	  effect	  of	  substitution	  between	  fuels.	  This	  is	  apparent	  first	  of	  all	  when	  comparing	  the	  ratio	  of	  gas	  versus	  coal	   in	  the	  electricity	  generation	  mix,	  as	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  difference	  between	  the	  conservative	  and	  optimistic	  shale	  gas	  scenarios.	  As	   shown	   in	   Figure	   6-­‐28,	   electricity	   generation	   from	   natural	   gas	   in	   the	   optimistic	  scenario	  is	  about	  a	  third	  higher	  than	  in	  the	  conservative	  scenario.	  	  While	   shale	   gas	   appears	   not	   to	   challenge	   the	   dominance	   of	   coal,	   it	   does	   not	   seem	   to	  deter	   investments	   in	   renewable	   energy.	   This	   is	   apparent	   when	   considering	   the	  difference	   between	   the	   conservative	   and	   optimistic	   cases	   of	   shale	   gas	   development.	  While	  in	  the	  latter	  gas	  grows	  proportionately	  to	  the	  decline	  in	  the	  use	  of	  coal	  (and	  to	  a	  lesser	   extent	  nuclear	  power),	   the	  difference	   in	   the	   amount	  of	   electricity	   generated	  by	  renewables	  is	  barely	  noticeable.	  Figure	  6-­‐28	  also	  shows	  how	  this	  result	  does	  not	  change	  if	  a	  more	  positive	  assumption	  about	  nuclear	  power	  (Opt-­‐LG	  high	  nuclear)	  is	  used,	  i.e.	  if	  the	  growth	  of	  nuclear	  power	  is	  not	  significantly	  constrained	  by	  social	  acceptance.	  In	  this	  case,	  nuclear	  would	  gain	  some	  weight	  in	  the	  electricity	  mix,	  but	  basically	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  coal	  with	  CCS.	  Finally,	   the	   last	  scenario	  depicted	   in	  Figure	  6-­‐28	  demonstrates	  how	  the	  above	  picture	  changes	  dramatically	   in	  a	  strongly	  carbon-­‐constrained	  energy	  system	  (Opt-­‐LG	  carbon-­‐
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constrained),	  where	  the	  CO2	  emission	  trajectory	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  target	  of	  limiting	  the	  global	  temperature	  rise	  to	  2˚C.	  Assuming	  that	  electricity	  generation	  with	  CCS	  will	  be	  available,	  this	  scenario	  projects	  an	  electricity	  mix	  which	  is	  progressively	  decarbonised.	  The	  share	  of	  ‘carbon-­‐free’	  electricity	  is	  already	  above	  50%	  in	  2030	  and	  reaches	  90%	  in	  2040	  (if	  generation	  with	  CCS	  is	  included	  in	  the	  figure).	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  role	  of	  gas	  in	  the	   electricity	   mix:	   while	   in	   the	   long	   term	   its	   use	   without	   CCS	   is	   less	   than	   a	   third	  compared	   to	   the	   other	   optimistic	   shale	   gas	   scenarios,	   this	   reduction	   is	   partially	  compensated	  by	  an	  increase	  in	  its	  use	  in	  plants	  with	  CCS.	  As	  already	  seen	  in	  Figure	  6-­‐17,	  the	   strict	   emissions	   target	  modelled	   does	   not	   preclude	   a	   stronger	   role	   for	   gas	   in	   the	  energy	  system,	  even	  if	  the	  results	  of	  this	  section	  highlight	  how	  this	  conclusion	  relies	  on	  the	  future	  availability	  of	  CCS.	  
Figure	  6-­‐27:	  Electricity	  production	  by	  fuel	  in	  four	  scenarios:	  conservative	  vs.	  optimistic;	  optimistic	  
with	  high	  nuclear;	  optimistic	  in	  a	  carbon	  constrained	  energy	  system	  
	  However,	   this	   broader	   trend	   of	   substitution	   is	   not	   uniform	   across	   regions.	   Much	  depends	   on	   regional	   specificities,	   in	   particular	   the	   relative	   competitiveness	   of	   the	  various	  fuels	  and	  technologies	  used	  in	  the	  electricity	  generation	  sector.	  A	  look	  at	  three	  key	   regions	   illustrates	   the	   different	   types	   of	   impacts	   that	   optimistic	   or	   conservative	  shale	   gas	   production	   can	   have	   in	   this	   respect.	   In	   China,	   for	   example	   (see	  Figure	   6-­‐28	  below),	   the	   difference	   between	   a	   conservative	   and	   optimistic	   case	   for	   shale	   gas	   does	  little	  to	  change	  the	  underlying	  evolution	  of	  the	  electricity	  generation	  sector.	  Demand	  for	  electricity	   in	  China	  will	  grow	  significantly	  even	  when	  using	  more	  conservative	   figures	  for	  GDP	  growth,	  while	  the	  share	  of	  gas	  used	  for	  electricity	  generation	  records	  steadily	  increases	   in	   both	   scenarios.	   But	   overall	   there	   is	   only	   a	   minor	   difference	   between	  conservative	  and	  optimistic	  shale	  gas	  development	  trajectories.	  This	  implies	  that	  coal’s	  dominance	  is	  not	  seriously	  threatened	  by	  an	  increase	  in	  shale	  gas	  production;	   instead,	  forces	   outside	   the	   unconventional	   gas	   market	   are	   driving	   the	   increase	   in	   gas-­‐fired	  power	  generation.	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Figure	  6-­‐28:	  China’s	  electricity	  generation	  by	  fuel	  
	  
Figure	  6-­‐29:	  US	  electricity	  generation	  by	  fuel	  
	  The	  same	  cannot	  be	  said	   for	   the	  USA,	  where	  changes	   in	   the	  electricity	  generation	  mix	  are	  much	  more	  dependent	  on	  production	  of	  shale	  gas.	  Indeed,	  Figure	  6-­‐29	  shows	  a	  stark	  difference	  between	  the	  conservative	  and	  optimistic	  cases;	   in	  the	   latter,	   the	  percentage	  share	   of	   natural	   gas	   in	   electricity	   generation	  doubles,	   from	  21%	   to	  44%	  by	  2040	   (an	  
	  227	  
average	  annual	  growth	  rate	  of	  3.4%).	  This	   increase,	   in	   turn,	   causes	  a	  correspondingly	  massive	  reduction	  in	  the	  use	  of	  coal-­‐fired	  power	  generation,	  such	  that,	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  period	  under	  scrutiny,	  coal	  generates	  just	  400	  TWh	  of	  electricity	  compared	  with	  2	  200	  TWh	   generated	   from	   natural	   gas.	   In	   a	   scenario	   where	   there	   is	   less	   US	   shale	   gas	  production	  however,	  gas	  use	  in	  power	  generation	  actually	  witnesses	  a	  decrease	  by	  20%	  over	   the	   same	   period	   (an	   average	   decline	   of	   1.3%),	   while	   the	   share	   of	   coal	   stays	  relatively	  buoyant.	  This	  means	  that	  much	  of	  the	  future	  development	  of	  the	  US	  electricity	  generating	  sector	  hinges	  on	  the	  shale	  gas	  supply	  curve.	  	  As	  regards	  Europe	  (see	  Figure	  6-­‐30),	  coal	  is	  set	  to	  lose	  relative	  market	  share	  over	  time.	  But	   unlike	   the	   US	   case,	   the	   difference	   between	   a	   conservative	   and	   optimistic	   case	   of	  shale	   gas	   production	   is	   far	   less	   dramatic.	   In	   the	   former,	   coal	   loses	   slightly	   less	   of	   its	  share	   of	   overall	   generation,	   dropping	   an	   average	   of	   0.3%	   per	   annum	   compared	  with	  0.6%	   in	  a	  more	  optimistic	   case.	  Given	   this	   slow	  evolution,	   the	   increase	   in	   the	   relative	  share	  of	  gas	  used	  for	  power	  generation	  is	  only	  visible	  after	  2030,	  when	  gas	  takes	  a	  2%	  share	   from	   coal	   and	   a	   1%	   share	   from	   renewable	   energy.	   This	   modest	   development	  suggests	  that	  shale	  gas	  will	  not	  significantly	  boost	  the	  competiveness	  of	  gas-­‐fired	  power	  generation	  or	  alter	  pre-­‐existing	  patterns	  of	  development	  in	  electricity	  generation.	  Since	  none	  of	  the	  two	  scenarios	  depicted	  in	  Figure	  6-­‐30	  take	  into	  account	  a	  significant	  carbon	  tax	   regime,	   renewables	   lose	   their	   relative	   share	   in	   the	   electricity	   generation	   mix	   as	  overall	  demand	  rises,	  independent	  of	  whether	  shale	  gas	  is	  produced	  or	  not.	  
Figure	  6-­‐30:	  Europe’s	  electricity	  generation	  by	  fuel	  
	  
	  228	  
6.3.2 Gas	  in	  transport	  The	  penetration	  of	  gas	  into	  the	  transportation	  sector	  does	  not	  depend	  entirely	  on	  shale	  gas	  production.	  Rather,	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  it	  is	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  oil	  and	   gas	   prices	   are	   coupled	   that	   will	   be	   a	   key	   determinant	   of	   the	   future	   evolution	   of	  prices	   for	   both	   sets	   of	   commodities,	   as	   well	   as	   their	   respective	   final	   uses.	   This	   is	  particularly	   true	   for	   transport,	   where	   the	   relationship	   between	   oil	   and	   gas	   prices	  strongly	  affect	  the	  future	  evolution	  of	  this	  sector.	  Figure	  6-­‐31	  shows	  the	  degree	  of	  penetration	  of	  natural	  gas	  in	  the	  transportation	  sector,	  comparing	   the	   values	   between	   conservative	   and	   optimistic	   shale	   gas	   development.	  Crucially,	   both	   scenarios	   assume	   a	   decoupled	   oil	   and	   gas	   price,	   which	   essentially	  favours	  natural	  gas	  as	   it	  can	  be	  priced	  according	  to	  its	  own	  internal	  market	  dynamics.	  Thus,	   in	   both	   scenarios	   natural	   gas	   grows	   at	   a	   steady	   rate	   and,	   under	   favourable	  conditions,	  the	  share	  of	  gas	  in	  transport	  peaks	  at	  close	  to	  13%	  by	  2030.	  Thereafter,	  once	  the	  cost-­‐competitive	  gas	  (vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  oil)	  is	  absorbed	  by	  the	  energy	  system,	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  share	  of	  natural	  gas	  becomes	  less	  pronounced	  as	  price	  ‘re-­‐coupling’	  begins	  to	  occur.	  
Figure	  6-­‐31:	  Global	  gas	  use	  in	  transport	  in	  the	  low	  growth	  scenarios	  
	  The	  results	  set	  out	  above	  seem	  particularly	  optimistic.	  Hence,	  a	  contrast	  must	  be	  made	  with	   a	   case	   in	   which	   no	   significant	   oil-­‐gas	   price	   de-­‐linkage	   occurs.	   This	   is	   done	   by	  comparing	  two	  variants	  of	  the	  conservative	  low-­‐growth	  scenario,	  revealing	  a	  significant	  role	   played	   by	   the	   gas-­‐to-­‐oil	   price	   ratio	   in	   determining	   the	   use	   of	   natural	   gas	   in	   the	  transportation	   sector.	   With	   coupling,	   there	   is	   a	   lower	   oil-­‐gas	   ratio	   and	   hence	  investments	   in	  new	  technologies	   like	  gas-­‐to-­‐liquids	  are	  more	  constrained.	  This	  causes	  the	  share	  of	  gas	  in	  transportation	  to	  be	  at	  a	  significantly	  lower	  level	  than	  a	  case	  where	  gas	  and	  oil	  prices	  are	  more	  strongly	  linked.	  	  Figure	  6-­‐32	  below	  shows	  this	  relationship.	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Figure	  6-­‐32:	  The	  oil-­‐gas	  price	  ratio	  compared	  with	  the	  use	  of	  gas	  in	  transport	  
	  
6.4 Conclusion	  This	   section	   presented	   an	   exploration	   of	   uncertainty	   rather	   than	   a	   prediction	   of	   the	  future	  impact	  of	  unconventional	  gas.	  The	  latter	  is	  only	  justified	  in	  cases	  where	  there	  is	  greater	  certainty	  surrounding	  the	  reserve	  size	  and	  production	  cost	  of	  shale	  gas.	  As	  these	  factors	  become	  increasingly	  known,	  it	  will	  be	  possible	  to	  narrow	  the	  range	  of	  possible	  outcomes.	  In	  the	  interim,	  highlighting	  the	  complex	  and	  interrelated	  outcomes	  of	  future	  gas	   supply	   and	   demand	   developments	   constitutes	   a	   necessary	   first	   step	   toward	  understanding	   the	   potential	   impact	   that	   shale	   gas	   can	   make	   on	   the	   global	   energy	  system.	  	  Each	   scenario	  presented	  here	  must	  be	   seen	  primarily	   as	   ‘an	   internally	   consistent	   and	  reproducible	   set	   of	   assumptions	   about	   the	   key	   relationships	   and	   driving	   forces	   of	  change’.47	  This	  set	  of	  assumptions	  has	  been	  derived	  from	  the	  authors’	  understanding	  of	  the	  current	  situation	  of	  the	  global	  energy	  system,	  in	  particular	  the	  gas	  system,	  and	  have	  been	  discussed	  as	  extensively	  as	  possible.	  The	  following	  summarises	  some	  preliminary	  conclusions	  as	  to	  what	  can	  be	  expected	  –	  for	  Europe	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  –	  from	  shale	  gas	  development,	  and	  the	  key	  factors	  that	  can	  affect	  this	  development:	  
• Overall,	  the	  scenario	  analysis	  highlights	  that	  shale	  gas	  does	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  extensively	   impact	   global	   gas	  markets,	   but	   only	   under	   optimistic	   assumptions	  about	  its	  production	  costs	  and	  reserves.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Nebojsa	  Nakicenovic	  et	  al.,	  'Special	  Report	  on	  Emissions	  Scenarios',	  (Geneva:	  Intergovernmental	  Panel	  on	  Climate	  Change,	  2000).	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• In	  a	  scenario	  favourable	  to	  shale	  gas	  development,	  natural	  gas	  as	  a	  whole	  has	  the	  potential	   to	   capture	   30%	   of	   the	  world’s	   total	   primary	   energy	   supply	   by	   2025,	  further	   rising	   to	   35%	   by	   2040.	   This	   would	  make	   it	   surpass	   oil	   as	   the	  world’s	  foremost	  source	  of	  energy.	  	  
• Although	   the	   strict	   CO2	   emission	   targets	  were	  modelled	   to	   reduce	   natural	   gas	  production	   –	   including	   shale	   gas	   –	   these	   targets	   do	   not	   preclude	   a	   significant	  growth	  in	  natural	  gas	  use.	  The	  modelling	  results	  therefore	  support	  the	  potential	  role	  of	  natural	  gas	  as	  a	  bridging	  fuel.	  
• Shale	   gas	   is	   relatively	   evenly	   dispersed	   around	   the	   world	   and	   the	  majority	   of	  regions	  will	   likely	  witness	   at	   least	   some	   level	   of	   production	   in	   the	   future.	   The	  USA	   and	   China	   are	   well	   placed	   to	   become	   the	   top	   producers	   of	   shale	   gas,	  although	   significant	   production	   also	   takes	   place	   in	   most	   other	   regions.	   The	  scenario	  analysis	  suggests	  that	  shale	  gas	  will	  tend	  to	  be	  used	  within	  the	  regions	  where	  it	  is	  produced;	  however,	  no	  single	  region	  will	  produce	  enough	  shale	  gas	  so	  as	  to	  move	  from	  being	  a	  net	  importer	  to	  a	  net	  exporter.	  
• The	  global	  trade	  in	  natural	  gas,	  driven	  by	  conventional	  gas,	  will	   increase	  in	  any	  scenario.	   Shale	   gas	   development,	   however,	   has	   the	   potential	   to	   moderate	   the	  degree	  of	  growth,	  particularly	  for	  interregional	  LNG	  flows.	  Low	  LNG	  costs	  would	  mitigate	   the	   reduction	   in	   trade	   resulting	   from	   widespread	   shale	   gas	  development.	  
• Significant	   shale	   gas	   production	   has	   the	   potential	   to	   lower	   natural	   gas	   prices,	  although	  to	  what	  extent	  strongly	  depends	  on	  the	  way	  natural	  gas	  will	  be	  priced	  in	   the	   future.	   In	  particular,	  oil	   indexation	  has	   the	  potential	   to	  reduce	   the	   fall	   in	  gas	  prices	  resulting	  from	  shale	  gas	  development.	  
• The	   degree	   of	   penetration	   of	   gas	   in	   transport	   strongly	   depends	   on	   the	   oil-­‐gas	  price	   link.	   A	   weaker	   link	   implies	   greater	   potential	   for	   shale	   gas	   to	   induce	   a	  significant	  growth	  of	  gas	  use	  in	  transportation.	  
• The	  impact	  on	  demand	  in	  an	  optimistic	  shale	  gas	  scenario	  is	  not	  equal	  across	  all	  regions.	  Much	  depends	  on	  the	  relative	  competitiveness	  of	  fuels	  and	  technologies	  in	   each	   region.	   This	   is	   particularly	   apparent	   for	   electricity	   generation.	   While	  shale	  gas	  can	   induce	  a	  dramatic	  change	   in	  the	  US	  electricity	  generation	  mix,	   its	  impact	  on	  China’s	  mix	  is	  more	  limited.	  




A Systematic	  review	  methodology	  There	  are	  several	  reasons	  why	  the	  systematic	  review	  approach	  has	  become	  so	  central	  to	  the	   ‘evidence	   based’	   movement.	   First,	   experience	   in	   the	   medical	   field	   and	   elsewhere	  suggests	   that	  policy	  and	  practice	  are	  often	  based	  on	   inadequate	  evidence.	  Second,	   the	  increasing	   volume	   of	   research	   findings	   makes	   it	   difficult	   for	   policymakers	   and	  practitioners	   to	   keep	   abreast	   of	   current	   understanding,	   creating	   a	   need	   for	   more	  effective	   synthesis	   of	   research	   results.	   Third,	   a	   combination	   of	   the	   complexity	   of	   the	  relevant	   issues,	   the	   variable	   quality	   of	   research	   evidence	   and	   the	  methodological	   and	  other	   biases	   of	   individual	   researchers,	   leads	   to	   conflicting	   recommendations	   by	  different	  authors	  and	  corresponding	  uncertainty	  over	  whom	  to	  trust.	  This	  problem	  can	  be	  exacerbated	  by	  the	  selective	  use	  of	  evidence	  by	  powerful	  interest	  groups	  and	  by	  the	  partial	   and	  unbalanced	   treatment	  of	   research	   results	  by	   the	  media	   (a	  problem	   that	   is	  particularly	  relevant	  to	  energy	  policy).	  	  Whilst	  the	  use	  of	  systematic	  reviews	  thus	  offers	  a	  number	  of	  benefits	  for	  addressing	  the	  topic	  of	  this	  study,	  the	  methodology	  does	  have	  its	  weaknesses.	  In	  particular,	  systematic	  reviews	  commonly	  address	  narrowly-­‐defined,	  ‘micro-­‐level’	  research	  on	  which	  questions	  may	   be	   more	   answerable	   but	   of	   less	   interest	   to	   policy-­‐makers	   and	   practitioners.	  Systematic	  reviews	  have	  also	  proved	  most	  successful	  in	  natural	  sciences	  where	  there	  is	  a	  tradition	  of	  either	  experimental	  or	  quasi-­‐experimental	  research.	  This	  raises	  questions	  as	   to	  whether	   the	   ‘gold	   standard’	   of	  methodological	   rigour	   normally	   required	   can	   be	  adapted	  to	  the	  field	  of	  energy,	  where	  evidence	  may	  be	  econometric	  or	  even	  qualitative	  and	  where	  so-­‐called	   ‘grey	  literature’	  may	  play	  an	  important	  role	  as	  a	  source	  alongside	  peer-­‐reviewed	  studies.	  In	  light	  of	  the	  above,	  a	  ‘realist’	  application	  of	  the	  methodology	  will	  be	  employed	  by	  this	  report	  (see	  Table	  A-­‐1).1	  Such	  an	  adaptation	  has	  informed	  work	  by	  the	  UKERC	  to	  address	  interesting	   and	   relevant	   energy	   policy	   debates	   such	   as	   the	   costs	   and	   impacts	   of	  renewable	  energy	  intermittency2	  and	  global	  oil	  depletion.3	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1 	  R.	   Pawson	   et	   al.,	   'Realistic	   synthesis:	   an	   introduction',	   in	   ESRC	   Research	   Methods	   Programme	  (Manchester:	  2004).	  2	  Robert	  Gross	  et	  al.,	  'The	  Costs	  and	  Impacts	  of	  Intermittency:	  An	  assessment	  of	  the	  evidence	  on	  the	  costs	  and	  impacts	  of	  intermittent	  generation	  on	  the	  British	  electricity	  network',	  (London:	  UK	  Energy	  Research	  Centre,	  2006).	  3	  Sorrell	  et	  al.,	  'Oil	  depletion'.	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Table	  A-­‐1:	  Stages	  of	  a	  traditional	  systematic	  review	  compared	  to	  those	  of	  a	  ‘realist’	  review4	  
Traditional	  systematic	  review	   Realist	  review	  Identify	  and	  refine	  a	  specific	  review	  question	  	   Clarify	  scope	  and	  purpose	  of	  review	  with	  client	  and	  articulate	  the	  key	  theories	  to	  be	  explored	  	  Search	   for	  primary	   studies,	   using	   clear	  predefined	  inclusion	  and	  exclusion	  criteria	  	   Search	   for	   relevant	   evidence,	   refine	   inclusion	  criteria	  in	  the	  light	  of	  emerging	  data	  	  Appraise	   quality	   of	   studies	   using	   a	   predefined	  appraisal	   checklist,	   emphasising	   relevance	   to	   the	  research	  question	  and	  methodological	  rigour	  	   Appraise	   quality	   of	   studies	   using	   judgement	   to	  supplement	   formal	   checklist	   and	   considering	  relevance	   and	   rigour	   from	   a	   ‘fit	   for	   purpose’	  perspective	  	  Extract	   standard	   items	   of	   data	   from	   all	   primary	  studies	  using	  a	  template	  	   Extract	  different	  data	  from	  various	  studies	  using	  an	  eclectic	  and	  iterative	  approach	  	  Synthesise	   data	   to	   obtain	   effective	   size	   and	  confidence	   interval	   and/or	   transferable	   themes	  from	  qualitative	  studies	  	   Synthesise	   data	   to	   achieve	   refinement	   of	   relevant	  theory	   –	   i.e.,	   to	   determine	  what	   works	   for	   whom,	  how	  and	  under	  what	  circumstances	  	  Make	   recommendations,	   especially	  with	   reference	  to	   whether	   findings	   are	   definitive	   or	   whether	  further	  research	  is	  needed	  	   Make	   recommendations,	   especially	  with	   reference	  to	  contextual	  issues	  for	  particular	  policy-­‐makers	  at	  particular	  times	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Source:	  Sorrel,	  'Improving	  the	  evidence	  base	  for	  energy	  policy'.	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B Definitions	  The	  industry-­‐standard	  term	  for	  discussing	  the	  ultimate	  recovery	  from	  an	  individual	  well	  is	   the	   ‘estimated	   ultimate	   recovery’	   (EUR),	   usually	   denoted	   EUR/well	   and	   also	  sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘productivity’.	  EUR	  is	  essentially	  identical	  to	  URR,	  although	  URR	   is	   usually	   preferred	   when	   referring	   to	   areas	   or	   regions	   larger	   than	   a	   well.	   As	  described	   in	   detail	   in	   Chapters	   3	   and	   4,	   a	   common	   procedure	   for	   estimating	   the	  recoverable	   resources	   from	   a	   country	   or	   region	   is	   through	   extrapolating	   values	   of	  EUR/well	   across	   an	   area.	   Confusion	   can	   occur	   over	   whether	   these	   recoverable	  resources	   should	   be	   interpreted	   as	   the	   ultimately	   recoverable	   or	   the	   technically	  recoverable.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  the	  estimates	  of	  recoverable	  resources	  derived	  in	  this	  way	   rely	   upon	   the	   extrapolation	   of	   existing	   estimates	   of	   EUR/well,	   not	   just	   to	   areas	  currently	  being	  produced	  but	  often	  into	  new	  areas	  which	  have	  experienced	  little	  or	  no	  previous	   production.	   The	   estimates	   of	   EUR/well	   are	   based	   upon	   the	   use	   of	   current	  technology	   and	   so	   extrapolating	   them	   into	   new	   areas	  would	   be	   expected	   to	   give	   the	  recoverable	   resources	   in	   those	   areas	   using	   current	   technology.	   Our	   interpretation	   is	  therefore	   that	   estimates	   derived	   using	   EUR/well	   should	   be	   seen	   as	   the	   technically	  recoverable	   resources	   (which	   assume	   current	   technology	   only),	   unless	   it	   is	   explicitly	  stated	  that	  future	  technological	  advances	  have	  been	  incorporated	  into	  the	  analysis.	  If,	  by	  whatever	  means,	   economic	   factors	   are	   taken	   into	   account	   –	   for	   example	   if	   an	   author	  estimates	   that	   some	   areas	   will	   have	   very	   low	   rates	   of	   production	   or	   will	   require	  excessively	  complex	  drilling	  procedures	  and	  hence	  discounts	  resources	  in	  these	  areas	  –	  the	  remaining	  resources	  are	  the	  economically	  recoverable	  resources.	  	  Since	  EUR	  and	  URR	  are	  identical	  terms,	  throughout	  the	  report	  the	  notation	  of	  URR/well	  instead	  of	  EUR/well	  is	  used	  to	  avoid	  confusion.	  In	   addition	   to	   the	   competing	   definitions	   of	   resources	   and	   reserves,	   some	   other	  definitions	   are	   relevant	   to	   the	   interpretation	   of	   published	   estimates.	   These	   are	  summarised	  and	  explained	  in	  Box	  B-­‐1.	  
Box	  B-­‐1:	  Measurement	  of	  natural	  gas	  volumes	  and	  energy	  content	  Natural	   gas	   is	   generally	   reported	   on	   a	   volumetric	   basis	   either	   in	   imperial	   (cubic	   feet)	   or	  metric	   (cubic	  metres)	   units.	   In	   the	   imperial	   system,	   a	   prefix	   of	   ‘M’	   usually	   denotes	   a	   thousand	   (so	  MMcf	   is	   a	  million	  cubic	  feet),	  while	  in	  the	  metric	  system	  ‘m’	  corresponds	  to	  a	  million	  (so	  mcm	  is	  a	  million	  cubic	  metres).	  For	  resource	  estimates,	  the	  most	  common	  prefixes	  are	  ‘B’	  for	  a	  billion	  and	  ‘T’	  for	  a	  trillion,	  both	  of	  which	  are	  commonly	  used	  with	  cubic	  metres	  and	  feet.	  It	   is	   also	   important	   to	  know	   the	   temperature	  and	  pressure	  at	  which	  natural	   gas	  volumes	  are	   reported.	  The	  EIA	  and	  API	  (the	  American	  Petroleum	  Institute)	  indicate	  that	  volumes	  of	  gas	  in	  the	  USA	  are	  measured	  at	   60oF	   (15.56oC)	   and	   14.73	   psi	   (1	   atmosphere	   or	   101.325kPa).1	  The	   UK’s	   Department	   of	   Energy	   and	  Climate	  Change	  (DECC)	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  indicates	  that	  European	  natural	  gas	  data	  is	  generally	  reported	  again	   at	   atmospheric	   pressure	   but	   at	   a	   slightly	   lower	   temperature	   of	   15oC.2	  These	   different	   definitions	  correspond	  to	  a	  volumetric	  difference	  of	  around	  4%.	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  evidence	  base	  presented	  below	  has	  been	  produced	  by	  North	  American	  institutions	  or	  by	  organisations	  relying	  upon	  North	  American	  data	  and	   so	   the	   volumes	   presented	   are	   most	   likely	   to	   correspond	   to	   the	   EIA	   and	   API	   definitions.	   At	   these	  conditions,	  cubic	  feet	  can	  be	  derived	  by	  multiplying	  cubic	  metres	  by	  35.3	  i.e.	  1	  Tcm	  =	  35.3	  Tcf.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  C.	   Augustine,	   B.	   Broxon	   and	   S.	   Peterson,	   Understanding	   Natural	   Gas	   Markets	   (Boston,	   MA:	   Lexecon,	  2006),	  DECC,	   'EMS:	  Atmospheric	   emissions	  Calculations',	   (London:	  Department	   for	  Energy	   and	  Climate	  Change,	  2008).	  2	  DECC,	  'EMS'.	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Gas	  can	  also	  be	  reported	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘dry’	  or	  ‘wet’	  volumes:	  dry	  gas	  is	  the	  volume	  of	  gas	  that	  remains	  after	  any	  liquefiable	  or	  non-­‐hydrocarbon	  portions	  of	  the	  gas	  stream	  has	  been	  removed,	  while	  wet	  gas	  includes	  both	   dry	   gas	   and	   these	   liquefiable	   or	   non-­‐hydrocarbon	   components.3	  Very	   little	   of	   the	   evidence	   base	  states	  whether	  dry	  or	  wet	  volumes	  of	  the	  unconventional	  gases	  have	  been	  reported.	  SPE/PRMS	  indicates	  however	  that	  when	  the	  gas	  is	  used	  in	  the	  end	  sector	  separately	  from	  any	  liquefiable	  fractions	  contained	  within	   it,	   reported	   resource	   figures	   should	   be	   of	   dry	   gas.4	  For	   this	   reason,	   it	   is	   likely	   that	  most	   of	   the	  evidence	  base	  reports	  dry	  natural	  gas	  figures,	  which	  will	  be	  assumed	  throughout	  this	  report.	  Gas	  can	  also	  be	  measured	   in	  terms	  of	  energy	  content.	  The	  most	  common	  unit	  as	  used	  on	  the	  New	  York	  Mercantile	  Exchange	  (the	  Henry	  Hub	  pricing	  point)	  is	  the	  British	  Thermal	  Unit	  (BTU),	  usually	  reported	  in	  MBtu	  (convention	  used	  here)	  or	  MMBTU	  (both	  1	  million	  British	  Thermal	  Units).	  An	  alternative	  unit	  used	  to	  price	  gas	  in	  the	  UK	  on	  the	  Intercontinental	  Exchange	  (ICE)	  at	  the	  National	  Balancing	  Point	  (NBP)	  is	  the	  ‘therm’,	  equivalent	  to	  100	  000	  BTU.	  One	  BTU	  of	  dry	  natural	  gas	  at	  60oF	  corresponds	  to	  around	  1	  055J.	  Conversion	  between	  volumes	  and	  energy	  depends	  on	  the	  calorific	  value	  of	  the	  natural	  gas,	  which	  varies	  over	  time	  and	  with	  the	  ‘wetness’	  of	  the	  gas.	  Yearly	  data	  from	  the	  USA	  since	  1949	  indicates	  that	  there	  are	  around	  1	  029	  BTU	  in	  a	  cubic	  foot	  of	  dry	  natural	  gas	  with	  a	  standard	  deviation	  of	  4	  BTU,	  while	  wet	  gas	  has	  an	  energy	  content	  around	  7.5%	  higher	  than	  dry	  gas.5	  One	  cubic	  foot	  of	  dry	  natural	  gas	  at	  60oF	  is	  therefore	  equivalent	  to	  around	  1.08MJ.	  
B.1 Resources,	  reserves	  and	  the	  USGS	  definitions	  Although	   the	   majority	   of	   existing	   literature	   uses	   one	   or	   more	   of	   the	   categories	   of	  resources	  described	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  there	  is	  one	  important	  exception:	  the	  USA	  Geological	  Service.	   The	   USGS	   states	   that	   it	   provides	   estimates	   of	   “undiscovered”	   volumes	   of	  unconventional	   gases	   in	   different	   geological	   areas	   of	   the	  USA.	   Two	   of	   its	  most	   recent	  studies	   for	   example	   provided	   the	   ‘undiscovered’	   resources	   in	   areas	   of	   the	  Marcellus,	  Haynesville	  and	  Eagle	  Ford	  shales.6	  These	  reports	  do	  not	  have	  a	  clear	  definition	  of	  the	  term	  ‘undiscovered’.	  	  One	  interpretation	  of	  the	  resource	  figures	  given	  by	  the	  USGS	  is	  given	  in	  a	  paper	  on	  its	  methods	  for	  estimating	  unconventional	  gas	  resources.7	  The	  USGS	  states	  that	  ‘essentially	  all	  of	  the	  moveable	  oil	  or	  gas	  in	  almost	  any	  [unconventional]	  accumulation	  that	  can	  be	  envisioned	   has	   become	   recoverable	   from	   a	   purely	   technical	   standpoint...	   more	  restrictive	  conditions	  are	  imposed,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  assessed	  petroleum	  volumes	  must	  not	   only	   be	   technically	   recoverable	   but	   must	   also	   have	   the	   potential	   to	   be	   added	   to	  reserves’.	  This	  indicates	  that	  the	  criteria	  required	  for	  gas	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  resource	  figures	  are	  more	  stringent	  than	  simply	  requiring	  the	  gas	  to	  be	  technically	  recoverable.	  Although	  an	  updated	  methodological	  paper	  issued	  in	  2010	  appears	  to	  contradict	  this	  by	  stating	   “USGS	   oil	   and	   gas	   estimates	   are	   of	   technically	   recoverable	   resources”,	   it	   later	  refers	   to	   figures	   being	   “potential	   additions	   to	   reserves”	   on	   the	   required	   data	   forms.8	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Society	  of	  Petroleum	  Engineers	  et	  al.,	   'Petroleum	  resources	  management	  system',	  (Allen,	  TX:	  Society	  of	  Petroleum	  Engineers,	  2008).	  4	  Ibid.	  5	  EIA,	   'Annual	   Energy	   Review	   2010',	   (Washington,	   DC:	   US	   Energy	   Information	   Administration,	   2011),	  Appendix	  A4.	  6	  Coleman	  et	  al.,	  'Assessment	  of	  undiscovered	  oil	  and	  gas',	  R.F.	  Dubiel	  et	  al.,	  'Assessment	  of	  undiscovered	  oil	   and	   gas	   resources	   in	   Jurassic	   and	   Cretaceous	   strata	   of	   the	   Gulf	   Coast',	   (Reston,	   VA:	   Unoted	   States	  Geological	  Survey,	  2011).	  
7 The	   USGS	   uses	   the	   term	   ‘continuous’	   for	   unconventional	   oil	   and	   gas	   resources	   to	   emphasise	   the	  geological	   difference	  between	   these	   and	   conventional	   oil	   and	   gas	   deposits.	   These	   terms	   are	   essentially	  identical	  however.	  Schmoker,	  'Assessment	  concepts	  for	  continuous	  petroleum	  accumulations'.	  8	  Charpentier	  and	  Cook,	  'Improved	  USGS	  methodology'.	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Both	  of	  these	  methodology	  papers	  therefore	  suggest	  that	  figures	  provided	  by	  the	  USGS	  should	  be	  interpreted	  as	  ‘potential	  additions	  to	  reserves’.	  A	   possible	   confusion	   that	   remains	   is	   whether	   the	   ‘potential	   additions	   to	   reserves’	  estimates	   provided	   by	   the	  USGS	   for	   shale	   plays	   include	   undiscovered	   unconventional	  gas	  in	  areas	  outside	  known	  formations.	  Contacts	  with	  the	  USGS	  indicate	  that	  it	  does	  not.	  To	  provide	  an	  equal	  basis	  for	  comparing	  the	  USGS	  figures	  to	  the	  estimates	  provided	  by	  other	   organisations,	   the	   USGS	   figures	   are	   hence	   interpreted	   as	   being	   a	   subset	   of	  remaining	   technically	   recoverable	  resources	   that	  exclude	  both:	  a)	   resources	   that	  have	  already	  been	  classified	  as	  reserves;	  and	  b)	  resources	  in	  undiscovered	  areas.	  An	  estimate	  of	  reserves	  and	  undiscovered	  resources	  must	  therefore	  be	  added	  to	  the	  USGS	  figures	  in	  order	   to	  determine	   an	   estimate	   of	   the	   remaining	   technically	   recoverable	   resources	   of	  the	  USA.	  Similar	   to	   aggregating	   reserve	   figures,	   it	   is	   only	   statistically	   correct	   to	   arithmetically	  sum	  estimates	  of	  reserves	  and	  resources	  if	  these	  correspond	  to	  the	  mean	  estimates.	  As	  indicated	   above,	   an	   estimate	   of	   2P	   reserves	   is	   closest,	   although	   not	   identical,	   to	   the	  mean	  estimate	  of	  reserves	  and	  so	  these	  should	  be	  added	  together	  to	  mean	  estimates	  of	  ‘potential	  additions	  to	  reserves’	  and	  resources	  in	  undiscovered	  areas.	  	  1P	  reserve	  estimates	  within	  the	  USA	  are	  publically	  available,	  while	  INTEK9	  also	  provide	  estimates	   of	   US	   ‘inferred	   reserves’.	   The	   definition	   of	   the	   term	   ‘inferred	   reserves’ is	  unclear	   as	   it	   is	   used	   by	   different	   organisations	   to	  mean	  different	   things.	   The	  USGS	   in	  1995	  for	  example	  used	   it	   to	  refer	  to	  reserve	  growth	   in	  conventional	   fields,10	  while	  the	  EIA	   indicated	   that	   it	   most	   likely	   corresponds	   to	   ‘probable	   reserves’. 11 	  This	   later	  definition	  is	  preferred	  since	  it	  is	  more	  recent	  and	  more	  applicable	  to	  unconventional	  gas	  resources.	   ‘Probable	   reserves’	   are	   different	   from	   the	   description	   of	   ‘proved	   and	  probable’	  2P	  reserves	  given	  above	  in	  that	  those	  reserves	  classified	  as	  proved	  reserves	  have	  been	  subtracted.	   ‘Probable	  reserves’	  would	  appear,	  therefore,	  to	  be	  equivalent	  to	  2P	  minus	  1P	  reserves.	  	   	  It	   is	   therefore	   concluded	   that	   an	   estimate	   of	   the	   remaining	   technically	   recoverable	  resources	  for	  the	  USA	  may	  be	  derived	  from	  the	  sum	  of:	  1) US	  proved	  reserves;	  2) US	  inferred	  reserves;	  3) the	  USGS	  mean	  estimates	  of	  potential	  additions	  to	  reserves	  in	  known	  formations;	  and	  4) mean	  estimates	  of	  undiscovered	  technically	  recoverable	  resources.	  The	   addition	   of	   contemporaneous	   estimates	   of	   total	   cumulative	   production	   gives	   an	  estimate	  of	  the	  total	  technically	  recoverable	  resource	  of	  the	  USA.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  INTEK,	  'Review	  of	  emerging	  resources'.	  
10 Reserve	   growth	   is	   indicated	   by	   the	   USGS	   to	   be	   “resources	   expected	   to	   be	   added	   to	   reserves	   as	   a	  consequence	   of	   extension	   of	   known	   fields,	   through	   revisions	   of	   reserve	   estimates,	   and	   by	   additions	   of	  new	   pools	   in	   discovered	   fields.	   Also	   included	   in	   this	   category	   are	   resources	   expected	   to	   be	   added	   to	  reserves	   through	  application	  of	   improved	   recovery	   techniques.”	  Gautier	   and	  Survey,	   'Assessment	  of	  US	  resources'.	  11	  EIA,	  'Estimation	  of	  reserves	  and	  resources'.	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B.2 Estimates	  of	  shale	  gas	  resource	  A	   total	  of	  50	   sources	  provide	  original	   country	  or	   regional-­‐level	   estimates	  of	   shale	  gas	  resources	   and	   these	   are	   listed	   in	   Table	  B-­‐1.	  No	   distinction	   is	  made	   between	  whether	  total	   or	   remaining	   technically	   recoverable	   resources	   have	   been	   reported,	   as	   the	  difference	  is	  relatively	  minor	  and	  can	  be	  easily	  transformed	  from	  one	  to	  the	  other.	  	  As	   indicated	   previously,	   a	   number	   of	   sources	   do	   not	   indicate	   whether	   they	   have	  included	  estimates	  of	  undiscovered	  volumes	  of	  shale	  gas	  in	  their	  estimates	  of	  TRR.	  The	  likelihood	  of	  this	  can	  be	  deduced	  by	  examining	  whether	  they	  only	  consider	  individual,	  discovered	  shale	  plays	  and/or	  make	  any	  reference	   to	   the	  potential	   for	  shale	  gas	   to	  be	  found	   outside	   these	   plays.	   INTEK12	  estimates	   that	   there	   are	   1.6	   Tcm	   of	   undiscovered	  shale	  gas	  resources	  in	  the	  USA.	  Hence,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  convert	  estimates	  of	  ‘discovered	  TRR’	   in	  the	  USA	  to	  estimates	  of	   ‘full	  TRR’	  by	  adding	   in	  the	  INTEK	  figure.	  There	  are	  no	  estimates	  of	  undiscovered	  shale	  gas	  outside	  the	  USA	  since	  the	  focus	  to	  date	  has	  been	  on	  those	  shale	  plays	  that	  are	  known	  to	  exist.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  INTEK,	  'Review	  of	  emerging	  resources'.	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Table	   B-­‐1:	   Shale	   gas	   reports	   providing	   original	   country	   level	   estimates	   by	   date,	   countries	   or	  
regions	  covered	  and	  type	  of	  resource	  estimate	  




Resource	  estimate	  Mohr	  and	  Evans	   Sep-­‐11	   Continental	  regions	   URR	  USGSa	   Aug-­‐11	   USA	   ‘Potential	   additions	   to	  reserves’	  Medlock,	  Jaffe	  and	  Hartley	  	   Jul-­‐11	   9	   North	   American,	  European	   and	   Pacific	  countries	   TRRb	  INTEK	  (for	  EIA)	   Jul-­‐11	   USA	   ‘Unproved,	   discovered	  TRR’c	  Petak	   May-­‐11	   USA.	  Canada	   ERRd	  Kuuskraa	   May-­‐11	   USA	   TRR	  EIA	  (AEO)	   Variouse	   USA	   TRR	   (1999-­‐2010)	   ERR	  (1997	  and	  1998)	  Potential	  Gas	  Committee	   Apr-­‐11	   USA	   TRR	  Advanced	   Resources	  International	  (for	  EIA)	   Apr-­‐11	   32	  individual	  countries	  	   OGIP	  and	  TRR	  Henning	   Mar-­‐11	   USA,	  Canada	   ERR4	  Kuuskraa	   and	   T.	   Van	  Leeuwen	   Jan-­‐11	   USA	   TRR	  Zou	  et	  al.	   Dec-­‐10	   China	   OGIP	  Medlock	  and	  Hartley	   Oct-­‐10	   USA,	  Canada	   TRR	  Kuuskraa	  (a)	   Oct-­‐10	   USA	   TRR	  WEC	   Sep-­‐10	   Nine	  continental	  regions	   OGIP	  Mohr	  and	  Evans	   Jul-­‐10	   USA,	  Canada	   URR	  Moniz,	  Jacoby	  and	  Meggs	   Jun-­‐10	   USA	   TRR	  Dawson	  	   May-­‐10	   Canada	   ERR	  Skipper	  	   Mar-­‐10	   USA,	  Canada	   TRR	  Hennings	  	   Mar-­‐10	   USA	   OGIP	  and	  TRR	  Kuuskraa	  (b)	   Mar-­‐10	   USA,	  Canada	   TRR	  Petrel	   Robertson	  Consulting	  Ltd	   Mar-­‐10	   Canada	   OGIP	  Downey	   Jan-­‐10	   USA,	  Canada	   TRR	  Harvey	  and	  Gray	   Jan-­‐10	   UK	   TRR	  Kuuskraa	   Dec-­‐09	   USA,	   Canada,	   Poland,	  Sweden,	   Austria,	   South	  Africa	   ‘Recoverable	  resources’	  Potential	  Gas	  Committee	   Jun-­‐09	   USA	   TRR	  Theal	   May-­‐09	   USA,	  Canada	   OGIP	  and	  TRR	  ICF	  (reported	  by	  Ejaz)	   Mar-­‐09	   USA	   ERR4	  IHS	  CERA	   Feb-­‐09	   Europe	   TRR	  Mackenzie	   Jan-­‐09	   Europe	   TRR	  ICF	  (Vidas	  and	  Hugman)	   Nov-­‐08	   USA,	  Canada	   OGIP	  and	  TRR	  Smead	  and	  Pickering	   Jul-­‐08	   USA	   TRR	  Kuuskraa	   Jul-­‐07	   USA	   URR	  Sandrea	   Dec-­‐05	   USA,	  Global	   ‘Recoverable	  reserves'	  Laherrère	   Jun-­‐04	   Global	   URR	  Kuuskraa	   Jan-­‐04	   USA	   TRR	  and	  URR	  Rogner	   Jan-­‐97	   Continental	  regions	   OGIP	  Kuuskraa	  and	  Meyers	   Jan-­‐83	   USA,	  Canada,	  ROW	   TRR	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a) USGS	  estimate	  based	  on	  several	  studies.13	  b) Medlock	   indicates	   that	   resource	   should	   be	   commercially	   viable	   so	   his	   definition,	   although	  described	   as	   technically	   recoverable	   resources,	   could	   be	   closer	   to	   ERR.	   This	   is	   discussed	   in	  further	  detail	  in	  Section	  3.2.	  c) TRR	   can	   be	   derived	   by	   adding	   the	   EIA	   and	   INTEK	   figures	   for	   contemporaneous	   proved	   and	  inferred	   reserves,	   undiscovered	   resources	   and	   ‘unproved	   discovered	   technically	   recoverable	  resources’,	  all	  of	  which	  are	  reported	  separately.	  d) ICF’s	   2011	   report14	  indicates	   that	   there	   is	   a	   total	   of	   61.5	   Tcm	   of	   economically	   recoverable	  resources	   in	   the	  USA	  and	  Canada.	   It	  provides	  a	  supply	  cost	  curve	   indicating	  that	   this	  volume	   is	  only	   recoverable	   at	   gas	   prices	   greater	   than	   $14/Mcf.	   Since	   this	   price	   is	   four	   times	  higher	   than	  current	  gas	  prices	  (around	  $3.5/Mcf	  on	  15	  December	  2011),	  the	  authors	  consider	  that	  all	  of	  ICF’s	  estimates	  are	  better	  interpreted	  as	  TRR.	  e) There	  have	  been	  a	  total	  of	  15	  Annual	  Energy	  Outlooks	  between	  1997	  and	  2011.	  The	  AEO	  in	  2003	  used	  the	  same	  unconventional	  gas	   figures	  as	  2002,	  while	  the	  2011	  estimate	  was	  based	  entirely	  on	  INTEK	  (2011)	  and	  so	  is	  reported	  separately.	  There	  are	  therefore	  a	  total	  of	  13	  AEOs	  included	  in	  this	  row.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Coleman	  et	  al.,	  'Assessment	  of	  undiscovered	  oil	  and	  gas';	  D.K.	  Higley	  et	  al.,	  'Assessment	  of	  undiscovered	  oil	  and	  gas	  resources	  of	   the	  Anadarko	  Basin	  Province	  of	  Oklahoma,	  Kansas,	  Texas,	  and	  Colorado,	  2010',	  (Reston,	  VA:	  United	  States	  Geological	  Survey,	  2011);	  Debra	  Higley	  et	  al.,	  '2002	  USGS	  assessment	  of	  oil	  and	  gas	   resource	   potential	   of	   the	  Denver	  Basin	   Province	   of	   Colorado,	   Kansas,	  Nebraska,	   South	  Dakota,	   and	  Wyoming',	  (Reston,	  VA:	  United	  States	  Geological	  Survey,	  2003);	  David	  W.	  Houseknecht	  et	  al.,	  'Assessment	  of	  undiscovered	  natural	  gas	  resources	  of	  the	  Arkoma	  Basin	  Province	  and	  geologically	  related	  areas,	  2010',	  (Reston,	  VA:	  United	  States	  Geological	  Survey,	  2010);	  Robert	  C.	  Milici	  et	  al.,	   'Assessment	  of	  undiscovered	  oil	   and	   gas	   resources	   of	   the	   Appalachian	   Basin	   Province,	   2002',	   (Reston,	   VA:	   United	   States	   Geological	  Survey,	  2003);	  Richard	  M.	  Pollastro	  et	  al.,	  'Assessment	  of	  undiscovered	  oil	  and	  gas	  resources	  of	  the	  Bend	  Arch-­‐Fort	  Worth	  Basin	  Province	  of	  North-­‐Central	  Texas	  and	  Southwestern	  Oklahoma,	  2003',	  (Reston,	  VA:	  United	   States	   Geological	   Survey,	   2004);	   C.J.	   Schenk	   et	   al.,	   'Assessment	   of	   undiscovered	   oil	   and	   gas	  resources	  of	   the	  Permian	  Basin	  Province	  of	  West	  Texas	  and	  Southeast	  New	  Mexico,	  2007',	   (Reston,	  VA:	  United	  States	  Geological	  Survey,	  2008);	  Christopher	  S.	  Swezey	  et	  al.,	  'Assessment	  of	  undiscovered	  oil	  and	  gas	  resources	  of	  the	  Illinois	  Basin,	  2007',	  (Reston,	  VA:	  United	  States	  Geological	  Survey,	  2007);	  Christopher	  S.	  Swezey	  et	  al.,	  'Assessment	  of	  undiscovered	  oil	  and	  gas	  resourcesof	  the	  US	  portion	  of	  the	  Michigan	  Basin,	  2004',	   (Reston,	   VA:	   United	   States	   Geological	   Survey,	   2005);	   United	   States	   Geological	   Survey,	   'National	  assessment	  of	  oil	  and	  gas	  resources	  update',	  (Reston,	  VA:	  United	  States	  Geological	  Survey,	  2010).	  14	  Petak,	  'Impact	  of	  natural	  gas	  on	  CHP'.	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C Methods	  for	  estimating	  the	  recoverable	  resources	  of	  shale	  
gas	  
C.1 Description	  of	  approaches	  A	   detailed	   description	   of	   the	   various	   methods	   for	   estimating	   the	   technically	   or	  ultimately	   recoverable	   resources	   for	   conventional	   resources,	   accompanied	   by	   a	  comparison	  of	  results,	  is	  given	  in	  Sorrell	  et	  al.1	  Several	  of	  these	  methods	  use	  non-­‐linear	  regression	   to	   fit	   curves	   to	   historic	   data	   on	   production	   or	   discoveries	   for	   aggregate	  regions.	   Such	   curves	   typically	   trend	   to	   an	   asymptote,	   which	   is	   interpreted	   as	   the	  ultimately	  recoverable	  resources	  for	  that	  region.	  More	  sophisticated	  methods	  rely	  upon	  data	  from	  individual	  fields.	  	  Such	  methods	  are	  not	  currently	  used	  for	  unconventional	  deposits	  and	  appear	  unlikely	  to	  be	  appropriate	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons.	  First,	  the	  conventional	  approaches	  are	  based	  upon	  implicit	  or	  explicit	  assumptions	  regarding	  the	  size	  distribution	  of	  conventional	  gas	  fields	  and	  the	  sequence	  in	  which	  these	  fields	  are	  discovered	  and	  produced	  (i.e.	  with	  the	  largest	   being	   found	   first).	   These	   assumptions	   are	   not	   applicable	   to	   unconventional	  deposits	   since	   these	   are	   not	   located	   in	   discrete	   fields.	   Second,	   sufficiently	   long-­‐time	  series	   data	   on	   regional	   production	   and	   discoveries	   is	   currently	   unavailable	   for	  unconventional	  resources,	  even	  within	  the	  USA.	  Third,	  continuous	  drilling	  is	  necessary	  to	  maintain	  production	  levels	  within	  a	  shale	  play2,	  so	  the	  regional	  production	  history	  is	  more	  dependent	  upon	  the	  economic	  and	  political	  factors	  affecting	  drilling	  activity	  than	  on	   any	   geological	   features	   of	   the	   resource.	   Hence,	   procedures	   relying	   on	   plotting	  cumulative	   production	   against	   time	   are	   unlikely	   to	   provide	   any	   useful	   information.	  Finally,	  shale	  geology	  is	  so	  variable	  that	  aggregating	  individual	  shale	  play	  production	  or	  exploration	  data	  that	  could	  be	  used	  to	  estimate	  the	  recoverable	  resources	  to	  a	  regional	  level	  is,	  at	  least	  at	  this	  stage	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  resource,	  neither	  informative	  nor	  useful.	  
C.2 Methods	   used	   by	   INTEK	   for	   the	   US	   Energy	   Information	  
Administration	  INTEK3	  undertook	  a	  review	  of	  all	  shales	  within	  the	  USA	  for	  the	  latest	  edition	  of	  the	  EIA’s	  Annual	  Energy	  Outlook	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  C-­‐1.	  INTEK	  sought	  to	  estimate	  the	  ‘unproved	  discovered	   technically	   recoverable	   resources’4	  within	   19	   individual	   shale	   plays	   in	   the	  USA.	  Aggregate	  estimates	  of	   the	  proved	  reserves,	   inferred	  reserves5	  and	  undiscovered	  resources	   for	   the	   whole	   of	   the	   USA	   are	   provided	   within	   INTEK’s	   report.	   The	   sum	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Sorrell	  et	  al.,	  'Oil	  depletion'.	  2	  Petak,	  Fritsch	  and	  Vidas,	  'American	  Midstream	  Infrastructure'.	  3	  INTEK,	  'Review	  of	  emerging	  resources'.	  4	  Elsewhere	  in	  the	  report	  these	  are	  described	  as	  ‘undeveloped	  technically	  recoverable	  resources’.	  Neither	  of	   the	   two	   definitions	   provided	   is	   particularly	   satisfactory.	   The	   first	   uses	   the	   term	   ‘discovered’	   in	   a	  manner	  that	  differs	   from	  the	  SPE/PRMS	  definition	  described	  in	  Section	  2.1.1,	  which	  would	  describe	  the	  figures	  produced	  by	  INTEK	  as	  ‘undiscovered’.	  The	  second	  implies	  that	  proved	  and	  inferred	  reserves	  can	  only	   be	   in	   developed	   areas,	   which	   is	   not	   necessarily	   the	   case.	   United	   States	   Securities	   and	   Exchange	  Commission,	   'Modernization	  of	  the	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  Reporting	  Requirements:	  Conforming	  version	  (proposed	  rule)',	  in	  RIN	  3235-­‐AK00,	  ed.	  United	  States	  Securities	  and	  Exchange	  Commission	  (2008).	  
5 As	  indicated	  in	  Section	  2.1.1,	  inferred	  reserves	  are	  assumed	  to	  be	  equal	  to	  ‘probable’	  reserves.	  The	  sum	  of	  proved	  and	  inferred	  reserves	  will	  therefore	  give	  an	  estimate	  of	  the	  2P	  reserves.	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these,	   together	   with	   INTEK’s	   estimates	   of	   the	   unproved	   discovered	   technically	  recoverable	  resources	  from	  each	  shale	  play,	  gives	  an	  estimate	  for	  the	  remaining	  TRR	  for	  the	   entire	   USA.	   The	   total	   TRR	   can	   then	   be	   estimated	   by	   adding	   a	   contemporaneous	  estimate	  of	  cumulative	  production.	  The	  undiscovered	  resources	  are	  indicated	  by	  INTEK	  to	  be	  estimated	  at	  1.2	  Tcm	   in	  Southern	  California	  and	  0.4	  Tcm	   in	   the	  Rocky	  Mountain	  region.	  For	  each	  shale	  play,	   INTEK	  first	  split	   the	  whole	  play	  area	   into	  two	  areas	   it	   termed	  the	  ‘active	  area’	  and	  the	  ‘undeveloped	  area’.6	  For	  a	  few	  plays	  INTEK	  judged	  the	  whole	  shale	  play	  area	  to	  be	   ‘active’	  and	  so	  did	  not	  differentiate	  the	  play,	  but	   in	  general	  each	  of	  the	  two	   areas	  within	   each	   shale	   play	  was	   considered	   separately.	   Based	   upon	   a	   variety	   of	  technical,	   commercial	   and	   industrial	   reports,	   INTEK	  estimated	   the	  URR/well	   and	  well	  spacing	   within	   each	   area	   of	   each	   shale	   play.	   The	   product	   of	   the	   URR/well	   and	   well	  spacing	  with	  the	  areal	  extent	  of	  the	  area	  under	  consideration	  coupled	  with	  an	  assumed	  ‘success	  factor’7	  yields	  an	  estimate	  of	  the	  ‘unproved	  discovered	  technically	  recoverable	  resources’	  within	   that	  particular	  area.	  The	  sum	  of	   the	   ‘active’	  and	   ‘undeveloped’	  areas	  finally	   gives	   the	   ’unproved	   discovered	   technically	   recoverable	   resources’	   within	   the	  whole	  shale	  play.	  INTEK’s	  success	  factor,	  a	  percentage	  that	  can	  vary	  between	  0%	  and	  100%,	  was	  assumed	  to	  depend	  upon	  three	  factors:	  whether	  the	  estimates	  for	  URR/well	  and	  the	  well	  spacing	  currently	  used	  were	  considered	  to	  be	  representative	  of	  what	  can	  be	  expected	  across	  the	  whole	   (‘active’	   or	   ‘undeveloped’)	   area;	   how	  much	   experience	   there	  was	   of	   geological	  factors	   that	   can	   affect	   production;	   and	   how	  much	   gas	   had	   already	   been	   produced	   or	  added	   to	   reserves.	   Choice	   of	   appropriate	   values	   for	   the	   success	   factor	   appears	   to	   be	  relatively	   subjective	   and	   varies	   between	   10%	   in	   the	   ‘active’	   area	   of	   the	   Fayettesville	  shale	  to	  100%	  in	  the	  ‘active’	  areas	  of	  the	  Eagle-­‐Ford	  and	  Barnett-­‐Woodford	  Shales.	  The	  arithmetic	  means	  success	  factor	  across	  all	  the	  shale	  plays	  is	  49%.	  	  Currently	  producing	  US	  shale	  gas	  plays	  are	  very	  heterogeneous,	  with	  production	  rates	  between	  neighbouring	  wells	  varying	  by	  a	  factor	  of	  three	  and	  across	  an	  entire	  shale	  play	  by	   a	   factor	   of	   ten.8	  A	   key	   issue	   for	   this	   method,	   therefore,	   is	   the	   validity	   of	   taking	  estimates	   of	   well	   spacing	   and	   the	   URR/well	   from	   one	   area	   and	   applying	   these	   to	   a	  second,	  potentially	  very	  different,	  area.	  It	  is	  commonly	  the	  case	  that	  some	  areas	  within	  the	   shale	   have	   significantly	   higher	   productivity	   and	   ultimate	   recovery	   than	   others.	  These	  are	  commonly	  referred	  to	  as	   ‘sweet	  spots’	  and	  correspond	  with	  the	  area	  INTEK	  called	  the	  ‘active’	  area.	  In	  addition,	  there	  also	  appears	  to	  be	  significant	  variation	  in	  the	  productivity	  of	  wells	  within	   sweet-­‐spot	  areas,	  although	  this	  distinction	  partly	  depends	  on	  how	  sweet	  spots	  are	  defined.9	  Given	  this	  heterogeneity,	   it	   is	   important	  not	   to	  assume	  single	  values	   for	   the	  URR/well	  and	   well	   spacing	   across	   the	   whole	   area	   of	   a	   shale	   play.	   This	   is	   particularly	   relevant	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Again	  this	  is	  not	  a	  particularly	  satisfactory	  term	  to	  use	  since	  some	  parts	  of	  the	  ‘active’	  area	  have	  not	  yet	  been	  developed.	  
7 INTEK	   refers	   to	   applying	   a	   ‘recovery	   factor’	   to	   the	   product	   of	   the	  URR/well	   and	  well	   spacing.	   This	   is	  easily	  confused	  with	  the	  recovery	  factor	  used	  to	  estimate	  the	  TRR	  from	  the	  OGIP.	  INTEK’s	  recovery	  factor	  more	  closely	  resembles	  the	  factor	  that	  geologists	  apply	  to	  estimate	  the	  risked	  OGIP	  from	  the	  total	  OGIP	  and	  so	  the	  term	  ‘success	  factor’	  seems	  more	  appropriate	  to	  avoid	  confusion.	  8	  EIA,	  'Estimation	  of	  reserves	  and	  resources'.	  9Kuuskraa,	   'Case	   study	   #1.	   Barnett	   Shale:	   The	   start	   of	   the	   gas	   shale	   revolution',	   Strickland,	   Purvis	   and	  Blasingame,	  'Reserves	  Determinations'.	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when	   extrapolating	   historical	   URR/well	   and	   well-­‐spacing	   estimates,	   since	   these	   will	  only	  be	   available	   from	   the	   areas	   of	   the	   shale	  play	   that	  have	  been	  developed	   first	   and	  which	  tend	  to	  be	  the	  most	  productive.	  Hence,	  they	  are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  representative	  of	  what	   will	   be	   encountered	   in	   the	   remainder	   of	   the	   shale.	   It	   was	   for	   this	   reason	   that	  INTEK	  split	  most	  shale	  plays	  into	  two	  areas.	  INTEK	  assumed	  a	  lower	  value	  for	  at	  least	  one	  of	  three	  relevant	  variables,	  namely	  the	  URR/well,	  well	  spacing	  or	  success	  factor	  in	  its	  ‘undeveloped’	  (non-­‐sweet-­‐spot)	  areas.	  Which	  variable	  was	  lower,	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  it	  was	  lower,	  depended	  on	  the	  shale	  play	  under	  consideration.	  Finally,	   INTEK	   assumes	   that	   the	   sweet-­‐spot	   area	   is	   the	   total	   area	   leased	   by	   shale	   gas	  producers. 10 	  As	   discussed	   in	   Section	   2.2.2,	   this	   is	   unlikely	   to	   be	   an	   appropriate	  assumption.	  	  
Figure	  C-­‐1:	  Map	  of	  US	  shale	  gas	  plays	  (lower	  48	  states)11	  
	  
C.3 Comparison	  of	  USGS	  and	  INTEK	  methods	  The	  INTEK	  approach	  differs	  in	  a	  number	  of	  important	  respects	  to	  that	  used	  by	  the	  USGS.	  First,	   the	  USGS	   acknowledges	   the	   considerable	   uncertainty	   in	   all	   of	   the	   above	   factors	  and	  uses	  Monte	  Carlo	  sampling	  techniques	  to	  combine	  these	  uncertainties	  and	  estimate	  a	  probability	  distribution	  for	  the	  relevant	  variables.	  Second,	  when	  developing	  estimates	  such	  as	  the	  URR/well	  or	  the	  areal	  extent	  of	  the	  shale	  (and	  in	  estimating	  the	  uncertainty	  in	   these	   values),	   the	   USGS	   takes	   geological	   factors	   into	   account,	   such	   as	   the	   shale	  thickness	   and	  mineralogy.	   The	  USGS	   indicates	   that	   these	   factors	   should	   be	   plotted	   as	  maps	  and	  that	   they	  can	  affect	   the	  assumed	  success	  ratios	  and/or	  URR/well.	  However,	  little	  detail	   is	  given	  as	   to	  how	  these	   factors	  are	  actually	  used.	  Third,	   the	  USGS	  splits	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  S.	  Nome	  and	  P.	   Johnston,	   'From	  shale	   to	  shining	  shale:	  a	  primer	  on	  North	  American	  natural	  gas	  shale	  plays',	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  Deutsche	  Bank,	  2008).	  11	  INTEK,	  'Review	  of	  emerging	  resources'.	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particular	   shale	   play	   into	   smaller	   ‘assessment	   units’,12	  and	   assesses	   each	   of	   these	  individually.	   It	   therefore	   differentiates	   between	   sweet-­‐spot	   and	   non-­‐sweet-­‐spot	   areas	  on	  a	  smaller	  scale	  than	  INTEK.	  The	  recent	  USGS	  assessment	  of	  the	  Marcellus	  Shale13	  for	  example	   split	   the	  play	   into	   three	  assessment	  units.	  Each	  of	   these	  units	   is	  divided	   into	  sweet	  and	  non-­‐sweet	  spots;	  the	  USGS	  therefore	  identified	  six	  different	  areas	  within	  the	  Marcellus	  Shale,	  each	  with	  different	  sizes	  and	  productivities,	  while	   INTEK	  only	  split	   it	  into	  two.	  	  Fourth,	  the	  USGS	  periodically	  updates	  its	  resource	  assessments	  for	  individual	  US	  shale	  plays	  or	  areas	  of	  the	  plays	  and	  produces	  an	  end-­‐of-­‐year	  summary	  combining	  all	  of	  the	  latest	  surveys	   it	  has	  carried	  out.14	  The	   latest	  resources	  assessments	  were	  summarised	  in	  Table	  2-­‐4.	   It	   can	  be	  seen	   that	  some	  areas	  have	  not	  been	  examined	  since	  2002.	  One	  would	  expect	  that	  those	  assessments	  produced	  after	  2010	  would	  have	  relied	  upon	  the	  updated	  assessment	  method	  described	  above,	  but	  this	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  the	  case.	  The	   USGS	   recently	   released	   the	   data15	  it	   used	   in	   its	   most	   recent	   assessment	   for	   the	  Marcellus	  Shale.16	  This	  data	  consists	  of	  the	  ranges	  assumed	  for	  the	  parameters	  required	  to	   estimate	   potential	   additions	   to	   reserves,	   for	   example	   the	   mean	   URR/cell	   and	  indicates	   that	   the	   old	   assessment	   method	   was	   used.	   While	   data	   for	   the	   other	  assessments	   undertaken	   since	   2010	   are	   not	   available,	   it	   seems	   likely	   that	   the	   old	  methodology	   was	   used	   for	   all	   of	   these.	   As	   described	   above,	   the	   earlier	   assessment	  methodology	  excluded	  volumes	  of	  gas	  estimated	  to	  exist	  in	  non-­‐sweet-­‐spot	  areas	  and	  so	  is	   likely	   to	   underestimate	   the	   total	   play	   TRR17.	   This	   represents	   another	   important	  difference	  between	  the	  assessment	  results	  of	  the	  USGS	  and	  INTEK.	  Extrapolating	   a	  mean	   URR/well	   from	   this	   area	   to	   the	  whole	   of	   the	   sweet	   spot	   could	  potentially	   overestimate	   the	   resource	   potential.	   If	   these	   estimates	   are	   then	   extended	  across	   the	   entire	   shale	   play,	   the	   resource	   potential	   of	   the	   region	   could	   be	   greatly	  overestimated.	   The	   USGS	   attempted	   to	  mitigate	   this	   problem	   by	  mapping	   a	   range	   of	  geological	   factors	   and	   using	   these	   to	   estimate	   the	   possible	   productivities	   outside	   the	  area	  currently	  in	  production,	  although	  it	  has	  not,	  in	  the	  assessments	  it	  has	  performed	  so	  far,	   attempted	   to	   estimate	   the	   productivity	   of	   non-­‐sweet-­‐spot	   areas.	   Nevertheless,	   its	  approach	   is	   relatively	   transparent	   and	   has	   the	   advantage	   that	   uncertainties	   are	  explicitly	   accounted	   for.	   In	   contrast,	   INTEK	   does	   not	   provide	   any	   detail	   on	   how	   it	  estimates	   either	   the	  URR/well	   or	   the	  well	   spacing	   in	   undeveloped	   or	   non-­‐sweet-­‐spot	  areas	  and	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  little	  empirical	  basis	  for	  the	  values	  chosen.	  The	  USGS	  relies	  upon	  geological	  assessments	  to	  classify	  sweet	  spots,	  while	  INTEK	  uses	  the	   area	   leased	   by	   companies	   as	   a	   proxy.	   While	   the	   latter	   is	   a	   simpler	   and	   cheaper	  approach,	  it	   is	   likely	  to	  over-­‐simplify	  the	  problem	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons.	  Firstly,	  the	  acreage	  details	  used	  appear	  to	  be	  significantly	  out	  of	  date.	  Within	  the	  Marcellus	  Shale,	  for	   example,	   XTO	   Energy,	   purchased	   by	   ExxonMobil	   in	   2009	   when	   it	   held	   around	  280	  000	   acres,	   is	   listed	   as	   holding	   150	  000	   acres.	   Similarly,	   Talisman	   Energy	   Inc.	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 An	  ‘Assessment	  Unit’	  is	  defined	  as	  areas	  that	  ‘encompasses	  fields	  (discovered	  and	  undiscovered)	  which	  share	   similar	   geologic	   traits	   and	   socio-­‐economic	   factors.’	   United	   States	   Geological	   Survey,	   'Chapter	   GL	  Glossary'.	  	  13	  Coleman	  et	  al.,	  'Assessment	  of	  undiscovered	  oil	  and	  gas'.	  14	  United	  States	  Geological	  Survey,	  'National	  assessment	  of	  oil	  and	  gas	  resources	  update'.	  15	  EIA,	  Shale	  gas:	  proved	  reserves	  (cited).	  16	  Coleman	  et	  al.,	  'Assessment	  of	  undiscovered	  oil	  and	  gas'.	  17	  Charpentier	  and	  Cook,	  'Improved	  USGS	  methodology'.	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reported	  to	  hold	  640	  000	  acres	  yet	  in	  a	  May	  2010	  investor	  report	  indicates	  that	  it	  held	  around	  218	  000	  acres.18	  	  A	  second	  problem	  regarding	   INTEK’s	  choice	  of	   sweet-­‐spot	  areas	   is	   its	   reliance	  upon	  a	  report	   published	   in	   2008.19	  Since	   only	   a	   limited	   number	   of	  wells	   had	   been	   drilled	   by	  that	   time	  (e.g.	  only	  234	   in	  Pennsylvania),	   the	  productivity	  of	   the	   leased	  areas	  was	  not	  known	   with	   any	   confidence.20	  There	   is	   therefore	   no	   real	   justification	   why	   the	   area	  leased	   in	   mid-­‐2008	   should	   correspond	   to	   the	   sweet-­‐spot	   area.	   Furthermore,	   as	  mentioned	   above,	   given	   the	   heterogeneity	   of	   sweet-­‐spot	   areas,	   assuming	   current	  productivity	   will	   likely	   provide	   an	   overestimate	   for	   the	   remainder	   of	   the	   sweet-­‐spot	  area.	  One	   final	   drawback	   with	   the	   INTEK	   report	   is	   its	   reliance	   upon	   highly	   subjective	  estimates	   of	   the	   ‘success	   factor’	   to	   translate	   historical	   production	   experience	   into	   an	  estimate	  of	  recoverable	  resources	  for	  the	  whole	  shale.	  The	  updated	  USGS	  methodology	  includes	  a	  comparable	  ‘success	  ratio’	  that	  reflects	  the	  percentage	  of	  wells	  estimated	  to	  produce	   at	   least	   the	  minimum	  URR.	   The	   updated	   USGS	  methodology,	  which	   requires	  estimating	  the	  success	  ratio,	  was	  not	  actually	  used	  for	  any	  of	  the	  assessments	  that	  were	  presented	   in	   Table	   2-­‐4.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   new	   USGS	   methodology	   estimates	   success	  ratios	  at	  a	  lower	  level	  of	  spatial	  aggregation,	  basing	  its	  assumptions	  to	  a	  greater	  extent	  on	   the	   results	   from	   drilling	   activity	   and	   using	   probability	   distributions	   to	   reflect	   the	  associated	  uncertainties.	  Hence,	  it	  should	  have	  a	  lower	  degree	  of	  subjectivity.	  	  
C.4 Impact	  of	  technology	  on	  resource	  estimates	  The	  studies	  reviewed	  above	  have	  focused	  upon	  estimating	  the	  volume	  of	  shale	  gas	  that	  could	  be	  recovered	  using	  currently	  available	  technology.	  As	  the	  USGS	  comments:	  
"The	   USGS	   oil	   and	   gas	   estimates	   are	   of	   technically	  
recoverable	   resources	   as	   opposed	   to	   in-­‐place	   resources.	  
Technological	   and	   economic	   assumptions	   are	   conservative	  
and	  limited,	   in	  that	  the	  production	  data	  used	  for	  calculating	  
well	  URRs	  are	  contemporary	   to	   the	   time	  of	   the	  assessment...	  
large	   improvements	   in	   technology	   or	   increasing	   petroleum	  
prices	  could	  possibly	  increase	  recovery	  factor	  substantially	  in	  
the	   future.	   Because	   this	   new	   methodology	   is	   tied	   to	  
contemporary	  well-­‐production	  data,	  such	  improved	  recovery	  
factors	   are	   not	   used	   as	   part	   of	   this	   assessment	  
methodology…"	  As	   indicated	   in	   Section	   2.2,	   assessment	   methods	   that	   explicitly	   allow	   for	   future	  technological	  advances	  are	  likely	  to	  lead	  to	  substantially	  larger	  estimates	  of	  recoverable	  resources.	  Only	   three	  reports	   that	  attempt	   to	  quantify	   the	  effects	  of	   future	   technology	  development	  have	  been	  identified,	  namely	  a	  2004	  report	  by	  Kuuskraa,21	  a	  paper	  by	  the	  US	   National	   Petroleum	   Council22	  and	   a	   number	   of	   the	   EIA	   AEOs23.	   In	   each	   case,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Talisman	  Energy,	  'Investor	  open	  house	  May	  2010:	  North	  American	  operations',	  (Calgary,	  AB:	  Talisman	  Energy,	  2010).	  19	  Nome	  and	  Johnston,	  'From	  shale	  to	  shining	  shale'.	  20	  Marcellus	   Shale	   Advisory	   Commission,	   'Governor’s	   Marcellus	   Shale	   Advisory	   Commission	   report',	  (Canonsburg,	  PA:	  2011).	  21	  Kuuskraa,	  'Gas	  resources,	  unconventional'.	  22	  Holditch,	  'Unconventional	  gas'.	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technological	   progress	   is	   represented	   by	   annual	   percentage	   increases	   in	   the	  URR/well.24	  This	   percentage,	   extrapolated	   over	   a	   given	   time	   frame	   and	   multiplied	   by	   a	  contemporary	  estimate	  of	  TRR,	  will	  yield	  an	  estimate	  of	  the	  URR.	  For	  example,	  if	  TRR	  in	  a	  particular	   region	   is	   estimated	  at	  2.8	  Tcm	  and	   technological	  progress	   is	   estimated	   to	  increase	  URR/well	   by	   30%,	   then	   all	   else	   being	   equal,	   the	  URR	   for	   that	   region	  will	   be	  3.7	  Tcm.	  	  Table	   C-­‐1	   illustrates	   the	   assumed	   annual	   improvement	   in	   recovery	   and	   the	   implied	  overall	  increase	  over	  a	  30-­‐year	  time	  period.	  The	  mean	  of	  all	   ‘medium’	  estimates	  of	  the	  increase	   in	  TRR	   that	   is	   estimated	   to	   occur	   from	   future	   technological	   progress	   is	   36%	  over	  a	  30-­‐year	  period	   (this	  mean	  has	  been	  weighted	  by	   the	  number	  of	   reports	  giving	  each	   technological	   progress	   and	   so	   takes	   into	   account	   that	   more	   than	   one	   AEO	   is	  included	  in	  the	  first	  and	  third	  rows).	  	  The	   EIA	   from	   2000	   to	   2009	   identified	   three	   technologies	   that	   it	   expected	   would	  contribute	   to	   a	   greater	   URR/well	   for	   shale	   gas	   (and	   the	   other	   unconventional	  technologies	   but	   at	   different	   rates).25	  These	  were:	   “geology	   technology	  modelling	   and	  matching”,	  “more	  effective,	  lower	  damage	  well	  completion	  and	  stimulation	  technology”	  and	  “advanced	  well	  completion	  technologies,	  such	  as	  cavitation,	  horizontal	  drilling,	  and	  multi-­‐lateral	  wells”.	   The	   first	   two	  of	   these	   contribute	   an	   annual	   increase	   in	  URR/well	  and	  the	  third	  an	  aggregate	  increase,	  presumably	  resulting	  from	  switching	  from	  vertical	  to	  these	  new	  drilling	  technologies,	  over	  the	  timescale	  of	  the	  AEOs,	  generally	  around	  20-­‐25	  years.	  It	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  different	  AEOs	  assumed	  slightly	  different	  rates	  of	  progress.	  These	   technologies	   are	   assumed	   to	  be	   complementary	   and	   so	   the	   figures	   indicated	   in	  Table	  C-­‐1	  are	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  contribution	  from	  each,	  converted	  into	  an	  annual	  increase	  and	  the	  total	  increase	  in	  the	  30-­‐year	  period.	  	  The	  latest	  two	  AEOs	  (2010	  and	  2011)	  use	  a	  slightly	  different	  approach	  and	  indicate	  that	  the	   “pace	   at	   which	   technology	   performance	   improves	   and	   the	   probability	   that	   the	  technology	   project	   will	   meet	   the	   program	   goals”	   for	   URR	   for	   shale	   gas	   was	   8%	   for	  ‘developing’	  resources	  and	  7%	  for	  ‘undiscovered’	  resources.26	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  what	  these	  terms	  mean	  or	  how	  these	  percentages	  are	  actually	  used	  and	  as	  very	  little	  explanation	  is	  provided,	  they	  are	  therefore	  not	  include	  in	  Table	  C-­‐1.	  Two	  of	   the	   three	  technologies	  (stimulation27	  and	  horizontal	  drilling)	  mentioned	  above	  are	  indeed	  the	  technologies	  that	  have	  spurred	  the	  recent	  increase	  in	  TRR	  estimates.	  The	  rate	  at	  which	  they	  would	  increase	  URR/well	  has	  been	  vastly	  underestimated,	  however.	  ARI28	  indicates	  that	   the	  URR/well	  within	  the	  Barnett	  Shale	  averaged	  around	  11.3-­‐14.1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  For	  example,	  EIA,	  'AEO	  2010'.	  24	  Other	  metrics	  for	  measuring	  the	  impact	  of	  technological	  progress	  on	  recoverable	  volumes	  of	  shale	  gas	  can	  also	  be	  used.	  For	  example	  the	  usual	  metric	  for	  estimating	  impacts	  of	  technology	  on	  conventional	  oil	  and	  gas	  recovery	  is	  by	  increases	  in	  the	  recovery	  factor	  IEA,	  'World	  Energy	  Outlook	  2008',	  in	  World	  Energy	  
Outlook	  (Paris:	  Organisation	  for	  Economic	  Co-­‐operation	  and	  Development	  2008).	  25	  For	  example,	  EIA,	  'AEO	  2008'.	  26	  For	  example,	  EIA,	  'AEO	  2010'.	  
27 Stimulation,	   also	   known	   as	   hydraulic	   fracturing,	   involves	   ‘“pumping	   fluids”	   consisting	   primarily	   of	  water	  and	  sand...injected	  under	  high	  pressure	  into	  the	  producing	  formation,	  creating	  fissures	  that	  allow	  resources	  to	  move	  freely	  from	  rock	  pores	  where	  it	  is	  trapped’.	  American	  Petroleum	  Institute,	   'Hydraulic	  fracturing'.	  28	  Kuuskraa,	  'Case	  study	  #1.	  Barnett	  Shale:	  The	  start	  of	  the	  gas	  shale	  revolution'.	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mcm/well	   between	   1985	   and	   1990	   but	   in	   2007-­‐2008	   had	   increased	   to	   around	   65.2	  mcm/well.	  This	  corresponds	  to	  around	  a	  410%	  increase	  in	  URR/well	  in	  about	  a	  20-­‐year	  period	  and	  has	  occurred	  primarily	  through	  the	  more	  widespread	  and	  improved	  use	  of	  horizontal	  drilling	  and	  stimulation.	  The	   fastest	   rate	   of	   increase	   in	   URR/well	   anticipated	   in	   Table	   C-­‐1,	   which	   includes	  increases	   resulting	   from	   switching	   from	   vertical	   to	   horizontal	   wells	   and	   the	   use	   of	  hydraulic	   fracturing,	   implies	   an	   increase	   of	   only	   50%	   over	   a	   comparable	   timeframe.	  This	   significant	   underestimation	   of	   the	   role	   of	   technological	   progress	   in	   the	   past	  demonstrates	   the	   difficulty	   in	   estimating	   future	   technological	   progress,	   even	   when	  using	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  potential	  values.	  	  Nevertheless,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   it	   was	   not	   the	   introduction	   of	   ‘new’	  technologies,	   i.e.	   technologies	   that	   had	   not	   been	   employed	   elsewhere	   and	   whose	  potential	  was	  unknown,	  but	  the	  adaptation	  and	  utilisation	  of	  existing	  technologies	  that	  led	   to	   the	   large	   increases	   seen	   in	   the	   URR/well.	   The	   potential	   for	   the	   utilisation	   of	  entirely	  ‘new’	  technologies	  for	  shale	  gas	  recovery	  has	  not	  been	  discussed	  in	  any	  of	  the	  EIA	  AEOs.	  This	  suggests	  that	  it	  is	  the	  existing	  technologies	  of	  stimulation	  and	  horizontal	  drilling	  that	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  used	  in	  the	  future	  and	  that	  increases	  in	  URR/well	  will	  be	  driven	  by	  their	  more	  widespread	  usage	  and	  improvements	  in	  how	  they	  are	  used.	  New	  technological	  breakthroughs	  can	  never	  be	  ruled	  out,	  however.	  	  These	  two	  technologies,	  stimulation	  and	  horizontal	  drilling,	  are	  now	  much	  more	  widely	  used	  than	  in	  2000,	  when	  the	  estimates	  of	  technological	  progress	  in	  URR/well	  were	  first	  given	  by	  the	  EIA.	  It	  therefore	  seems	  likely	  that	  there	  is	  less	  potential	  for	  a	  step	  increase	  through	   switching	   from	   vertical	   wells	   without	   stimulation	   to	   horizontal	   wells	   with	  stimulation,	   in	  addition	   to	   there	  now	  being	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	   the	  current	  and	  future	  potential	  of	   these	   technologies.	  There	  has	  also	  been	  a	   significant	  body	  of	  work	  analysing	   the	   geology	   of	   individual	   shale	   plays.	   One	   would	   therefore	   expect	   shale	  geology	   to	   be	   now	   also	   much	   better	   understood	   and	   hence	   the	   scope	   for	   future	  improvements	   in	   URR/well	   to	   be	   better	   appreciated.	   These	   two	   factors	   suggest	   that	  such	   a	   step	   change	   in	   URR/well	   as	   witnessed	   between	   1985	   and	   the	   present	   is	   less	  likely	  to	  occur	  again	  in	  the	  future.	  	  However,	  another	  way	  to	  look	  at	  the	  role	  of	  technology	  is	  by	  examining	  the	  influence	  of	  changes	   in	   the	   shale	   gas	   recovery	   factors.	   Even	   a	   very	   small	   increase	   in	   average	  recovery	   factors	   can	   have	   very	   significant	   impacts	   on	   estimated	   global	   recoverable	  volumes	   of	   shale	   gas.	   For	   example,	   using	   ARI’s	   global	   estimate	   of	   shale	   gas	   OGIP	   of	  around	   708.2	   Tcm,29	  a	   1%	   increase	   in	   recovery	   factors	   globally	   would	   lead	   to	   an	  increase	  in	  global	  URR	  of	  7.1	  Tcm	  –	  over	  twice	  the	  global	  production	  of	  all	  natural	  gas	  in	  2010.30	  In	  conclusion,	  the	  ranges	  of	  technological	  progress	  suggested	  by	  literature	  as	  presented	  in	   Table	   C-­‐1	   are	   likely	   to	   represent	   a	   better	   approximation	   of	   the	   role	   of	   future	  technological	  progress	  than	  they	  have	  previously.	  However,	  the	  significant	  impact	  that	  even	   a	   small	   improvement	   in	   technology	   can	   have	   on	   the	   URR	   and	   the	   possibility	   of	  major	   future	   technological	   breakthroughs,	  means	   that,	   in	   principle,	   estimates	   of	   URR	  will	  always	  be	  more	  uncertain	  than	  estimates	  of	  TRR.	  Estimates	  of	  future	  technological	  progress	  must	  therefore	  be	  interpreted	  with	  considerable	  caution.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Advanced	  Resources	  International,	  'World	  shale	  gas	  resources'.	  30	  BP,	  'Statistical	  review	  2011'.	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Table	  C-­‐1:	  Assumed	  rates	  of	  technological	  progress	  in	  URR/well	  from	  various	  sources31	  
Source	   Date	   Annual	  increase	   Implied	  30-­‐year	  increase	  	   	   Low	   Medium	   High	   Low	   Medium	   High	  EIA	  AEO	   2004-­‐2009	   0.3%	   1.3%	   2.0%	   8%	   49%	   80%	  	   2003	   0.4%	   0.5%	   0.6%	   13%	   16%	   19%	  	   2001-­‐2002	   0.6%	   0.8%	   1.2%	   19%	   25%	   43%	  	   2000	   0.3%	   0.5%	   1.1%	   9%	   16%	   41%	  Kuuskraa	   2004	   	   0.8%	   	   	   27%	   	  NPC	   2003	  (updated	  in	  2007)	   0.2%	   0.9%	   1.5%	   7%	   30%	   56%	  
Mean	   	   0.3%	   1.0%	   1.5%	   9.6%	   36.1%	   56.3%	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Note:	  the	  mean	  figures	  have	  been	  weighted	  by	  the	  numbers	  of	  reports	  providing	  each	  percentage.	  Sources:	  EIA,	  'AEO	  2010',	  Holditch,	  'Unconventional	  gas',	  Kuuskraa,	  'Gas	  resources,	  unconventional'.	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D Decline	  rate	  methodologies	  Production	   decline	   from	   oil	   wells	   was	   first	   modelled	   by	   Arnold	   and	   Anderson1	  and	  subsequently	   by	   Cutler 2 	  and	   Larkey, 3 	  among	   others.	   Contemporary	   decline	   curve	  analysis	  has	   its	   roots	   in	  Arps,4	  who	   synthesised	  and	  elaborated	  a	  group	  of	   techniques	  now	   commonly	   referred	   to	   as	   Decline	   Curve	   Analysis	   (DCA).	   DCA	   typically	   involves	  fitting	  a	  curve	  to	  a	  time	  series	  of	  monthly	  or	  annual	  production	  from	  a	  well	  or	  field	  and	  extrapolating	   this	   curve	   into	   the	   future	   to	   forecast	   production	   rates	   and	   ultimate	  recovery.	  Arps	   identified	   two	  main	   functional	   forms	   for	   these	  curves:	  exponential	  and	  hyperbolic.	   More	   advanced	   formulations	   of	   DCA	   equations	   exist,5	  with	   some	   being	  explicitly	   developed	   for	   the	   analysis	   of	   tight	   gas	   and	   shale	   gas	   reservoirs.6	  However,	  there	   is	  an	  ongoing	  debate	  about	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  different	  functional	   forms	  for	  simulating	  production	  decline	  from	  shale	  gas	  wells.	  Exponential	  production	  decline	  takes	  the	  form	  
	  
Equation	  D-­‐1	  Where	  q(t)	  is	  the	  rate	  of	  production	  at	  time	  t,	  qi	  is	  the	  initial	  rate	  of	  production	  at	  t=0	  and	  
D	   is	   a	   constant	   reflecting	   the	   decline	   rate	   ( 0≥D ).	   The	   corresponding	   equation	   for	  hyperbolic	  decline	  is:	  
	  
Equation	  D-­‐2	  Where	  Di	  is	  the	  initial	  decline	  rate	  (t=0)	  and	  b	  is	  a	  constant,	  commonly	  termed	  the	  Arps	  decline	   constant,	   which	   typically	   (but	   not	   always)	   lies	   between	   0	   and	   1.0. 7 	  The	  appropriate	  value	  of	  this	  constant	  is	  often	  the	  focus	  of	  disputes	  in	  decline	  curve	  analysis.	  These	  two	  functional	  forms	  are	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  D-­‐1.	  For	  two	  curves	  with	  the	  same	  initial	   production	   rate	   and	   the	   same	   initial	   decline	   rate,	   the	   hyperbolic	   curve	   flattens	  earlier,	  maintaining	   a	   greater	   production	   rate	   for	   any	   given	   time.	   The	   area	   under	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  R.	  Arnold	  and	  R.	  Anderson,	  'Preliminary	  report	  on	  Coalinga	  oil	  district',	  in	  US	  Geological	  Survey	  Bulletin	  (1908).	  2	  W.C.	   Cutler,	   'Estimation	   of	   underground	  oil	   reserves	   by	   oil-­‐well	   production	   curves',	   (Washington,	  DC:	  Department	  of	  the	  Interior,	  1924).	  3	  C.S.	  Larkey,	  'Mathematical	  determination	  of	  production	  decline	  curves',	  Trans	  AIME	  71	  (1925).	  4	  Arps,	  ed.,	  Analysis	  of	  Decline	  Curves.	  5	  Ibid,	  Fetkovich,	  'Decline	  Curve	  Analysis'.	  6	  Ilk	   et	   al.,	   'Integrating	   Multiple	   Production	   Analysis	   Techniques	   To	   Assess	   Tight	   Gas	   Sand	   Reserves:	  Defining	  a	  New	  Paradigm	  for	   Industry	  Best	  Practices';	  P.P.	  Valko,	   'Assigning	  Value	   to	  Stimulation	   in	   the	  Barnett	  Shale:	  A	  Simultaneous	  Analysis	  of	  7000	  Plus	  Production	  Histories	  and	  Well	  Completion	  Records'	  (paper	  presented	  at	  the	  SPE	  Hydraulic	  Fracturing	  Technology	  Conference,	  Woodlands,	  TX,	  2009).	  7	  D.	   Ilk	   et	   al.,	   'Exponential	   vs.	   Hyperbolic	   decline	   in	   tight	   gas	   sands:	   understanding	   the	   origin	   and	  implications	   for	   reserve	   estimates	   using	   Arps'	   decline	   curves'	   (paper	   presented	   at	   the	   SPE	   Annual	  Technical	  Conference	  and	  Exhibition,	  Denver,	  CO,	  2008).	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decline	   curve,	   from	   when	   production	   begins	   to	   when	   it	   finally	   ends	   represents	   the	  ultimately	  recoverable	  resource	  from	  the	  well.	  







	  The	  exponential	  decline	  curve	  exhibits	  a	  constant	  rate	  of	  decline,	  D	  (i.e.	  the	  percentage	  change	  in	  production	  between	  time	  t	  and	  time	  t+1	  is	  constant)	  and	  a	  plot	  of	  the	  natural	  log	  of	  production	  against	  time	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  a	  straight	  line	  (Figure	  D-­‐2).	  In	  contrast,	  the	  hyperbolic	  decline	  curve	  exhibits	  a	  reducing	  decline	  rate	  over	  time,	  so	  a	  plot	  of	  the	  natural	   log	   of	   production	   against	   time	   takes	   the	   form	   of	   a	   curve	   (Figure	   D-­‐2).	   The	  constant	  b	  represents	  the	  rate	  with	  which	  that	  decline	  rate	  reduces.	  	  







	  While	  originally	  applied	  to	  oil	  production,	  decline	  curves	  are	  now	  commonly	  applied	  to	  gas	  fields,	  including	  shale	  gas.	  However,	  given	  the	  relatively	  recent	  nature	  of	  most	  shale	  gas	   plays,	   the	   historical	   evidence	   with	   which	   to	   estimate	   decline	   curves	   is	   relatively	  limited.	  The	  level	  of	  uncertainty	  may	  be	  expected	  to	  increase	  with	  the	  time	  period	  over	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which	   curves	   are	   extrapolated,	   but	   to	   estimate	   the	  URR/well,	   extrapolation	  over	   long	  time	  periods	  is	  required.	  In	  addition,	  the	  rapid	  technical	  developments	  over	  the	  past	  few	  years	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  affected	  the	  pattern	  and	  rate	  of	  production	  decline	  –	  so	  newer	  wells	  may	   not	   necessarily	   behave	   in	   the	   same	   fashion	   as	   older	  wells,	   even	  when	   the	  geology	   is	   similar.	   These	   factors	   have	   fuelled	   the	   debate	   regarding	   the	   appropriate	  choice	  and	  use	  of	  decline	  curves	  in	  shale	  gas	  areas.8	  Whilst	   the	  exponential	  decline	  curve	   is	  simpler,	   the	  hyperbolic	  curve	   is	  often	  found	  to	  provide	   a	   more	   accurate	   model	   of	   conventional	   oil	   and	   gas	   fields,	   since	   the	   rate	   of	  production	   decline	   typically	   slows	   rather	   than	   remaining	   constant.	   Production	   from	  conventional	   gas	  wells	   typically	  declines	  by	  25-­‐40%	  per	  year	   in	   the	   early	   stages,9	  but	  production	  from	  shale	  gas	  wells	  declines	  even	  faster	  	  –	  for	  example,	  by	  as	  much	  as	  63-­‐85%	  per	  year.10	  But	  rather	  than	  focusing	  on	  the	  initial	  rate	  of	  decline,	  which	  is	  apparent	  after	  only	  a	  few	  months	  of	  production,	  the	  contentious	  question	  is	  how	  quickly	  and	  by	  how	  much	  will	  these	  decline	  rates	  reduce?	  The	  debate	  has	  sometimes	  been	  characterised	  as	  an	  argument	  between	  hyperbolic	  and	  exponential	  decline.11	  However,	  exponential	  decline	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  special	  case	  of	  hyperbolic	   decline	   where	   b=0.	   The	   debate	   may	   therefore	   be	   recast	   as	   ‘what	   is	   the	  appropriate	   value	   of	   b?’	   Figure	   D-­‐4	   illustrates	   the	   change	   in	   hyperbolic	   decline	   as	   b	  varies	  between	  0.01	  and	  0.99.	  	  The	  theoretical	  basis	  for	  a	  hyperbolic	  decline	  curve	  assumes	  ‘boundary-­‐dominated	  flow’	  –	  where	   the	   influence	   of	   the	   reservoir	   boundaries	   affects	   the	   flow-­‐rate	   behaviour.	   In	  these	  circumstances,	  b	  is	  normally	  found	  to	  be	  between	  0	  and	  1.	  However,	  shale	  gas	  and	  other	   unconventional	   gas	   resources	   exhibit	   more	   ‘transient’	   or	   heterogeneous	   flow	  rates12	  and	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  fit	  curves	  with	  b	  constants	  greater	  than	  1.	  To	  correct	  for	  the	  anomaly	   that	   hyperbolic	   decline	   suggests	   infinite	   production,	   a	   point	   of	   economic	  truncation	   must	   be	   assumed,	   where	   the	   value	   of	   produced	   gas	   drops	   below	   some	  assumed	  cost	  of	  operation.	  The	  well	   is	   then	  assumed	  to	  be	  no	   longer	  profitable	  and	  is	  ‘shut-­‐in’.	  Such	  calculations	  require	  assumptions	  about	  the	  capital	  and	  operating	  cost	  of	  the	  well,	   the	   expected	  price	   of	   gas	   over	   the	  well	   lifetime	   and	   the	   period	   of	   time	   over	  which	   these	   costs	   should	   be	   amortised.	   Some	   estimates,	   based	   on	   a	   gas	   price	   of	   $5/	  thousand	   cubic	   feet,	   suggest	   that	   wells	   in	   the	   Barnett	   Shale	   are	   no	   longer	   profitable	  when	  producing	  below	  1	  million	  cubic	  feet	  per	  month.13	  While	  estimates	  of	  b	  constants	  greater	  than	  1	  are	  possible,	  URR	  estimates	  appear	  to	  be	  more	  sensitive	  to	  variation	  in	  these	  higher	  values	  of	  b.	  Figure	  D-­‐3	  presents	  the	  outcome	  of	   an	   analysis	   of	   44	   fields	   in	   the	   Haynesville	   play.14	  In	   this	   figure	   URR	   estimates	   are	  presented	  on	  the	  y	  axis	  while	  b	  constant	  values	  are	  presented	  on	  the	  x	  axis.	  Both	  initial	  production	   and	   initial	   decline	   are	   fixed.	   Based	   on	   this	   analysis,	   the	   change	   in	   URR	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Ibid,	  J.P.	  Spivey	  et	  al.,	   'Applications	  of	  the	  Transient	  Hyperbolic	  Exponent'	  (paper	  presented	  at	  the	  SPE	  Rocky	  Mountain	  Petroleum	  Technology	  Conference,	  Keystone,	  CO,	  2001).	  9	  J.D.	  Hughes,	  'Will	  Natural	  Gas	  Fuel	  America	  in	  the	  21st	  Century?',	  (Post	  Carbon	  Institute,	  2011).	  10	  Chesapeake	  Energy,	  'Investor	  and	  analyst	  meeting'.	  11	  Dizard,	  'Debate'.	  
12 Transient	  or	  heterogeneous	  flow	  is	  defined	  as	  a	  changing	  flow	  rate	  over	  time.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  shale	  gas	  this	  means	  that	  the	  flow	  rate	  is	  more	  volatile	  than	  boundary-­‐dominated	  flow	  rates,	  with	  the	  potential	  rate	  of	  change	  being	  more	  dramatic.	  
13 The	  method	  of	  calculation	  of	  this	  figure	  and	  assumptions	  are	  not	  given.	  Berman,	  'Shale	  Gas-­‐Abundance	  or	  Mirage?	  Why	  The	  Marcellus	  Shale	  Will	  Disappoint	  Expectations'.	  14	  Ibid.	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estimates	  over	  a	  change	   in	  b	   constant	  appears	   to	   increase	  as	  b	   increases.	  This	   implies	  that	   even	   small	   errors	   in	   the	   assumed	   b	   constant	   will	   have	   large	   impacts	   on	   the	  estimated	   URR.	   It	   is	   also	   suggested	   in	   this	   analysis	   that	   different	   b	   constants	   create	  hyperbolic	  curves	  that	  fit	  the	  data	  equally	  well.	  This	  underlines	  the	  possibility	  of	  making	  a	   small	   error	   in	   assumed	   b	   constant	   potentially	   leading	   to	   a	   significant	   error	   in	  estimated	  URR	  if	  b	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  greater	  than	  1.	  







b	  Constant 	  Evidence	  suggests	  that	  shale	  gas	  wells	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  closed	  down	  after	  relatively	  short	  periods	  of	  production.	  In	  an	  analysis	  of	  well	  data	  from	  the	  Barnett	  Shale	  between	  2001	  and	  2008,	  Sutton	  et al.16	  found	   that	  10%	  of	   the	  horizontal	  wells	  used	   to	  produce	  shale	  gas	  were	  shut-­‐in	  within	  40	  months	  of	  initial	  production.	  This	  compares	  to	  vertical	  wells	  in	  the	  same	  region	  which	  took	  over	  70	  months	  to	  lose	  the	  same	  percentage	  of	  producing	  wells.	   The	  difference	   in	   expected	   longevity	   between	  horizontal	   and	   vertical	  wells	   is	   a	  function,	  amongst	  other	  things,	  of	  the	  decline	  rate	  and	  the	  cost	  of	  well	  construction	  and	  operation.	   The	   implications,	   therefore,	   are	   that	   using	   vertical	   well	   decline	   rates	   to	  estimate	   horizontal	   well	   behaviour	   will	   likely	   overestimate	   future	   well	   longevity.	  However,	  some	  authors	  have	  suggested	  that	  shale	  gas	  wells	  have	  been	  maintained	  past	  this	   economically	   rational	   point	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   downgrading	   company	   reserve	  estimates.17	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Source:	  Arps,	  ed.,	  Analysis	  of	  Decline	  Curves.	  16	  R.P.	   Sutton,	   S.A.	   Cox	   and	   R.D.	   Barree,	   'Shale	   Gas	   Plays:	   A	   Performance	   Perspective',	   in	   Tight	   Gas	  
Completions	  Conference,	  ed.	  Society	  of	  Petroleum	  Engineers	  (San	  Antonio,	  TX:	  2010).	  17	  Berman,	   'Shale	   Gas-­‐Abundance	   or	   Mirage?	   Why	   The	   Marcellus	   Shale	   Will	   Disappoint	   Expectations';	  Berman,	  'Abundance	  or	  Mirage?'.	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  Geologists	  typically	  estimate	  decline	  curves	  for	  wells	  or	  groups	  of	  wells	  with	  the	  help	  of	  non-­‐linear	  regression	  techniques.18	  However,	  this	  form	  of	  curve	  fitting	  may	  have	  limited	  accuracy	   if	   only	   short	   periods	   of	   historical	   data	   are	   available.	   A	   key	   difficulty	   is	   that	  curves	  with	  different	  functional	  forms	  and/or	  parameter	  values	  can	  fit	  short	  periods	  of	  data	   comparably	   well	   but	   lead	   to	   substantially	   different	   estimates	   of	   the	   URR	   (see	  Figure	   D-­‐3	   and	   surrounding	   discussion).	   In	   these	   circumstances,	   an	   alternative	   is	   to	  base	  the	  choice	  of	  curve	  and	  parameters	  on	  data	  from	  ‘analogues’	  –	  that	  is,	  wells	  with	  a	  longer	  production	  history	  that	  are	   in	  areas	  with	  similar	  geological	  characteristics.	  The	  guidelines	  on	  what	  may	  be	  considered	  an	  appropriate	  analogue	  are	  now	  well	  defined.19	  Nevertheless,	   some	  commentators	  argue	   that	   resource	  estimates	  are	   frequently	  based	  upon	   inappropriate	   analogues.20	  The	   considerable	  variability	   in	  decline	   rates	  between	  different	   shale	   gas	   areas	   highlights	   the	   potential	   error	   associated	   with	   using	  inappropriate	  analogues.21	  This	  variability	  also	  affects	  the	  minimum	  gas	  price	  needed	  to	  support	   gas	   production	   in	   different	   shale	   gas	   areas.	   For	   example,	   between	   2008	   and	  2009,	   a	   shale	   gas	   price	   of	   $4/Mcf	   would	   support	   production	   in	   the	   Barnett	   and	  Fayetteville	  Shales,	  while	  a	  price	  of	  $6/Mcf	  feet	  would	  be	  required	  in	  the	  other	  areas.22	  Due	   to	   the	  difficulties	  associated	  with	  hyperbolic	  decline	  curves,	   several	  authors	  have	  suggested	  using	  a	  new	  decline	  curve	  formulation	  known	  as	  the	  ‘power-­‐law	  exponential’	  rate	   relation	   for	   shale	   gas	   wells	   instead.23 	  But	   while	   this	   new	   formulation	   could	  potentially	   succeed	   the	  hyperbolic	   decline	   curve	   as	  best	   practice,	   it	   seems	  unlikely	   to	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  the	  estimation	  of	  URR	  in	  shale	  gas	  wells	  for	  some	  time.	  The	  continuing	   concern	  over	   the	  accuracy	  of	  hyperbolic	  decline	   curves	  has	  also	  prompted	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Jikich	  and	  Popa,	  'Hyperbolic	  Decline	  Parameter	  Identification'.	  19	  J.E.	  Hodgin	  and	  D.R.	  Harrell,	  'The	  Selection,	  Application,	  and	  Misapplication	  of	  Reservoir	  Analogs	  for	  the	  Estimation	   of	   Petroleum	   Reserves'	   (paper	   presented	   at	   the	   SPE	   Annual	   Technical	   Conference	   and	  Exhibition,	  San	  Antonio,	  TX,	  2006);	  R.	  Sidle	  and	  W.J.	  Lee,	  'An	  Update	  on	  the	  Use	  of	  Reservoir	  Analogs	  for	  the	  Estimation	  of	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  Reserves',	  SPE	  Econ	  &	  Mgmt	  2	  no	  2	  (2010).	  20	  Hodgin	  and	  Harrell,	  'Reservoir	  Analogs'.	  21	  Chesapeake	  Energy,	  'Investor	  and	  analyst	  meeting'.	  22	  Baihly	  et	  al.,	  'Shale	  Gas	  Production	  Decline	  Trend	  Comparison'.	  23	  Ilk	   et	   al.,	   'Integrating	   Multiple	   Production	   Analysis	   Techniques	   To	   Assess	   Tight	   Gas	   Sand	   Reserves:	  Defining	   a	   New	   Paradigm	   for	   Industry	   Best	   Practices';	   Ilk	   et	   al.,	   'Exponential	   vs.	   Hyperbolic	   decline';	  Strickland,	  Purvis	  and	  Blasingame,	  'Reserves	  Determinations'.	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some	   authors	   to	   suggest	   that	   their	   use	   may	   not	   qualify	   under	   the	   US	   Securities	   and	  Exchange	  Commission’s	  (SEC)	  guidance	  on	  the	  reporting	  of	  reserves.24	  Finally,	   analytical	  models,	   or	   their	   combination	   in	   ‘hybrid’	  methodologies,	   provide	   an	  alternative	   route	   to	  derive	   the	  b	   constant.25	  Decline	   curves	  have	   traditionally	  been	  an	  empirical	   technique	   in	  which	   future	   estimates	   are	   derived	   by	   extrapolating	   historical	  data.	  These	  curves	  may	  better	  reflect	  the	  later	  stages	  of	  shale	  gas	  well	  production,	  the	  so	  called	   boundary-­‐dominated	   flow. 26 	  Newer	   analytical	   models	   seek	   to	   derive	   flow	  characteristics	   from	   horizontal,	   fractured	  wells	   through	   computer	   simulations,	   which	  model	   the	   shape,	   pressure	   and	   characteristics	   of	   these	   wells. 27 	  These	   analytical	  techniques	   may	   represent	   the	   initial	   transient	   flow	   more	   accurately.28	  By	   applying	   a	  combination	   of	   these	   techniques,	   geologists	   have	   created	   hybrid	   methodologies	   that	  help	   to	   balance	   the	   potential	   bias	   of	   each	   technique	   as	   the	   well	   transitions	   from	  transient	   flow	   to	   boundary-­‐dominated	   flow.	   These	   hybrid	  methods	   are	   new	   and	   it	   is	  unclear	  whether	  they	  will	  prove	  valuable	  given	  the	  effort	  associated.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Lee	  and	  Sidle,	  'Reserves	  Estimation'.	  25	  Ray	  J.	  Ambrose	  et	  al.,	  'Life-­‐Cycle	  Decline	  Curve	  Estimation	  for	  Tight/Shale	  Reservoirs'	  (paper	  presented	  at	   the	   SPE	   Hydraulic	   Fracturing	   Technology	   Conference,	   Woodlands:	   TX,	   2011);	   J.M.	   Thompson,	   V.O.	  Mangha	   and	  D.M.	   Anderson,	   'Improved	   Shale	   Gas	   Production	   Forecasting	   Using	   a	   Simplified	   Analytical	  Method-­‐A	   Marcellus	   Case	   Study',	   in	  North	   American	   Unconventional	   Gas	   Conference	   and	   Exhibition,	   ed.	  Society	  of	  Petroleum	  Engineers	  (The	  Woodlands,	  TX:	  2011).	  26	  Ambrose	  et	  al.,	  'Life-­‐Cycle	  Decline	  Curve	  Estimation'.	  27	  L.	   Larsen	   and	  T.M.	  Hegre,	   'Pressure-­‐Transient	   Behavior	   of	  Horizontal	  Wells	  With	   Finite-­‐Conductivity	  Vertical	  Fractures,	   (paper	  presented	  at	   the	   International	  Arctic	  Technology	  Conference,	  Anchorage,	  AK,	  1991).	  28	  Ambrose	   et	   al.,	   'Life-­‐Cycle	   Decline	   Curve	   Estimation';	   Thompson,	   Mangha	   and	   Anderson,	   'Improved	  Shale	  Gas	  Production	  Forecasting	  Using	  a	  Simplified	  Analytical	  Method-­‐A	  Marcellus	  Case	  Study'.	  
	  XXIV	  
E Best	  estimates:	  characterising	  the	  uncertainty	  Four	   regions	  were	   given	   in	   Table	   2-­‐6	  where	   high,	   best	   and	   low	   estimates	   have	   been	  identified.	  There	  is	  no	  evidence	  for	  the	  shape	  of	  the	  probability	  distributions	  that	  will	  be	  found	  between	  these	  points,	  however.	  There	  is	  also	  no	  evidence	  of	  whether	  the	  high	  and	  low	   points	   should	   be	   interpreted	   as	   absolute	   maxima	   and	   minima	   or	   whether	   they	  should	   be	   seen	   more	   as	   extreme,	   but	   not	   maximum	   values	   such	   as	   the	   95th	   and	   5th	  percentiles.	   Given	   this	   lack	   of	   evidence,	   a	   possible	   approach	   is	   to	   choose	   as	   many	  distributions	   that	   are	   judged	   to	   be	   appropriate,	   assume	   that	   all	   of	   these	   have	   equal	  weighting	  and	  combine	  them	  using	  statistical	  procedures.	  Given	  that	  the	  high	  and	  low	  points	  are,	  in	  general,	  not	  equally	  spread	  about	  the	  central	  value,	  the	  distributions	  must	  be	  capable	  of	  being	  asymmetric.	  Various	  distributions	  have	  been	  used	  for	  such	  purposes	  previously1	  and	  would	  include	  triangular	  or	  beta	  distributions,	  with	   the	  high	  and	   low	  values	  at	  both	  the	  maxima	  and	  minima	  and	  the	  95th	  and	  5th	  percentiles.	  A	  selection	  of	  possible	  distributions	  is	  shown	  in	   Figure	   E-­‐1.	   An	   aggregate	   distribution	   for	   each	   region	  with	  more	   than	   one	   possible	  distribution	  could	  be	  derived,	  for	  example,	  by	  randomly	  sampling	  from	  each.	  
















































































Technically	   recoverable	  resources	  (Tcm)
Former	  Soviet	  Union
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  V.	  Voudouris,	  'The	  ACEGES	  Project:	  An	  ACE	  Model	  for	  the	  Availability	  of	  Global	  Conventional	  Oil	  Supply',	  in	  16th	   International	  Conference	  on	  Computing	   in	  Economics	  and	  Finance,	   ed.	   Society	   for	   Computational	  Economics	  (2010).	  
	  XXV	  
F Evidence	  base	  
Table	  F-­‐1:	  Documentation	  and	  classification	  of	  the	  evidence	  base	  






Type	   of	  
resource	  
estimate	  
Approach	  used	   Notes	  
Aluko	   Aug-­‐01	   No	   11	  countries	   CBM	   TRR	   Literature	  review	   	  
ARI	  (Kuuskraa)	   May-­‐11	   No	   USA	   Shale	   TRR	   Method	  not	  stated	   It	  is	  likely	  that	  Kuuskraa	  adopts	  a	  bottom-­‐up	  analysis	  of	  geological	  features	  approach	  as	  used	  in	  ARI	  April	  2011	  report,	  but	  this	  is	  not	  stated	  
ARI	   (Kuuskraa,	  
Stevens	  et	  al.)	  
Apr-­‐11	   Yes	   32	   individual	  countries	  worldwide	   Shale	   OGIP	  and	  TRR	   Bottom-­‐up	  analysis	  of	  geological	  parameters	   	  
ARI	  (Kuuskraa)	   Jan-­‐11	   No	   USA	   Shale	   TRR	   Method	  not	  stated	   	  
	   	   	   	   CBM	   TRR	   Method	  not	  stated	   	  
	   	   	   	   Tight	   TRR	   Method	  not	  stated	   	  
ARI	  (Kuuskraa)	   Oct-­‐10	   No	   USA	   Shale	   TRR	   Method	  not	  stated	   	  
ARI	  (Kuuskraa)	   Mar-­‐10	   No	   USA,	  Canada	   Shale	   TRR	   Method	  not	  stated	   	  
ARI	  (Kuuskraa)	   Dec-­‐09	   No	   Rest	  of	  World	   Shale	   TRR	   Not	  independently	  assessed:	  based	  on	  Rogner	  (1997)	  and	  IEA	  WEO	  2009	  
Recovery	  factor	  of	  40%	  suggested	  
	   	   	   USA,	   Canada,	  Poland,	   Sweden,	  Austria,	   South	  Africa	  
Shale	   ‘Recoverable	  resources’	   Method	  not	  stated	   	  
	   	   	   Global	   Tight	   TRR	   Not	  independently	  assessed:	  based	  on	  Rogner	  (1997)	  and	  IEA	  WEO	  2009	  
Recovery	  factor	  of	  50%	  suggested	  
	   	   	   Individual	  countries	  worldwide	   CBM	   OGIP	  and	  TRR	   Method	  not	  stated	   	  
ARI	  (Kuuskraa)	   Jul-­‐07	   No	   USA	   Shale	   URR	   Bottom-­‐up	  analysis	  of	  geological	  parameters	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Type	   of	  
resource	  
estimate	  
Approach	  used	   Notes	  
	   	   	   	   CBM	   URR	   Bottom-­‐up	  analysis	  of	  geological	  parameters	   	  
	   	   	   	   Tight	   URR	   Bottom-­‐up	  analysis	  of	  geological	  parameters	   	  
BGR	  (Kümpel)	   Nov-­‐09	   No	   Individual	  countries	  worldwide	   CBM	   TRR	   Method	  not	  stated	   	  
	   	   	   Continental	  regions	   Shale	   OGIP	   Not	  independently	  assessed:	  based	  on	  Holditch	  and	  Chianelli,	  Kawata	  and	  Fujita,	  and	  Rogner	  
No	  recovery	  factor	  suggested	  
	   	   	   	   Tight	   OGIP	   Not	  independently	  assessed:	  based	  on	  Holditch	  and	  Chianelli,	  Kawata	  and	  Fujita,	  and	  Rogner	  
No	  recovery	  factor	  suggested	  
Caineng	  et	  al.	   Dec-­‐10	   Yes	   China	   Shale	   OGIP	   Bottom-­‐up	  analysis	  of	  geological	  parameters	   	  
Chatham	   House	  
(Stevens)	  
Sep-­‐10	   No	   Continental	  regions	   Shale	   OGIP	   Not	  independently	  assessed:	  based	  on	  Holditch	  (2007)	   	  
Dawson	   May-­‐10	   No	   Canada	   Shale	   ERR	   Method	  not	  stated	   Indications	  based	  on	  Petrel	  Robertson	  Consulting	  (2010)	  report;	  however,	  this	  report	  does	  not	  include	  any	  ERR	  figures.	  
	   	   	   	   CBM	   ERR	   Method	  not	  stated	   	  
	   	   	   	   Tight	   ERR	   Method	  not	  stated	   	  
DECC	   (Harvey	   and	  
Gray)	  
Jan-­‐10	   No	   UK	   Shale	   TRR	   Extrapolation	  of	  production	  experience	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Type	   of	  
resource	  
estimate	  
Approach	  used	   Notes	  
EIA	  (AEO)	   Various	   No	   USA	   Shale	   TRR	   Bottom-­‐up	  analysis	  of	  geological	  parameters	   There	  have	  been	  a	  total	  of	  15	  Annual	  Energy	  Outlooks	  between	  1997	  and	  2011.	  The	  AEO	  in	  2003	  used	  the	  same	  unconventional	  gas	  figures	  as	  2002,	  while	  the	  2011	  estimate	  was	  based	  entirely	  on	  INTEK	  (2011)	  and	  so	  is	  reported	  separately.	  
FERC	   May-­‐10	   No	   USA	   Shale	   TRR	   Not	  independently	  assessed:	  based	  on	  ‘American	  Clean	  Skies	  Foundation’	  
	  
Gény	   Dec-­‐10	   No	   Europe	   CBM	   TRR	   Not	  independently	  assessed:	  based	  on	  Wood	  Mackenzie	  ‘Unconventional	  Hydrocarbons’	  Multi-­‐client	  Study	  
	  
	   	   	   	   Tight	   TRR	   Not	  independently	  assessed:	  based	  on	  Wood	  Mackenzie	  ‘Unconventional	  Hydrocarbons’	  Multi-­‐client	  Study	  
	  
	   	   	   	   Shale	   TRR	   Not	  independently	  assessed:	  based	  on	  ‘IHS	  CERA	  Gas	  from	  Shale:	  Potential	  Outside	  North	  America?’	  
	  
Global	   Warming	  
Policy	   Foundation	  
(Ridley)	  
Apr-­‐11	   No	   Global	   Shale	   OGIP	  and	  TRR	   Not	  independently	  assessed:	  based	  on	  ARI	  report	  	   	  
	   	   	   	   CBM	   OGIP	  and	  TRR	   Not	  independently	  assessed:	  based	  on	  ARI	  report	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Type	   of	  
resource	  
estimate	  
Approach	  used	   Notes	  
Hennings	   Mar-­‐10	   No	   USA	   Shale	   OGIP	  and	  TRR	   Bottom-­‐up	  analysis	  of	  geological	  parameters	   	  
Holditch	   and	  
Chianelli	  
Apr-­‐08	   Yes	   Continental	  regions	   Shale	   OGIP	   Not	  independently	  assessed:	  based	  on	  Rogner	  (1997)	  (although	  not	  stated)	  
No	  recovery	  factor	  suggested	  
	   	   	   	   CBM	   OGIP	   Not	  independently	  assessed:	  based	  on	  Rogner	  (1997)	  (although	  not	  stated)	  
No	  recovery	  factor	  suggested	  
	   	   	   	   Tight	   OGIP	   Not	  independently	  assessed:	  based	  on	  Rogner	  (1997)	  (although	  not	  stated)	  
No	  recovery	  factor	  suggested	  
Holditch	   Jul-­‐07	   No	   Continental	  regions	   Shale	   OGIP	   Not	  independently	  assessed:	  based	  on	  ‘Tight	  Gas	  Sands’	  Holditch	  (2006)	  
	  
	   	   	   	   CBM	   OGIP	   Not	  independently	  assessed:	  based	  on	  ‘Tight	  Gas	  Sands’	  Holditch	  (2006)	  
	  
	   	   	   	   Tight	   OGIP	   Not	  independently	  assessed:	  based	  on	  ‘Tight	  Gas	  Sands’	  Holditch	  (2006)	  
	  
Holditch	   Jun-­‐06	   Yes	   Continental	  regions	   Shale	   OGIP	   Not	  independently	  assessed:	  based	  on	  Rogner	  (1997)	  taken	  from	  Kawata	  and	  Fujita	  (2001).	  No	  recovery	  factor	  stated	  
No	  recovery	  factor	  suggested	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Type	   of	  
resource	  
estimate	  
Approach	  used	   Notes	  
	   	   	   	   CBM	   OGIP	   Not	  independently	  assessed:	  based	  on	  Rogner	  (1997)	  taken	  from	  Kawata	  and	  Fujita	  (2001).	  No	  recovery	  factor	  stated	  
No	  recovery	  factor	  suggested	  
	   	   	   	   Tight	   OGIP	   Not	  independently	  assessed:	  based	  on	  Rogner	  (1997)	  taken	  from	  Kawata	  and	  Fujita	  (2001).	  No	  recovery	  factor	  stated	  
No	  recovery	  factor	  suggested	  
ICF	   Mar-­‐09	   No	   USA	   Shale	   TRR	   Bottom-­‐up	  analysis	  of	  geological	  parameters	   Reported	  by	  MIT	  supplementary	  paper	  (Ejaz	  (2010)	  SP2.2)	  The	  authors	  consider	  that	  all	  of	  ICF’s	  estimates	  are	  better	  interpreted	  as	  TRR	  
	   	   	   	   CBM	   TRR	   Bottom-­‐up	  analysis	  of	  geological	  parameters	   The	  authors	  consider	  that	  all	  of	  ICF’s	  estimates	  are	  better	  interpreted	  as	  TRR	  
	   	   	   	   Tight	   TRR	   Bottom-­‐up	  analysis	  of	  geological	  parameters	   The	  authors	  consider	  that	  all	  of	  ICF’s	  estimates	  are	  better	  interpreted	  as	  TRR.	  
ICF	  (Petak)	   Jun-­‐11	   No	   USA.	  Canada	   Shale	   ERR	   Bottom-­‐up	  analysis	  of	  geological	  parameters	   This	  report	  indicates	  that	  there	  is	  a	  total	  of	  61.5	  Tcm	  of	  economically	  recoverable	  resource	  in	  the	  USA	  and	  Canada.	  It	  provides	  a	  supply	  cost	  curve	  indicating	  that	  this	  volume	  is	  only	  recoverable	  at	  gas	  prices	  greater	  than	  $14/Mcf.	  Since	  this	  price	  is	  four	  times	  higher	  than	  current	  gas	  prices	  (around	  of	  $3.5/Mcf	  on	  15	  December	  2011),	  the	  authors	  consider	  that	  all	  of	  ICF’s	  estimates	  are	  better	  interpreted	  as	  TRR.	  
	  XXX	  






Type	   of	  
resource	  
estimate	  
Approach	  used	   Notes	  
ICF	  (Henning)	   Mar-­‐11	   No	   USA,	  Canada	   Shale	   ERR	   Bottom-­‐up	  analysis	  of	  geological	  parameters	   The	  authors	  consider	  that	  all	  of	  ICF’s	  estimates	  are	  better	  interpreted	  as	  TRR.	  
ICF	   (Vidas	   and	  
Hugman)	  
Nov-­‐08	   No	   USA,	  Canada	   Shale	   OGIP	  and	  TRR	   Bottom-­‐up	  analysis	  of	  geological	  parameters	   	  
	   	   	   	   CBM	   TRR	   Method	  not	  stated	   	  
	   	   	   	   Tight	   TRR	   Method	  not	  stated	   	  
IEA	  (Priddle)	   Jan-­‐11	   Yes	   Continental	  regions	   Shale	   TRR	   Not	  independently	  assessed:	  based	  on	  ARI	  report	  (Kuuskraa,	  Stevens	  et	  al.	  2011)	  
	  
	   	   	   	   CBM	   TRR	   Not	  independently	  assessed:	  based	  on	  Rogner	  (1997)	  	   Recovery	  factor	  of	  around	  25%	  suggested	  
	   	   	   	   Tight	   TRR	   Not	  independently	  assessed:	  based	  on	  Rogner	  (1997)	  	   Recovery	  factor	  of	  around	  40%	  suggested	  
IHS	  CERA	  (Downey)	   Jan-­‐10	   No	   USA,	  Canada	   Shale	   TRR	   Method	  not	  stated	   	  
IHS	  CERA	   Feb-­‐09	   No	   Europe	   Shale	   TRR	   Unknown	   Reported	  by	  R.	  Weijermars	  et	  al.,	  ‘Unconventional	  gas	  research	  initiative	  for	  clean	  energy	  transition	  in	  Europe’.	  
Journal	  of	  Natural	  Gas	  Science	  and	  
Engineering,	  2011.	  3(2):	  p.	  402-­‐412.	  
INTEK	  (for	  EIA)	   Jul-­‐11	   No	   USA	   Shale	   ‘Unproved,	  undiscovered	  TRR’	   Extrapolation	  of	  production	  experience	   TRR	  can	  be	  derived	  from	  this	  figure	  by	  adding	  proved	  and	  inferred	  reserves;	  undiscovered	  resources	  are	  reported	  separately	  
Kawata	  and	  Fujita	   Apr-­‐01	   No	  	   Continental	  regions	   Shale	   OGIP	   Not	  independently	  assessed:	  based	  on	  Rogner	  (1997)	  	   No	  recovery	  factor	  suggested	  
	   	   	   	   CBM	   OGIP	   Not	  independently	  assessed:	  based	  on	  Rogner	  (1997)	  	   No	  recovery	  factor	  suggested	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Type	   of	  
resource	  
estimate	  
Approach	  used	   Notes	  
	   	   	   	   Tight	   OGIP	   Not	  independently	  assessed:	  based	  on	  Rogner	  (1997)	  	   No	  recovery	  factor	  suggested	  
Kuhn	  and	  Umbach	   May-­‐11	   Yes	   Continental	  regions	   Shale	   OGIP	  and	  TRR	   Not	  independently	  assessed:	  based	  on	  BGR1	   	  
	   	   	   	   CBM	   TRR	   Not	  independently	  assessed:	  based	  on	  BGR	   	  
	   	   	   	   Tight	   TRR	   Not	  independently	  assessed:	  based	  on	  BGR	   	  
Kuuskraa	   Jan-­‐04	   No	   USA	   Shale	   URR	  and	  TRR	   Method	  not	  stated	   	  
Kuuskraa	   Jan-­‐98	   No	   12	  countries	   CBM	   OGIP	  and	  TRR	   Method	  not	  stated	   Reported	  in	  Kuuskraa,	  V.A.,	  Natural	  gas	  resources,	  unconventional,	  in	  
Encyclopedia	  of	  Energy,	  C.J.	  Cleveland,	  (ed.).	  2004,	  Elsevier	  Inc.	  p.	  257-­‐272.	  
Kuuskraa	   Oct-­‐92	   No	   12	  countries	   CBM	   OGIP	  and	  TRR	   Extrapolation	  from	  coal	  resources	   	  
	   	   	   	   CBM	   URR	  and	  TRR	   Method	  not	  stated	   	  
	   	   	   	   Tight	   URR	  and	  TRR	   Method	  not	  stated	   	  
Kuuskraa	   and	  
Meyers	  
Jan-­‐83	   No	   USA,	  Canada,	  ROW	   Shale	   OGIP	  and	  TRR	   Literature	  review	   Could	  equally	  be	  an	  expert	  opinion	  
	   	   	   	   Tight	   OGIP	  and	  TRR	   Literature	  review	   Could	  equally	  be	  an	  expert	  opinion	  
	   	   	   Continental	  regions	   CBM	   OGIP	  and	  TRR	   Bottom-­‐up	  analysis	  of	  geological	  factors	   	  
Laherrere	   Jun-­‐04	   No	   Global	   Shale	   URR	   Expert	  judgment	   	  
Medlock	   and	  
Hartley	  
Oct-­‐10	   No	   USA,	  Canada	   Shale	   TRR	   Literature	  review	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  BGR,	  'Reserves,	  resources	  and	  availability'.	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Type	   of	  
resource	  
estimate	  
Approach	  used	   Notes	  
Medlock	  et	  al.	   Jul-­‐11	   Yes	   9	   North	   American,	  European	   and	  Pacific	  countries	   Shale	   TRR	   Literature	  review	   Medlock	  indicates	  that	  resource	  should	  be	  commercially	  viable	  so	  his	  definition,	  although	  described	  as	  technically	  recoverable	  resources,	  could	  be	  closer	  to	  ERR.	  	  
MIT	  (Moniz)	   Jun-­‐10	   Yes	   USA	   Shale	   TRR	   Literature	  review	   Figures	  are	  reported	  without	  proved	  reserves	  so	  1.7	  Tcm	  gas	  have	  been	  added	  
	   	   	   	   CBM	   TRR	   Literature	  review	   Figures	  are	  reported	  without	  proved	  reserves	  so	  0.54	  Tcm	  gas	  have	  been	  added	  
	   	   	   	   Tight	   TRR	   Literature	  review	   Figures	  are	  reported	  without	  proved	  reserves	  so	  2.3	  Tcm	  gas	  have	  been	  added	  	  
	   	   	   Continental	  regions	   Shale	   OGIP	   Not	  independently	  assessed:	  based	  on	  Rogner	  (1997)	   Reported	  in	  Appendix	  2A.	  Recovery	  factor	  between	  10-­‐35%	  suggested	  
	   	   	   	   CBM	   OGIP	   Not	  independently	  assessed:	  based	  on	  Rogner	  (1997)	   Reported	  in	  Appendix	  2A.	  Recovery	  factor	  between	  10-­‐35%	  suggested	  
	   	   	   	   Tight	   OGIP	   Not	  independently	  assessed:	  based	  on	  Rogner	  (1997)	   Reported	  in	  Appendix	  2A.	  Recovery	  factor	  between	  10-­‐35%	  suggested	  
Mohr	  and	  Evans	   Sep-­‐11	   Yes	   Continental	  regions	   Shale	   URR	   Literature	  review	   	  
	   	   	   	   CBM	   URR	   Literature	  review	   	  
	   	   	   	   Tight	   URR	   Literature	  review	   	  
Mohr	  and	  Evans	   Jul-­‐10	   Yes	   USA,	  Canada	   Shale	   URR	   Literature	  review	   	  
	   	   	   	   CBM	   URR	   Literature	  review	   	  
	   	   	   	   Tight	   URR	   Literature	  review	   	  
Murray	   Jan-­‐96	   Yes	   12	  countries	   CBM	   OGIP	   Adaptation	  of	  existing	  review	  (Kuuskraa	  et	  al	  1992)	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Type	   of	  
resource	  
estimate	  
Approach	  used	   Notes	  
Navigant	   Consulting	  
(Smead	   &	  
Pickering)	  
Jul-­‐08	   No	   USA	   Shale	   TRR	   Literature	  review	   	  
	   	   	   	   CBM	   TRR	   Literature	  review	   	  
	   	   	   	   Tight	   TRR	   Literature	  review	   	  
Palmer	   Mar-­‐08	   No	   12	  regions/	  countries	   CBM	   OGIP	   Not	  independently	  assessed:	  based	  on	  Kuuskraa	  (1992)	   	  
Petrel	   Robertson	  
Consulting	  
Mar-­‐10	   No	   Canada	   Shale	   OGIP	   Literature	  review	   	  
	   	   	   	   CBM	   OGIP	   Literature	  review	   	  
	   	   	   	   Tight	   OGIP	   Literature	  review	   	  
Potential	   Gas	  
Committee	  
Apr-­‐11	   No	   USA	   Shale	   TRR	   Bottom-­‐up	  analysis	  of	  geological	  parameters	   	  
	   	   	   USA	   CBM	   TRR	   Bottom-­‐up	  analysis	  of	  geological	  parameters	   	  
Potential	   Gas	  
Committee	  
Jun-­‐09	   No	   USA	   Shale	   TRR	   Bottom-­‐up	  analysis	  of	  geological	  parameters	   	  
	   	   	   USA	   CBM	   TRR	   Bottom-­‐up	  analysis	  of	  geological	  parameters	   	  
Rogner	   Jan-­‐97	   Yes	   Continental	  regions	   Shale	   OGIP	   Extrapolation	  of	  production	  experience	   	  
	   	   	   	   CBM	   OGIP	   Literature	  review	   	  
	   	   	   	   Tight	   OGIP	   Literature	  review	   The	  global	  figure	  was	  modified	  to	  regional	  estimates	  based	  on	  the	  distribution	  of	  conventional	  gas	  
Ryan	   Dec-­‐08	   No	   12	  regions/	  countries	   CBM	   OGIP	   Not	  independently	  assessed:	  based	  on	  Wood	  Mackenzie	  ‘Unconventional	  Hydrocarbons’	  Multi-­‐client	  Study	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   of	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estimate	  
Approach	  used	   Notes	  
	   	   	   	   Tight	   OGIP	   Not	  independently	  assessed:	  based	  on	  Wood	  Mackenzie	  ‘Unconventional	  Hydrocarbons’	  Multi-­‐client	  Study	  
	  
Sandrea	   Dec-­‐05	   No	   USA	   Tight	   TRR	   Extrapolation	  of	  production	  experience	   	  
	   	   	   USA,	  Global	   Shale	   ‘Recoverable	  reserves’	   Expert	  judgment	   	  
	   	   	   	   CBM	   ‘Recoverable	  reserves’	   Expert	  judgment	   	  
Schulz	   Jan-­‐10	   Yes	   Europe	   Shale	   OGIP	   Not	  independently	  assessed:	  based	  on	  Rogner	  (1997)	   No	  recovery	  factor	  suggested	  
Skipper	   Mar-­‐10	   No	   USA,	  Canada	   Shale	   TRR	   Method	  not	  stated	   	  
Theal	   May-­‐09	   No	   USA,	  Canada	   Shale	   OGIP	  and	  TRR	   Bottom-­‐up	  analysis	  of	  geological	  parameters	   	  
Total	   Jan-­‐06	   No	   5	  regions	   Tight	   TRR	   Method	  not	  stated	   	  
	   	   	   Global	   Tight	   OGIP	  and	  TRR	   Method	  not	  stated	   	  
USGS	   Aug-­‐11	   No	   USA	   Shale	   ‘Potential	   to	   be	  added	   to	  reserves’	   Extrapolation	  of	  production	  experience	   USGS	  resource	  estimate	  based	  on	  Coleman	  et	  al.	  (2011);	  Dubiel	  et	  al.	  (2011);	  Higley	  et	  al	  (2011);	  Houseknecht	  et	  al.	  (2010);	  Schenk	  et	  al.	  (2008);	  Swezey	  et	  al.	  (2007);	  Swezey	  et	  al.	  (2005);	  Pollastro	  et	  al.	  (2004);	  Higley	  et	  al.(2003);	  Milici	  et	  al	  (2003;	  and	  USGS	  (2010).	  
	   	   	   	   CBM	   ‘Potential	   to	   be	  added	   to	  reserves’	   Extrapolation	  of	  production	  experience	   	  
	   	   	   	   Tight	   ‘Potential	   to	   be	  added	   to	  reserves’	   Extrapolation	  of	  production	  experience	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resource	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Approach	  used	   Notes	  
Wood	  Mackenzie	   Jan-­‐09	   No	   Europe	   Shale	   TRR	   Method	  not	  stated	   Reported	  by	  R.	  Weijermars	  et	  al.,	  ‘Unconventional	  gas	  research	  initiative	  for	  clean	  energy	  transition	  in	  Europe’.	  
Journal	  of	  Natural	  Gas	  Science	  and	  
Engineering,	  2011.	  3(2):	  p.	  402-­‐412.	  
Wood	  Mackenzie	   Nov-­‐06	   No	   12	  regions/	  countries	   CBM	   OGIP	   Unknown	   Reported	  by	  Ryan	  (2008)	  and	  Gény	  (2010).	  Figures	  appear	  to	  be	  similar	  to	  Rogner’s	  
	   	   	   	   Tight	   OGIP	   Unknown	   Reported	  by	  Ryan	  (2008)	  and	  Gény	  (2010).	  Figures	  appear	  to	  be	  similar	  to	  Rogner’s	  
World	   Energy	  
Council	  
Sep-­‐10	   No	   9	  regions	   Shale	   OGIP	   Literature	  review	   Recovery	  factor	  of	  40%	  suggested	  to	  convert	  to	  ERR	  	  
	  XXXVI	  
G Major	  regulations	  for	  the	  EU	  internal	  gas	  market	  The	  Second	  Gas	  Directive	  of	  20031	  committed	  Member	  States	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  single	  market	  throughout	  Europe	  by	  July	  2007.	  Covering	  much	  the	  same	  ground	  as	   its	  1998	  predecessor	  –	  albeit	  more	   forcibly	  –	   the	  Directive	  ruled	   that	  each	  Member	  State	  had	   to	   appoint	   system	   operators	   for	   the	   transmission,	   storage,	   LNG	   and	   distribution	  systems	  who	  would	  guarantee	  non-­‐discriminatory	  and	  transparent	  access	  for	  all	  users.	  Member	  States	  also	  had	  to	  appoint	   independent	  regulators	  who	  would	  be	  responsible	  for	   monitoring	   respect	   of	   the	   non-­‐discrimination	   principle,	   the	   level	   of	   transparency	  and	  competition,	  and	   the	   tariffs	  and	  methods	   for	  calculating	   them.	  The	  choice	   to	  have	  regulated	   or	   negotiated	   third-­‐party	   access	   was	   removed.	   And	   finally	   the	   Directive	  codified	   common	   minimum	   consumer	   protection	   standards,	   including	   the	   rights	   to	  change	   supplier,	   transparent	   contract	   conditions,	   general	   information	   and	   dispute	  settlement	  mechanisms.	  In	  spite	  of	  these	  more	  robust	  measures,	  a	  series	  of	  Commission	  reports	  monitoring	  the	  Directive’s	   implementation	   documented	   disappointing	   progress	   in	   the	   liberalisation	  process.2	  These	   reports	  noted	   that	  although	   ‘the	  basic	   concepts	  of	   the	   internal	   energy	  market	   have	   become	   embedded	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   legal	   framework,	   institutional	  arrangements	  and	  the	  physical	   infrastructure…	  meaningful	  competition	  does	  not	  exist	  in	   many	   Member	   States’.	   Citing	   ‘widespread	   shortcomings’,	   it	   was	   deemed	   that	   gas	  prices	   in	   many	   Member	   States	   were	   more	   likely	   ‘the	   direct	   result	   of	   decision	   of	  companies	  with	  market	  power’	  than	  meaningful	  competition.3	  	  Complaints	   about	   the	   barriers	   to	  market	   entry	   and	   the	   lack	   of	  meaningful	   consumer	  choice	   led	   the	   Commission	   to	   open	   an	   inquiry	   into	   the	   operation	   of	   the	   gas	   and	  electricity	  markets.	  This	  found:	  1)	  a	  continuing	  high	  degree	  of	  market	  concentration;	  2)	  inadequate	   unbundling	   of	   network	   and	   supply,	   and	   suspicions	   that	   infrastructure	  operators	  were	  favouring	  their	  own	  affiliates;	  3)	  a	  lack	  of	  market	  integration,	  including	  lack	  of	  regulatory	  oversight	  for	  cross-­‐border	  issues;	  4)	  a	  lack	  of	  market	  transparency;	  5)	  price	  formation	  deficiencies	  stemming	  from	  oil	  indexation	  and	  regulated	  supply	  tariffs;	  6)	  limited	  competition	  at	  the	  retail	  level;	  7)	  balancing	  markets	  that	  favour	  incumbents	  and	   create	   obstacles	   for	   newcomers;	   and	   8)	   various	   other	   deficiencies	   in	   the	   LNG	  market.4	  	  In	   response,	   the	   Commission	   launched	   dozens	   of	   infringement	   procedures	   against	  Member	  States	  for	  violation	  and	  non	  transposition	  in	  the	  five	  years	  following	  the	  Second	  Directive’s	   transposition	   deadline	   on	   1	   July	   2004.5	  Despite	   these	   efforts,	   however,	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  European	  Union,	  'Directive	  2003/55/EC	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  26	  June	  2003	  concerning	   common	   rules	   for	   the	   internal	   market	   in	   natural	   gas	   and	   repealing	   Directive	   98/30/EC',	  (Luxembourg:	  Office	  for	  Official	  Publications	  of	  the	  European	  Communities,	  2003).	  2	  See,	   for	   example,	   European	   Commission,	   'Third	   benchmarking	   report	   on	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	  internal	   electricity	   and	   gas	   market',	   ed.	   Directorate-­‐General	   for	   Transport	   and	   Energy	   (Luxembourg:	  Office	  for	  Official	  Publications	  of	  the	  European	  Communities,	  2007).	  3 	  European	   Commission,	   'Communication	   from	   the	   Commission	   to	   the	   Council	   and	   the	   European	  Parliament	   -­‐	   Prospects	   for	   the	   internal	   gas	   and	   electricity	   market',	   (Luxembourg:	   Office	   for	   Official	  Publications	  of	  the	  European	  Communities,	  2007).	  4 	  European	   Commission,	   'Communication	   from	   the	   Commission	   Inquiry	   pursuant	   to	   Article	   17	   of	  Regulation	  (EC)	  No	  1/2003	   into	   the	  European	  gas	  and	  electricity	  sectors	   (Final	  Report)',	   (Luxembourg:	  Office	  for	  Official	  Publications	  of	  the	  European	  Communities,	  2007).	  5	  See,	   for	  example,	  European	  Commission,	   'Commission	  acts	   to	  ensure	  effective	  and	  competitive	  energy	  market	  across	  Europe',	  (Brussels:	  2009);	  European	  Commission,	  'Commission	  brings	  actions	  before	  Court	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2009	  Commission	   report	  noted	   that	   the	   implementation	  of	   the	   second	  Electricity	   and	  Gas	   Directive	   was	   still	   incomplete.	   With	   respect	   to	   market	   concentration,	   the	  Commission	   found	   that	   the	   three	   largest	   wholesalers	   had	   a	  market	   share	   of	   90%	   or	  more	  in	  12	  Member	  States.	  Ownership	  unbundling	  was	  implemented	  by	  only	  12	  of	  the	  EU’s	  gas	  transmission	  system	  operators	  (TSO).6	  Considering	  that	  the	  internal	  energy	  market	  could	  not	  be	  realised	  under	  the	  prevailing	  rules,	  the	  Commission	  initiated	  work	  on	  its	  Third	  Internal	  Market	  Package	  in	  2007	  –	  a	  collection	   of	   regulations	   and	   directives	   that	   took	   direct	   effect	   on	   3	  March	   2011.7	  The	  package	  set	  more	  stringent	  conditions	  for	  pipeline	  access	  and	  gave	  stronger	  powers	  and	  independence	  to	  national	  energy	  regulators.	  It	  introduced	  new	  measures	  to	  harmonise	  pan-­‐European	   market	   and	   network	   operation	   to	   facilitate	   cross-­‐border	   trade	   and	  reduce	  transaction	  costs.	  It	  also	  created	  new	  institutions	  to	  promote	  the	  completion	  and	  functioning	  of	   the	   internal	  market,	   including	  an	  Agency	   for	   the	  Cooperation	  of	  Energy	  Regulators	  and	  an	  association	  of	  gas	   transmission	  system	  operators.8	  The	   inception	  of	  the	  Third	   Package	   coincided	  with	   a	   big	   legal	   push	   against	   abuse	   of	   dominance	   in	   the	  natural	  gas	  sector,	  with	  the	  Directorate-­‐General	  for	  Competition	  bringing	  cases	  against	  Distrigaz,	  E.ON,	  ENI,	  GDF	  and	  RWE	  in	  the	  period	  2007-­‐2011.9	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  of	   Justice	   against	   several	   Member	   States	   for	   incorrect	   transposal	   of	   Electricity	   and	   Gas	   Directives',	  (Brussels:	   2008);	   European	   Commission,	   'The	   Commission	   takes	   action	   against	   Member	   States	   which	  have	  still	  not	  properly	  opened	  up	  their	  energy	  markets',	  (Brussels:	  2006);	  European	  Commission,	  'Energy	  markets:	   five	   Member	   States	   to	   be	   taken	   before	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice',	   (Brussels:	   2005);	   European	  Commission,	   'Opening	   up	   of	   energy	  markets:	   ten	  Member	   States	   have	   still	   not	   transposed	   the	   new	  EU	  rules	  ',	  (Brussels:	  2005).	  6 	  European	   Commission,	   'Communication	   from	   the	   Commission	   to	   the	   Council	   and	   the	   European	  Parliament	  -­‐	  Report	  on	  progress	  in	  creating	  the	  internal	  gas	  and	  electricity	  market	  '.	  7	  European	  Union,	  'Directive	  2009/73/EC	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  13	  July	  2009	  concerning	   common	   rules	   for	   the	   internal	   market	   in	   natural	   gas	   and	   repealing	   Directive	   2003/55/EC	  (Text	  with	  EEA	  relevance)';	  European	  Union,	  'Regulation	  (EC)	  No	  713/2009	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  13	  July	  2009	  establishing	  an	  Agency	  for	  the	  Cooperation	  of	  Energy	  Regulators	  (Text	  with	  EEA	  relevance)';	  European	  Union,	  'Regulation	  (EC)	  No	  715/2009	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	   Council	   of	   13	   July	   2009	   on	   conditions	   for	   access	   to	   the	   natural	   gas	   transmission	   networks	   and	  repealing	  Regulation	  (EC)	  No	  1775/2005	  (Text	  with	  EEA	  relevance)'.	  8	  In	  order	   to	  properly	   facilitate	   investments,	  both	   the	  second	  Gas	  Directive	  and	  a	   third	  package	  contain	  provisions	   for	   alternative	   coordination	   mechanisms,	   such	   as	   derogations	   from	   the	   third-­‐party	   access	  provisions	  and	  long-­‐term	  supply	  contracts.	  9	  European	  Commission,	  'Antitrust	  /	  ENI	  case:	  Commission	  opens	  up	  access	  to	  Italy's	  natural	  gas	  market	  ',	  (Brussels:	   2010);	   European	   Commission,	   'Antitrust:	   Commission	   accepts	   commitments	   by	   GDF	   Suez	   to	  boost	   competition	   in	   French	   gas	   market	   ',	   (Brussels:	   2009);	   European	   Commission,	   'Antitrust:	  Commission	   fines	  E.ON	  and	  GDF	  Suez	  €553	  million	  each	   for	  market-­‐sharing	   in	  French	  and	  German	  gas	  markets',	   (Brussels:	  2009);	  European	  Commission,	   'Antitrust:	  Commission	  opens	  Belgian	  gas	  market	   to	  competition',	  (Brussels:	  2007);	  European	  Commission,	  'Antitrust:	  Commission	  opens	  German	  gas	  market	  to	  competition	  by	  accepting	  commitments	  from	  RWE	  to	  divest	  transmission	  network',	  (Brussels:	  2009).	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H Evaluating	   potential	   shale	   gas	   wells	   and	   quantifying	  
finding	  and	  developing	  costs	  
Table	  H-­‐1:	  FX	  Energy’s	  drilling	  programme	  in	  Poland	  and	  net	  asset	  value	  analysis1	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  FX	  Energy,	  'Poland'.	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Figure	  H-­‐1:	  Example	  of	  finding	  and	  development	  costs	  for	  range	  resources2	  
	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Range	  Resources	  is	  an	  upstream	  player	  active	  in	  the	  Marcellus	  Shale	  play.	  Range	  Resources,	  Finding	  and	  
development	   cost	   calculation	   (SEC	   Filings,	   2011,	   cited	   12	   February	   2012);	   available	   from	  http://phx.corporate-­‐ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=101196&p=irol-­‐sec&submit.x=0&submit.y=0	  
	  XL	  
I A	   brief	   comparison	   of	   JRC	   and	   IEA	   modelling	   results	   on	  
unconventional	  gas	  	  The	  following	  pages	  compare	  the	  modelling	  methodology	  and	  results	  of	  this	  report	  with	  those	  of	  the	  recently-­‐released	  'Golden	  Rules	  for	  a	  Golden	  Age	  of	  Gas'	  report	  by	  the	  IEA.3	  	  
Framework	  
• The	  JRC-­‐IET	  builds	  a	  framework	  around	  four	  base	  scenarios	  for	  the	  period	  to	  2040.	  They	  result	   from	  the	  combination	  of	  either	  optimistic	  or	  conservative	  assumptions	  about	   shale	   gas	   production	   cost	   and	   reserve	   size	   (Opt/Con)	   and	   high	   or	   low	  assumptions	  about	  global	  GDP	  growth	  (HG/LG).	  The	  four	  scenarios	  are	  subsequently	  submitted	   to	   6	   additional	   sensitivities,	   to	   explore	   the	   supply	   and	   demand	   side	  factors	  that	  can	  constrain	  or	  enable	  unconventional	  gas	  development,	  i.e.:	  a	  stronger	  or	   weaker	   oil/gas	   price	   link,	   the	   social	   acceptance	   of	   nuclear	   energy,	   a	   carbon	  constrained	  energy	  system,	  a	  less	  or	  more	  costly	  LNG	  transport.	  Thus,	  the	  results	  are	  an	  exploration	  of	  uncertainty.	  
• The	  model	  used	  by	   JRC	   is	   the	  ETSAP-­‐TIMES	   Integrated	  Assessment	   (ETSAP-­‐TIAM)	  model,	  a	  multi-­‐region	  partial	  equilibrium	  model	  of	  the	  energy	  systems	  of	  the	  entire	  world	   divided	   in	   15	   regions,	   linked	   by	   trade	   variables	   of	   the	   main	   energy	   forms	  (coal,	  oil,	  gas).	  It	  is	  based	  on	  the	  MARKAL/TIMES	  family	  of	  models.	  
• The	  IEA	  report	  sets	  out	  projections	  from	  two	  scenarios	  for	  the	  period	  to	  2035,	  both	  built	   on	   the	   IEA’s	   New	   Policies	   Scenario	   (2011	   World	   Energy	   Outlook).	   The	   two	  scenarios	   compare	   favourable	   versus	   unfavourable	   conditions	   for	   unconventional	  gas.	   In	   the	   Golden	   Rules	   (GR)	   case,	   all	   potential	   obstacles	   to	   unconventional	   gas	  development	  are	  overcome;	  supportive	  policies	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  constraints	  leads	  to	  an	  assumed	  lower	  unconventional	  production	  cost,	  greater	  recoverable	  reserves,	  more	  favourable	  demand-­‐side	  policies,	   lower	  gas	  prices,	   and	   less	  gas-­‐oil	   indexation.	  The	  Low	  Unconventional	  (LU)	  case	  models	  the	  opposite	  case,	  where	  there	  is	  an	  absence	  of	  supportive	  policies	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  public	  acceptance.	  	  
• The	  IEA	  uses	  the	  World	  Energy	  Model	  (the	  same	  used	  for	  the	  annual	  World	  Energy	  Outlook)	   to	   project	   the	   potential	   impact	   of	   two	   different	   trajectories	   for	  unconventional	  gas	  development.	  	  	  
Assumptions	  
• The	  JRC-­‐IET’s	  variables	  are	  the	  size	  of	  the	  recoverable	  reserves	  and	  their	  production	  cost,	  which	  are	  used	  to	  build	  supply	  curves	  (the	  rate	  of	  increase	  in	  production	  costs	  of	   the	   resource	   base).	   These	   curves	   represent	   the	   range	   of	   uncertainty	   facing	  unconventional	  gas	  development	  without	  explicitly	   linking	   them	  to	  specific	   factors	  (e.g.	  adherence	  to	  ‘golden	  rules’).	  The	  third	  key	  variable	  is	  the	  rate	  of	  GDP	  growth,	  a	  main	  driver	  for	  gas	  demand.	  Gas	  prices	  are	  endogenous	  in	  TIAM,	  i.e.	  they	  result	  from	  the	  supply/demand	  equilibrium	  in	  any	  given	  scenario.	  All	  other	  assumptions	  remain	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  IEA,	  'Golden	  Rules	  for	  a	  Golden	  Age	  of	  Gas'.	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constant	   from	   TIAM	   reference	   scenario,	   which	   can	   be	   considered	   similar	   to	   the	  Current	  Policies	  case	  of	  WEO-­‐2011	  (it	  does	  not	  account	  for	  future	  policies).	  
• The	  IEA	  does	  not	  directly	  model	  the	  impact	  of	  different	  degrees	  of	  adherence	  to	  the	  Golden	   Rules.	   Rather,	   the	   report	   assumes	   that	   a	   lack	   of	   supportive	   policies	   (e.g.	  failure	   to	  abide	  by	   the	   ‘golden	   rules’)	   translates	   into	   less	   recoverable	  gas	   reserves	  than	  in	  the	  GR	  case.	  They	  also	  assume	  that	  the	  rate	  of	  increase	  in	  production	  costs	  is	  higher	   in	   the	   Low	   Unconventional	   case	   than	   in	   the	   GR	   case.	   Thus,	   the	   two	   main	  variables	  are	  the	  size	  of	  the	  recoverable	  reserves	  and	  their	  production	  costs,	  which	  are	   varied	   to	   reflect	   hypothetical	   adoption	   of	   these	   rules.	   GDP	   assumptions	   were	  updated	  from	  the	  baseline	  WEO-­‐2011	  case	  and	  applied	  to	  both	  the	  LU	  and	  GR	  case.	  Gas	  price	  assumptions	  are	  exogenous;	  the	  IEA	  assumes	  that	  the	  gas	  price	  in	  the	  Low	  Unconventional	   case	   is	  15-­‐30%	  higher	   than	   in	   the	  Golden	  Rules	  case,	  with	  a	  more	  rapid	   rate	   of	   increase	   over	   time.	   All	   other	   assumptions	   remain	   constant	   from	   the	  New	  Policies	  Scenario	  of	  WEO-­‐2011,	  which	  takes	  into	  account	  policies	  and	  declared	  future	  intentions	  as	  of	  mid-­‐2011	  (e.g.	  national	  pledges	  to	  reduce	  GHG	  emissions	  and	  phase	  out	  subsidies4).	  	  	  
Key	  Assumptions	   JRC	   IEA	  
Recoverable	  Reserves	  (tcm)	   	   	  
Conventional	  gas	   403	   421	  
Shale	  gas	   149-­‐417	   30-­‐208	  
Production	  Cost	  ($/Mbtu)	   low/best/high	   	  
USA	  (Shale)	   4	  -­‐	  6.5	  -­‐	  19	   3-­‐7	  
EUROPE	  (Shale)	   4.4	  -­‐	  7	  -­‐	  21	   5-­‐10	  
Avg.	  Annual	  Global	  GDP	  growth,	  %	  (2012-­‐35)	   2.7-­‐3.7	   3.5	  	  
Results	  Due	  to	  the	  different	  assumptions	  used	  in	  the	  two	  analyses,	  the	  results	  can	  be	  compared	  only	  broadly.	  However,	  the	  tables	  below	  show	  similarities	  in	  terms	  of	  some	  key	  results.	  	  
Key	  Results	  
(Low/High	  Unconv.	  Gas)	  
JRC	  (2035)	   IEA	  (2035)	  
Total	  Gas	  Demand	   4.9	  /	  5.6	  tcm	   4.6	  /	  5.1	  tcm	  
Unconv.	  Gas	  Production	   1	  /	  2.1	  tcm	   0.6	  /	  1.6	  tcm	  
UG-­‐USA	   500	  /	  940	  bcm	   274	  /	  580	  bcm	  
UG-­‐China	   170	  /	  350	  bcm	   112	  /	  391	  bcm	  	  
Key	  Results	   JRC	  (2035)	   IEA	  (2035)	  
Total	  gas	  trade	  -­‐	  High	  vs	  Low	  UG	   -­‐11%	   -­‐23%	  
Europe	  import	  dependency	  -­‐	  High	  vs	  Low	  UG	   57%	  /	  72%	   59%	  /	  n/a	  
EU	  gas	  import	  (Low-­‐High	  UG)	   430	  /	  470	  bcm	   	  
Electr.	  prod.	  from	  nat.	  gas	  (TWh)	   6	  144	  /	  7,966	   7	  100	  /	  8,780	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  IEA	  report	  does	  not	  explicitly	  or	  systematically	  present	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  assumptions	  are	  used	  in	  the	  model.	  Therefore,	  the	  methods	  used	  to	  model	  the	  assumptions	  can	  only	  be	  inferred.	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Further	  significant	  results	  are	  the	  following:	  
• A	   consistent	   significant	   result	   is	   the	   impact	   on	   gas	   prices	   of	  more	   unconventional	  gas.	   The	   JRC	   model	   results	   are	   similar	   to	   the	   IEA’s	   exogenous	   assumptions:	   the	  optimistic	   shale	  gas	   case	  assumes	  a	   reduction	  of	  gas	  price	  between	  20%	  (Europe)	  and	  30%	  (USA)	  in	  the	  IEA	  report,	  while	  the	  JRC	  report	  analysis	  estimates	  a	  reduction	  between	  15%	  (Europe)	  and	  25%	  (USA).	  	  
• Both	  studies	  agree	  that	  the	  best	  case	  scenario	  for	  shale	  gas	  development	  in	  Europe	  is	  one	  in	  which	  declining	  conventional	  production	  can	  be	  replaced	  by	  unconventional	  gas,	  with	  import	  dependence	  maintained	  at	  a	  level	  around	  60%.	  	  
• A	   result	   consistent	   across	   the	   two	   studies	   is	   that	   greater	   unconventional	   gas	   has	  only	  a	  slight	  impact	  on	  renewable	  energy.	  
• The	   specific	   JRC	   analysis	   on	   the	   potential	   impact	   of	   a	   carbon	   constrained	   world	  shows	  that	  strict	  CO2	  targets	  do	  not	  preclude	  a	  significant	  growth	  in	  natural	  gas	  use.
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